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Abstract of Reading Plato's Hippias Mhior:Introduction of a methodology 
for reading Plato's dialogues and Analysis of the Hippias Minor (a thesis for 
M.Litt., 1995) 
This work presents a reading of the whole and parts of Plato's Hippias Minor, 
independently of his other dialogues, on the premise that we cannot legitimately 
reduce Plato's characters' speech in a dialogue to his indirect speech. Hence the 
crux is analysis of Plato's interlocutors' interplay, but not his thought or Socrates' 
doctrine. The Hippias Minor properly provokes in readers intertwined 
paradoxical questions centred on two conversational conclusions: 'All and only 
false men are true' and 'Al l and only those are good who do injustice as they 
wish to'. In reply to Socrates' fishing question in Homeric context, Hippieis, 
shackled by his boast of polymathy, allows the possibility of deceit as achieve-
ment, despite his persistence in the usual dispositional sense of honesty. This 
unanalysed idea of Hippias' and Socrates' rhetoric invites Hippias' pubUc 
downfall. He is forced to accept the first conclusion by his commitment to the 
commissive sense of 'speaking falsely' and the reciprocity of abihty with 
actuality. Led mto a respondent's role agam by Socrates' long ex post facto 
speeches, Hippias resists Socrates' push towards the moral implication of the 
first conclusion: the preferability of those who do injustice as they wish to. 
Socrates rhetorically pushes Hippias to the preferabihty by a circumveniive 
arrangement of analogical topics and, further, by a trilemma argument on the 
assumption that justice is an ability and/or a knowledge. Each time Hippias 
aflSrms the propositions embodied in Socrates' questions, but he rootedly rejects 
the preferability. Socrates does not necessarily commit himself to the crafl-
analogy and justice as a knowledge, but, finally, questionmg the existence of 
those doing justice as they wish to, scuttles the tnlemma argument. Socrates' 
impUcation by this question is irreconcilable with his preceding presuppositions, 
but he suggests Hippias' inconsistency in his commitment to justice in an 
achievement sense. 
The material contained in this thesis has not 
been submitted for any previous degree in 
any academic institution. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the 
author. No quotation from it should be pub-
lished without his prior written consent and 
information derived from it should be ac-
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I 
Note on References and Abbreviations 
I use the follo^^'ing abbre^-iations for ancient authors and works on the basis 
of those listed in Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon. 
5 Plato, Alcibiades I = Ale. I 
\d.. Apologia = Ap. 
id., Ch ami ides = Chrm. 
id.,Crat}'lus - Cra. 
id., Crito = Cri. 
10 id.,Epistulae = Epi. 
id., Eiithydenms = Euthd. 
id., Eiithyphro = Eiithphr. 
id., Gorgias = Grg. 
id., Hippias Major = HpMa. 
15 id., Hippias A finor = HpMi. 
id.. Ion = Ion 
id., Laches = La. 
id., Leges = Lg. 
id.. Lysis = Ly. 
20 id., Mem = Mn. 
id.,Me?iexemis = Mx. 
\d.,Phaedo = Phd. 
id., Phaednis = Phdr. 
id., Po/i/ictis = Pit. 
id., Protagoras = Prt. 
id.,Respiiblica = Rp. 
id., Sophista = Sph. 
5 id., Symposion = Snip. 
id., Theaetetits = Tht. 
Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea = EN 
id., Ethica Eudemia = EE 
id.,Physica- Ph. 
10 id., His tori a Aiiimalium = HA 
id.. Problemata = Pr. 
id., de Partibtts Ammaliiim = PA 
id.,Metaphysica =Metaph. 
id., Topica = Top. 
15 Aristophanes = Ar. 
Homer, Iliad = //. 
id., Odyssey = Od. 
Xenophon = Xen. 
Thucydides = Th. 
20 Demosthenes = Dem. 
Aeschylus = Aeschy. 
Euripides = Eur. 
Sophocles = Soph. 
I l l 
By LSJ, I refer to Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edition 
revised by Jones and McKenzie. 
I refer to Plato's works by the pages and sections of the edition of Stephanus, 
Henri Etienne, Paris, 1578. The following numbers are the lines of Bumet's 
5 edition (Platonis Opera, 5 vols., Oxford, 1903-1907). I refer to Aristotle's works 
by using the pagination of Bekker's edition (Tmmanuel Bekker, Aristotelis 
Opera, 5 vols, Berlin, 1830-1871). Other ancient works are referred to according 
to the Oxford Classical Texts. 
Modem books and essays are normally referred to by their author's name and 
10 . the date of publication of the first edition, i f no other specific edition is 
significant, to indicate the chronological order of the related studies. Full 
publication data of cited works that I have used are given in the bibliography. 
I refer to Professor Stokes' oral and marsinal comments onlv bv his name in 
some endnotes. In our tutorials about mv earlier versions of this work, he verv-
15 , often said that he was making not assertions but questions about my work. Even 
in his marginalia on his copy of my earlier drafts, he often did not forget to 
indicate by punctuation that he was asking about my passage or his own 
reading. Hence, exactly speaking, in that case, I should refer not to his 
suggestion but to his question; for he did not commit himself to my opinion. So 
20 by his name only I refer to his proposition embodied in his question and I do 
thus in order to indicate that my idea concerned did not come right \^'ithout his 
speech or marginalia on my work. 
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Introduction: the Objective of this Work 
This work aims at presenting a reading of Plato's Hippias Minor as a whole, 
by putting into practice a justifiable method of reading Plato's dialogues. I will 
consider a methodological approach in the first chapter, and apply its results to 
the Hippias Minor in the second chapter. I wish my readers to trace each step 
of a general hypothesis and its application. 
I Avill, in a general introduction, make the outline of my work clear, reser\'ing 
my particular supporting arguments for their pertinent sections in the main part. 
The range of this work does not go beyond reading a text. I do not refer to 
Plato's biography or the synopsis of Plato's coipus. This restriction is entailed by 
my answer to the question how we can legitimately approach Plato's dialogues. 
'Reading' is used equivocally in ordinary language and the matter theoretically 
has not been fully analysed. I attempt to evaluate different recursive and 
15 reasoned readings of my own and others' and choose one according to the 
relevancy to the whole and parts of a text. 
To present a reasoned reading of a given text, we have to ask what statements 
we can legitimately make about it. My answer concerning reading Plato is that 
I do not pursue reduction of Plato's 'inexplicitly fictional' dialogues to his 
!o indirect speech as organised assertions but take them as fictions. 
My general premise is that interlocutors exchange a given expression m a real 
conversation but not necessarily the same value of the expression in the same 
conceptual scheme. The premise is theoretically open to question; it requires 
2 
investigation of a propositional act to be established. However, I lea\'e it open 
in this work. 
Following this premise, I maintain that in a written work in dialogue form, 
readers are prima facie given an interactive exchange between interlocutors. 
5 Therefore, in a dialogue of Plato, readers are prima facie given an interactive 
exchange between interlocutors but not Plato's speech directed to us. What 
Plato's readers can do first is to anah'se the given interactive exchange. 
Taking the author's point of ^^ew, we may legitimately ask what literary-
conventions Plato a\'ailed himself of But I only provisionally regard Plato's work 
10 as an inexplicit fiction until we have acquired some established notion of 
Socratic writings by the historical investigation of Socratic writings as a literary-
convention. Rather my attempt is to ask what readers can do with a given form 
of a text. 
My contention entails, first, that readers are given an interactive exchange, 
15 irrespective of the author's indirect intention, although a given text by Plato is 
not a literal script of a real con\'ersation but a script of what Plato conceived. 
Plato governs and permeates the whole conversation and every expression 
exchanged bet\\'een his interlocutors. Nevertheless, the expressions m a dialogue 
as Plato represents them appear to readers prima facie to be exchanged under the 
20 interlocutors' interplay. 
Further, my premise implies that we cannot decide whether Plato, who 
probably also circulated the whole to his contemporary readers, supported or 
resisted any belief his interlocutors hold or represented any interlocutor's speech 
— not without considering other dialogues. 
In sum, we cannot approach Plato's indirect speech, i f any, through his 
portrayal of conversations until we have a notion of Socratic writings. The 
reason is that we cannot decide how and in which particular passage of a 
5 dialogue Plato transformed his own speech in his real context into his interlocu-
tors' speech in his 'fictional' context. 
A positive result is that instead of rounding off a 'wiry'' conversation, we 
analj'se the functions of ambiguities and fallacies in a given conversation. 
Whether or not Plato instills any such deficiencies into what he conceives as 
10 proceeding in a conversation, any exchange prima facie appears to readers to be 
liable to personal divergence in communication. Although the same public 
circulating expression is exchanged, personal divergence as well as impersonal 
isomorphising force in encoding and decoding systems is a necessary accom-
paniment in communication. My task is to describe such interplay in a dramatic 
15 conversation; Plato's interlocutors' intentional deficiencies and conscious 
negligence are, though, to be distinguished or identified so far as possible. 
Generally speaking, my method follows the interpretive assumptions, 
suggested by Stokes' and reformulated by me, as follows: (1) reading Plato's 
dialogues in the first place independently but not interdependently; (2) reading 
20 a whole of a particular dialogue, but not a part, whether the part may be 
categorised as 'philosophical' or 'literary'; (3) exploring the contextual relation-
ship between the parts and the M'hole. Accordingly, my position is irreconcilable 
with the working hypotheses, suggested by Kraut\ and Irwin'' and reformulated 
4 
by me, as follows: (1) Socrates' remarks in Plato's dialogues are the full or open 
expression of Plato's philosophy (or the historical Socrates'); (2) Plato uses 
dialogue form as a device to give his (or the historical Socrates') real opinion; 
(3) we have historical e\ddence on Plato's intention in his philosophy (or the 
5 historical Socrates'), especially, Aristotle's e\'idence ;^ (4) therefore, by interpreting 
Plato's main interlocutor's intention in his speech according to Aristotle's 
evidence on Plato's intention, we can deduce from a particular passage in Plato's 
dialogues what Plato (or the historical Socrates) believes and why. 
Plato's Socrates' speeches before and after his question about a proposition are 
10 so treacherous in respect of his commitment to the proposition embodied in his 
question that Plato's text has given some grovmd for the attempt to reduce Plato's 
dialogues to Plato's direct speeches through Socrates' direct or indirect assertions. 
Lastly, I refer to my reason for choosing the Hippias Minor. First, I think it 
worth tr}'ing to apply the method to the Hippias Minor, to which it has not yet 
15 been applied*. Secondly, while the Socrates's in the Apology, Crito, and Gorgias 
clearly are taken by their interlocutors to argue for some positive beliefs, the 
Socrates in the Hippias Minor seems murky. Therefore, it is still significant to 
present a reading of the whole and parts of the Hippias Minor independently of 
the Socrates's in other dialogues. 
I. On the Method of Reading Plato's Dialogues 
How can we approach Plato? When we read the dialogues, we talk much 
about Plato. However, how can we legitimately make statements about Plato? 
5 What did Plato intend to say? If we assume that Plato was expressing his own 
philosophising in writing dialogues, how should we understand his dialogues? 
How can we answer these questions? First, let me roughly portray a methodo-
logical situation and, then, argue about a specific problem of reducing Plato's 
dialogues to his arguments. 
10 How far can we reconstruct Plato's historical life, setting aside his writings? 
Plato would have done other things besides writing dialogues, such as ordinary 
conversations^ with his friends or lectures, i f he gave more than one .^ However, 
we can get little on the whole'. 
Then, what can we know about Plato-^from his writings? The dialogues give 
15 us few autobiographical events. The Seventh Letter tells us some but its 
authenticity is controversial. Unfavourably, if we admitted the view in the letter 
that he wrote nothing serious m his writings'", all we obtain fi-om his dialogues 
are nothing but rich and 'laboured'jokes, although they are better than nothing. 
Then, how else can we approach Plato in his dialogues? How can we know 
20 what Plato intended to say indirectly in writing dialogues by using a literary 
convention? If we had been familiar with his ordinary discourses, we could have 
presumed, when we read his dialogue and found his voice in his character's lines, 
that it is just in this passage that Plato instilled his ordinary speech. Even so, he 
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gave no authorised key to transform his dialogues to his speech. Then, how can 
we know what Plato was thinking just when he was writing this or that passage 
in his dialogue?" Plato might have been thinking his characterisation of his 
dramatis personae and the whole process of the dramatic conversation, but how 
can we know what .Plato was thinking indirectly from what his character is saying? 
The situation is like this. A composer composes a piece of music and for its 
premiere, he asks a conductor to interpret it through his written score, which will 
be copied and continue to circulate. He gives the conductor many instructions 
on how to represent the score. The conductor learns how to supply what the 
composer did not fully express in notation. Then, is the conductor privileged to 
interpret the score according to the composer's intention? Is even the composer 
privileged to represent its final form? 
In such a situation, we face interpretative problems such as a relation between 
an author's work and his or her intention in writing it or that between the 
background and the foreground of a work. However, I believe that we still have 
to consider the methodological questions of reading Plato's dialogues. We have 
already unreflectively introduced interpretive assumptions, including philologi-
cal ones, in reading a text. 
For example, when we turn over any leaf of Platonic studies, while we are 
shown scholarly references to a particular passage of Plato's dialogues, we are 
sometimes embarrassed that we do not easily understand on what interpretive 
assumptions a particular statement about Plato or Socrates is made in respect of 
the quoted passage. We are not told the method of reading or the established 
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consensus of stating something about Plato. Nevertheless, my trivialism claims 
that i f we quote a particular passage of Plato's dialogues out of context to 
support our statement about Socrates and Plato, we need to make traceable how 
we deduce the statement concemed from the passage. The above-mentioned 
expository style motivates us to ask methodological questions for fear of 
illegitimately getting into tacit interpretive habits. 
As to preceding methods of reading Plato's dialogues, there have been 
rivalling and sometimes irreconcilable assumptions. Although not ever)' writer 
makes explicit his assumptions m reading Plato's dialogues, when Plato or 
Socrates are mentioned in respect of their belief, doctrine, philosophy, or ethics, 
there seems, according to careful interpreters' remarks'^, no established 
consensus, but only working hypotheses to be evaluated by the criterion of their 
fiiiitfulness. 
Then, can we methodologically assume that any working hypothesis on 
reading Plato's dialogues can be evaluated only by evaluating its results? Can 
we not put its legitimacy into question, considering Plato's dialogues? 
When modem interpreters deal with a dialogue, some tend to reduce it to 
something other than itself, such as his predetermined philosophical system, his 
philosophical development, his anti-dogmatic investigation, his philosophical 
discontinuity or unity, his autobiography, his biography of Socrates, his genius, 
his psychology, the socio-economical conditions in his life, and so on; some 
maintain that we can deduce nothing about Plato's thoughts from his dialogues. 
According to Tigerstedt and Bowen''', modem studies on Plato alternate between 
8 
such reductionism and skepticism. 
As Bowen argues''*, the claim of deducing anything but the portrayed 
conversations is methodologically illegitimate in that Plato has no position in 
dialogue form. Truly we can formulate the question 'What did Plato believe?' 
meaningfully, and probably Plato believed something when he wrote his 
dialogues. But how can we deduce Plato's belief from his dialogues? From his 
main character's beliefs? 
Kraut denies that it is an a priori truth that a dialogue is not a treatise". He 
urges that Plato used a dialogue form to express his own views, in contrast to 
Greek tragedians and comedians whose objective was to express what satisfied 
their audience'*. Orators also might not necessarily have proposed their moral 
beliefs in their existing writings, but they must sometimes have appealed to the 
•audience's moral beliefs'^. However, how can we legitimately assume that 
Plato's Socratic writings were politically and culturally independent of ancient 
readership and censorship, psychological or not? 
Kraut claims the truth of the hypothesis that Plato uses his main character to 
support his reasoned -views and that he does not intentionally instill ambiguities 
and fallacies'^. However, it is unclear to what extent this can explain Plato's 
representation of an interplay between Socrates and his adversary. 
Irwin admits the following premises: (1) Plato took no role in the dialogues; 
(2) it is possible that Plato did not support the content". However, he also denies 
that writmg a dialogue is not writing a treatise'" and defends on the historical 
data the view that Plato did not invoke any established literary convention but 
used a dialogue form for 'presenting his own philosophical \aews'''. He 
maintains that Aristotle gives reliable evidence on Plato's intended expression 
of his own views in the dialogues"'. 
However, Aristotle gave no substantial analysis of Plato's dialogues. It is still 
doubtful whether there is any reliable instruction for transforming Plato's 
s k dialogues into treatis^( 
As to the reduction of Plato's act in writing the dialogues to Plato's direct 
speech, apart from the cultural significance of the constellation of ancient 
philosophical writings and Socratic writings, we can easily imagine, i f we take 
the point of •view of an addresser in communication, that Plato could have 
fictionalised his own beliefs into a variety of literary forms. However, when we 
are given a dialogue form of text, how can we readers deduce from the dialogues 
the views of a person absent from the scene or of an author who govems an 
exchange between interlocutors characterised by himself? 
Reductionists tend to assume (a) that Plato used his main character, Socrates, 
as his mouthpiece and (b) that his Socrates performs assertions directly or 
indirectly^. Howex'er, his Socrates unfavourably often disavows knowledge and 
performs question directly or indirectly'^ in a controversial context of an 
elenchus"^ Nevertheless, reductionists such as Santas'*, Kraut, Irwin, Vlastos", 
and Penner'^ , apart from differences in detail, deduce Socrates' positive beliefs 
from Socrates' questions, whether or not justified by Socrates' commitment to the 
propositions embodied in his questions, and Plato's beliefs from Socrates'"''. 
On Socrates' disavowal of knowledge of the issue in the conversation, they 
10 
take it at face value and yet, for the reason that an unexamined belief is, 
according to Socrates' standard, not knowledge^", they interpret that his 
disavowal is not incompatible with his positive beliefs. 
According to this interpretation, Socrates does not know the issue concemed; 
5 then, he asks a question because he wants to know his interlocutor's answer to 
his question about the issue, and he secures his interlocutor's agreement to his 
belief as a proposition embodied in his question. 
Asking about a proposition is compatible with believing it'" but also with not 
believing it. How can we know Socrates' belief from Socrates' question? • 
10 Some working hypotheses are: Aristotle's evidence on Socrates' and Plato's 
philosophy (Irwin^^); Socrates' asking context in which he knows the answer to 
the question (Santas '^'); Socrates'justification in his denial of his interlocutor's 
initial belief as well as the inconsistency of a set of beliefs which his interlocutor 
holds (Vlastos^''); Socrates' hints to solve conflicting beliefs (Penner^ )^. As to 
15 this issue. Kraut does not deduce Socrates' belief; rather, he assumes that 
Socrates holds positive beliefs^*. 
Stokes cuts his way into interpretive reductionism by noting that there is no 
punctuation to signal assertion or question in Plato's original text and that the 
grammatical form of a given sentence should be critically decided''^ . He indicates 
20 that either Plato's Socrates' introducing a grammatically interrogative signal or 
Socrates' disavowal of knowledge and questioning stance is a proof that Socrates 
asks a question^ .^ He admits that Socrates may or may not believe the proposi-
tion embodied in his question '^, which is one reductionist premise, but urges that. 
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insofar as asking is not asserting, Socrates does not commit himself to the 
proposition''" Put another way, in asking, Socrates neither supports nor objects 
to the proposition embodied'" or, possibly, he might not endorse even the 
presuppositions of his question. 
Stokes' main point is that for interpreters, it is indeterminable from the 
situations inside the conversation, in which questions Socrates instills his 
opinion''". Moreover, instead of seeking how to dig out Socrates' or Plato's belief, 
he indicates that Socrates sometimes reformulates what he understands his 
interlocutor believes, in referring to his interlocutor's speech act, by what Stokes 
calls a diagnostic tagged question such as 'Do you say that ...?'''•'. Further, he 
suggests that Socrates does this not only in his question but also in his assertive 
sentences'**. According to Stokes on Socrates' intention in introducing of 
interrogative or assertive forms, Socrates explicitly or implicitly reformulates his 
interlocutor's beliefs or seeks to establish them. Therefore, although Stokes 
admits that Plato's Socrates sometimes performs assertions, he maintains that 
the main point of a dialogue is not that Socrates expounds his opinion but that 
Socrates' interlocutor is compelled by his own previous admissions and 
character to accept the proposition embodied in Socrates' question''^ 
Against Stokes' general proposal''*, Kidd, regarding it as etiolation of 
Socrates' questions, gives priority to Plato's governance of his fictionally 
portrayed exchange rather than to what is going on between dramatic interlocu-
tors'* .^ His intention is to make Plato's philosophising deducible, but his 
argument for promoting only Socrates' initiative is not valid because interpreters 
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cannot assume that Plato originates only Socrates' speeches'*^ . However, his 
proposal implies that we should remove from the dramatic exchange the 
interlocutors' different understanding of the same exchanged expression, 
although dramatically and communicatively an exchange goes on under 
interaction. His position prevents this interpretively hazardous point by giving 
priority to Plato's governance; Apart from his commitment to this implication, 
his view suggests that we can see Plato carrying on an argument unhazardously. 
Further, if Stokes means by 'a Socratic conclusion''" or 'Socratic tenets'^ " what 
readers recognise Plato's Socrates professes in a dialogue independently of his 
other dialogues, Taylor has the right to argue that Plato's Socrates attempts not 
only to show that his interlocutor is compelled by his admissions to commit self-
contradiction but also to argue for his beliefs^^. 
Certainly, while one cannot commit oneself to the proposition in one's 
question, one can believ'e it; flirther, Plato's Socrates' interlocutors sometimes not 
ought to but can take Socrates to profess his belief in advance of his questioning 
or to have believed the proposition in his preceding question. However, even i f 
Plato's Socrates always fishes out his interlocutor's initial assertion and, then, 
without making explicit his non-commitment, asks whether his interlocutor 
agrees to his beliefs, his inferential rules, and his conclusion inferred from them 
and contradictory to his interlocutor's initial assertion, could readers say that 
Socrates argues for his beliefs? I f Socrates' interlocutor always consciously 
understands the propositions embodied in Socrates' questions as Socrates 
expected him to understand them according to the same system of beliefs as 
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Socrates holds and if he always agrees to the propositions, he can take Socrates 
not only to make public his self-contradiction but also to have argued for 
Socrates' belief by his answers. However, it is still open to question whether 
Socrates' interlocutor always understands the propositions embodied in Socrates' 
questions as Socrates expected him to understand them, and always agrees to the 
propositions^ ,^ even in a didactic context in which Socrates' interlocutor is ready 
to correct his previous wrong answer". Thus it is still open to question for the 
interlocutor whether Socrates argiies for his beliefs^''. Contrariwise, whether or 
not Socrates always instills his opinion into his question inexplicitly to ask 
whether his interlocutor agrees to it, insofar as his interlocutor agrees not 
because Socrates believes it but because he believes it, his interlocutor is taken 
by Socrates and the audience to profess his opinion each time he responds. 
Certainly, Plato offers some motivation to deduce Plato's Socrates' and Plato's 
behefs. Plato's Socrates does not always make explicit, before and after asking 
about a proposition, his non-committal stance. He sometimes makes explicit 
what he believes before and after his question. Whether or not Socrates believes 
what he says he believes, his interlocutor often can take hhn to have introduced 
his belief into his question. 
Plato's Socrates sometimes can be taken by his interlocutor to profess that he 
is concemed with not his opinion but his interlocutor's opinion in asking a 
question"; sometimes with the proposition neutral to personal opinions^*; 
sometimes with both him and his interlocutor^'. 
Plato's Socrates someUmes can be taken by his interiocutor to profess his 
14 
opinion by some explicit indication'^. On the other hand, Plato represents an 
exchange in which one's interrogative sentence is not taken by another as a 
question^^. In questioning, Plato's Socrates sometimes can be taken by his 
interlocutor to ask a question and not to assert his opinion, with some explicit 
indication*', for example, by assuming someone's question to his interlocutor*'; 
sometimes, to assert his opinion indirectly*^, even when his interlocutor admits 
that he perfoims a question*"', and sometimes not*''; sometimes, to ask explicitly 
whether his interlocutor agrees to his opinion*^ 
Specifically, (1) when Plato's Socrates uses the first person plural pronoun in 
his question, he sometimes can be taken by his interlocutor to commit himself 
to the proposition**, although his interlocutor may be required to form his own 
judgement on the proposition embodied in Socrates' question. Then, (2) when 
Plato's Socrates deals with consequences of his questions and his interlocutor's 
answers, Socrates sometimes may be taken by his interlocutor to take upon 
himself the responsibility for the consequences*^ and sometimes not*^ . Further, 
(3) when Plato's characters use the verb ouoXoyelv and its related verbs 
ouv6oxEiv , ouu(pdva i , ouYX'^QS^'v*'. c'i)vouoA.OYslv,inthecontext 
of a direct or indirect report of an answer to a question or a response to a 
statement, (3)-(i) they can be generally taken to mean 'admit a proposition while 
one's interlocutor does not commit himself to it'^ ° or 'agree to one's interlocutor's 
opinion'^' or ambiguously either^ "; (3)-(ii)-(a) Plato's Socrates sometimes can be 
taken by the supposed audience of his indirect report to mean by these verbs 
'admit a proposition embodied in a question while a questioner does not commit 
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himself to it'^ ^ and (3)-(ii)-(b) sometimes can be taken by the supposed audience 
of his indirect report or by his interlocutor to have instilled his opinion into his 
previous questions '^', even into his previous diagnostically tagged question^^ or 
into his alternative question^*; (3)-(ii)-(c) Socrates sometimes can be taken by 
his interlocutor to be asking whether his interlocutor agrees to his opinion", 
although Socrates sometimes requires his interlocutor not to say anything 
against his interlocutor's behef'^ and (3)-(ii)-(d) sometimes can be taken by his 
interlocutor to be ready to agree to the proposition in his question by using the 
first person plural form of a verb^' and (3)-(il)-(e) sometimes Socrates' 
interlocutor can be taken by him or the audience to admit the proposition in 
Socrates' question whether Socrates believes it or not^°. 
It is, therefore, risky to generalise about Plato's Socrates' speeches in 
conversation although it is tempting to seek communicability with Plato by 
hypothesising that Plato instilled his reasoned beliefs into his Socrates' speeches 
and that his Socrates instills his and Plato's reasoned beliefs into his questions. 
It is hardly determinable how Plato instilled his opinion into the dialogue; 
neither is it necessarily a sound approach to dialogues to deduce one interlocu-
tor's statement from his interrogation and then, to deduce an author's statement 
from his. We have not yet any established notion of the literary convention Plato 
availed himself of^'; Plato gave readers no explicit marks of his intention of 
wnting fiction. Accordingly, readers must prima facie interpret a given message 
by Plato in accordance with a structure in which a hearer or reader decodes the 
message, i.e., by regarding it as a kind of quotation of which a hearer or reader 
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suspends judgement in respect of fictionality, as if it were overheard. 
If readers are given a dialogue form of writing as a kind of quotation, all the 
expressions in a script appear to them to be exchanged by the interlocutors 
concemed. Readers can read the exchanged expressions, but are not present as 
the public audience^. 
All the expressions in a fictionalised script originate from the author. They do 
not appear to readers to be addressed to them, but to be exchanged between his 
characterised interlocutors, although the author can use a narrative form in 
which the expressions appear as i f addressed to readers by a fictional character '^'. 
We must clearly distinguish a fictionalised script from a script of a real 
conversation with regard to the role of a scriptwriter '^*, but what readers can do 
with both kinds of scripts first is to analyse the expression exchanged between 
the interlocutors concemed, based on a script as an abstract from a live spoken 
language. A ficfionalising scriptwriter is not present at a real conversation and 
it is interpretively irrelevant to reconstruct the unnoted elements of a conceived 
conversation. However, the dialogue form looks like a script of an exchange. 
When readers deal with a fictional script, they do not re-present the original 
situation of a conversation, but dramatise or recreate what they interpret the 
author to conceive. 
Accordingly, my general premise of interpreting dialogues whose fictionality 
is open to question is that given expressions in a written dialogue appear to 
readers to be exchanged under conversational interacfions like those in a real 
conversation. Specifically, i f a conversafion is possible, persons get into a 
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relationship between interlocutors; a speaker issues an expression to a hearer; 
the hearer receives the same expression. However^ both do not always 
understand the same connotations of the expression, because the value of the 
same token is different according to personally divergent conceptual systems. 
Speakers presuppose the possibility of a propositional act by reference and 
predication in advance of their utterance as a condition of the possibility of their 
utterance. They presuppose the possibihty of individualising the possible 
referents by a system of generic classification and the possibility of 
characterising them by a system of descriptive differentiation. These systems are 
impersonal in advance of their utterance and work in utterance under both 
personally diversifying and impersonally isomorphising forces, but the whole of 
the elements and their relationships of a system are personally divergent in 
utterance; for even by expository exchanges, interlocutors have to elicit 
iiidefmite mutual agreements on the elements and their relationships of a system 
each possesses. What is prima facie given to readers is just a script of a 
conversation between interlocutors with personally divergent backgrounds^^ 
Readers cannot legitimately assume that Plato dramatised his central line of 
argument into a dialogue. Readers cannot assume an argument proceeding prior 
to characterised interlocutors' interactive exchange. Therefore, readers may 
assume only that it appears to each interlocutor that an interlocutor's statements 
or answers to questions lead to a conclusion. From each interiocutor's perspec-
tive, it does not necessarily follow that linguistic tokens such as words and 
sentences, are used with the same connotations. Even the logical connectives 
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such as 'and', 'not', and ' i f . . , then can be subject to the conversafional 
interaction in a dialogue. I f A may take B in a concluding stage to persuade A 
to B's belief by producing the consequence of A's admissions of propositions and 
inferential rules, A may take B to have perceived that persuasiveness. 
Therefore, on the problem about Socrates' intentional fallacy or Plato's 
consciousness of it^* interpreters should not add tacit premises to justify some 
neutral argument in a dialogue, i.e., explain away logical deficiencies, but 
interpret what each interlocutor understands to be exchanged^. 
In addition, as to general inconsistencies of the main characters' views, 
readers need not explain them away. For readers should not read the view of the 
Socrates in one dialogue into an exchange between the Socrates in another 
dialogue and his interlocutor. Even i f the Socrates in one dialogue is taken by 
one interlocutor to covnnit himself to any proposition or any presupposition in 
his question, it does not follow that the Socrates in another dialogue assumes 
that proposition or presupposition in talking with another interlocutor. 
Certainly, if we justify the claim that expressions in a dialogue are exchanged 
under personally divergent connotations as well as impersonal isomorphising 
force, we have to investigate fully the conditions of a speaker's reference and 
predication. Hence, it is still open to question how our personal divergence turns 
out to be at issue v/hen we exchange expressions with others. However, in 
respect of a method of reading Plato's dialogues, although every expression 
functions under the confrol of what Plato conceives is going on in a conversa-
tion, it is worth trying the method of reading a dialogue based on interiocutors' 
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interaction. Within these limits, we legitimately deal with a dialogue as 
interactive exchange, and my interpretive task is to recreate what Plato 
conceived as occurring in a conversation, by supplying how the interlocutors 
issue particular utterances and by analysing interlocutors' personal divergences 
in a given expression. 
Let me describe a topical problem. According to my assumptions on verbal 
activity, when one interlocutor addresses another, one's expression is uttered in 
an action realised under the control of a convention and also exchanged with the 
other. My task is to describe fully these interrelated aspects in each speech in a 
dramatic conversation. However, as the text fundamentally lacks full informa-
tion about an interlocutor's implicit intention, we have to reason out the contextual 
consistency, and still more, different kinds of indeterminable elements in the 
interlocutors' interaction. We have to deal with such a scene as an open context 
or frankly admit the ambiguity of the text. 
Specifically, we have to note three types of discourses in analysing dramatic 
conversation. First, we deal with a sentence as an open unit whose function is 
to be determined by the context of parts and the whole, hi this stage, we can 
interpret that one interlocutor says this and that, but how can we answer 
questions about interlocutors' intentions or about the responsibility the interlocu-
tor takes in making a speech or what the other interlocutor understands of it? 
Certainly, the interlocutor mtends to do something in saying this or that under 
a certain mle which controls a mutual relationship formed on the basis of mutual 
recognition of personality, and we can conjecture the rule determining the 
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interlocutor's intention in saying something, but can we decide that the interlocu-
tor understands so? This is the problem even within a method of reading 
independently of other dialogues or reports. 
For example, i f we read some interrogative form of sentence in Socrates' 
speech, do we have the right to state that Socrates is questioning? It is not self-
evident that because Socrates is grammatically using an interrogative form of 
sentence, he has an intention to ask a question. He might intend to do something 
in accordance with the way that his speech tfpe ordinarily fimctions in his 
company, or he might take advantage of the ftinction to do something else. 
Then, how should we describe the interaction in each speech? The key to the 
problem on one interlocutor's intention and responsibility for a rule which the 
interiocutor's action follows is the relationship with the other interlocutor. If we 
find the other's response to the first interlocutor, we have a right to read that the 
first interlocutor's speech fijnctions as a certain speech act as the other judges 
fi-om his knowledge of the language, and also that the first interlocutor appears 
to the other to take responsibility for the speech. Therefore, we can describe the 
interaction Q"om the mterlocutors' mutual standpoints. We need at this stage to 
determine the function of an interlocutor's speech by analysing the value of the 
other interlocutor's response to the speech. Provisionally, we can say of a speech 
that when the interlocutor makes it, the other's response tells us that the 
interlocutor appears to the other to be performing a certain speech act and to take 
the responsibility for the act. Inasmuch as the interlocutor does not object to the 
other's understanding, we can determine further that the interlocutor intended to 
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perfomi the speech act indicated by the other's response. 
However, the second stage of analysis involves the same problem. Can we 
decide that the other interlocutor's response to the first speech functions as 
intended? I f A says somethic^ to B, A's intention and intended speech act is not 
determinable separately from the context. I f it depends on B's intention in the 
responding speech act, we have to determine B's intention, but we are similarly 
required to determine A's intention in the next speech to determine B's. 
However, the dramatic conversation ends somewhere. Therefore, A's intention 
is open and theoretically we cannot start our plan. In a conversation, B might not 
always respond to A, or say what B understands by A's speech. Anyway, if one 
interlocutor's intention is determinable by the other's understanding of it, we are 
given no ultimate evidence. Then, is my plan impracticable? Certainly, we have 
to admit that we cannot finally answer how B understands A's intention or A's 
understanding of B's intention, but it is not the case that we have no starting 
point for analysis. Although many points are indeterminable by the context, we 
are given a script of the interlocutors' speech as the starting point. Exactly 
speaking, we cannot determine what the interlocutors intend to do in their 
speeches or what mles they understand mutually. Therefore, we should attempt 
to find the form of the speeches which best accords with the agents' intention, 
mles, and understanding of themselves .and the others. Hence, according to our 
interpretive understanding of the speeches in context, we have not only to 
consider the mutual interaction at the second stage but also, finally, to say, of the 
interlocutors, not what they are doing or what they understand but what one may 
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be taken by another to do and understand. 
For example, when we judge that Socrates is using an interrogative sentence, 
it does not immediately follow that Socrates understands that he is asking a 
question or that he intends to be asking a question. Neither does it immediately 
5 follow that Socrates appears to his interlocutor to be asking a question or to 
understand that he is asking a question, even if we judge that Socrates' interlocu-
tor is grammatically responding to a question. Therefore, given Socrates' speech 
in a grammatically interrogative form and his interlocutor's one in responsive form, 
what we have the right to say is not the description of their intentional action, 
10 namely, that Socrates is asking a question and his interlocutor is answering it. 
We have to say on our knowledge of the language that Socrates may be taken 
by his interlocutor both to be asking a question and to take responsibility for his 
speech act; and, further, Socrates may take his interlocutor to be answering what 
he regards as Socrates' question and to understand that he is responsible for his 
15 answer. Wlien we simply say that Socrates is asking a question by using a 
certain grammatical token, we must note that we are describing our interpre-
tively condensed construction of what the interlocutors are mutually taken to 
understand as their actions in using that token. 
My fundamental objective is reading a Platonic dialogue as a dramatic dialogue 
20 . by dramatic interlocutors and not reading a dialogue as, or reducing it to, Plato's 
speeches to us, whether they are his philosophy or his biography of Socrates, I 
do not propose that we should avoid all assumptions in reading dialogical 
writing. I believe, like most readers and scholars, that if we introduce no 
assumptions into our reading, whether they are systematic transforming methods 
or ordinary reading habits, we cannot read a writing. What I intend to show as 
my reading output of Plato's dialogues is not an innovation in Platonic studies 
but, maybe, just a practice of a method reflectively generated from some habit 
5 already effective in readership of literature. 
What is reading a written script of a dramatic conversation under the aspect 
of the interiocutors' interactive activities? A simple and far-reaching question is 
what we have a right to say about the text more than to copy the original. What 
can we say about unwritten things in a text? Where i s the border between things 
10 written and unwntten? The answer depends on our reading assumptions but we 
must admit that there are no absolute reading rules to inhibit readers from 
deducing an arbifrary output. The task of tenacious readers of a text is to put 
forward their reading assumptions and make traceable how a particular part is 
read on those assumptions. This would be the first step for the stage in which 
15 we publicly evaluate the relevancy of different readings to a text. 
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I I . Analysis of Plato's Hippias Minor 
1. Introductory Note on my Analysis 
My approach to the text, as shown in the preceding chapter, is not to regard 
Plato's text as a treatise as Hoerber did^^ or to hearken to Plato's voice as Grote 
assumed he could^ .^ I do not try to extract a dialectic structure neutral to 
interiocutors' interplay fi-om their prima facie exchange, as Goldschmidt does'". 
Neither do I read into the text any assumptions on Plato's intention, whether 
'philosophical' or biographical, or any of Plato's development and, then, deduce 
the output fi-om the text. Therefore, I do not assume, as Sprague" and Pohlenz^ 
do, that Plato intentionally instills fallacies into the dialogue. Nor do I assume, 
as Ovink does'', that Plato is attending to analysis of the freedom of will on the 
basis of his critical and idealistic philosophy'^ Nor do I read into the dialogue, 
with Mtiller'^ and Sciacca'*, Socrates' belief in metaphysical knowledge of 
goodness in itself which leads to a just action. Likewise, I do not attempt to 
introduce what Socrates believes into the exchange independently of what goes 
on in the dialogue, pace Penner'^  and Guthrie'^, who objects to Wilamowitz 
seeing only Socrates' mockery in the Hippias Minor ^. Thus, I do not seek for 
any philosophical result, as do Zeller'°°, Ritter'°', Apelt'°' and Fouillee'°\ who 
objects to Stallbaum's preference of seeing Plato's mockery to seeing his 
philosophy in the dialogue'""*, even if the interlocutors' exchange is woven, as 
Wilamowitz sees'°^ only by Socrates' sopliistry and mockery, neither do I defend 
Socrates' sophistry by Plato's implicit philosophy as Stallbaum does'°^ or by 
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Plato's concept of knowledge as a thing passing the test of cross-examination, 
whether sophistical or not, as Grote does'°^. Furthermore, my approach differs 
from that of Jantzen, who preconceives the conversation in the Hippias Minor 
as a discussion on ability or disposition in general or as a Platonic discourse 
necessarily developing some concept along with its opposite'"^. Neither do I 
accept Weiss'"" and Zembaty's"° reading assumption that validity of the argu-
ment can be separated from other aspects of the conversation, because I do not 
believe that I can deduce a neutral argument separately, as even Weiss needs 
subsequently 'the argument in context' to endorse the intactness of the 
argument'". As the problem of Weiss' introduction of'the argument in context' 
suggests"", we should find some criterion by which I hope that we can 
distinguish the assumptions which we make relevantly to the dramatic 
conversation from our conjecture of Plato's tacit conceptions on the dramatic 
setting. Blundell assumes that Plato explores aspects of moral and intellectual 
character by characterising the dramatic characters, Hippias, Socrates, and 
Eudicus, and by forming the argument"''. This raises the question how we can 
know Plato's intention. Further, when she refers to 'Plato's scrutiny of Homer's 
character and his own use of characterisation'"'', she tacitly assumes that she can 
reconstruct the "broader dramatic and cultural context'"^ in which Plato sets the 
conversation. Although one appreciates that she spotlights aspects other than the 
argument in the Hippias Minor, and although I agree that Hippias' commitments 
are explained by his character as represented in the dialogue, how can we project 
not arbitrarily into the dialogue a broader cultural arid dramatic context? It is 
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risky to set in the same level of discourse what is deduced firom the interlocutors' 
viewpoint and what is deduced as Plato's characterisation"*. I f we deduce fi-om 
Plato's other dialogues his interest in education and read into the dialogue the 
contrast between Socrates' educational work and the sophists', as Ritter^'^, 
5 Pohlenz"^, Friedlander^", and Jantzen'-° also do, then, we could say, with 
Blundell'-', that the introductory dialogue raises the question of education and 
literary character, however, neither Socrates nor Hippias puts forward a universal 
theme of education or literary character at 363al-365d5. Therefore, what 
questions appear to arise fi-om the dialogue depends on what she regards as 
10 Plato's view. 
Against my negative contrast to the preceding approaches, students of Plato's 
dialogues would want to ask what Socrates in the Hippias Minor means 
concerning the Socratic doctrines, 'Virtue is a knowledge' and 'No one does 
wrong as one wishes to (EKCOV)'. Whether or not these doctrines mean that all 
15 and only those are good in themselves who know goodness in itself as one and 
the only end in itself but not as an end in a specific spatio-temporal situation or 
as a means to an end established for a skill or science, does Socrates in the 
Hippias Miiior believe the doctrines m some sense and argue for them 
indirectly? Apart firom such questions of Socratic ethics, i f any, the exchange 
20 between Socrates and Hippias gives interpreters difficulty in explaining parts 
and the whole consistenth-, to say nothing of the two paradoxical conversational 
conclusions: 'All and only false men are true' (369b3-7) and 'All and only those 
who do injustice as they wish to, i f there are such, are good' (376b4-6). I will try 
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to tackle this difficulty only on the basis of the exchange m the Hippias Minor. 
This is my positive proposal. 
The interlocutors' interplay provokes intertwined paradoxical questions in 
readers. As the crucial part of Homer's lines which Hippias quoted suggests 
(365a4-bl), honesty is, commonsensically, a disposition to say what one 
believes or, as Socrates' interpretation of Achilles' behaviour in the Iliad 
indicates (370a2-d6), achieve what one tells others that one will do; deceitful-
ness is a disposition to say what one believes false or to say that one will do 
what one does not intend to do. Then, why does Hippias, suggesting this 
commonsensical idea (364e7-365b6), admit to the discussion a false man who 
tells a lie about the subject of an expertise (367a6-bl)? According to the 
commonsensical idea of honesty and deceitfulness, expertise is irrelevant to 
these dispositions, but why does Socrates come to talk about expertise (366c5-6 ; 
367d6,367e8-368al; cf. 368b2, 368d2-3, 373c9, 374a2)? When Socrates asks 
about a false man about other subjects besides arithmetic (367a6-7), does 
Hippias accept that all or some false men are occupied about any other subject 
besides arithmetic or that for any subject, there is a false man who deceives 
about it (367a8)? Why does Hippias accept the existence of a deceitful man 
occupied about the subject of an expertise (367bl)? Moreover, when Socrates 
asks whether all and only false men are true (367c7-d2, 368e2-369a2, 369b3-7), 
why does Hippias not reject the conclusion as a whole by maintaining that domg 
justice is not doing injustice (367d3, 367e6-7, 368a7, 369a3, 369b8-c2) rather 
than only deny that both Homer's Achilles and Odysseus are both false and true 
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(369c2-5; cf 369a9-bl, 369b4-7)? Further, when Socrates, saying retrospec-
tively that Homer's heroes are difficult to distinguish in respect of truth and 
falsity and the rest of goodness (369el -3), suggests that falsity is included m the 
rest of goodness, why does Hippias not object that deceitfulness is not goodness 
(370e5)? Furthermore, when Hippias clings to the preferability of those who do 
injustice as they do not wish to (a x o v t e g) to those who do injustice as they 
wish to ( e x o v T s g ) in respect of their wish to do justice (371e9-372a5), why 
does Socrates attempt to induce Hippias to commit himself to the preferability 
of the latter to the former without specifying the criterion of the preferability 
(373c7-8, 375dl-2; cf 371e4-5, 371e7-8)? And yet, while Hippias accepts the 
preferability of those who err as they wish to, probably in respect of the 
ambivalence of the ability, i.e., the ability to do well and badly, suggested only 
at 374a7-b3, in the field of expertises (373d7, 373e5, 374a3, 374a6, 374b3-4, 
374b8. 374c2, 374c4, 374e5, 375al, 375a2-3, 375a6, 375a7, 375bl, 375b2, 
375b4, 375b6, 375c3) and not in the field of crimes such as assault or fraud, 
why does Socrates repeatedly show that Hippias should properly believe the 
preferability of those who do injustice as they wish to (372e3-6, 375d5, 375d7)? 
If Socrates believes that, i f the criterion is the wish to do justice, that preferabil-
ity concerning injustice is false, why does Socrates need to restart questioning 
for Hippias to reach the conclusion of the preferability conceming injustice and 
yet do thus by asking whether justice is a knowledge and/or abilit}' rather than 
by referring to the case of crimes as Hippias' firm ground (375d8-el)? Why does 
Hippias, then, not object that neither knowledge nor ability is relevant to justice 
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(375el), although his admission of falsity as a knowledge and abilit)' (365d6-
366al) led him to his apparent self-confradiction (366a2-369b7)? ]n the final 
stage, confronting Socrates' formulations interpretable according to a dispo-
sitional sense of justice (376a6-7; 376b2-4), why does Hippias affirm the 
propositions embodied in Socrates' questions (31 Gal, 376b4)? While Socrates 
talked about Homer's Achilles' lordly scorn of speaking truly (369d5-6) and 
enumerated lying coordinately with injustice (372d4-7), why does he question, 
by using a conditional clause (e I K e g, 376b5-6), at the end of the conversation, 
the existence of a man who does injustice as he wishes to? Does this question 
of Socrates' (cf 376c2) indicate the same wavering as he mentioned (372d7-e3)? 
Does this question imply that he did not believe the presupposition of his 
previous questions about a false man (365d5-369b7) and about non-psychic or 
psychic things which err (373c6-375c6)? Is there any interpretation which can 
explain all these questions inter-relatedly and consistently? The task of my 
analysis is to try to answer all these questions. 
2. Setting 
As Eudicus' opening address to Socrates indicates, the conversation starts 
after some exchange among Hippias, Eudicus, and some audience remaining 
behind. Socrates is present at the unotTicial after-session. We are given no exact 
evidence on what precedes Eudicus' opening address. We can only construct the 
opening situation by conjecture from Eudicus' indications. Hippias finished a 
while ago his presentation which Eudicus might have sponsored and organised. 
Some of the audience, including Socrates, remain behind afterwards. Pace 
Ritter'", Wilamowitz'^ and Tairant'"'*, the number of people present, as Grote'"^ 
and Jantzen''^  indicate, is more than three as Hippias' speech at 369c7 suggests. 
Whether or not Eudicus is presiding over the after-session, some of the people 
present praised some point of it. 
3. Personal ReIation.ship 
I assume (see p. 16) that every speech in dramatic conversation is made under 
a certain significant or non-significant personal relationship. However, not every 
written token of an interlocutor's speech explicitly shows such relationship. 
Although ever)' language has some signals of a personal relationship, interlocu-
tors do not always refer to i t In ordinary speeches, we often already preconceive 
personal relationship, and so, we do not reconfirm it each time we make an 
utterance. We may regard personal relationship as background on specific 
utterances. Then, should interpreters analyse the personal relationship of 
dramatic characters and read the result in every stage of their conversation? 
Certainly, we can collect implicit and explicit elements conceming personal 
relationship from the whole work and make some judgement on mutual 
relationship among interlocutors. But suspending indications of personal 
relationship is a dramaturgy. Hence interpreters should not say that every speech 
at ever}' stage is a function of this construed mutual relationship. Provisionally, 
any token in a speech at some stage may give us a different aspect to interpret 
another preceding or subsequent stage. In other words, if we read any construed 
assumption on the mutual relationship into a certain stage, we may explain 
better what an interlocutor means or give a different value to a speech from 
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when we leave open the relationship. 
Within these limits, the personal relationship among Eudicus, Hippias, and 
Socrates can be conjectured only in their later remarks. Eudicus may be so 
acquainted with both Hippias and Socrates that he can influence them (363c4-6; 
364b9; 373a6-7; 373cl-3). Hippias may be so acquainted with Eudicus that he 
respects Eudicus' request (373c4, 363c7). Socrates has known Eudicus' father, 
Apemantus, so well that he can give his view on Homer's poetry exactly (363b 1 -
4), but it is not determinable whether Socrates is acquainted with Eudicus'". 
Socrates may have frequented the circles in which his contemporaries successfijl 
in the world (oocpo^) appeared (369d2-e2; 372a6-d3). So he heard Hippias 
speaking of his crafts and abilities at the money-changers' tables, and that so 
carefully that he can repeat the detail (368b5-el). Although he gives no evidence 
whether or not he has crossed swords with Hippias'•^, he is now present at 
Hippias' display again. 
4. Skirmish (363al-365d5) 
General analysis of 363al-365d5 
The text permits speculation about the interlocutors' conversational tactics'^'. 
It is doubtful whether Hippias takes Socrates to be earnestly concerned with 
Homer's characterisation and whetiier Hippias is straightforwardly expounding 
Homer's characterisation in order to make Socrates understand the subject-matter 
distinctively'''". Interpreters tackle what preconception Hippias holds in 
infroducing the predicate 'pohtropos' (364c6-7) and what preconception 
Socrates holds in asking whether Achilles is not created by Homer to be 
polyfropos (364e5-6) and fiirther what Hippias means by the predicate 'false' 
when infroducing it to explain 'polyfropos'. I f the interlocutors require each other 
to keep consistency with their preceding speeches in a question-and-answer bout 
about a false man in general (365d6 ff.), one interlocutor could claim that the 
other has held some specific answer to the above interpretive questions 
consistently. However, it is not necessary that as most interpreters assume''", 
Hippias holds a specific belief about a polytropos man and a false man. He 
might infroduce these predicates to take and retrieve the initiative from Socrates, 
because they are open to exposition of their descriptive conditions. Hippias takes 
Socrates to ask a conducive question about Homer's Achilles (364e5-6), but 
Socrates can ask for Hippias' usage of'polytropos' to establish Hippias' opinion 
because it has no established meaning. Crucially, although Hippias later, if he 
suspected Socrates' strategy here, could take him superficially to have tried to 
understand Hippias' opinion by asking a question''^', Hippias is shackled by his 
pubhc boast of polymathy'"'' to escaping Socrates' questions by all means. Further, 
Hippias' do\vnfall arises not, as some interpreters explained'^'', from Socrates' 
ambiguity between potentiality and actuality or between abilit}' and disposition, 
in describing a false man, but, as Blundell suggests''^ Hippias' unanalysed, 
indistinct opinions about falsity in opposition to sincerity. 
Readers can suspect that both interlocutors attempt to enact their hidden 
tactics in the conversation about literary characterisation of heroes, but it is hard 
to prove beyond their speeches that both players play their different games using 
the same cards at the same place. What we can say at most is that their later 
remarks give some sign of their hidden intentions in the opening. 
Eudicus mediates the conversation between Socrates and Hippias (363al-c6) 
Eudicus draws Socrates' attention. He may be pressed'^ * to address Socrates 
in order to leave Socrates in silence no longer'", and/or may be surprised''^ at 
the contrast of Hippias' great speech to Socrates' silence'^'. Whether or not 
Socrates has been thoughtful'''", Eudicus, presupposing that Socrates is 
performing a purposeful inaction in issuing no utterance about Hippias' 
presentation, reminds Socrates of his continued inaction. Implying a reproach, 
he encourages Socrates to lift the inaction and, specifically, to involve himself 
in the interchange among Eudicus, Hippias, and the other remaining audience 
(363a 1-3). Eudicus suggests that Socrates has not uttered so much as Hippias 
(363a 1). In referring to the quantity of Hippias' lecture, Eudicus does not expect 
Hippias to take him to suggest that Hippias' lecture was verbose, however, not 
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141 only Eudicus may be ironical''", considering his distance from Hippias' side later 
(373a9-b3, 373cl-3) but also Socrates would take his expression as ambivalent. 
Since, as Eudicus' expression 'praise together' indicates (363a2), at least one 
of those present has praised at least part of Hippias' speech, his expression 
(363a2) not only indirectly requires Socrates to keep in line, but also works to 
Hippias as an indirect praise. 
Whether or not Eudicus himself praised Hippias' presentation, he is not, apart 
from the evidence at HpMa. 286b7, a blind follower of Hippias. Translation of 
o u v e i t a i v e l v (363a2) as 'join us in praising''"*^ suggests that Eudicus is a 
follower of Hippias. However, pace some critics'''\ Eudicus does not blindly 
protect Hippias from what Hippias claims as Socrates' bad conduct in the 
conversation (373c 1-3). As Wilamowitz''*'' and Hildebrandt'"*^ interpret, neither 
would he be a Socratic, pace Jantzen'''*. It would not be cogent that Hippias is 
left alone among Socrates and his disciples', for others have praised some of 
Hippias' display (363a2) and Hippias supposes that this audience can judge his 
and Socrates' contest for interpreting Homer (369c7-8), although Socrates may 
possibly claim, by using the first person plural pronoun (364b3, 364c I ; cf 
364b9), that this audience are on his side. 
On the other hand, it is hardly determinable whether Eudicus, using a particle 
K a i (363a3) modifying the verb eXeyxei-v, means by this verb what he regards 
as Socrates' usual activity. As some critics point out'"", Eudicus' expression 
suggests Socrates' questioning. However, it does not necessarily follow that, as 
Pohlenz'"'^andBlundell'^' indicate, Eudicus means by eA-eyxeiv what Socrates 
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usually performs in making interlocutors see their self-contradiction. But, as most 
translators and critics indicate, Eudicus refers to Socrates' refutation'^". I f 
Eudicus refers to something more than Socrates' statement, pace Zeller'^' and 
Guthrie'", what does he mean by e A e y x s i v ? h i my opinion, whether or not 
Socrates in the Hippias Minor is a man who usually requires interlocutors to 
answer his questions briefly, s A . e y X e i v is not a simple speech act in which a 
speaker's intention is fulf i l led by the speaker's utterance irrespective of the 
hearer's responses. We should recognise this point in translating E A - S Y X ^ ^ ^ ^ S 
'criticise' or 'refute'. Refutation would be relative to some subjective or objective 
axiological system of beliefs. We should consider how we can both refute and 
ask others. Certainly, Eudicus may imagine that Socrates can refute some point 
of Hippias' speech by (a) just asserting that i t is wrong, possibly by explicitly 
appealing to some self-exadent truth, or (b) proving on what Socrates regards as 
true propositions and rules of valid inference, that it is wrong or (c) making 
Hippias admit that it is wrong, (c)-(i) by eliciting Hippias' agreement to what 
Socrates regards as Hippias' assumptions and logical rules and/or (c)-(ii) by 
putting an arrangement of loaded questions to Hippias. It is hardly determinable 
whether Eudicus suggests that Socrates can go by (c) beyond Socrates' 
subjective criticism in (a).or (b). It is not necessary that Eudicus takes Socrates 
to be able to refute Hippias by (c) nor to imagine that Socrates is able to do it. 
Then, in what sense does Eudicus regard iXiyx^^^ as an unordinarj' act in 
this context by 'even'? His modification fiinctions to Socrates as indicating 
intensively that Socrates should not only refer to Hippias' negatively evaluated 
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point but also ask a question to test or disprove it. But, a question to test or 
disprove what Socrates evaluates negatively is different from a question to 
understand something in Hippias' presentation. Therefore, asking about some 
negatively evaluated point is an act not reinforced by the preceding speakers and 
different from a simple critical statement. Therefore, Eudicus' modification also 
affects Hippias as an expression of Eudicus'. courtesy in that i t suggests that a 
question to disprove or tisst something wrong in Hippias' display is less 
expected'". 
Then, Eudicus justifies Socrates in even asking a question by the fact that the 
audience have the right definitely to claim (udA , iOT ' a vavx iTCoxr ioa ;ue9a ) 
to participate in philosophical activity, in the sense of general cultural'^'* and not 
reprehensible'" activity, as his distance from both ffippias. and Socrates 
indicates (363a3-5). Specifically, Eudicus' reasoning would be: (1) those 
remaining have a right to claim to participate in any cultural activity; (2) 
Socrates is one of those remaining; (3) therefore, Socrates has a right to claim 
to participate in a cultural activity; (4) asking a question to disprove or test 
something in Hippias' presentation is participating in a cultural activity; (5) 
therefore, Socrates has a right to claim to ask a question to disprove or test 
something in Hippias' presentation. 
Although Eudicus addresses Socrates directly, simultaneously he reminds 
others,, in referring emphatically to those remaining, including Hippias, in the 
first person (363a4, a5), that they claim the ability to participate in philosophical 
discourse. 
Socrates follows Eudicus' message'"(363a6), but does not specify his 
assentient intention. He does not confirm or question the right to what Eudicus 
regards as a 'philosophical' discourse, which Eudicus endorses in support of 
Socrates' involvement in the conversation (363a3-5). Neither does he make clear 
that he does not choose to praise any topics of Hippias' presentation nor that he 
chooses to ask a question to test or disprove some wrong point. Although 
Socrates eventually praises none of Hippias' presentation in his contiguous 
speech, he does not here make clear, by repeating the verb e X e y x e i v , his 
intention of following Eudicus' alternative suggestion, i.e., asking a question to 
test or disprove something in Hippias' presentation. He specifies no wrong point. 
In Hippias' presence, he does not describe his intention under the conditions 
which Eudicus specified (363al-5). Even in the following conversation with 
Hippias in Eudicus' presence, when he refers to Eudicus' opening suggestion, he 
does not show that he understood that Eudicus suggested him performing an 
eienchus to disprove some wrong point; he rephrases Eudicus' suggestion as that 
of asking a question (364b9) or his inducement to converse with Hippias 
(373a6-8), although Socrates' u s e o f S i a A s y s o d a i suggests that he may take 
Eudicus to suggest that he should hold a specific style of conversation with 
Hippias (cf 364e9) in contrast to an exchange with long speeches (373al) '" . 
However, now he only ceases to retain the inaction of issuing no utterance, he 
does not refer to his preceding inaction as negligence or thoughtfulness''^. 
Socrates indicates that he has something to say at least (363a6). In professing 
that there is something he would like to ask Hippias on what he said about • 
Homer (363a6-7), he expresses in Hippias' presence his willingness to ask 
Hippias a question, although even indirectly he has not perfoimed a question yet 
because he has not specified his interrogative formulation. He only limits the 
subject-matter to Hippias' remarks about Homer. Hence, in his opening speech, 
Socrates expresses assent to Eudicus' preceding message, but does not give a 
response directly relevant to it. Although Eudicus probably accepts Socrates' 
intention to ask a question within the limits of what he regards as a philosophi-
cal discourse, Socrates, suspending his question, shows that he is asking about 
a topic relevant to the unofficial after-session. 
Next (363bl-5), Socrates associates the subject-matter of his forthcoming 
question witl i Eudicus father's, Apemantus', view. Socrates supposes'^' that his 
topic does not directly arise fi-om Hippias' speech'*". For when Socrates (363c 1 -
3) says that many other things of all kinds have been lectured to us about poets, 
especially Homer, Socrates excludes Hippias' lecture firom the subject-matter of 
his question. However, we must, at the same time, admit the difficult}' in 
reconciling Socrates' exclusion of Hippias' lecture with his introducton' 
indication that what he would hke to ask about is Hippias' remarks about Homer 
(363a6-bl). 
Apemantus' theses as Socrates formulates them (363b2-b5) are: 
(1) Homer's Iliad is finer (Kct A. A, l o v) than his Odyssey (366b2-3); 
(2) the [Had is finer than the Odyssey to that degree to which Achilles 
is better or braver ( a i i s i v c o v ) than Odysseus (363b3-4); 
(3) the reason is that Homer created the Iliad wi th Achilles as its 
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subject'*' and the Odyssey with Odysseus as its subject (363b4-5)'". 
As Socrates recounts, Apemantus' view has an inferentially clear construction. 
Truly, it is arguable whether we can legitimately accept statements about 
imaginary characters in respect of their verifiability. However, i f we make the 
argument explicitly non-fallacious, we have to read (2) as the thesis that the 
degree to which the Iliad is fmer than the Odyssey depends on the degree of the 
superiority of one main character to the other in respect of goodness or bravery. 
Although, considering the grammatical subordinate relation, (1) cannot be 
inferred from (2) and (3) without the thesis that Achilles is better than Odysseus, 
(1) and (2) logically entail that thesis'". 
Thus Eudicus could take Socrates (363b5-cl) to ask about a tacit entaihnent 
from Apemantus' theses or the premise necessary for concluding that the Iliad 
is finer than the Odyssey. Therefore he could take Socrates to cite Apemantus' 
viev/ as a topic related to Hippias' lecture in order to accept what he regards as 
Eudicus' introduction to the conversation. At the same time, Socrates does not 
commit himself to Apemantus' theses. 
While Socrates shows that his question is concerned with Apemantus' view, 
he indirectly asks Hippias a question by referring to Hippias' willingness 
(363b5-cl). Socrates is not explicitly allowed by Hippias to ask, but by 
indicating that his question is relevant to the after-session, he indirectly claims 
the right conditioned by Hippias' willingness. For the purpose of the claim, 
while mentioning Apemantus' view, he contrasts'*"* the subject-matter of his 
question to those of Hippias' display (363c 1-3): 
40 
Socrates formulates a diagnostically tagged question'" (363b7-cl). Hence, 
pace some critics'**, Socrates shows he is asking not which hero is better but 
wUch Hippias says is better; Socrates does not show willingness to learn from 
Hippias Homer's characterjs'lnoral value. We can suspect that Socrates is not s'^' 
serious in seeking information but asks a question as a run-up, as Ovink inter-
prets'*^, and that his question is a snare to his cross-examination of Hippias' own 
thought, as Guthrie interprets'*^. But we have difficulty in proving Socrates' 
tactics here beyond what Hippias can take Socrates to be responsible for in 
formulating his question. Socrates' interrogative formulation (363b7-cl) 
indicates his concern with Hippias' personal opinion on Homer's poetry rather 
than Homer's poetry itself He does not explicitly indicate that he wants to know 
some true proposition about Homer, despite mentioning Apemantus' view of 
Homer. 
As the diagnostic tags indicate obviously, when the speaker introduces them, 
the speaker passes to the hearer the responsibility for the propositional act. 
Therefore, a speaker introducing an interrogative formulation wi th a diagnostic 
tag cannot be formally committed to the propositional act in the formulation, 
while the hearer takes responsibility for the propositional act insofar as the 
hearer admits the speaker's right of asking the question. 
Accordingly, when Socrates indirectly asks what Hippias thinks about 
Homer's Achilles and Odysseus (363b6-7), he is not committed to the 
propositional act in referring to Homer's Achilles and Odysseus and predicating 
something of them, while Hippias takes responsibility for that propositional act. 
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i f he admits Socrates' right of question. The same conditions apply to the 
propositional act in the proposition of Socrates' indirect question which of the 
heroes Hippias says is the better or the braver (363b7-cl). The relevant answers 
to Socrates' interrogative formulation wi th diagnostic tags naturally implicitly 
contain performative verbs in the first person. Therefore, we can judge formally 
that, while Socrates introduces the propositional parts, he cannot give his 
opinion in his interrogative formulation. Truly, it is puzzling to assume that 
Socrates is not concerned with the tmth-values of the propositions he introduces. 
However, what Socrates has the right to do by using uiterrogative formulations 
with diagnostic tags is not professing his own opinion or showing his interlocu-
tor's agreement but, at most, seeking Hippias' personal opinions. 
I f Socrates leaves out explicit second person performative verbs from his 
questions, his interlocutor has the right to require Socrates to admit the possibility 
of the propositional acts presupposed in his questions and even the admissibilitj' 
of the vocabulary' in the question'*'. However, even in a question without a 
diagnostic tag, generally speaking, Socrates might not expect a right answer of 
the hearer"". 
Eudicus' a A. A. a (363c4) indicates that Socrates' conditional clause in his 
indirect question is superfluous. Eudicus tells Socrates in Hippias' presence that 
evidently Hippias w i l l not refuse to answer i f Socrates asks a question. We can 
take that Eudicus means 'any question' or 'some question''^' by 'a question'. The 
reading 'any question' does not necessarily determine whether Eudicus is a 
follower of Hippias or not; Eudicus' attitude still can be ironical or appreciative. 
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He is indirectly requesting Hippias to answer Socrates because in Hippias' 
presence, he refers to Hippias' future speech act, i.e., his grudging reftisal to 
ai^swer Socrates and publicly rejects it. He thus inhibits Hippias from refiasing 
to answer Socrates' question, by reminding Hippias and the audience that he would 
seem to the audience to be grudging Socrates his answer. 
Eudicus gives Hippias a choice in introducing an alternative interrogative 
formulation'^' (363c5-6). However, considering his second alternative of 
Hippias' right of any choice, his expression does not appear to Hippias to offer 
choice, i f Hippias is proud of the so-called ability to answer any question, i.e., 
polymathy, as his following speech suggests (363c7-d4) and, thus, assumes that 
the audience know his reputation for polymathy. Rather, he appears to Hippias 
to press him to answer Socrates'". Hence his apparent offer of any choice would 
be condescending to Hippias. 
KDlppias' boast of poKinathy and Socrates' ironical extolmcnt (363c7-364b3) 
Responding after a tacit assent'^'' (363c7), Hippias takes Eudicus' preceding 
remarks as his indirect request for Hippias' answer to Socrates' question. 
Hippias, like Socrates, superficially makes no response relevant to Eudicus' 
alternative interrogative form, but actually accepts his indirect request in the 
introductory' response. Hippias understands Eudicus' request and Socrates' 
intention to ask, and, so, accepts their request. 
Hippias justifies himself also by his own reasoning: addressing Eudicus in 
Socrates' presence, he introduces his substantial response, in saying, " I would 
do awful things'" i f ....(363c7)" Those present could easily anticipate that Hippias 
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would not refuse to answer Socrates from his putting the case of his refusal in 
his conditional clause. Hence Hippias suspends their anticipation'^* with his 
description of his practical principle. 
As Socrates' reference to Hippias' display on money-changers' tables suggests 
(368b3-368el), Hippias may suppose that people gathering for his presentation 
have some ideas of Hippias' so-called successful life based on many crafts, 
abihties, and knowledge as polymathy. While Hippias accepts Eudicus' request 
and keeps the audience in suspense, he is drawing their attention to his feat at 
the Olympics and showing his practical principle in order to demonstrate his 
rhetoric'^^ and to boast of his feat (363c7-d4). 
Responding to Hippias' speech to Eudicus, Socrates expresses suspicion of 
the practicability of Hippias' principle that he never fails to answer any question 
from anyone on any display by him, ironically by eulogising Hippias (364a 1 -6). 
When Socrates refers to Hippias' state at the festival (364a 1-3), he understands 
that i f Hippias offers to make any speech he had prepared and answer any 
question on it, then, Hippias assumes that he is able to do what he offers. Socrates 
describes Hippias' state as hopeful about his soul in respect of cleverness 
(364a2-3). He does not affirm Hippias' preceding remark, but, putting Hippias' 
presupposition in the conditional clause (364a 1-3), eulogises his blessedness on 
this condition. His words suggest to Hippias that his eulogy is superficial, 
because they smack of exaggeration. Therefore, he is suggesting that he may 
suspect the practicability of Hippias' principle"^; especially as it would be 
discourteous overtly to doubt Hippias' boast'^'. 
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Further, Socrates is suggesting so in comparison with an athlete at the festival 
(364a3-6). He does not directly question the practicability of Hippias' principle 
concerning his verbal and intellectual activity; however, in expressing his 
hypothetical astonishment at the physical Olympic athlete with the same perfect 
fearlessness and confidence, he indicates that as he doubts the possibility of such 
an athlete, so he does the possibilit}' of a verbal athlete like Hippias. 
Hippias is confident in answering any question on his speech. Therefore, 
when Hippias responds in reserved tone to Socrates' exaggerated, and somewhat 
emotive, sarcasm (364a7), the audience can take Hippias to risk showing a 
ridiculous attitude in accepting Socrates' exaggerated eulogy. He puts forward 
the evidence, following Socrates' analogy to a physical athlete, that he has never 
encountered any competitor mightier since he first competed at the Olyonpics 
(364a7-9). This literally justifies his fearlessness and confidence. Against 
Socrates' sarcasm, he ostentatiously affirms that he is the mightiest competitor 
in a verbal exchange on any subject, too (eic, ouSsv)!'^" 
Whether Hippias hearkens to this critical sound or naively takes Socrates' 
eulogy at face value depends on our interpretation of Hippias' tactics. To allot 
conversational tactics only to Socrates and, as Stallbaum'^' and BlundelP" do, 
confine Hippias to a subordinate role with tactical naivete might be to 
oversimplify Hippias' role. We have to give Hippias some right of retort here. 
Against Hippias' retort reducing Socrates' sarcasm to a genuine eulog}', 
Socrates sets aside their tit-for-tat with expressions of extreme admiration. He 
sarcastically e\1ols Hippias as famed for cleverness (364bl-3). In this exchange. 
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whether or not Hippias can answer Socrates' question turns out to be the public 
test of his professed cleverness as polymathy'^'. 
I f we may glance at the overall significance of Hippias' boast of polymathy, 
on one hand, Hippias' confidence in answering any question on his display 
(363c7-d4) constitutes his practical judgement on accepting the request for his 
answer to Socrates' question, and he shows his audience that he lives up to his 
practical principle. On the other hand, his confidence (363c7-d4; 364a7-9) not 
merely causes the conversation to proceed by answering Socrates' questions but 
also shackles himself to answering any question, even when Socrates' ordering 
of questions appears to him unfair. He might ask back about Socrates' question 
at the expense of his professed polymathy. From Socrates' point of view, Hippias 
turns out not to give any appropriate answer in the conclusion of each topic 
(369b3-7; 376b8-c6), although Hippias keeps confident of answering any 
question on his display'^' (365d5; 369a6; 369c2-8; 370e5; 371a 1; 371b2; 
371d8-e3; 373b4-5; 373c4-5; 375d6; 376b7). In other words, the practicability 
of his principle begins to be tested by Socrates' questions. From the audience's 
viewpoint, whether or not Hippias fails in answering depends on the standard 
of appropriateness of question and answer, although Hippias would have to be 
able to examine the appropriateness of the question in his answer. Socrates does 
not request Hippias simply to give an answer to his question, but an answer he 
can understand. Socrates obtains from Hippias the right to repeat a question and 
understand the answer (364c8-d7). From Socrates' viewpoint, Hippias cannot 
answer properly until Socrates understands. Socrates' demand seems reasonable 
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to the normal audience, but, importantly, i f neither Hippias nor Socrates defmes 
the conditions on which Socrates understands his answer, Hippias cannot finish 
answering. At the end of the conversation, Socrates indicates that Hippias fails 
in answering Socrates' question, and that it turns out to be awful (376c4-6). 
Socrates' remark suggests that, whether or not Socrates' questioning is unfair, 
Hippias' practical principle is not practicable'^^ 
Coups d'essai (364b3-c7) 
Socrates ends their retorts about Hippias' practical principle and returns to his 
performance of direct questioning (36^b3-5). Addressing Hippias directly, he ^ \ 
reformulates his question as follows: "What do you say to us about Achilles and 
Odysseus? Wliich do you say is the better and in what respect?" Following his 
first indirect formulation (363b5-c3), Socrates shows that he is not asking about 
Achilles or Odysseus but what Hippias says about them; he asks with a diagnostic 
tag, 'you say'. 
Without immediately allowing Hippias to answer his question, Socrates 
expresses his motivation to ask (364b5-9) and, then, again d i f f e r e n t l y , t e l l 
and explain (6 iSdoKeiv)'^* to us clearly; what were you saying about those 
two men? How were you distinguishing them? (364b9-c2)" Pace Blundell '^, 
6 i6doKEiv is not always used with educational connotation (see LSJ). Rather 
Socrates uses educationally connotable words uavO 'dve iv and 6 i 6 d o K £ i v 
ironically to dissimilate a learner of something from so-called clever men, as 
Pohlenz suggests'^^ (cf 364e5, 369d4, 372c2, c6, c7, c8). Socrates admits that 
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he could not understand things which Hippias was saying in his lecture. Hence 
Hippias and the audience can take Socrates superficially to be motivated to ask 
about a point he did not understand. 
Socrates' third and final interrogative formulation (364c 1-2) makes him 
responsible for the condition that he wants to know clearly what Hippias said 
about Homer's Achilles and Odysseus, and how Hippias distinguished them. 
Socrates clearly presupposes that Hippias said something about the heroes and 
that Hippias distinguished them in some respect. 
I f Socrates, as Sprague suggests'^', were taking any steps possible to lead 
Hippias, as Socrates w i l l suggest in the ex post facto contexl; (370e2-3), to a 
conclusion like that at 369b3-7, i.e., (ID) the identity of a consistent virtue with 
its consistent opposite, then, Socrates would be taking the first step of his 
strateg}' not after Hippias' answer at 364c3-7, as she thinks"", but before it. 
Even in his opening speech (363a6-c3), he would be able to induce Hippias to' 
differentiate Homer's Achilles from his Odysseus in respect of some goodness 
in reference to Apemantus' view. Specifically, Socrates would be taking a crucial 
step here after Hippias' unsolicited boast of his polymathy in asking how 
Hippias was differentiating the two heroes (364c2), because he would be 
inducing Hippias to confirm that he differentiated the \^vo heroes, whether or 
not Hippias' display had explicitly mentioned this point. Consequently, 
whichever route Socrates would expect Hippias to take to (ID), i f he had reason 
to assume that Hippias accepts (1) that one hero has a goodness while the other 
has its opposite; (2), as she suggests'", that both goodness and its opposite are 
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logically polarised to incompatible characteristics; (3) that this opposite, an 
apparent vice, is a knowledge; (4) that the opposite is performed intentionally 
and consistently; (5) that the first goodness is the same knowledge; (6) that this 
goodness is also performed intentionally and consistently, then, Socrates could 
expect Hippias to be faced with (ID), such as a proposition that courage is 
cowardice"^. Socrates, certainly, has reason to expect that (a) however Hippias 
characterised Homer's Odysseus, he would attribute Homer's Odysseus' 
characteristic to his shrewdness (cpgovrioic;) , because of his knowledge about 
Homer (363c2-3) [(3)]; (b) he would also admit, because of his Homeric knowl-
edge, that Homer's Odysseus' shrewd character is actualised in his intentional 
performance [(4)]; (c) as Blundell points out'", Hippias would admit that any 
goodness is knowledge, because he professes to know anything (363c7-d4; 
364a7-9) and teach it too (364d3-6) [(5)]. However, how could Socrates expect 
that Hippias admit the logical polarisation of a personal characteristic [(2)] and 
its consistency [(4), (6)]? Hippias might admit this polarisation to avoid public 
self-confradiction because of his boast of polymathy (363c7-d4), i f he admitted 
the differentiation of Homer's heroes' characteristics as a logically consistent 
distinction. Further, he might admit Homeric heroes' consistent performance, 
because of what he showed as his living up to the principle (363c7-d4), i f he 
projected his principle of consistency into Homer's heroes'. Therefore, i f Hippias 
admits the superiority of Homer's Achilles to Odysseus, who is shrewd, Socrates 
could expect, to a certain extent, (d) that Hippias would accept that Homer's 
Achilles has a knowledge in respect of his goodness and, consequently, (e) that 
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Hippias would reach (ID). However, i f Hippias admitted, against ApemanUis 
(363bl-5), the superiority of Homer's Odysseus to Achilles, could Socrates 
expect Hippias' commitment to the conclusion? Socrates might succeed in 
committing Hippias to the moral ambivalence of Homer's Odysseus' shrewdness 
in contrast to Homers Achilles' naivete as moral ignorance; Hippias might 
potentially accept that even moral badness, is a knowledge, i f he were ready to 
admit logical polarisation of a personal characteristic and its consistency; 
however, Socrates could not necessarily expect Hippias to accept that Homer's 
Achilles has a knowledge in respect of his character, whether it is good or bad. 
Therefore, Sprague has reason to start her argument at 364c3-7, but, in my 
opinion, still confuses what a dramatic interlocutor can anticipate with what 
readers conceive the author can command, even i f one cannot refute another 
without intention. 
I f Hippias said nothing to distinguish the heroes, he has to question Socrates' 
presupposition (364c3) that he distinguished them. However, i f he admits 
Socrates' presupposition, he must describe the heroes' characteristics distinctively 
in order to answer Socrates' question on his display. 
Hippias is required to consider Homer's passages and form his judgement in 
order to answer With a A Ad (364c3), Hippias accepts Socrates' request for his 
answer to Socrates' third interrogative formulation at 364b9-c2. Pace Blundell'*'', 
Socrates' demand of clearness does not imply that Hippias' speech was in itself, 
or seemed to Socrates, unclear But Socrates leaves the possibility that he means 
that it was unclear''^ Accordingly, in accepting Socrates' demand of clearness, 
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Hippias, admitting Socrates' possible implication, proclaims that he is going to 
make a statement even more clearly than before. Superficially accepting 
Socrates' demand, Hippias is making a subtle retort against Socrates' possible 
imphcation'^* (364c4-5). Then, Hippias expresses his intention to propound 
thoroughly ( S i s X d ' s i v ) what he says about other heroes as well as Achilles 
and Odysseus. He makes publicly clear his intention of ansv/ering Socrates' 
question, satisfying his request. 
His answer is: "I say that Homer created Achilles the best or bravest"^ man 
among those who arrived in Troy, Nestor the wisest"*, and Odysseus the most 
polytropos. (364c4-7)" 
Apparently, Socrates can judge Hippias' answer consistent with his preceding 
remark in that he refers to another hero, Nestor, and in that he allots different 
characteristics to those three heroes, distinctively by the superlafive adjectives. 
I f he requires Hippias to distinguish the heroes clearly, he can ask for further 
exposition on what descriptive conditions Hippias claims that Homer used the 
evaluative words. I f Hippias takes him to want to leam from Hippias how 
Homer distinguished the heroes cleariy, Hippias can expect him to ask for this 
exposition. Specifically, i f he takes Hippias to mean 'the best' by d o i o x o c , he 
can ask about the descriptive conditions of goodness. On the other hand, i f he 
takes Hippias to mean 'the bravest' by this superlative, he can ask whether 
bravery is goodness. 
Further, Socrates cannot determine whether Hippias means by 'polytropos' 'the 
wiliest ' , 'the most wandering', 'the most resourceftil' or anything else. What 
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Hippias means by it depfehds on his tactics in conversation with Socrates. 
Hippias might understand, and use, this word to mean 'wily' or 'cunning'. 
Socrates and the audience may later turn out to take him to have used it thus 
here i f he keeps consistency with his exposition of this predicate by the predicate 
'false' (364e7-365b6), but his present speech gives Socrates no clue"'. 
Altematively, Hippias might mean 'resourceful' by this word here in reference 
to his subsequent admission that a false man is able to do something (365d7-8; 
cf 365a 1)'°°. Ex post facto, interpreters are inclined to require Hippias to keep 
consistency with his subsequent remark. Hence,'we may interpret that Hippias 
has to be ready to mean by this word 'deceitfiil'. But it does not necessarily 
follow that he is ready to do so. Neither does i t foUow'that Socrates can take him 
to mean 'deceitful' by 'polytropos'. He might understand that the word has no 
established meaning and use it, for example, to induce Socrates to demand fiirther 
explanation. The word exchanged may be a currency in common, but the 
interlocutors may hold different connotations and even change connotations 
according to their conversational tactics. This is practicable especially when the 
word exchanged has no estabUshed meaning. Pace BlundelP' , i t is so arguable 
•whether 'polytropos' had an established meaning that Antisthenes raised the 
question whether it was laudative or reprehensive and attempted some 
interpretation of it'°^. Therefore, neither is it decisive whether Socrates 
understands, as Mulhem and Weiss interpret""'', that TZoXvxpoTiOQ means 
'resourceful', although i f Hippias later requires Socrates to be consistent, 
Socrates might be ready to admit that he understood what the word meant. In 
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any case, Hippias' answer is still open to question in the context. 
Socrates' 'flinch' for a rollback and Hippias' 'allowance' according to his 
'professional ethic' (364c8-d6) 
Hippias' explicit performative, ' I say', (364c4) squares ridiculously with 
Socrates' demand in his interrogative formulations. Socrates responds exaggerat-
edly as i f he interrupted Hippias, who seemed about to develop supporting points 
by Homer's particular passages (364c8)^°''. Socrates does not discuss Hippias' 
answer (364c4-7), but discusses the way of their ongoing conversation (364c8-d2). 
Socrates exclaims with surprise (364c8), but, as his verbatim reference to 
Hippias' answer just after Hippias' concession indicates (364d7), not because he 
did not catch the words. Socrates makes an apparently exaggeratedly self-
humiliating entreaty, whether as a signal of missing his words or not, to make 
Hippias change his way of answering. He also leaves unspecified the substantial 
conditions of answering properly and does not clarify what in Hippias' preceding 
answer contravenes his demand. Calogero takes Socrates' entreaty as a means 
to induce Hippias to answer the question'"^ but Socrates does not show his 
hidden intention on the surface of his speech. 
Either Hippias might think he has finished answering Socrates' question as 
he professes in his practical principle (363c7-d4) or he might be ready to 
propound further'Homer's characterisation i f Socrates requests further explana-
tion. Nevertheless, Socrates suggests publicly that he claims a right to ask 
further when he does not understand things Hippias says. Hippias must 
inescapably give Socrates the right to ask again because of his boast of 
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polymathy (363c7-d4; 364a7-9).. However, once he gives Socrates the right, 
Hippias cannot predict when Socrates' questioning w i l l end; for it is not clear on 
what conditions Socrates understands things which Hippias says (364c9). 
In reply to Socrates' entreaty (364c8-d2), Hippias does not refer to or confirm 
what he understands that Socrates intends to do by using humble expressions 
(364d3). Nevertheless, reinterpreting that Socrates entreats' him to make 
allowances for asking a question again and to answer gently, he inexplicitly 
expresses his acceptance (364d3-6) in the type similar to his former acceptance 
of answering Socrates (363c7-d4), as follows: "it would be ugly and/or shameful 
( a i o x o o v ) , i f . . . " Again suspending his acceptance, he draws Socrates' and the 
audience's attention to his professional principle. Specifically, he professes, 
whatever Socrates takes him to teach, his professional principle that he teaches 
others in respect of the very thing that Socrates mentioned and deserves the fee. 
Readers can see, as Blundell does"°*, that Hippias indirectly shows off his 
moral principle in teaching and his living up to the principle (cf 363c7-d4; 
364a7-9) and that his principle is eventually indirectly tested by his responses 
as its embodiment; however, Socrates does not directly question its vahdit}'. 
As Socrates leaves unclear his substantial conditions in entreating Hippias to 
change his way of answering (364c8-d2), so does Hippias not specify how he 
makes allowances for Socrates or how he answers gently and generously. Even 
in respect of the length of an answer, Hippias' second answer (364e6-365b6) is 
evidently longer than his first (364c3-8). 
Socrates fishes out Hippias' opinion about 'polytropos' (364d7-e6) 
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Both leave vague the descriptive conditions of the evaluative 'generous' and 
'gentle', but Socrates expresses satisfaction with Hippias' attitude; for he could 
appeal to some pubUc check on Hippias' commitment to a 'generous and gentle' 
answer although Hippias leaves room for evasion. 
Returning to the substance of Hippias' answer on Homer's characterisation 
(364c4-7) and referring his preceding entreaty to Hippias' answer (y a Q r o ; ) , 
Socrates does not discuss Hippias' answer as a whole, nor refers to the truth-
value of Hippias' statements about Homer's characterisation of the three heroes. 
He says he thought that he understood that (1) Homer created Achilles the best 
or bravest and (2) Homer created Nestor the wisest (364d7-el). But he says he 
does not understand at aU (3) that Homer created Odysseus the most polytropos 
(364el-4). To understand (3), he asks whether Achilles is not created polytropos 
by Homer (364e4-6). 
Socrates does not question the soundness of the presuppositions of the 
statement type that Homer created a hero x [as] F, where 'x' is a hero and T a 
predicate. Once Socrates sought Hippias' opinion about Homer's charactensauon 
(364b9-c2; 364b3-5; 363b5-cl), Hippias can plausibly take Socrates to admit 
the possibility of making such a statement type because Socrates would 
plausibly expect him to make such a statement in relation to Apemantus' view. 
Socrates can question the justifiability of making such a statement type, but 
Hippias wotild take such an ordering of questions to be inverted because 
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Socrates would query a presupposition of his previous question which Hippias 
takes him to have admitted. Socrates can question how we can refer to a poet's 
207 intention in characterisation; for, as Blundell points out'°^. Homer gives no direct 
evidence on his characterisation and Homer is not committed to his characters' 
propositional acts about characterisation^"^. Socrates can question, especially, 
how Hippias can deduce Homer's characterisation of Achilles and Nestor by 
comparing other heroes and ranking them""', but he does not. Socrates can 
assume that Hippias made a statement about Homer's characterisation by 
applying his descriptive conditions of the predicate 'good' or 'brave' and the 
predicate 'clever' to Homer's portrayals of his heroes, but he does not confirm it. 
Further, when Socrates says in contrast to the cases of Homer's Achilles and 
Nestor that he does not understand what Hippias meant by his statement on 
Homer's Odysseus (364el-4), Hippias can legitimately take Socrates to have 
admitted the possibility of statements about Homer's characterisation and to 
have traced Homer's portrayal of Odysseus because Socrates says that he 
thought he understood Homer's characterisation of Achilles and Nestor. Therefore, 
Hippias and the audience can take for granted that Socrates admits the 
possibility of statements about Homer's characterisation. 
However, Socrates is not ready to require Hippias to check his statements 
wi th Homer's specific passages. Hence, it is not plausible that Socrates is 
querying the justifiability of statements about Homer's charactensation. 
Considering Socrates' readiness to let Homer go (365c8-dl), he may give 
priority to establishing Hippias' opinion about 'polytropos', taking advantage of 
the role of a learner of Hippias' exposition about Homer's characterisation. 
Accordingly, when he sets aside Hippias' statements about Homer's Achilles and 
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Nestor, he might only appeal to circulating literary discourse on Homer's 
characterisation and regard Hippias' answer as understandable within these 
limits' '" However, the predicate 'polytropos' has no established meaning. Hence, 
he might seek to prevent Hippias from using it ambiguously. 
It is dubious \yhether he admits Hippias' statement about Achilles and Nestor 
and whether he admits that Hippias applies the predicates 'good' or 'brave' and 
'clever' rightly. However, superficially, Hippias can leave him to say not that he 
understood Hippias' statements but that he thought that he understood them, 
because Hippias can take him to use these predicates meaningfully but not to 
understand what are Hippias' descriptive conditions of them. For Socrates 
LQtroduces derivative forms of the predicates, 'the best' (363b3-4, 363c 1, 364b4) 
and 'the wisest' (364a2, b2), which Hippias subsequently introduces; as his 
usage of the evaluative words including the predicates in question shows 
(363b2, b3, b3-4, c l , 364al, a2, b l , b4, d l , d7), Socrates recognises an 
evaluative function and a descriptive one of the evaluative words. Accordingly, 
he has reason for not asserting that he understood what Hippias was saying, and 
it does not follow that he admits that Hippias' statements are true or not. 
Socrates says he does not understand that Homer created Odysseus the most 
polytropos and asks whether Achilles is not created polytropos by Homer 
(364el-6); however, it does not follow that Socrates has some preconception of 
the predicate 'pohlropos'. Socrates takes a syntactically positive form of the 
adjective from Homer's text and introduces it into his question about Achilles 
in order to understand Hippias' descriptive conditions for it. Hippias can take 
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him to conceive Homer's portrayal of Odysseus even wi th this predicate just as 
he thought that he understood Hippias' statements about Homer's Achilles and 
Nestor, but Socrates does not necessarily hold some established idea of its 
meaning. He may ask for Hippias' usage in asking the possibility of applying the 
predicate to an object which Socrates is familiar with. Hippias may take 
Socrates' negative, possibly grammatically loaded form of interrogation to imply 
that Socrates has some preconception of the predicate, but Socrates may only be 
seeking information after his disavowal of understanding'" in saying, '[To talk 
of] Achilles, isn't he created polytropos by Homer?^'"' 
Pace Sprague"'\ there is still little reason for taking Socrates to have 
anticipated already the conclusion that all and only false men are true, apart from 
the identity of a goodness with its opposite, and to attempt to lead Hippias to the 
conclusion, whether didactically'"'' or for a true aporia"'^; specifically, there is 
no reason for taking Socrates to pretend 'not to have understood what Hippias 
meant by calling Odysseus vvily' and ask 'whether Homer did not make Achilles 
wily as weir. It is tempting but, as argued before (see p. 47 ff.) invalid to read 
all ensuing actions of Socrates into his intention here. The dramatic Socrates 
cannot predict what Hippias w i l l do next. 
Hippias characterises Homer's Achilles as simple and true and his 
Odysseus as polytropos and false (364c7-365b6) 
Hippias does not propound how he deduces his answer on Homer's 
characterisation from Homer's poetry. Socrates does not confirm Hippias' 
descriptive conditions of the predicates, 'good (or brave)' of Achilles and 'clever' 
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of Nestor. Socrates leaves the issue unresolved. On one hand, Hippias can prima 
facie take Socrates to admit Hippias' steps in deducing Homer's characterisation 
when he says he thought that he understood what Hippias said. On the other 
hand, i f Hippias assumes that Socrates has some preconception of'polytropos', 
he can take Socrates to be suggesting, in saying that he does not understand 
Hippias on Odysseus, that he cannot follow what he conceives as Hippias' 
descriptive conditions of 'polyliropos'. Socrates may seek Hippias' descriptive 
conditions of it, by confirming its predicability of 'Achilles' with whom he is 
well acquainted; nevertheless, Hippias can take Socrates to ask him to confirm 
Socrates' preconception about 'polytropos'. Specifically, Socrates may appear to 
understand Hippias' descriptive conditions and object to^'* Hippias' ranking 
Homer's Odysseus first. 
Introducing the categorically negative response, '[Not in the] least'"'^ (364e7), 
Hippias denies that Homer created Achilles polytropos. Socrates' question at 
364e5-6 possibly works to Hippias as stupid rather than trivial in that the 
proposition that Homer's Achilles is not polytropos would seem self-evident to 
Hippias''^. I f Hippias takes Socrates to ask whether Homer's Achilles is not the 
most wandering, he would have to deny the predication categorically, consider-
ing Homer's poetry'"; i f he takes Socrates to ask whether Homer's Achilles is 
not wily, his response would be the same"'°. Apart from Socrates' possible 
tactics, this works as a fishing but clarifying question""'. 
Concerning Hippias' claim of Homer's distinction, this answer indicates that 
in saying that Homer created Odysseus the most polytropos of the Greek heroes 
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at Troy, he did not imply that Homer's Achilles partakes of polytropia. On his 
usage of the superlatives in his answer, he does not make clear whether Homer 
created Achilles as partaking of cleverness, Nestor as partaking of goodness (or 
braveness) and polytropia, and Odysseus as partaking of goodness (or 
braveness) and clevemess. Nevertheless, in the subsequent conversation in the 
non-Homeric context (365d5-369b7), Hippias' answer suggests his readiness to 
predicate 'clever' of Odysseus (cf 365e9-366al), and although inaccurately and 
hesitantly, of Achilles, (cf 367c7-d3) and to predicate 'good' in the meaning of 
'good at something' of Odysseus (cf 366d3-5). Therefore, i f Hippias cannot 
explain the polysemy of his characterisation terms or the experiential gradability 
of personal characteristics, Hippias would turn out not to distinguish Homer's 
heroes so clearly as he claims at 364c3-4. 
Responding to Socrates' question on Homer's Achilles, Hippias develops new 
points on Homer's Odysseus and Achilles (364e7-365d6). Socrates may take 
Hippias apparently to base Homer's distinction on a particular passage. Hippias 
introduces four predicates to explain Homer's charactensation realised in 
particular passages. Hence, Socrates can check the explanator}' predicates, 'false' 
and 'true' with Hippias' exposition on particular passages. 
On the whole, Socrates can provisionally take Hippias to give enough 
explanation for Socrates to conceive how Hippias deduces his exposition about 
Homer's characterisation. 
(I) As to 'simple' and 'true'^"", which Hippias introduces concerning Homer's 
Achilles in opposition to 'polytropos', Socrates would easily accept that these 
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predicates are predicable of persons, and are circulated in ordinary language, 
even i f he could not easily conjecture on what descriptive conditions Hippias 
predicates them of Homer's Achilles. While 'simple' of a person implies 
sincerity, or frankness^'\ 'true' is commonly used of a statement in the truth-
value sense that Socrates introduces just before (364e3) or of things, meaning 
'genuine'. However, it is not uncommon to predicate 'true' of a person on the 
descriptive conditions that the person is performing, or tends to perform, a 
propositionally right speech act including a statement or simply, in the meaning 
of'truthful' or 'honest', as Plato's examples"'' and others in LSJ show. Therefore, 
we could suppose that the predicate 'simple', coordinated with the predicate 'true', 
of a person, gives Socrates more idea of Acliilles' character than the rare opposite 
predicate 'polytropos'. Further, Hippias might echo in the co-ordinate arrange-
ments of 'true and simple' and 'polytropos and false' the idea that the truth is 
simple and its counterpart that falsity is double, many, various or indefinite"^ 
Aldiough llie collocation 'a true man' often requires further explanation to avoid 
ambiguity, speakers can reflectively use 'true' distinctively in the meaning of 
'honest', 'frank' or 'open'. Hence, we could admit that Hippias supposes that he 
gives more specific characteristics to Homer's Achilles, and more associations 
of Homer's Achilles' character. 
( I I ) As to the controversial predicate 'false' in Hippias' argument, even the 
predicate of a person in this context would not be so strange to Socrates as we 
suppose separately from the context"*. For Hippias, first, categorically denies 
the description of Achilles by 'polytropos' and affirms the description by 'true' 
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and 'simple', although leaving the responsibility for the predication ambiguous. 
As 'false' is in circulation used of a belief or a statement or of a thing in 
opposition to 'true', Socrates would easily associate some opposition with the 
relation between these two predicates. Further, Hippias illustrates the descriptive 
conditions of the predicates wi th Homer's passage. Although Hippias does not 
make clear the relation between 'simple' and 'true' and between 'polytropos' and 
'false', in arranging a couple of predicates coordinately, it would not be difficult 
to associate those four predicates of persons with some circulating ideas of 
personal character such as sincerity. 
(ni) As to Hippias' quotation of Homer (365a l-b2), when Hippias gives the 
reason for his belief that Homer does not in the least create Achilles polytropos, 
but very simple and true (364e8-b6), Hippias supposes that the crucial 
evidence""^ on Homer's characterisation of the two heroes lies in the book 
entitled 'Prayers', Iliad, IX. Hippias' reasoning is as follows: 
P I . Homer narrated in Iliad, IX , that Achilles and Odysseus 
converse, and, then, Achilles makes the speech 'S' to Odysseus 
CS' is a symbol of Acliilles speech (365al-365b2)) (364e8-365b2; 
365b5-6); 
C I . therefore, Homer makes clear in 'S' each hero's character: 
Achilles is both true and simple; Odysseus is both pol^'tropos 
and false (365b3-5)"^ 
As to'S', Hippias quotes not a part but the whole of Achilles' speech to Odysseus 
as evidence for Homer's characterisation of Achilles and Odysseus in contrast 
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to Socrates, who refers to a later part of the conversation (370a4-5, 371d2-3). 
Insofar as Socrates takes Hippias to find his final justification of his introduction 
of the explanatory predicates, 'true' and 'false', and 'simple' and 'poh-tropos' in 
'S', pace Calogero"', Hippias can require Socrates to take up the whole construc-
tion and the detail of Hippias' quoted passage and not to associate his explana-
tory predicates wi th a part. 
Achilles calls Odysseus by his epithet and patemal lineage, and in advance 
of his following substantial message, professes what he has to do in giving his 
message. Then, he supports his obligation by his practical principle of sincerity. 
Finally, he returns to his present address and professes his specific performance. 
Logically, Achilles transfers a specific pracfical rule to a general supporting 
moral principle, and then, to a particular instance. Apparently, except for 
naming Odysseus, Achilles is concerned only with his practice. Therefore, 
Achilles does not seem to refer to Odysseus' character. However, Hippias interprets 
that Achilles recounts his practice in allusion to Odysseus. 
One should not attach too much weight to Achilles' address; however, 
Odysseus' epithet 'resourceful' would function as an expression of his typical 
characteristic. This morally neutral characteristic related to his ability and tact, 
is to be explained by 'polytropos' and 'false' according to Hippias' deduction of 
Homer's characterisafion. Nevertheless, Hippias gives no clear implication 
between this particular description and the explanatory terms. On the other 
hand, considering the following conversation, it is noteworthy that Socrates, while 
responding to Hippias' answer to his quesfion about a false man, talks about 
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ability and, then, about specific sciences and arts. Therefore, although we could, 
not require this epithet to bear out the whole conversation, we note that Hippias 
smuggles confiising elements into his explanation without distinguishing them 
so that Hippias' explanation anticipates his answers to Socrates' subsequent 
questions^^°. 
A t 365a2-3, Socrates can find Achilles' rejection of studied speeches in 
requiring his intentions to correspond to his words'"". Hence Hippias introduces 
the explanatory predicates, 'false' and 'true', based on commissive acts'"'': the 
speaker's commitment to fiiture actions. Hippias here supposes that Achilles 
refers to a man who commits himself normally to future actions in his utterance 
in contrast to one who immorally pretends to commit himself 
A t 365a4-bl, to support the preceding specific rule, Achilles expresses his 
abhorrence of those who say different things fi-om what they intend. Therefore 
Hippias allows the possibility that he primarily refers to the opposition of 
sincerity to deceit or lying in respect of an agent's expressed intention, whether 
or not the agent fulfils his or her intention. 
At 365b2, Hippias allows the possibility that he supposes that Achilles fmds 
the typical characteristic of a false man in insincerity of a commissive speech^". 
However, Achilles emphatically professes his intention to fu l f i l his commitment. 
Accordingly, Hippias' reference to this passage allows Socrates' possible 
ovennterpretation on Achilles' assertion. Telling what one intends to do or what 
one believes true is not necessarily particularly praiseworthy. Achilles probably 
contrasts that normal conduct to a morally significant contravention of it. 
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Socrates, however, can doubt whether Hippias refers to an unusual kind of 
sincerity as achievement of one's commitments in contrast to deceit or lying as 
achievement. I f he does, he can doubt further whether Hippias supposes that 
deceit or sincerity as fijlfilment requires an agent to be able to realise his or her 
expressed intention. 
In consequence of (I), (II) and (III) , although Hippias may misinterpret 
Achilles' implication in the original context'^'* and also makes a dubious infer-
ence in concluding one's sincerity from one's professed hatred of insincerity'^^ 
Hippias allows the possibility that he interprets that Homer made Achilles 
profess his hatred of insincerity, especially in a commissive speech, while 
making a snide remark about Odysseus. Further, Socrates can find Hippias' 
indistinctness between deceit as attempt only and deceit as achievement as well 
and between sincerity as both expressed intenfion and attempt to f i i l f i l one's 
commitment ofid sincenty as achievement of one's commitment. 
HJppias' commitment: 'polytropos' means 'false' in Homer's poetrj' (365b7-
365c2) 
Hippias does not specify his descriptive conditions of'true' and 'false', or how 
he deduces Homer's characterisation from the passage quoted. Neither does 
Socrates fully specify how he has come to think he understands Hippias' 
exposition. 
Even i f Socrates does not judge that what he regards as Hippias' deduction of 
Homer's characterisation is sound, i f Socrates is ready to justify his saying that 
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he has probably understood Hippias' exposition (365b7), Hippias can assume 
that Socrates does not object to what he conceives as Hippias' inteipretive steps 
to Homer's characterisation. 
Therefore, when Socrates says he has probably understood what Hippias says, 
Hippias can suppose that Socrates can specify what he conceives as Hippias' 
interpretive steps to this explanation. Specifically, when Socrates introduces a 
negative form of question about Achilles (364e5-6), i f Hippias takes this as 
conducive, he can take Socrates to conjecture on what descriptive conditions 
Hippias applies 'false' and 'polytropos' and how Hippias thinks his descriptive 
conditions match Homer's descriptions of Odysseus. 
Accordingly, when Socrates indirectly asks a question'"'^, by referring to both 
a particular point of his understanding of Hippias' exposition and Hippias' 
present speech act, in saying, 'You mean 'false' by 'a polytropos man as it seems' 
(365b8), Hippias can take Socrates tacitly to trace Hippias' interpretive steps. 
Truly, Socrates need not justify himself in asking a question and embodying a 
proposition in it, because he is asking indirectly, but how can Socrates have come 
to conjecture the relationship between the predicates 'polytropos' and 'false' 
despite Hippias' failure to give any clear suggestion about a false man in general? 
The problem is why the direct translation makes sense and seems trivial to most 
translators and readers. 
Socrates might read into Hippias' coordinate arrangements of the predicates, 
'both true and simple' and "both polytropos and false' (364b4-5) the idea that the 
truth is simple while the falsity is indefinite""'^ However, when Hippias 
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propounds Homer's characterisation (364c3-7; 364e7-b6), and Socrates says that 
he probably understands (365b7), Hippias can take Socrates to conceive that 
Hippias is concerned wi th the relationship between the predicates of Homer's 
heroes and a bundle of descriptions of the heroes as the elementary predicates. 
I n other words, he can take Socrates to conceive how Hippias can apply a 
predicate in question to a given referent with a bundle of descriptions; he can 
. take Socrates to consider how Hippias can assume a general implication 
between a predicate and its elementary predicates for characteristics of the 
referent. Certainly, Hippias bases his consideration of the standard by which to 
apply a predicate on Homer's imaginary referent and his descnptions, but he can 
take Socrates to conceive that Hippias is substantially concerned with the 
relationship between the descriptive conditions of a predicate and the given 
descriptions of a referent. Therefore, when Hippias introduces the predicates, 
'true' and 'false' (365b4-5), Socrates has enough reason to leave out Homer's 
responsibility for the relationship between the predicates 'polytropos' 
(explicandum) and 'false' (explicans'^^). 
Although Socrates says that probably he understands what Hippias says, he 
does not appear to Hippias to stop questioning (365b6-7). Socrates is not ready 
to admit that Hippias has, as he offered, properly answered Socrates' question 
on his display. It is ambiguous to Hippias whether Socrates means that he could 
not fully understand Hippias or he has with difficulty come to understand Hippias. 
Whi le Socrates turns out to be reserving his right to ask about a false man in 
general (365d6 ff . ) after Hippias commits himself to Homer's view of the 
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contradiction of predicating 'false' with predicating 'true', of a man, Socrates 
does not take a step necessary to analyse the descriptive conditions of 'false'. 
Socrates does not ask what Hippias' formulation implies about Homer's 
descriptive conditions or check it with Hippias' exposition of Homer. 
Specifically, it is unclear whether Socrates thinks that he has understood that 
Achilles is notpolytropos, as he seemed to want to learn fi-om Hippias (364e4-
5), or that Odysseus is the most polytropos, as he was not able to understand 
(365el-4). I f Socrates had difficulty in understanding these points, he could 
legitimately ask again about them. However, instead of asking, Socrates says, 
'You mean 'false' by 'the polytropos man', at least as i t seems (365b8).' Socrates' 
conjecture in his indirect question about Hippias' expository speech act of the 
relation between the predicates, 'false' and 'polytropos', would not be irrelevant; 
for Hippias certainly left unclear the implication between the coordinately 
arranged predicates (365b5). 
Hippias understands that Socrates formulates a general proposition. Hence, 
he is going to justify afFirming the general proposition by extrapolating Homer's 
characterising Odysseus as a false man in accordance with his way of propound-
ing Homer's characterisation (365c 1-2). 
Accordingly, when Hippias definitely affirms the general proposition 
embodied in Socrates' indirect question, he is tacitly justifying himself by 
appealing to his way of expounding Homer's characterisation. When Hippias in 
the next speech explicitly justifies his definite affirmation by saying that Homer 
created Odysseus false in many passages in hoih. Iliad and Odyssey (365c 1-2), 
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this extrapolation is a necessary entailment from the assumptions in Hippias' 
way of expounding Homer's characterisation. For, as his interpretation of 
Homer's characterisation requires, Hippias has to apply 'false' consistently as an 
explanatory term to the major descriptions of Homer's Odysseus. Nevertheless, 
a man boasting of answering any question on interpreting Homer's poetry may 
strategically introduce non-univocal terms such as 'polytropos' or 'false' 
consecutively to adapt the descriptive conditions to particular passages adroitly 
and furtively"^'. 
Hippias must be ready to refer his general statement on characterisation to his 
interpretation of particular passages. Insofar as Hippias attempts to distinguish 
Homer's Achilles from his Odysseus in some specified respect consistently and 
exhaustively in order to avoid being caught committing inconsistency, Hippias 
must extrapolate the distinction. 
Hippias would be ready to propound particular passages convincingly enough 
to prove the distinction, as shown by his confidence in proving Homer's general 
and consistent distinction at 369c2-5. Socrates can check the point he indirectly 
asked about with Hippias' specific interpretation of Homer's passages by 
learning it through Hippias' interpretive speech. Accordingly, i f Hippias has 
expected that Socrates is concerned with learning Homer's characterisation from 
him, he may expect to demonstrate publicly his ability to answer any question 
on his display by retrieving the initiative to get through Socrates' questions. 
Hippias' commitment to Homer's opinion that no false men are true 
(365c3-7) 
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Socrates does not explicitly mention Hippias' explicit speech act (365c3-4), 
but only Homer's belief as Homer's prepositional attitude. Clearly, not Hippias 
but Socrates introduces from Hippias' preceding speeches the embodied 
proposition that no false men are true. However, Socrates connects the 
proposition with Hippias' preceding speeches by an inferential particle (a o a; 
365c3), and refers by the phrase 'as it seems' to the assertiveness of what he 
conceives Hippias would infer. Therefore, Socrates' speech ftinctions as an 
indirect question to Hippias^''°. 
Without enquiring further about the view that Homer created a polytropos 
man false, Socrates here mentions Homer's belief that no false men are true, by 
inference from Hippias' preceding speeches. Hippias can suspect that Socrates 
attempts to establish his opinions when Socrates introduces the formulation 
concerning Hippias' inference on Homer's view. As Socrates connects this with 
Hippias' preceding speech ( a g a ) , Socrates would be concerned with the 
question whether Homer created Odysseus false, or whether Homer created 
Achilles true. I f Socrates is concerned with either, he has to check this with 
Homer's passages before suggesting dismissing Homer's responsibility for what 
Hippias regards as Homer's intention in the quoted lines (365c8). Therefore, i f 
Socrates is concerned wi th the justification of Hippias' way of expounding 
Homer's characterisation according to the soundness of Hippias' interpretation 
of Homer's particular passages, it would be pointless to suggest dismissing 
Homer's responsibilit}' for what Hippias' formulation formally implies as 
Homer's view. 
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Socrates says, 'In Homer's opinion, one is a true man and another [or the other] 
is a false man but the same man is not [both true and false] (365c3-4).' Socrates' 
expression admits of ambiguity from our point of view, because he uses the 
correlative pronouns, 'one' and 'another' or 'one' and 'the other'. Hippias can 
understand Socrates' expression as a particular proposition or as a general one, 
compared with Socrates' other clearer expressions in the conversation"'". I f 
Socrates intends a particular proposition, he means that one of the two, i.e., 
Odysseus and Achilles, is a true man and the other is a false man while neither 
is both true and false. He may mean that Achilles is a true man and Odysseus 
is a false man, while neither is both true and false. But, i f Socrates intends a 
general proposition, he means that no false men are true. 
The former proposition under Homer's responsibility would be trivial to 
Hippias because it would be what he meant by his preceding speeches; he did 
not, though, state that Homer created Odysseus not true. 
But, to what ex-tent did Hippias explicitly commit himself to Homer's belief 
on the general relation among the predicates, 'true', 'simple', 'false' and 
'polytropos'? Hippias certainly is ready to aff irm that Homer created a polytropos 
man false. Thence Socrates has the right to conjecture the proposition, as a 
counterpart, that Homer created a simple man true, but Socrates could not infer 
from these two premises that Homer held the view that no false men are true. 
What Socrates has the right to claim about Hippias' statement under Homer's 
propositional attitude, 'Homer created ...', is at most the proposition with the 
particular subject, 'Odysseus' or 'Achilles' under this propositional attitude, i f 
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Socrates still concedes the implication of the propositions under Homer's 
propositional attitude. Within these limits, Socrates can use his expression with 
the correlative pronouns to put forward a particular proposition. Accordingly, i f 
Hippias takes Socrates to trade on his following affirmation, by misinterpreting 
that he affirms a general proposition, he would take Socrates to abuse his 
ambiguous expression. 
Then, how could Socrates justifiably conjecture a general proposition under 
Homer's propositional attitude from Hippias' speeches? It would be reasoning 
f rom Hippias' previous commitments and common sense about the opposite 
predicates, 'true' and 'false', as follows^'*^. 
(1) Hippias asserted that Homer created Achilles not polyfropos 
(364e7). 
(2) Hippias affirmed that Homer created a polytropos man 
explanatorily identical with a false man (365b8). 
(3) Therefore, insofar as Hippias does not question the validity 
of inference between the propositions under Homer's preposi-
tional attitude (365b3-6), Socrates has the right to infer that 
Homer created Achilles not false. 
(4) Further, Hippias aflBrmed that Homer created Odysseus false 
in many passages (365c2). 
(5) Therefore, i f Socrates has the right to interpret that Hippias 
is ready to accept by extrapolation that Homer created Odysseus 
false in any passage, Socrates would have enough right to 
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assume, as a counterpart, that Hippias may accept that Homer 
created Achilles true in any passage. 
A t this stage, neither Socrates nor Hippias has any right to conclude that no 
false men are true. I f Socrates does not avail himself of Hippias' assumptions, 
he must consider what Hippias must assume on the general relation between 
predicating 'false' and predicating 'true' of a person in order to conclude that 
Achilles is true and not false while Odysseus is false and not true. Hippias 
cannot accept the logical possibilities (1) that all true men are false or (2) that 
all false men are true. Therefore, what is left to Hippias is (3) that no true men 
are false or (4) that some true men are false. Logically speaking, Socrates can 
ask whether Hippias concludes from both Achilles' consistent tmth and Odysseus' 
consistent falsity in Homer's poetry that Homer believed that there is someone 
who is both true and false. 
Nevertheless, probably Socrates conjectures that Homer believed that no false 
men are true, for the following reasons: (a) we can assume that both Hippias and 
Socrates could easily associate the couple of predicates of a person in question 
with the homonymous incompatible predicates of propositions, or of things in 
respect of genuineness; (b) we can assume that both could easily fmd the general 
opposition on sincerity in Achilles' speech to Odysseus, whether or not it is used 
in an unusual achievement sense; (c) we can assume that both could suppose 
that an imaginary character functions as a kind of bundle of universal 
charactenstics, i f the referential function of the imaginary character is removed. 
Accordingly, we could explain why Socrates introduces what he regards as a 
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conclusion from Hippias' preceding speeches and indirectly asks a question. 
Since Socrates is indeterminate about what he conjectures, Hippias need not 
require Socrates to justify himself in affirming ahything"''^ 
At the same time, when Socrates formulates Homer's proposition about 
incompatibility of human proclivities, Hippias, considering the opposite 
predicates commonsensically, has a right to accept the proposition; however, 
reflecting about an inoffensive lie in daily life"'*'' or a lie morally necessary in an 
agent's situation'''^ i f he does not believe that telling a lie is such a moral 
principle as he showed o f f (363c7-d4; 364d3-6), Hippias can suspect that 
Socrates may introduce logical polarisation as sophistry'''*. 
In reply to Socrates' indirect question about Hippias' implicit inference on 
Homer's view (365c3-4), Hippias' rhetorical question emphasises his tacit 
affirmation (365c5). He accepts the general proposition probably because he 
read into Homer's passage Achilles' opposition to Odysseus in respect of 
sincerity in commissive speech acts'" and read his usage of the opposites, 'true' 
and 'false', into Homer's characterisation. Apparently, Socrates is merely asking 
an appendant question about Hippias' agreement to Homer's view (365c6). 
Instead of asking about Socrates' purpose in arranging his preceding questions, 
Hippias categorically affirms his agreement to Homer's view by appealing to the 
paradoxicality of its denial (365c7). 
However, in the whole context, Socrates' question at 365c6 works to elicit, in 
advance of their exchange on false men in general (365d6 f f . ) , Hippias' personal 
opinion of false men which Socrates eventually rejects (367c7-d2, 368el-369a2, 
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369a4-5, 369b3-7). However, pace Zembaty''^ Blundell"'', and Vlastos' '° , 
readers need not require Socrates to establish the refutandum and keep 
consistency in referring to it. 
As to the predicates in question, 'polytropos', 'false', 'true', 'simple' and their 
superlatives which appear at 364e 1-2, 364e5, 364e7, 365b4-5, 365b5, 365b7-8, 
365c3-4, we can legitimately ask what each interlocutor means by them and 
what one conceives the other means. I f Socrates later, considering Hippias' 
remark at 369c2-5, requires Hippias to be consistent here, he could take Hippias 
to have meant 'sincere' or 'honest' by 'true' and 'deceitful' by 'false'. Further, i f 
Hippias, considering Socrates' remark at 369e2-370a2, requires Socrates to be 
responsible for his speech, he could take Socrates to have understood here that 
Hippias avails himself of Homer's passage to mean 'deceitful' by 'false'. Most 
translations and paraphrases suggest this" ' . 
Certainly, it has been disputed whether the predicates belong to the concept 
of ability or that of typical behaviour; the concept of potentiality or actuality. As 
M u l h e m initially pointed out'", we have reason to interpret that Hippias 
introduces, based on the quoted passage of Homer, the concept of a false man 
who actually makes an insincere commitment at 365b5 and that Socrates 
conceives at 365b7-8 that Hippias does this. Even if, as some interpreted"^", 
Socrates intentionally takes advantage of Hippias' use of the predicates to defend 
the paradox that all and only liars are truthful, and to lead Hippias to self-
contradiction, Socrates must recognise that Hippias implies actuality and typical 
behaviour by the predicate, 'false'. 
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However, neither Socrates nor Hippias, while using the controversial 
polysemous predicates as Kraus shows'^ '*, offers expository speeches about their 
meanings. Hippias does not explain 'false' or 'true' further. Socrates does not 
request ftirther explanation. Therefore, certainly, Hippias means and Socrates 
understands something specific by 'true' and 'false', but Hippias does not 
expound it or show how he deduces these predicates from Homer. Therefore, I 
think that they use TioXvxoonoQ as a predicate without established meaning 
and ccXT\fir]C„ T \ i e v 6 r \ Q , ocnXovc, as those predicable of a person and a thing. 
We should translate those predicates consistently and interrelatedly, as Schleier-
macher did in German'", 'vielgewandt', 'einfach' 'wahr (wahrhaft)' and 'falsch' 
or in Enghsh'^*, 'complex', 'simple', 'true', and 'false'^". Hence, I follow Vlastos' 
translation of i | ; eu6f j c;'^ ^ but not his assumption that it is exchanged in a 
specific meaning constantly between the interlocutors. 
In my opinion, the interpretive point is not to ask what specific preconception 
about 'pol^'tropos' and 'false' interpreters must take the interlocutors to have held 
because of subsequent speeches, but rather, to ask v/hat unanalysed ideas about 
falsit}' Hippias provides Socrates for further questioning. M y answer is that 
Hippias' downfall arises from his indistinctness between achievement and 
intention in deceit and sincerity"^'. 
Hippias lets Homer go (365c8-(15) 
Subsequently, Socrates makes a reasoned proposal and order to Hippias, to 
obtain the right to ask about Hippias' own opinion (365c8-d4). 
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First, Socrates suggests that they should dismiss Homer's responsibility for 
what Hippias claims as Homer's view (365c3-7). Socrates' reason is that it is 
actually impossible ( x a ; a 5 i 3 v a r o v ) t o ask again what Homer intended in 
creating those lines which Hippias quoted^^ (365al-b2). Next, Socrates orders 
Hippias to answer his question with Homer on behalf of Homer and himself 
Socrates' reason is that Hippias obviously takes responsibility for Homer's view 
and shares with Homer the very things Hippias says Homer says (365c3-7). 
Hippias would have no reason to reject Socrates' propounded reason for his 
order at 365d2-3 because of Hippias' preceding affirmations. For, certainly, 
Hippias might be able to avoid all-out agreement with Homer, but Socrates 
confines Hippias' agreement to what Hippias says Homer says. 
But, i f Hippias accepts, for the reason Socrates gives (365c8-dl), Socrates' 
proposal to dismiss Homer, Hippias also has to accept the presupposition of that 
reason that it is impossible that Hippias asks Homer about his intention. Then 
he has no right to say what Homer intends to say. Therefore, he has no right to 
accept Socrates' propounded reason for the order. 
Then, when Socrates makes the proposal and the order, does Socrates allows 
the possibility that he commits himself to what he regards as the reason for these 
two speech acts? I f so, Hippias can take Socrates not to be self-contradictor}', but 
to indicate that while Hippias has no right to deduce Homer's view, Hippias 
holds the same view. Nevertheless, i f so, Hippias can take Socrates to be 
intentionally making an unacceptable request in public. 
When we make a proposal, we can elicit the hearer's attitude toward it, but 
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may be required to commit ourselves to the proposition. Nevertheless, we are not 
necessarily explicitly professing commitment. Therefore, Socrates may leave 
Hippias to understand what he says in his proposal and give an answer. 
Giote'*', Shorey"*', and Friedlander'^^interpret that Socrates talks about the 
general impossibility of learning Homer's intention in his poetry'*"*, but Socrates 
refers to the particular passage Hippias quoted (365dl). Hence, Socrates need 
not refer to the general impossibility'*^ As Guthrie'** and Friedlander'*' 
indicate, Socrates' proposal and order here work to l i f t the opaqueness of the 
proposition under Homer's propositional attitude and lead Socrates to ask about 
Hippias' opinion. Whether or not Socrates commits himself to the general 
impossibility of learning Homer's intention, Socrates' speech here might be, as 
Guthrie'*^ and Waterfield'*' point out, a dialectical sfratagem, but Hippias would 
have the right to argue that Socrates claimed, and presupposed in his questions. 
Homer's intention. 
Hippias commits self-contradiction i f he affirms propositions embodied in the 
reasons in Socrates' proposal and order (365d5). Although Socrates does not 
enquire about Hippias' attitude toward his proposal and order separately, 
Hippias does not show what he understands of Socrates' speech or point out its 
contradictory presuppositions. 
When Hippias next (365d5) repeats by implication his principle of answermg 
any question, he is still confident of answering Socrates' questions as he 
promised (363c7-d4). While his request for a brief question suggests that he is 
alert to Socrates' eristic motion, he cannot anticipate what Socrates is going to 
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ask about. 
In ihe Hippias Minor, Hippias is not so well-trained in answer-and-quesuon 
bouts as he claims^^", but it is improbable that he has no tactics""". Then, does 
he botch owing to Socrates' tactics? Does Socrates manoeuvre? Is Socrates 
expression so ambiguous? Relatively so. For Socrates' expression may be so 
ambiguous that i f Hippias does not request clarification, and yet affirms or 
denies what he regards as the proposition embodied in Socrates' question, then, 
Socrates may formulate another question on Hippias' response by interpreting 
that Hippias responds to what Socrates thought as a proposition embodied in his 
question. At the same time, Socrates' expression may be so clear to Hippias that 
Hippias can interpret the proposition embodied without requesting clarification 
of what Socrates regards as the proposition embodied. 
The author of the drama may create how Hippias' answers lead to a 
paradoxical conclusion because of his lack of clanfication. However, even i f 
Socrates' concluding question appears to press Hippias to admit self-contradic-
tion, Socrates is not necessanly committed to the ambiguity of his expression in 
which Hippias involved himself by answering Socrates' questions. Therefore, 
even i f Socrates' concluding step discloses Hippias' self-contradiction, we need 
not conclude that, as Sprague maintains"''-, Socrates intentionally commits 
ambiguity. Therefore, pace Grote"^^ and Gomperz"^'', Hippias is not forced by 
Socrates to answer Socrates' questions but answers at his wi l l . I f Hippias is 
forced by anything within the drama to answer, it is his boasts'^\ Insofar as we 
confine pur analysis to the dramatic characters' intention in interactive 
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conversation, what forces Socrates' interlocutor to admit the proposition 
embodied in Socrates' question? Socrates' trick or sophistry as his interlocutor 
sometimes claims? How does Socrates trick his interlocutor in order to elicit 
agreements which he wants? Although Socrates might be taken by his 
interlocutor to be insincere in that he does not commit himself to the proposition 
embodied in his question or surreptitiously supports some opposite view, and 
although Socrates' interlocutor turns out to be aware of what appears to him to 
be Socrates' sophistry, we must say that Socrates asks a question and, at a quite 
high rate of success, elicits an answer which tums out to contribute much to 
formulation of his concluding question which presses his interlocutor to self-
confradiction. As the reverse of the coin, what his interlocutor interprets as a 
proposition embodied in Socrates' question presses h im to give his own answer 
at each stage. 
Therefore, our task is to explain how Socrates is successful in eliciting 
answers leading his interlocutor to self-contradiction. We must consider how 
Socrates uses his interlocutors' preceding assumptions in belief and logic and 
how he formulates a proposition representing his interlocutors' potential view 
and how he gets a sense of direction in ordering his questions. 
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5. Barrage (365d6-369b7) 
General analysis of 365(16-366al 
Socrates takes the initiative in asking about Hippias' predication of false men 
by introducing predicates of them into the propositions embodied in his 
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questions 
Hippias allowed the possibility that he had preconceived the concept of falsity 
in advance of ex-plaining Homer's characterisation of Odysseus by 'false' (365b5). 
However, not only is Hippias reminded of Homer's Odysseus by Socrates' 
reintroduction of 'poljlropos' (365e2), but also he may compare false men to 
Homer's Odysseus whenever he answers Socrates' question on Homer's behalf 
(see 365d3-4). For Socrates asks about Hippias' predication of false men after 
Hippias introduced 'false' to explain Homer's characterisation of Odysseus 
(365b5, 365cl-2). Accordingly, i f Hippias seeks consistency, he has to judge 
whether he validly applies to Homer's Odysseus the predicates given by Socrates. 
Specifically, Hippias accepts that 'able to do something' and 'clever' (oofpoc,) 
are predicated of false men; for he cannot accept that Odysseus is unable to do 
something (365b6-e2) or that Odysseas is not clever in deceiving (365e2-366a 1). 
As to the interpretively controversial points, first, neither interlocutor analyses 
the concept of falsit>' for the sake of analysis, but Socrates attempts to establish 
Hippias' opinion about false men without any preconception of 'polj'tropos', 
while as Zembat}' and Blundell point out"", Hippias is shackled by his boast of 
poljTnathy (363c7-d4; 364a7-9) to survi\Tng a ban-age of questions from Socrates. 
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Next, as to Hippias' opinion about deceit, Socrates introduces predicates of 
false men, but does not necessarily invent them. In explaining Homer's 
Odysseus' polytropia by quoting Homer's Achilles' speech to Odysseus (364e7-
365b6), as the ambiguity of the normal usage of'deceit' suggests, Hippias did 
not distinguish attempted deceit from achieved deceit, but what Hippias 
proposed as Achilles' sincerity (365a2-3, 365bl) permitted overinterpretation of 
it as achievement of his commitments. Therefore, Hippias' explanation was not 
unambiguous. Hence, Socrates allowed the possibility that he believes that 
sincerity categorically matches ability to do something (365d6-7). Hence, pace 
Hoerber'^^, Socrates does not directly add to confusion by 'confused logic' or 
'confused terminology'. 
Moreover, as to Hippias' opinion about ability, Socrates does not commit 
himself to the analysis of ability; neither does Hippias differentiate his usage 
from the normal. It is crucial for Hippias to show Socrates in what meaning he 
distinctly uses the predicate, 'able', but he leaves it moot. This point has 
provided the controversy over the equivocation between actuality and ability. 
Apart from the dramatic interlocutors' commitment to the equivocation, this 
problem has been mostly resolved by recourse to the ordinary usage of'ability' 
which is indifferent to actuality'' ' since Aristotle's suggestion"^". Certainly, 
talking about potentiality of an action, talking about its actuality, and talking 
about their relation should not be confused. However, the interlocutors' exchange 
is not so transparent, What Hippias understands about ability is confusing 
according to his commitment to the propositions embodied in Socrates' 
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questions. But ordinary usage of'ability' is not necessarily distinct. I f it is a kind 
of possibility, it lies conceptually between impossibility and necessity. The 
borders of modal concepts are philosophically murky. Hence, to solve the 
general problem of the usage of'ability', I believe, we must reconsider how and 
what we can legitimately and distinctly talk about by introducing a group of 
expressions related to 'able to', such as 'capable of , 'can', 'habit', 'topical 
performance', 'regular performance', 'state', 'disposition', 'choice', 'wish' and so 
on. Therefore, the problem is still open^'. However, neither Hippias nor Socrates 
provides such reconsideration in the Hippias Minor, although it might give a 
hint towards such reconsideration as it would have done to Aristot le^. In the 
exchange, Socrates does not invite Hippias to undertake such reconsideration 
f rom Hippias' equivocal commitments but starts questioning from Hippias' 
commitments. 
I f we introduce the concept of potentiality as probability of the case that one 
does on some occasion what one is not doing or what one is doing, I w i l l show 
that we can interpret that Hippias is ready to accept tiiat ability is not potenualio,' 
as inexpenence or insufficient expenence but as infallible cause of acnial 
performance. 
Then, Hippias' categorisation of falsity as ability in his answer to Socrates' 
first question (365d7-8) enables Socrates to invent other predicates in subse-
quent questions as possible components of Hippias' unanalysed opinion about 
falsity. 
Further, Hippias' additional remarks in his first answer (365d7-8; c f 365e8, 
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365el0) pave the way for Socrates' questioning about false men in sciences and 
crafts (365e7, 365e9, 366a4, 366bl-2, 366b3, 366c5 ff.). 
In this stage, Socrates does not palm off a wong inference from a proposition 
about potentiality to that about actuality. It is questionable whether Socrates 
knowingly introduces that wrong inference into his question (365e3; 365e7), in 
assuming (a) that ability is potentiality indifferent to actuality, whether as 
experience or as inexperience, (b) that falsity is such potentiality, and (c) that 
they talk about false men's deceit in respect only of potentiality. Whether or not 
Hippias distinguishes ability from potentiality indifferent to actuality and 
whether or not he distinguishes ability from actuality, Hippias clearly commits 
himself to the proposition that falsity is actuality, i.e., that false men actually 
deceive (365e4-5, 365e8-9). 
Weiss attempts to make the argument logically irmocuous'^\ She proposes 
that both interlocutors use every dispositional word in the non-standard 
meaning, i.e., in the meaning of potentiality indifferent to actuality'^''. However, 
although her interpretation, as she understands, trivialises the paradoxical 
conclusion at 369b3-7, her presupposition about ability is controversial (see 
Zembat}''^^). Weiss presupposes (a) that 'typical and regular employment of 
ability' as Mulhem understands it"^*, does not follow from ability"^' and (b) that 
a single performance does not constitute ability^^^. Hence, she can leave 
innocuous the effect of both interlocutors' references to false men's actual 
performance at 365bl, 365b2, 365e3, 365e7, 365e8-9, 366b3. However, if she 
admits that it is sound that an expert is able to speak truthfully and lie, then, 
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according to (b), she must admit that an expert practised both speaking 
truthfully and lying more than once. Then, would she suppose that once an expert 
has acquired the ambivalent ability without ambivalent disposition he does not 
typically employ the ability'^'? 
Hippias' commitment: false men are able to do many, especially, deceive 
others (365d6-8) 
Socrates' tagged question introduces alternative formulations, namely, either 
'false men are such as those unable to do something just like sick people' or 
'false men are such as those able to do something' (365d6-7)"'°. 
The Greek word for 'able'^' can be used variously in respect of a substitute for 
the dummy part, 'to do something', like the English, 'able'. ]n taking a sick man 
as an example of one unable to do something, Socrates is not committed to how 
they should analyse the meaning of 'able to do something'. He would only 
suggest a circulatmg usage of 'unable'. Pace Sprague"'', Socrates need not 
introduce terms 'ambiguous by nature' in order to make Hippias transpose the 
contradiction of truth to falsity to the equivalence of truth and falsity. Hippias' 
unanalysed opinion evolves self-contradiction through his ambiguity expressed 
in understanding what Socrates introduces mto his question. Whether Socrates 
clarifies Hippias' ambiguitv' or not, Socrates may introduce the proposition possibly 
involved in Hippias' opinion. Ability is difficult to analyse; as Sprague says''\ 
it involves ambiguity. Ability may be used morally neutrally, Socrates may use 
this characteristic. However, Socrates' introduction of 'able' is justified by 
Hippias' preceding unanalysed opinion about falsity (365a l-b2). 
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Hence, what kind of propositions are embodied here depends on Hippias' 
interpretation. Socrates does not attempt to clarify further what propositions he 
means by these formulations; neither does Hippias attempt to clarify what 
propositions Socrates intends to introduce. Accordingly, it is dubious whether 
Socrates or Hippias analyses the concept of ability for the sake of analysis. 
Hence it is not necessanly fruitful to read into their conversation an analysis 
of the concept of ability and test its soundness. On the basis of modal 
concepts'''', Jantzen classifies the model of ability into two classes as follows, 
according to the co-ordinate relation between the possibility that an agent does 
appropriately to an end and the possibility that an agent does inappropriately to 
the end '^^ ; (1) an ordinary elementary motion like running in which the two 
possibilities are co-ordinate"'*; (2) a skill or science in which the possibility of 
an improper action apparently derives from the possibility of a proper action but 
does not"'^. Jantzen maintains that Socrates' fallacy cannot be excluded if, as 
Weiss interprets, all tropos-words are unusually used as diinmiis-words in the 
conversation''^ . Socrates' fallacy, as Jantzen sees it, is that of the double-meaning 
of ability''' and, specifically, that of applying the model (1) to the model (2)"'°°, 
and that of applying the model (2) to the case of morality^"'. He rejects the 
ambivalence of ability in an area of a skill or science^°^ Jantzen's analysis bnngs 
out the problematic of the concept of ability, but I do not see in which speech^°\ 
Socrates argues about or commits himself to or asserts the ambiguous usage of 
ability in reference to modal concepts (see also p. 129 ff.). 
Hippias later might take Socrates here (365d6-7) to have elucidated Hippias' 
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opinion about Homer's characterisation but he could not decide which 
alternative Socrates indirectly proposes that he should take. When Socrates said 
that he probably had understood what Hippias said (365b7), Hippias might have 
taken Socrates to have imderstood that Hippias regarded falsity as deceitflil-
ness found in Homer's Odysseus, but Hippias could not understmid that 
Socrates regarded falsity as deceitfulness or that Socrates implies ability by 
deceitfulness. 
Socrates' question commits him to neither altemative^°\ On one hand, i f 
Hippias has allowed the possibility that he meant only attempted deceit by falsity 
in his explanation about Homer's characterisation of Achilles and Odysseus 
(364e7-365b6), Socrates possibly takes Hippias to believe that false men are 
unable to do something normal like sick men. On the other hand, i f Hippias has 
allowed the possibilit}' that he meant by falsity achieved deceit in contrast to 
Homer's Achilles' emphasis on his realisation of commitments (365a3 ; 365b2), 
Socrates possibly takes Hippias to hold that false men are able to do something 
because they always achieve their plots. However, Hippias did not make clear 
the distinction between sincerity and insincerity in deceit in respect of attempt 
and achiex'ement. Socrates can come to believe that Hippias categorises deceit 
as ability or as inability, but could not decide exactly how Hippias categorises 
falsity. Hence, pace Kahn^°\ Socrates does not invent the unusual meaning of 
falsity; pace Sprague'°*, it is not Socrates but Hippias who masks his ambiguit}' 
about falsity. 
Hippias not only admits predication of false men by 'able to do something' 
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(365d7) but additionally remarks in respect of the actions as objects of the 
ability that false men are extremely able to do many things and, especially, to 
deceive people (365d8)^°^. 
In whatever sense Hippias understands 'ability', i f he intends to keep 
consistency in answering, on Homer's behalf, Socrates' questions about Hippias' 
predications of false men, he would have to take Homer's Odysseus as an 
exemplar of false men in spite of letting Homer go. Hippias would have to judge 
whether a given predicate of false men is predicated of Homer's Odysseus, and 
hence, given Socrates' formulations, whether Odysseus is in a sense unable to 
do something. 
Hippias drops some reservation (olo v; 365d6) in Socrates' categorisation of 
false men as those able to do something and emphasizes the degree of the ability 
and the number of actions as objects of the ability (365d8). Hence, Hippias 
allows the possibility that he assumes that (a) there are many things in which 
false men are capable''" ,^ (b) the many things are sciences and/or skills, (c) 
deceiving others is representative among the many things false men are able to 
do, (d) the many things are subordinated to deceit, or (e), on the basis of 
conjecture from (c), deceit is achievement of one's plots and not attempt only. 
Hippias' additional remark raises a question whether the many things Hippias 
refers to as what false men are able to do are co-ordinate with deceit; whether 
they are ordinaty subjects like arithmetic or skills like plaiting; for what purpose 
false men are able to do many things. Although Hippias can object that those 
who are able to achieve something are not necessarily those who actually do it 
88 
on some occasion, Socrates possibly takes Hippias to assume that those who are 
able to achieve deceit'"' are those who actually deceive. 
Although Hippias is pressed to distinguish ability from inability and not 
actuality from possibility or potentiality'"", i f we defme a man who does 
something potentially as a man who actually does on some other occasion what 
he is not doing or what he is doing, we can interpret that Hippias can mean by 
ability (i) potentiality as inexperience which does not cause present actual 
performance'"', (ii) potentiality as insufficient experience which only acciden-
tally causes present actual performance '^^  or (iii) potentiality as experience 
which infallibly causes present actual performance'"\ If Hippias significantly 
refers to plurality of what false men are able to do, Socrates can take Hippias to 
mean by the ability potentiality which possibly causes present actual perform-
ance ((ii) or (iii)). Hippias will not make clear whether he assumes that falsity 
is present actual performance or that false men's actuality is deduced from their 
ability, but he will come close to ability as potentiality as experience (iii), 
inasmuch as he emphasises the degree of false men's ability. Pace Kraus^''' and 
Fouillee"*'^ Hippias does not immediately leave false men's disposition out of 
consideration. Mulhem'"^ interprets that (a) on account of his explanation of 
K o X u T O O T i o g byij/euSfig (365b4-5), Hippias supposes that falsity is not 
only ability but 't\pical and regular employment of the ability' and (b) therefore, 
Hippias accepts that falsity is ability. However, Hippias may take abilit}' as 
something more than power which accidentally causes present actual perfor-
mance, as Weiss suggests''^ Pace Blundell^'^ and Waterfield^", Weiss' 
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interpretation of ability in contrast with actuality implies that ability as skill is 
not mere capability but some acquired and frained experience closely connected 
to the disposition concerned. 
Hippias may not analyse how one can achieve a deceit or realise his intention. 
It is questionable whether the ability to deceive others is generally possible, 
because we cannot specify the elementary actions involved. Generally, when one 
deceives another, one may take advantage of a deceived person's belief of 
something in some area and, i f successful in deceit, may need knowledge of the 
area. However, Hippias may not analyse falsity. On one hand, Hippias may 
mean by 'ability to deceive others' potentiality as experience which infallibly causes 
present actual performance. On the other hand, Hippias may only deduce 
Odysseus' ability from Homer's portrayal of Odysseus' actual deceit. He may 
deduce Odysseus' ability from his successful deceits and other characters' 
reference to his wiles rather than from analysis of the possibility of deceiving 
others. 
Hippias' first answer to Socrates' first question involves the crucial issue in 
the whole subsequent conversation"'". Hippias is responsible for presupposing 
the possibility of the ability to do wrong intentionally in referring to the ability 
to deceive people (cf 365e8-9). However, finally, Socrates questions the 
existence of a man who does wrong as he wishes to (376b5-6). 
Sincerity is normally concerned with expressed intention and not necessarily 
with achievement of commitments. Hence, i f we categorise sincerity as ability 
or inability, we normally commit a category mis-match"'. On the other hand. 
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deceit as insincerity can normally ambiguously mean attempt or achievement, 
as Kraus' analysis here suggests'''^ , although it cannot be specified how one can 
attempt or achieve deceit. 
If Hippias admits that one is able to deceive another, he probably admits that 
one is able to succeed in decemng another. For normally, i f we say that one is 
able to deceive another, what we admit is not that one is able to attempt or 
intend to deceive another but that one is able actually to deceive another"''. 
Hence, if Hippias, tacitly assuming that deceit is specifiable, keeps consistency, 
he would have to avoid admitting that deceit involves failure by ignorance or 
error. He would come close to admitting that that kind of deceit as achievement 
shares the same knowledge with truth, that is, with sincerity as achievement of 
one's commitment. But, i f Hippias means by ability to deceive not potentiality 
(ii) but potentiality (iii) as experience which mfallibly causes present perfor-
mance, he must admit consistently that falsity is actuality. Hippias' downfall is 
involved in his categonsation of falsity as ability, as Sprague"'' and Hoerber"^ 
indicate; however, pace Sprague"* and Weiss"^, it is open to question whether 
Hippias admits only ability for evil purposes but not that for good ones, 
distinguishing this from that. 
Hippias' commitment: false men arc shrewd (365el-6) 
Socrates performs an indirect question by referring to the statement asserted 
under Hippias' responsibility as probable (365el-2) and seeks confirmation 
(365e2); Socrates himself leaves unclear whether he approves the propositions 
in his indirect question. 
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Linking the content in the present question with Hippias' answer (ue v 6r\ ; 
365el), Socrates mtroduces the proposition that false men are also polytropos 
(365el-2). He asks not whether if a false man is able to do something, then he 
is polytropos, but whether a false man is able to do something and polytropos. 
Socrates does not attend here to Hippias' limitation of the objects of false 
men's ability. Hippias referred to plurality of actions which false men's ability 
covers, whether or not they are relevantly subordinated to deceit, but Socrates 
(except as argued below) drops this point. As Jantzen criticises"^, i f as Weiss' 
interpretation implies^'', Socrates asks whether false men [whom both 
interlocutors suppose able to deceive] are able and polytropos, i.e., able to 
deceive, Socrates' formulation may seem redundant to Hippias. 
Whether or not 'ability' differs in exact meaning according to the action 
concerned, Socrates can justify asking for Hippias' confirmation about the 
proposition about false men's ability because Hippias dropped Socrates' 
reservation (o lov) in categorising false men as able to do something and 
committed himself to the category-match between falsity and ability. 
However, Socrates apparently redundantly adds 'polytropos', co-ordinately 
with 'able', and makes ambiguous the focus of his question. Hippias can judge 
Socrates' introduction of'polytropos' redundant, if Hippias intended not to imply 
'pol}tropos' by 'false' only, as the grammatical form suggests (365b8-cl), but to 
explain 'pohtropos' by 'false' bi-conditionally in introducing 'false' in expound-
ing 'poMropos' to Socrates"" (364el-365b6). Since Socrates professed that he 
did not understand what Hippias meant by 'polytropos', Hippias introduced 
92 
'false' to make Socrates understand, and, then, Socrates confirmed this point 
(364el-365b6). Therefore, Socrates' re-introduction of 'polytropos' into the 
exposition of'false' may seem redundant to Hippias. 
However, if Hippias judges that when Socrates did not ask for clarification of 
'false' (365b7-c4), he understood that Hippias meant 'deceitful' or 'insincere' by 
'polytropos', Socrates does not necessarily seem to Hippias to commit redun-
dancy and shift the focus of the question by introducing 'polytropos'. Rather, 
Socrates leaves open the possibility that he confirms Hippias' additional remarks 
in his preceding answer (365d7): 'exceedingly able to do many things and, 
especially, to deceive people'. Hence, Hippias' ij;eu6f)g at 365b4-5 is, as 
Mulhem interprets'''", not 'merely pleonastic' but epexegetical; nevertheless, 
Socrates' reintroduction here is still, i f not entirely certified, legitimate"'. 
Socrates would have understood what Hippias meant by 'polytropos', through 
Hippias' explanation by Talse', in contrast to 'true'. It would not necessarily 
follow that Socrates preconceives a meaning of'polytropos'''''^. However, since 
Hippias suggests that falsity is categorised not only as ability but also as deceit 
as achievement, he allows the possibility that i f he associates a false man with 
Odysseus, he would atFirm that both polytropia in Homer's Odysseus and deceit 
as achievement are caused by unscrupulousness (uavougy^a) and some 
shrewdness (cpoo vr) oic;) rather than by folly and foolishness (365e2-4). As 
Sprague indicates"'', Socrates' reference to 'polytropos' suggests his rhetoric 
hidden in his apparent redundancy. 
The whole contiguous context indicates not that Socrates is investigating 
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mutual difference about the concept of polytropia or that he is attempting to 
cheat Hippias by trading on the redundancy of the expression and the shift of the 
focus of the question. Rather, by using 'polytropos', as he thinks Hippias does, 
Socrates is trj'ing to establish what Hippias implies by categorising falsity as 
ability and inexplicitly as deceit as achievement. 
We learn from this conclusion that the conversation does not proceed mono-
linearly toward analysis of the general concept of polyfropia. Neither interlocutor 
makes clear his plan or method of analysis. Apparently, polytropia is analysed 
into falsity and then into ability, based on the interlocutors' public agreement, 
but further relevant analysis by the question what actions are the object of the 
ability is not raised. Neither Hippias nor Socrates is necessarily taking things in 
order. 
Hippias affirms unreservedly that he predicates 'able' and 'polytropos' of false 
men (365e2). He cannot deny the predication by 'able' of false men because he 
just accepted it. Neither can he deny the predication by 'polytropos' of false men 
because he explained 'polytropos' by 'false' (364e7-365b6) and confirmed this 
(365c 1-2). Pace Sprague"^ insofar as Hippias supplies what he takes Socrates 
to omit as obviously implied in the conversation, Hippias does not necessarily 
take Socrates to commit the fallacy of de dicto secimdiim quid ad dictum 
simpliciter^^. As the conversation proceeds (366c5 ff.), Hippias would suspect 
that Socrates' sophistic move led in a different direction. 
Hippias can ask about Socrates' intention in asking the question and about his 
intention in arranging the two predicates co-ordinately at 365el-2. However, 
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even i f he may suspect Socrates' cheat, he might still be confident of keeping 
consistency in categorising falsity as ability. We cannot assume that Plato 
cannot represent that one interlocutor asks back about another's question"^ So 
Hippias might feel constrained not to ask back because he boasted of answering 
any question from anyone on his lecture (363c7-d4) or on any subject (364a7-9) 
and in any way (364d3-6). 
Socrates is asking whether Hippias predicates of false men 'polytropos and 
deceitful because of foolishness and folly' or 'polytropos and deceitftil because 
of Tzavovoyia and a kind of (po6vr\o\Q (365e2-4). Socrates arranges 
'polytropos' and 'deceitftil' co-ordinately, whether he substitutes 'deceitful' for 
'able to deceive' in Hippias' speech (365d8) or deduces the former from the 
latter. 
ByTtavougy ia Socrates introduces ideas about how one can succeed in 
deceiving. Whether Socrates focuses on morally neutral intelligence in 
wrongdoing or on morally bad wish in wrongdoing without scruple, Hippias can 
take T t a v o u o y i a as a morally negatively evaluated element. Hence, pace 
Hoerber"^, Socrates does not add to confusion at least for Hippias'''''. 
Does Socrates introduce any confusion here b y c p g o v r j O K ; ? Aristotle at EN 
1144a26-28 seems to convey how people used this term and its derivatives but 
this passage is controversial^''". However, Aristotle's analysis of the Hippias 
Minor suggests that its conflision lies in the equation of 'a false man' to 
cpooviuoc;, i.e., a morally neutral intelligent"'. Socrates may understand that 
this term can connote morally positive evaluation, as Smith'''" and Zembaty"'' 
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indicate, when he qualifies it. However, pace Sprague^ '*'' and Hoerber^ ^ ,^ Hippias 
interprets that it means a morally neutral or negative element, insofar as he 
affirms the proposition in his question"*. As Jantzen suggests"^, we should 
distinguish what interpreters see as interpretatively confusing from what Hippias 
takes Socrates sophisticaUy to introduce as confiision, although, pace Jantzen''''^ , 
Hippias recognises moral wrongdoing here. By questions, Socrates seeks to 
establish what Hippias commits himself to by Hippias' words in Hippias' usage 
in Hippias' propositional acf''". 
Socrates was not embodying in his question the conditional proposition that 
if false men are able to do something or many things, then they are pol34ropoi; 
neither is he embodying the conditional proposition that i f false men are 
polytropoi, they are deceitflil; neither a syllogism: i f false men are able to 
deceive others, they are polytropoi; i f they are polytropoi, they are deceitful; 
therefore, i f false men are able to deceive others, they are deceitfiil. 
Socrates' linkage between this question (365e2-4) and the preceding (365el-2) 
suggests his concern with Hippias' predication and not his own. 
The predications about the cause of being polytropos and deceitful anse 
indirectly from Hippias' speeches becaase (1) Hippias did not clearly distinguish 
achieved deceit from attempted deceit (364e7-365b6), (2) Hippias allowed the 
possibility that he referred to achieved deceit in predicating 'able to deceive 
others' of false men (365d8), and (3) Hippias added that false men are able to 
do many things including deceiving others (365d8). 
Certainly, a deceitful man is not necessarily a man who is deceiving someone 
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now, but rather a man who deceives someone on some occasion, regularly or 
habitually. Normally, a deceitful man is one inclined to attempt to deceive 
others, whether he succeeds or not. Further, it is indeterminable whether 
Socrates means so or not''^°. However, if Hippias supposed that the ability to 
deceive others, is some potentiality which does not cause a present actual 
performance or is indifferent to actuality, and if he understood that deceitfiilness 
here means such ability, he would deduce such ability from false men's actual 
performances. 
I f Socrates intentionally introduced a wrong inferential transition from 
potentiality to actuality, Hippias could accuse Socrates of palming off However, 
Hippias did not clearly categorise ability to deceive others as potentiality 
indifferent to actuality or as potentiality implying actuality. Moreover, Hippias 
is ready to accept that false men are not those who deceive potentially only but 
those who deceive actually (365e7; 365e8-9; 366b3), whether accidentally or 
infallibly. Therefore, Hippias supposes that a deceitful man actually deceives. 
Hippias is responsible for what he understands as inferences and conclusions 
embodied in Socrates' questions. 
Socrates' alternatives of the cause of pol}1;ropia and deceit are 'foolishness and 
folly' and 'unscrupulousness and a kind of shrewdness' (365e2-4). Whether or 
not Socrates believes that some foolishness and folly can cause deceit, Hippias 
can read into Socrates' alternatives the opposition of deceit by shrewdness to 
deceit by ignorance or stupidit}'. I f Hippias takes the second alternative, he 
leaves open the possibilit}' that he believes that as he suggested (365d8), a false 
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man has knowledge of the area in which he is shrewd in deceiving others"'. 
Hippias takes Socrates' second alternative and emphasises false men's 
unscrupulousness (365e4-5). In dropping Socrates' qualification of shrewdness 
at 365e4, he may interpret that Socrates' question infroduced at 365e2-4 the 
proposition that false men are polytropos and deceitful because they have 
knavery and shrewdness in achieving deceit. He may take causes of deceit as 
morally bad. However, if he cannot distinguish moral badness of false men from 
morally neutral intelligence, his response allows the interpretation that he 
accepts that morally neutral intelligence is proper to false men (368e5-369al). 
Hippias leaves unclear whether he substitutes 'deceitful' for 'able to deceive' 
or deduces the former from the latter. If Hippias believed that a false man is only 
potentially a deceiver, he would not admit the meaningfulness of the proposition 
in Socrates' question. Accordingly, his answer (365e4-5) suggests that (a) he 
believes that a false man is actually a deceiver and (b)-(i) he infers ability in 
false men from actuality in false men if he supposes that ability is potentiality 
which does not cause present performance or (b)-(ii) he infers actuality from a 
kind of ability as experience which infallibly causes present performance. Hence, 
pace Zembaty"', not Socrates but Hippias takes the crucial step although 
Hippias later could take Socrates to have inserted somewhere a sophistical, 
perhaps illegitimate, question. 
In forming a proposition in his indirect question"^ (365e5-6), Socrates avails 
himself of a form of inference from a propositional type that x is F because x has 
G-ness to a propositional type that x is G. If the former propositional type is 
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afiBrmed, the truth of the part that x has G-ness is also affirmed. Therefore, the 
conclusion that x is G is vahdly concluded. If Hippias thinks it valid, he has to 
accept the form of inference. 
Hippias emphasised unscrupulousness with morally negative connotation 
rather than shrewdness perhaps morally neutral (365e4-5). However, Socrates 
does not here introduce the proposition that false men are unscrupulous and 
shrewd. Socrates clearly chooses the predicate, 'shrewd', which can denote 
morally neutral intelligence. I f Hippias supposes that Socrates instigates him to 
commit himself to meaning by this predicate something morally neutral, he can 
reproach Socrates for instigating him to reduce a morally significant idea to a 
morally neutral one. Socrates is not committed to EQppias' predication because 
he is asking about Hippias' predication. Therefore, either Hippias does not 
distinguish unscrupulousness from shrewdness, assuming that both are 
intelligence and morally negative disposifion or he does not distinguish 
achieved deceit from morally neutral intelligence. The latter case presages 
Hippias' self-contradiction. 
As Sprague''""' and Waterfield''" suggest, Socrates consistently does not refer 
to any terms with explicitly morally negative evaluation after Hippias' reference 
to s^auaTctv (366aI), whether Hippias uses x a x o u o y p O o i v (365e8-9) 
morally or non-morally. However, if there is reduction of morality to moral 
neutralit}', it is Hippias who commits himself to it"*. 
Hippias categorically affirms his predication by 'shrewd', additionally 
remarking, 'false men are too shrewd' (365e6). Hippias does not accuse Socrates 
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of choosing 'shrewd', and omitting 'unscrupulous', probably (a) because he 
supposes (1) that shrewdness is the cause of an achieved deceit and (2) that 
shrewdness is in that case directed to morally bad ends and (b) because he 
would not deny Homer's Odysseus the characteristic. 
hi his categorical affirmation (365e6), he probably believes that he is 
consistent in assuming that false men are those who arrange the means 
appropriate to achieving deceit as a specifiable act. 
According to Hippias' commitments about the cause of deceit, Socrates can 
judge that Hippias contrasts those who achieve deceit to those who deceive by 
ignorance or stupidit}'. Hence, he can take Hippias to believe that he keeps 
consistency in answering from a successful deceivers' point of view, but i f 
Hippias conflises the standard for evaluating intelligence in achieved deceit with 
the standard for evaluating wish to deceive, he would lose consistency. 
Further, Hippias allows the possibility that he believes that (i) there may be 
someone who achieves deceit because of foolishness and ignorance; (ii), 
therefore, some deceivers may be foolish and ignorant; (iii) false men are not 
foolish or ignorant. Moreover, i f Socrates contrasts Hippias' possible opinion 
about true men to his opinion about false men by introducing 'guilelessness' as 
a counterpart of 'unscrupulousness', then, whether or not Hippias admits the 
categor>'-match of the proposition that true men are honest because of foolishness 
and ignorance or because of guilelessness and some shrewdness, Socrates 
possibly takes Hippias to believe that (iv) true men achieve honesty in realising 
their commitment because of (a) ignorance and foolishness or (b) guilelessness 
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and some shrewdness; (v) there may be someone who realises his commitment 
because of (a) ignorance and foolishness; (vi) therefore, some honest men are 
ignorant and foolish; (vii) true men are not ignorant or foolish; (viii) true men 
achieve their commitment because of (b) guilelessness and some shrewdness; 
(ix) therefore, true men are guileless and shrewd in some sense"^ Socrates 
could be aware of the probability of Hippias' identification of truth with falsity 
in shrewdness i f he, disregarding Hippias' possible emphasis on true men's 
guilelessness as at 365e4-6, envisaged Hippias' possible shift to shrewdness 
from guilelessness as a disposition, as at 365e6 ff.. 
Is Hippias committed to the proposition that false men are clever at deceit 
or at deceit about any subject concerned (365e6-366al)? 
Socrates, linking his question with his previous question at 365e5-6, 
introduces an alternative form of question about an implication of Hippias' 
predication of'shrewd' to false men (365e6-7). Socrates introduces an inferential 
form that if x is shrewd, x knows what x is doing. This inferential form is not 
self-evidently valid on account of the meaning of'shrewd'. 
Socrates' alternatives about an implication of the predication to false men of 
'shrewd' are 'not knowing what they are doing' and 'knowing what they are 
doing' (365e7). 'What they are doing' is not necessarily univocal. It is theoreti-
cally difficult to specify what agents know about what they are doing"^. 
However, here, Socrates attnbutes what he refers to by 'what false men are doing' 
to Hippias' preceding speech (365d8), if Hippias' subsequent speeches (365e8; 
365elO) make more sense. If what Socrates refers to here by 'what false men are 
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doing' is the same as what Hippias refers to as the cause of false men's 
misbeha '^iour in the next speech (365e8), what Socrates rephrases in plural form 
(365e8), and what Hippias refers to by the plural neuter pronoun as to what false 
men are clever at (365elO), as argued below, then Hippias can refer these 
referents only to the objects which false men are able to do (365d8). Hence, 
although Socrates does not specify what false men are doing, Hippias can take 
Socrates to refer back to what Hippias suggested as the sciences or crafts in 
which false men are false. 
Hippias takes Socrates' second alternative (365e8-9). Consequently, he 
commits himself to the inferential form that i f x is shrewd, x knows what x is 
doing. Hippias does not mention what false men know, but as he emphasises the 
degree of false men's ability (365d8; cf 365e5), so he emphasises that of their 
knowledge. Hippias adds that false men actually do badly, whether morally or 
not, because they know what they deceive others about. Hence, Hippias 
presupposes that false men not only potentially but actually do badly. 
Socrates introduces an alternative form to ask about the implication of 
Hippias' predication, 'knowing what they are doing', of false men without 
specifying the objects of knowledge (365e9-10). Socrates introduces two 
predicates concerning knowledge, oocpoc and auadf ic , which can mean 
respectively 'wise' and 'foolish' with moral connotations^ '^, 'clever'''^ " and 'stupid' 
as to worldly tactfulness or ability to learn"', or 'skilled' or 'knowledgeable' and 
'ignorant' as to a specific knowledge. 
Socrates introduces (365e9-10) an inferential form that if x knows y, x is 
102 
sophos, and implicitly, a transitivity: i f x is false, x knows y; i f x knows y, x is 
sophos; therefore, i f x is false, x is sophos. He does not, however, commit 
himself to this inferential form; nor the inference as follows: x is shrewd; i f x is 
shrewd, x knows y; i f x knows y, x is sophos; therefore, x is sophos. It is 
Hippias who admits their validity and concludes that false men are sophos. 
Socrates later can use his acceptance in introducing his concluding proposition 
about Hippias' commitments into his question. 
Hippias affirms the implication that i f false men know what they are doing 
then they are sophos and the proposition that they are sophos (365elO-366al). 
I f Hippias associates 'sophos' with morally good connotation, he could not 
affirm this. But, i f Hippias considers what Socrates means by 'sophos' here in 
contrast to Socrates' previous superficially laudative reference to Hippias' 
'sophid (364a2, 364b2) and in contrast to Hippias' own predication of Homer's 
Nestor by 'sophos' (364c6), he has to make distinct their differences to keep 
consistency. Pace Schleiermacher^*' and Hoerber'*^, 'sophos' is not necessarily 
connected to morality. 
Although Hippias' qualification for the limitation of the charactenstic 
suggests both specific areas of knowledge and deceit, as did his qualification for 
false men's ability (365d8), Hippias would mean in reference to false men's 
shrewdness that false men are clever at deceiving in the areas in which they are 
false; for, pace Burnet, I delete the comma at 365elO"'*''. 
On one hand, (1) aocpog can be used like Setvog, ixavoc; and 6uva-
xoQ with an infinitive defining the meaning of the adjective or with it so; 
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or a limitative accusative (see LSJ); (2) according to Brandwood's Word Index, 
Plato's examples of o o c p o g with infinitive are rare but confirmed at Prt. 310e6-
7 and Eiithd. 271d3; (3) the word order of the adjective, o o cpo c, followed by 
the limitative accusative modifying the following infinitive is.admissible''*^; (4) 
the word order in which modifiers of an infinitive are arranged between the 
adjective, oo(p6<;, and the infinitive is supported by Eiithd. 271d3; (5) Plato 
admits this order with ixav6g"'^and Suvatoc;"^ also; (6) Plato co-ordinately 
arranges oocpog with Ssivog in the sense of 'clever'"^; (7) Plato uses 
5 8 I V 6 g with an infinitive as its modifier"'; (8) as to the word order of an 
adjective modified by an infinitive, Plato admits orders as follows: (a) infinitive 
before adjective^™; (b) infinitive and its modifier before adjective"'; (c) 
adjective between infinitive and its modifier"*; (9) Plato admits the order in 
which another element of a. sentence is inserted between an adjective and an 
infinitive which modifies the adjective''^''; (10) as Jantzen says"**, if Hippias 
commits himself, on one hand, to the proposition that false men are able in respect 
of things in which they are false (366a3-4) and, on the other hand, to the 
proposition that false men are able to speak falsely or deceive (366b2), Hippias' 
response separate from the exchange here involves some gap between capability 
of a skill or science and capability of deceit, although Socrates does not, as 
Jantzen infers"^ de\iate the meaning of ability from the area of deceit to that of 
a skill or science. 
On the other hand, (11) Plato uses oocpog with limitative accusative'"* as 
well as T x e o l " ^ more often than with infinitive; (12) the collocation with 
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infinitive here is related to the controversial examples at 366b5 and at 366b6; 
Schleiermacher^ '^^ , Croiset^ '^ *, and Jantzen"' take the infinitive at 366b5 as 
modifying ao(poi against Muraji^*", Totsuka^^', Vlastos^* ,^ and Blundell^^; 
some are not unambiguous in this respect'*'; (13) the infinitive at 366b5 can 
grammatically modify ootpoi but it is implatisible that the same infinitive at 
366b6 modifies aua^ r j <;, the adjective opposite to aocpog, in Socrates' next 
proposition (366b6-7) which is probably the contraposition of the previous 
proposition (366b4-5); only Schleiermacher'^^ Schneidewin-'^, and Jantzen^ *^  
take the infinitive to modify both adjectives; (14) although Stallbaum-'^ and 
Weiss-'^ ^ point out ffippias' reference to the areas in which false men are false, 
most critics interpret the limitative phrase by the neuter plural pronoun and the 
intensive one at 365elO as appositive to the next infinitive, 'deceive' (366a 1)^^; 
(15) Lyons' lexical analysis suggests that ( a ) e 7 u i a T a v T a i o T i 7 t : o i o i 3 o i v a t 
365e7 would be STC Cora v t a x s ^a i t a r av rather than eit l o t a v t a ; X-siv 
with 'X' as a given technical action like a g i ^ u e l v or oixoSousiv-" ' , (b) 
e n l O T a u s v o i 6t r a u T a a S T t x o T a v t a i at 365e9 would be 
S T C i o T a u e v o i xoc. s g a T c a x r i T i x a rather than S T i i O T a u s v o i roc N-xd 
with T d N - K d as a techmcal matter like T d a u A. q T i x d ( c ) therefore, a u T d 
ys xocvxa at 365elO would be xa e ^ a T c a t r i T i x d in apposition to 
E ^ a i t a r d v at 366al""", and (d) therefore, the area mentioned in the relative 
accusative at 3 66a3, 366b 1-2, and 366b3 would be t d iE,aTiaxr\x\xcc rather 
than any technical subject related t o e ^ a i t a t d v . 
Oh balance, although o o cp 6 <; with infinitive here is not entirely certified by 
loa-
the usage of this adjective (366b5) and its opposite, a ua drj <; (366b6), without 
supplying another infinitive modifying the opposite, I believe that the limitative 
accusative (365el0) modifies the infinitive (366al) and that this infinitive 
modifies the adjective, a o (po I (365el0), (a) because this reading makes Hippias' 
reference to the areas concerning falsity consistent and (b) because this gives 
Socrates more reason for starting asking about false men in the area of sciences 
and crafts (366c5 ff). Hence, Hippias' answer paves the way at least for Socrates' 
questioning about a false man in a specific area of knowledge. 
Certainly, as Lyons' work suggests, Hippias might envisage the area related to 
deceit (xcc tE,<XTiccxr\xxxa.) and as Ion, 537c 1 -e8 suggests, he might envisage 
the detail of one subject (s^aTt ai:r| T i x f i ) ; however, the question arises what 
Hppias believed false men are able to do besides or in relation to deceit at 365d8, 
and what he believes are sub-skills for a skill of deceit. 
Amoral area is co-ordinately arranged with different established technical areas in 
Socratic craft-analogy '^*. Socrates' locution in the Hippias MinoP^^ suggests a usual 
transition from morally neutral skills or sciences to morality. However, Hippias' 
polymathy with all skills and sciences in one person (368a8-e 1) and his controversial 
admission at 367a8 Iea\"es open the possibiHty that, refemng to a particular skill at 
each step in his induction, Socrates takes Hippias to commit himself to the proposi-
tions about skills subordinated to deceit as a superintendent skill and about a false man 
with this superintendent skill who is occupied about each subject concerned. 
Socrates proposed and Hippias accepted that they should let Homer go 
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(365c8-d5), but if Hippias gets through Socrates' questions without committing 
self-contradiction, he has to examine the validity of a predication of false men 
according to the validity of its predication of Homer's Odysseus, insofar as he 
is committed to the proposition that Homer's Odysseus is false. He seems to 
Socrates to introduce the predicate, 'false', according to his own descriptive 
conditions, but i f Hippias, asked about his predication of false men, intends to 
keep consistency on the assumption that 'false' is not polysemous, he ought to 
consider the validity of the predication of Homer's Odysseus, and, in respect of 
the predicate, 'sophos', of Homer's Nestor as well. In reference to Homer's 
Odysseus, his rejection of predicating 'unable to do something like a sick man', 
'polytropos and deceitful because of foolishness and folly' 'not knowing what 
they are doing' and 'stupid' would be justified. At the same time, he must avoid 
confusing the standpoint for evaluating intelligence of achieved deceit as 
wrongdoing with the standpoint for evaluating wish to achieve deceit as 
wrongdoing in order to keep consistency. 
Further, although Hippias suggests that false men are experienced in 
achieving deceit, he has not yet explained what potentiality he means by ability 
(see p. 88). If he means by ability potentiality which does not cause present 
performance, he must a\'oid committing himself to reducing falsit}'. to ability; for 
he has committed himself to the proposition that falsity implies actual pierfomiance 
(366e4-5; 365e8-9). But he leaves the possibility of his readiness to accept that 
abiht}' is potentialit)' as experience which infallibly causes actual performance. 
I f he reduces falsity as actual performance to ability as such potentiality, he 
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would risk approximating falsity as that ability to truth. 
General analysis of 366a2-c4 
Hippias admits Socrates' review of his predicates of false men. He has not 
made distinct whether intelligence in false men's deceit is morally neufral or 
what potentiality false men's ability to deceive is. But he accepts (a) that a true 
man and a false man are different and most opposite in respect of actuality, (b), 
in answering Socrates' questions about Hippias' implications, that a false man 
is able to falsify (see below) whenever he wishes to and (c) that 'a man who does 
that which he cashes to do whenever he wishes to' is 'a man able to do something'. 
Hippias leaves open the possibility that he admits that falsity is potentiality and 
that he presupposes that falsity implies actuality. Hippias' ambiguity about 
ability paves the way for Socrates' questions about ability in the usual sense 
which is indifferent to a temporally specific actualisation of the ability and 
independent of the acquisitional process of the ability. 
HUppias' commitment: false men are able to falsify about what they falsify 
about, whenever they wi.sh to (366a2-b7) 
Socrates omits Hippias' explicit predication by 'polytropos' and 'deceitful' and 
inexplicit predication by 'unscrupulous' in his review of Hippias' previous 
predications (366a2-4). Further, he paraphrases 'knowing what one is doing' mto 
'knowledgeable' and generalises Hippias' limitation of falsity by unspecific areas 
(365d8, 365e7, 365elO), deceit (365d8, 366al) or doing badfy (365e8-9) into 
those areas in which false men are false. When Socrates lists the predicates, he 
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might intend to note what Hippias predicated of false men, but i f Socrates' notes 
omit any of his predications at 365d6-366al, and i f Hippias wants to keep 
consistency, he must correct Socrates' review or supply what he finds missing; 
however, he only affirms (366a4), probably because of his confidence of his 
consistency or his boast of polymathy. 
Hippias did not commit himself to the superlative degree in the opposition of 
a true man to a false man before (365c3-7). Whether Socrates remembers this 
or not, Socrates asks whether a true and a false man are different and mos^^^ 
opposite (366a5-6). 
Socrates might set this question here to ask Hippias to confirm the proposition 
fmally to be refuted. As argued before (p. 47, 57, 99), readers have reason for 
assuming that Socrates anticipates his concluding question (367c7-d2; 369a8-
b l ; 369b3-7), because readers are privileged, unlike dramatic interlocutors, to' 
read Socrates' concluding question. I f Socrates assumed that Hippias is going 
to accept propositions and inferential rules embodied in his preceding questions, 
he could anticipate that Hippias will have to accept the proposition embodied in 
his concluding question. However, Hippias is not forced by Socrates to accept 
them as Socrates anticipated. 
Socrates is asking a question, not conducively (366a5-6). Socrates gives 
Hippias the right to deny the proposition. Hippias can suspect Socrates' intention 
but Socrates has reason to set the similar form of question again because he sets 
the question after confirming that Hippias held that false men actually deceive 
and that they are clever in achie\'ing deceit in a given area. 
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Without asking about Socrates' intention, Hippias affirms that a true and a 
false man are different and most opposite (366a6). I f he keeps consistency with 
his previous commitment to the same proposition as he understood, he has to 
reaffirm it, inasmuch as he does not reconsider what is the criterion of the degree 
of opposition or what his commitment entails. 
Socrates does not commit himself to the law of the excluded middle, but can 
assume that Hippias accepts it (cf 365c3-7; 365d6-8; 365e6-8; 365e9-366al). 
Then, Socrates starts a series of questions different from his previous two 
questions without proclaiming his purpose (366a6-8). Although Socrates does 
not explain how he deduces the proposition from Hippias' previous affirmation, 
he also refers to what Hippias implies in his previous predication of false men. 
Using the same form of indirect question of Hippias' commissive speech act 
as that at 365el (cf 365b8, 365c3), Socrates indirectly asks^ '^  whether Hippias 
implies that he categorises false men as members of the classes of able and 
clever men ( t GOV Suvatcov XWZQ x a i ooq)(i)v). He chooses Hippias'first 
and last predicates in his review (366a2-4). He gives no reason for his choice. 
Neither does he refer to Hippias' implications among his predications, 
specifically, that between ability and cleverness. But if Socrates fmally 
establishes Hippias' belief that ability and cleverness are similar in respect of 
experience which endorses actual achievement, he will be able to take Hippias 
to believe not only that false men actually deceive sometimes but that they have 
potentiality which infallibly causes actual performance. 
Hippias affirms categorisation of false men as able and clever men, because 
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he predicated these predicates with the limitation of their predicabilit}' in respect 
of false men's action and because he assumes that cleverness or ability does not 
form different categories according to the limitation by an agent's action 
(366a8). Socrates does not specify the limitadon of ability and cleverness, but 
the expression, 'some of able and clever men', is sufficient for Hippias' 
acceptance, insofar as it does not imply identification without limitation. 
While referring to sf)ecific areas in which false men are false by using the 
phrase, 'in respect of just those things', correspondingly to previous limitative 
expressions (366a4, 365elO, 365e9, 365e7, 365d8), Socrates would be 
reformulating that Hippias aflBrms that false men are able and clever, and asking 
about Hippias' implication, by introducing an alternative form of question 
(366a8-b3): whether Hippias implies that, in respect of subjects which they 
falsify (see below) about, false men are able or unable to falsify whenever they 
wish to. 
As to the punctuations at 366a8-b3, Croiset puts a comma before the first 
limitative phrase, eic; a u x d xaOta (366bl-2)^'', in contrast to (1) the 
punctuation with a comma after it"*"", (2) that with a comma after the furst 
limitati\'e phrase and another before the phrase dTceg i | feu6eoda; (366b3)"'°' 
and (3) that with a comma after the first limitative phrase and another before the 
second one ei? t a u t a dTteg i j ; eu6eoda i ' ' ° ' . I follow Croiset because (a) 
Socrates asks Hippias about his previous affirmation, which does not refer to the 
area in which false men are false, (b) i f Socrates refers to the area, he would 
intend to refer to it in both alternatives in the consequent clause, (c) Socrates' 
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reference to the areas in which false men falsify can be justified by Hippias' 
reference (366a4, 365el0, 365e9-10, 365e8, 365e7, 365d8) and (d) this readmg 
explains why Socrates starts asking about false men in a specific area (365c5 ff.). 
Socrates introduces the derivative verb, 'falsify' (i jfeudeaOai) of'false' 
(i|; s u 6 r| g). The franslation, 'falsify' is my recoinage which can mean 'deceive'"*"^  
('attempt to make another believe what one believes false or what one does not 
intend to do' or 'achieve either of those things'), 'tell a lie'"'"'' ('tell what one 
believes false or what one does not intend to do'), or 'speak falsely''*"^ ('tell what 
one believes false and is false', 'tell what one believes true and is false' or 'tell 
what is false, whether one believes it false or not'), from an observer's or an 
agent's point of view', or as an intentional or unintentional act. Hence, Hippias 
must interpret what proposition Socrates infroduces into his question and 
respond to it, or ask for clarification. 
I f Hippias accepts either alternative (366b2-3), he allows, on account of the 
implication of the limitative expression, the possibility that he still presupposes 
that a false man actually and not only potentially falsifies. Therefore, if he later 
takes Socrates to palm otT equivalence of actuality to potentiality in introducmg 
a proposition about ability into his question, he could have recourse to this 
limitative expression of Socrates' inasmuch as he distinguishes ability to falsify 
in respect of actuality and potentiality. Hence, pace Vlastos''"*, the text does not 
show that throughout the dialogue, Socrates means by iji eu Sf] g 'able to speak 
falsehoods if one so chooses'"*"'. 
Socrates may anticipate Hippias' choice of the first altematiye in his question. 
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If we simplify the proposition embodied, setting apart the implication of the 
ability to fill the gap between wish and realisation''"^, and further, i f Socrates 
assumes that ability and cleverness are closely related and that 'falsify' adds 
nothing new as a verb derived from the adjective 'false', the proposition type is 
that i f X states that false men are able, x implies that, in respect of those things 
about which they falsify, either they are able, or they are unable, to falsify 
whenever they wish to. The focus of the question seems the choice between 'able' 
and 'unable', but if Socrates assumes that Hippias can deduce ability from ability 
and cleverness, what Socrates focuses on is, rather, whether or not Hippias 
admits that false men are able to falsify in an area in which they falsify 
whenever they wish to. I f so, Socrates might be ready to introduce infallibly 
false men in an area in contrast to infallibly true men in that area; hence, ability 
impl}dng infallible falsifx'ing in an area in contrast to ability implying infallible 
'verifying'^'^'^ in that area. 
Hippias takes the first alternative without reservation (366b3-4). Hence 
Socrates can take him still to presuppose that false men actually falsify. Hippias 
could have objected that some false men sometimes, while wishing to falsify, 
fail in falsifying, because of ignorance. However, once he admitted that false 
men are deceitfiil because of shrewdness (365e4-5) as knowledgeableness 
(365e8-9) and cleverness (365elO-366al), he would come close to self-
contradiction unless he took the first alternative. Hence, pace Grote'"" and 
Kahn'"', it is not Plato or Socrates but Hippias who commits himself to the view 
that false men are those who are able to speak falsely. 
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Socrates' speech comes in a series of tagged questions (366a8; 366b 1; 366b2). 
Hence, Hippias probably takes Socrates to refer to Hippias' speech act also in his 
concluding speech in this series. Therefore, pace Burnet, Socrates' speech Sanc-
tions as a question at least for Hippias (366b4-5). Hence, pace Weiss'"^ and 
Vlastos'"^, Socrates does not commit himself to the proposition. 
In asking in conclusion whether false men are both able to falsify and clever 
at falsifying, Socrates indicates that he is introducing something deducible from 
' Hippias' preceding affirmations and asks whether Hippias draws such a 
conclusion (366b4-5). 
At 366b5, F in Burnet's critical apparatus, puts a definite article, o i before 
oocpoi xe x a l S u v a x o i ijieuSso^ai, in contrast to the omission of the 
article in W and T. This reading suggests that, according to the normal usage of 
Greek definite articles'"'*, whether or not the usage for indicating a bi-conditional 
relation was ftiUy established (cf 367c3-4; 367d7-9; 368a4-5; 376b4-6)"^ 
Socrates leaves open the possibility that he introduces the proposition that the 
class of false men is co-extensive with that of men who are both able to falsify 
and clever at falsifying""*. 
However, first, the co-extension of these two classes does not, as Socrates 
professes, follow from Hippias' pre\'ious commitments. Clearly, unlike the 
context at 365b7-c2, both are concerned not with Hippias' explanation but his 
inference. So the convertible proposition here would not necessarily be 
contextually explanatory. Further, Hippias previously accepted (1) that false 
men are able and clever (366a6-8) and (2) that if false men are able and clever. 
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they are able to falsify about what they falsify about, whenever they wish to 
(366a8-b3), but it does not formally follow, at least because of inconsistency of 
Socrates' locution here, that the man both clever at falsifying and able to falsify 
is the false man. Socrates omits the predicate 'clever' in the consequent of (2). 
F suggests Socrates' formally unsound argument (FUA): an invalid inference 
with inconsistent locution. 
Secondly, Socrates certainly may seem to Hippias to ask about the differentia 
of the genus of false men here (366a6-b4). Hippias may think Socrates is tr\-ing 
to ask him to admit that 'those able and clever' is a genus and 'clever at falsifying 
and able to falsify^ is the differentia, but this interpretation does not explam why 
Socrates introduces the clause 'whenever they wish to' at 366b2-3 and omits it 
at 366b4-5. 
According to the usual sense of 'able', 'a man able to do something' does not 
necessarily mean 'a man able to do it whenever he wishes to'. Hence, Socrates' 
omission of the clause concerned at 366b4-5 indicates inconsistent locution. It 
is, however, undeniable, considering the sense of'clever at doing something', 
that Socrates might believe that a man clever at falsifying is able to falsify" 
whenever he wishes to. Socrates might inexplicitly mdicate that 'falsifymg 
whenever they wish to' is an element of a definiens of'false men'. However, 
Socrates does not show Hippias what is the differentia. 
Alternatively, as the translation not taking the infinitive at 366b5 as modify ing 
'clever' or the infinitive at 366b6 as modifying 'ignorant or foolish' suggests '^", 
Socrates at 365el might have set aside the analysis of Hippias' opinion about 
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false men's ability for this part (366a6-c4), while working at analysis of Hippias' 
opinion about false men's polytropia and deceitfulness (365e2-3) into his 
commitment to false men's cleverness (365el0-366al), and now he might get 
down to analysis of Hippias' opinion about false men's ability on the assumption 
that Hippias takes false men's cleverness as established. However, this 
interpretation does not explain why Socrates refers to false men's cleverness in 
the antecedent at 365b 1. 
Therefore, whatever Hippias understands by ability in respect of its reciprocity 
with actual performance, formally, i f Socrates introduces a bi-conditional 
proposition, and i f Socrates introduces an object of the ability and cleverness 
concerned as the differentia, Hippias would take Socrates to introduce (FUA) 
into his speech as to the defmition of 'false men' in contrast with his previous 
attempt to avoid ambiguity of class inclusion by the verb, 'be', and a defmite 
article (366a6-8)", Socrates' sophistry and Hippias' tactics behind the scenes, 
though, could not be entirely denied in that Socrates has left Hippias to disregard 
Socrates' qualifications (365d6-8; 365e2-5) while Hippias has allowed Socrates 
to omit part of what Hippias accepted (365e5-6; 366a2-4). 
Furthermore, i f Socrates asserted this concluding speech with Bumet's 
punctuation'"^, Hippias could judge that Socrates apparently commits himself 
self-defeatingly to (FUA) while attempting to find the differentia of the genus 
of clever and able men. However, even if Socrates asks a question, Hippias can 
still take Socrates to introduce (FUA) into his question. Anyway, i f Socrates 
palms off (FUA), Hippias can accuse Socrates of sophistry. Accordingly, 
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formally, when Hippias does not object to Socrates' intention in his speech 
(366b5), he may unwarily admit (FUA) without understanding or he may leave 
Socrates' sophistic move without regarding his disregard as crucial. 
Further, as to Piippias' understanding of ability, (i) //Socrates understands 
that Hippias assumes, according to the normal idea of ability, that ability does 
not imply actuality, and (ii) //, in spite of introducing into his previous question 
(366a8-b3) the proposition presupposing, as Hippias consistently supposed 
(364e7-365b6, 365e4-5, 365e8-9), the actuality of falsity, Socrates intends to 
ask Hippias whether, by committing himself to that bi-conditional: all and only 
false men are both clever at falsifying and able to falsify, Hippias reduces 
actuality in false men to potentiality in them, then, Hippias can accuse Socrates 
of palming off a wrong reduction inasinuch as Hippias can point out Socrates' 
intentional ambiguity. However, Hippias accepts without reservation what he 
regards as the proposition embodied in Socrates' question (366b5). If the 
premises, (i) and (ii), are nght, either Hippias gives an unwary admission 
without noticing Socrates' intentional ambiguity or he does not accept what 
Socrates understands that he introduced. Then, what does Hippias accept? If 
Hippias accepted that false men are able to falsify in the sense indifferent to 
actual performance, he would be too loose in answering Socrates' questions, 
even i f Hippias made commitment in a question-and-answer bout. 
However, Hippias, suggesting that ability to achieve a deceit implies actual 
deceit (365d8), does not explicitly commit himself to the proposition that abilit}' 
is potentiality which does not imply present actual performance or that ability 
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does not imply actualit}'. Hence, although it is debatable whether Hippias 
understands that Socrates introduced a bi-conditional, i f Hippias unusually but 
not ver>' distinctly supposes that ability implies actuality, apart from (FUA), he 
would have no reason to reject the bi-conditional. Then, does Socrates clearly 
sophistically commit Hippias to (R) the reduction of actuality to ability in the 
usual sense? Certainly Socrates may introduce the bi-conditional. However, it 
does not follow that Socrates intends sophistry. Socrates may seek to establish 
Hippias' opinion about false men, reserving his question about Hippias' usage 
of 'able', although Hippias later still could take Socrates to have arranged his 
questions sophistically. 
Therefore, we might not necessarily delete the defmite article at 366b5, i f 
Hppias understands the ability unusually but not very distinctly and if Socrates 
has not committed Hippias to the distinct idea of ability. Further, it would be 
debatable, as suggested by Socrates' omission of definite articles in the 
contraposition (366b6-7), whether Socrates introduces a bi-conditional and 
whether Hippias understands Socrates does so""'. However, F's reading gives 
Hippias more reason for easily taking Socrates to introduce into his question 
both (FUA) and (R). This reading implies that either Hippias admits both unwanly 
but later will be unable to withdraw or Hippias knows that he leaves, according 
to normal Greek usage of a definite article, the possibility that he commits 
himself to the bi-conditional, and yet intentionally disregards what he regards 
as Socrates' sophistries, (FUA) and (R), because he boasted of his ability to 
answer any question. If Hippias unwarily commits himself to (R) somewhere in 
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the conversation, against his certainty of the opposition of falsity to truth in 
respect of actuality (366a5-6; 369c2-5), F's reading gives a cogent but too 
blatant mark, and, ironically, botches interpreters' attempt to purify Socrates of 
sophistry. Therefore, insofar as the ambiguity in the usage of defmite articles for 
logical equivalence is not endorsed, I reject F's reading. 
Hippias affirms the proposition in Socrates' question without reservation 
(366b5). It is unclear whether or not, as Socrates suggested, Hippias deduces it 
from his previous commitments (366a6-8; 366a8-b2). Hippias might afFinn it 
by regarding falsifying as deceit and by following his previous answers (365d8; 
365el0-366al), in order to avoid risking self-contradiction. 
The proposition which Socrates introduces into his question"*'" at 366b6-7 and 
Hippias affirms is the contraposition of the proposition Hippias accepted. 
Socrates could anticipate Hippias' affirmation, given the inferential rule about 
contraposition. 
However, if the connective, 'and', does not function epexegetically, the logical 
contraposition is not that a man unable to falsify atid stupid in falsifying is not 
false but that a man unable to falsify or a man stupid in falsifying is not false 
((P-'(Q»R))=((-QV~R)-~P)). Hence, since Hippias does not make distinct his 
commitments about the relation between ability to falsify and cleverness at 
falsifying, Hippias leaves open the possibility that accepting paraphrase by 
contraposition, he presupposes that as normal usage suggests, there is some 
implication between cleverness at falsifying and ability to falsify. 
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Hippias' commitment: false men falsify whenever they wish to (366b7-c4) 
The proposition embodied in Socrates' question is the explanation of a man 
able to do something^"'. 
Socrates may expound what proposition he introduces but need not commit 
himself to the proposition (366b7-c4); however, unless he clarifies his non-
commitment, he allows the possibility that he expounds his opinion about ability. 
But when he does not propose clever men's freedom from failure'*"" but 
excludes an exceptional case that a man able to do something whenever he 
wishes to do it is prevented from realising his abihty through illness etc. (366cl), 
he leaves the possibihty that he refers to the ordinary meaning of 'able', in which 
ilbess etc. do not repeal our right to regard that man still as able to do it. Hence, 
Hippias cannot take Socrates to refer to identifying ability with actuality, 
whether or not ability, as Fhppias understands it, involves actuality. Further, 
when taking Hippias as an example of a man able to do something, he says, ' I 
talk about such a thing as the case that you are able to write my name whenever 
you wish to (366c2-3).' But he refers to the proposition that abilit}' to do 
something is to do it whene'V'er an agent wishes to. Hence, he focuses on whether 
or not a man able to do something does it whenever he wishes to. Socrates' 
rhetoric by excluding the exception would canalise Hippias to the plausibility of 
being asked both whether a man knowledgeable at some area is able to speak 
truly, i.e., telling consistently and infallibly what he believes true and is true, 
even if he fails through unusual circumstances (366c5-el) Ofid whether he is 
able to falsify (366el-367a5)"'^\ However, if Hippias understands that ability 
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impHes actuality, he must be alert to Socrates' introduction of the transition from 
actuality to potentiality according to the broader sense of ability. 
Socrates asks whether Hippias commits himself to the proposition that the 
man able to do something is the man who actually does it whenever he wishes 
to. Certainly, it is still arguable whether Socrates' qualification (366b7-cl) 
excludes the case that ability is actuality. Therefore, although Socrates' locution 
does not necessarily focus on clarifying Hippias' distinction of ability from 
potentiality, Hippias is responsible for reducing falsity as actuality to falsity as 
potentiality, if Hippias supposes that a man able to do something whenever he 
wishes to does not necessarily actually do it. 
Kppias affirms Socrates' proposed description of a man able to do something 
(366c4). Hence, Socrates can apply Hippias' general description of a man able 
to do something to that of a false man. Specifically, Socrates can assume that 
according to the ordinary usage of'able', which does not necessarily imply the 
reciprocity with actuality, Hippias will accept that a false man falsifies whenever • 
he wishes to. 
What implications Hippias realises he is committed to in his affirmation at 
366c4 IS not decisively explicable, although we have the right to mterpret that 
Hippias supposes in a sense of ability that a false man is able to deceive others 
and clever at deceiving others. However, it is still not clear on what conditions 
Hippias accepted tliat a false man deceives others; neither is it clear, considering 
Hippias' tacit reference to Homer's Odysseus as an exemplary false man, 
whether Hippias supposes that only telling a lie is a necessaty condition for deceit. 
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When Hippias aflBrmed that no false men are true (366a6), he could not have 
reahsed what implications he turned out to commit himself to after affirming the 
propositions embodied in Socrates' subsequent questions (366a6-c4). Hippias 
here might not realise how his preceding affirmation at 366a6 is related to his 
following affirmations (1) that a false man is a man both able to falsify and 
clever at falsif}dng (366b4-c7) and (2) that the man who does what he wishes 
to do whenever he wishes to is the man able to do something (366a7-c4). 
However, as he supposed that a false man actually falsifies, to keep consistency, 
he must consider whether or not all false men falsify whenever they wish to 
actually falsify." 
Hippias would, on one hand, affirm the following contradictions about 
actuality: those between sincerity as expressed intention and insincerity as 
contravention of it, between deceit as achievement of one's plot and truth as 
realisation of one's commitment, between telling a lie generally and telling the 
truth generally, bet\veen telling a lie on a particular occasion and telling the truth 
on that occasion, and between introducing a false proposition into his speech on 
a particular occasion and introducing the negation of the proposition into the 
same speech type on the same particular occasion. That would be mainly, 
perhaps wholly, why he accepted that no false men are true (366a6). On the other 
hand, he would accept the truism that one who can judge whether or not a given 
proposition is false can judge whether or not it is true''"'*. From this truism, he 
might realise that each couple of the above contradictions are similar in respect 
of presupposed knowledge of the matter concerned. 
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I f Socrates appears to the audience to foist on Hippias the proposition about 
the opposition in the above senses, the audience could accuse Socrates of 
sophistry although Hippias betrays the vanity of his boast of pol}'mathy. 
Indeed, according to our ordinary usage, Hippias has reason for affirming the 
opposition of falsity to truth in the meaning of the above contradictions. 
However, it is not e\'idently paradoxical, considering that truism, that a man 
who falsifies whene\"er he wishes to is opposite to a man who 'verifies' 
whenever he wishes to. 
Accordingly, whether or not Socrates believes the propositions in his 
questions, the consistency of Hippias' admissions as a test of his practical 
principle depends on his understanding of ability; i f Hippias would accept that 
if a man falsifies whenever he wishes to, he has not only learned how to falsify 
but also acquired the disposition to falsify, then, Hippias would risk committing 
self-contradiction in accepting that all and only those able to falsify are able to 
'verify''''''. I f learning how to falsify is complementary to learning how to verify 
according to corresponding senses of'falsify' and 'verify', and if learning how to 
falsify does not require acquisition of the disposition to falsify, Hippias would 
not take that risk. However, i f learning how to falsify in a sense is acquisition 
of the disposition to falsify and i f verifying and falsifying are incompatible, 
Hippias could not avoid self-contradiction. 
The problem is the interpretation of the ability to do something, i.e., doing it 
whenever an agent wishes to. I f Hippias interprets the ability as potentiality 
indifferent to actual performance, he would commit an error in meaning by 'a 
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false man' an actually deceitful man and a potentially deceitful man'*"'^ . But, i f 
Hippias interprets that ability as potentiality implying actual performance, he 
would commit an error in accepting that a potentially deceitful man is the same 
as a potentially truthful man. 
If Socrates committed himself to the inferential rule in his questions such as 
the transition from actuality to potentiality indifferent to actuality and rejected 
- the inference from potentiahty indifferent to actuality to actuality, Hippias could 
accuse Socrates of inducing hun (a) to commit the wrong transition from 
actuality to potentiality and (b) to accept that the equivalence of truth to falsity 
in respect of potentiality indifferent to actuality is that equivalence in respect of 
actuality, especially i f Socrates knew that Hippias had accepted the opposition 
in respect of actuality. However, pace 'Vlastos'*^ ,^ we need not care about Socrates' 
sophistry because Socrates is not saddled, by any commitment to the proposition 
embodied in his question, with Hippias' conclusion deduced from his previous 
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commitments . 
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General analysis of 366c5-369b7 
After asking about Hippias' expertise in arithmetic (366c5-367d3), Socrates 
asks Hippias to confirm that his commitment to propositions about his expertise 
(367d6-368a7) is generahsedto propositions about an expert in general (368a8-
369a2). Socrates concludingly asks whether Hippias commits himself, 
contradictorily to his earlier commitment (365c7; 366a6), to the conclusion that 
all and only true men are false. From Hippias' commitment to this (369a3), 
Socrates shows that Hippias' commitments entail, contradicting his earlier 
commitment (365b4-5), that both Odysseus and Achilles are both true and false 
(369a4-b7). 
Socrates' questions suggest that for Hippias to reach this conclusion, Socrates 
asks him to appeal to (1) the tmism that the criteria in judging truth or falsehood 
of a proposition are the same (366e5-6) and (2) to a supposed scheme of proof 
by means of the inferential rules which Hippias committed himself to earlier 
(365d6-366c4). Specifically, by recourse to (2)-"(i) the inference by 
confraposition (366b4-6; cf 367b3-5) and (2)-(ii) the rule of transitivity (365e5-
366a 1), Socrates might be taken by Hippias later to ask whether he accepts a 
proof in which the conclusion that all and only false men are true follows by the 
rule of transitivity from the following premises, implying the reciprocity of 
abihty with actuality: (PI) all and only experts are true (cf 367c6); (P2) all and 
only experts are false, and in which each premise follows by confraposition from 
the further premises; (P3) all experts are false (366e3-e6) or true (366c5-dl), 
which is a proposition of the transition from expertise as ability to truth or falsity 
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as actuality; (P4) all non-experts are neither false (366e6-367a2; 367a2-a5) nor 
true. 
However, Socrates does not propound clearly how Hippias has to deduce the 
conclusion from his commitments. Rather, Hippias reluctantly accepts the 
conclusion (367d3; 367e6-7; 368a7; 369a3), except for Socrates' concludiag 
formulation (369a8-bl and 369b3-7), without objecting. Hippias used 'true' and 
'false', at least in a dispositional sense (365a4-bl). Hence, Hippias is committed 
to the reciprocity of ability with actuality (cf 367c6). 
Hippias may be confident of keeping consistency with his admissions (366c6-
7, 366dl, 366d5-6), but Hippias' baast of polymathy shackles him to answering, 
even when: (a) he may not be sure of the right answer (367d3) or of the valid 
inference leading to the right answer (367b5-6, 367c7, 368a3); (b) he may 
suspect Socrates' concealment of his intention in his question (366c6-7, 366dl, 
366d3, 367b7, 367d5, 368a 1) or Socrates' ordering of questions (366c6-7, 
366d3, 369b2). He would realise that if he objects to Socrates' question or even 
withdraws his pre\'ious admission (cf 369b2), he would risk publicly betraying 
the emptiness of his polymathy. 
Hippias would not care whether Socrates refers to (1) a professional who has 
acquired a disposition to obey a professional ethic, (2) an expert in a subject, 
whether professional or not, or (3) a clever man who has abandoned professional 
ethics and acquired the ability to do improperly as well as property'*'' (366c5-6, 
367d9, e2, 367e8-368al, 368b2, 368c 1, 368d3; cf 373c9, 374a2, a6). Socrates' 
reference to Hippias' experience is sophistic formally in the conversational 
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interplay. 
However, when Socrates refers to Hippias' utterance of true propositions 
about his experience in order to refer further to his utterance of false propositions 
in commissive context, Socrates' move is crucial for Hippias i f Hippias commits 
himself to the systematic shifting of the meaning of both 'speak truly' and 'speak 
falsely''"''". Although Socrates has linguisfic means, say explicit performative 
verbs, to distinguish 'uttering true or false proposifions in commissive context' 
from 'uttering true or false propositions, irrespective of a commissive context', 
Socrates leaves Hippias to understand whether or not these verbs involve a 
commissive context. Most critics and translators suggest that the interlocutors 
use the verbs in commissive context''^'. Kraus''" and Wilamowitz''" indicate the 
systematic ambiguity of the verbs; Grote''^ '', Croiset''", Fowler"^*, and Santas'*" 
suggest it. Ovink clarifies this problem"*"*^ . Vlastos argues about this problem 
and rejects the interlocutors' shift of the meaning of the verbs"'. 
Most critics have instilled into their interpretation the formalised proof 
PI . all and only experts in an area are able to speak truly in the area; 
P2. all and only experts in the area are able to speak falsely in the area; 
CI . all and only men who are able to speak truly in the area are able to 
speakfalsely in the area. 
And yet they often regard premises PI and P2 as true and, therefore, the 
argument as valid and sound, although they are divided as to the meaning of the 
relevant verbs'*'*" and although some reject the soundness of the argument in 
which the verbs are used as 'uttering true or false propositions in commissive 
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contex't''*'*'. However, critics have not discussed ftiUy where and how Socrates 
iatroduces the verbs into his questions or in what sense of these verbs Hippias 
commits himself to the propositions embodied ia Socrates' questions. 
Certainly, i f we interpret that the verbs mean 'formulate true or false 
propositions', the argument is fairly, although not entirely, sound because ability 
to formulate true or false propositions effectively defmes knowledge, but it is not 
necessarily tri\'ial, as some suppose, that all and only experts are able to utter 
true or false propositions i f they disregard or can disregard commissive con-
text'*'*"; nor is it trivial that all and only experts are able to utter true or false 
propositions in commissive context. The interpretive problem still lies between 
Hippias' usual response about an expert's uttering true propositions (366c5-el) 
and Socrates' introduction of an expert's uttering false propositions (366el-
367a5). If Socrates does not envisage a triyial conclusion, readers may plausibly 
assume some gap between the meanings of the complementary verbs, 'verify' 
and falsify in 366c5-el and 366el-367a5. 
In the drama, Socrates is concerned only with Hippias' commitments. 
Socrates does not necessanly mvestigate whether or not the propositions Hippias 
is committed to are experientially and commonsensically supported; rather, what 
Hippias should properly believe according to his earlier commitments. 
I. Socrates does not, as Jantzen suggests''''^  investigate the conditions for 
expertise or speaking falsely. To produce a wrong product of calculation, we must 
follow an arithmetical rule and take another additional anthmetical procedure. 
In arithmetic, if we show others that we contravene the arithmetical rules, we 
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have to follow the rule first and not vice-versa. Also, an expert in arithmetic, by 
definition, knows the one criterion of appropriate and inappropriate procedures 
in following arithmetical rules. Hence, an expert in arithmefic is able to judge 
which arithmetical procedure or product is right and wrong according to 
arithmetical rules. Therefore, i f the expert is given any example of arithmetical 
procedure or product, he is able to judge whether it is right or wrong. Further, 
the expert is able to formulate a wrong example of an arithmetical procedure or 
product by following arithmetical rules and then deviating. 
However, from our point of view, apart from the interlocutors' opinions, the 
expert is, as Vlastos suggests'*'*'*, not necessarily trained to tell a lie in uttering 
a false proposition in commissive speech, even i f the expert is in the utterance 
situation in which the audience takes him not to be committed to the wrong 
arithmetical procedure in question, as when a teacher tests a student by 
deliberately showing a wrong procedure or when the speaker knows that the hearer 
understands that the speaker is not committed to the proposition introduced in 
the commissive speech•*"*^  Pace Kraus'*'**, an expert in arithmetic is not 
necessarily able to speak truly or falsely in commissive context. Practice in 
introducmg a false proposition is not proper to the process of learning anthme-
tic. Therefore, introducing a false proposition into one's commissive speech t}TDe 
is not proper to an expert. 
However, an expert in arithmetic does not lose his ability to follow arithmeti-
cal rules, even i f he.speaks falsely in arithmetic in commissive context. 
Intentional deviation from the rules is sufficient for expertise. A reliable expert 
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in arithmetic is expected to speak truly in arithmetic in commissive context. The 
expertise is acquired by habituation to following the rules. However, an expert 
does not necessarily speak falsely or truly in his area in commissive context. 
Therefore it is indifferent to expertise in arithmetic whether the expert wishes to 
speak truly or falsely in arithmetic in a commissive speech type, and still more 
whether the expert wishes to deceive others or to be honest in arithmetic, 
although expertise in arithmetic would be an important factor in deceiving others 
in arithmetic. 
II . Socrates does not investigate the conditions of deceit. However, since 
Hippias suggests his unanalysed opinion about deceit in an achievement sense 
(365d8, 365el0-366al), one notes that uttering false propositions is not sufficient 
or, exactly speaking, necessary for achievement of a deceit without a hearer's 
noticing, although uttering a false proposition is necessary for achieving a lie 
without a hearer's noticing. The conditions of deceiving others concern not only 
a deceiver's act but also a deceived person's beliefs and proclivity to believe 
something. Uttering a false proposition consistently and infallibly whenever one 
wishes to can be telling a lie consistently and infallibly but cannot be necessanly 
succeeding in deceiving the hearer without the hearer's noticing. 
Further, if we can conceive a successful and consistent honest man who 
achieves his commitments, unusually but correspondingly to such a deceiver, we 
can say, likewise, that uttering tme propositions is not sufficient or necessary for 
being thus honest. 
I I I . As some critics assume, if we take, as Hippias would do, 'falsify' in a 
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moral or non-moral sense, we might find a sound argument in the conversation 
about a false man in an area of sciences and crafts (366c5-369b7). However, 
even i f we take 'falsify' as 'formulate a false proposifion', we could not keep 
entirely intact the whole argument in the Hippias Minor. 
Probably a man able to formulate a true proposition is also able to formulate 
derivative false propositions. Only in this sense, as Jantzen says'*'*^ , can we say 
that an expert is able both to formulate a true proposifion and to formulate a 
false one. As argued on pp. 128-129, an expert is not necessarily able both to tell 
the truth and to lie. Neither is an expert able both to do appropriately and to do 
inappropriately to the expertise, if, as Jantzen'*'*^  and Sprague'*'*' say, the expert 
preserves his acquired disposition to do appropriately to the expertise. Nor, 
crucially for Hippias, is a man able both to do appropriately and inappropnately 
a criminally described action. An expert in a specific criminal act is not 
necessarily able to work improperly. 
In the proposition embodied in his quesfion, Socrates refers to the point that 
formulating a false proposition parasitically derives from formulating a true 
proposition (366e6; cf 370d5-6)'*^°. Socrates does not emphasize or develop this 
point, even in his reference to the conclusion of the present conversation (371e7-
8; 372e3-6) or in the following (373c6-375d7). Pace Jantzen the interlocutors, 
at least at 365c5-369b7, do not talk about a false man who does something 
falsely or wrongly but one who speaks falsely or truly a given proposition in a 
skill or science; Socrates at 373c6 ff., though, refers to the case of doing 
something well and badly, probably in reference to the conversation at 366c5-
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369b7 (cf. 372e3-6, 371e7-8, 373c7, 374a7-bl, 375e9-376al). But whether or 
not the derivativeness in formulating a false proposition applies to uttering a 
false proposition in commissive context, i.e., lying or deceit, and further, to the 
case of doing \vrong in general is crucial, not from the interlocutors' point of 
view but from ours, for the justifiability of Hippias' commitment about a false 
man (366c5-367d3) and for the interpretation of Socrates' wavering (372d7-e3). 
If the derivativeness of formulating a false proposition applies to wrongdoing 
in general"*'", intentional wrongdoing in general derives from formulating doing 
right and therefore, intentional wrongdoing presupposes knowledge of doing 
right. This derivativeness holds in speaking falsely. One who attempts to lie or 
deceive believes what is true or what he intends to do, but this does not hold 
generally. He, prima facie, does not necessarily know what is right. Moreover, 
apart from the two plausible assumptions (1) that there exists only one absolute 
norm that no one should contravene and (2) that there is some relation between 
an established criminal law in a society and that absolute norm, knowledge of 
a norm a man intends to contravene, if it is described as knowledge of a norm 
he acknowledges, is impossible; hence one contravening a norm he does not 
acknowledge might formulate an action of obeying the norm when he intends 
to contravene it. However, one described as a wrongdoer, i.e., contravener of a 
norm from the point of \'iew of one who acknowledges the norm, can intend to 
obey another nonu from an agent's point of view, although this noun is 
incompatible with that norm. Even a psychological conflict between incompati-
ble norrns might not occur to him. Therefore, the derivativeness of formulating 
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a false proposition from formulating a tme proposition cannot, as Socrates' remarks 
(372el-6; cf. 371e7-8) suggest to some, be applied to intentional'wrongdoers, 
and, especially, intentional and consistent criminals, except for the case of those 
aware that they are contravening a norm others acknowledge. 
I f an agent imagines which means is appropriate to an end and yet does 
something inappropriate to the end, the agent has in view both the end and the 
means appropriate to it. In some area like calculation, we can only descnbe one-
way derivative relation. What we can intentionally do is either calculating 
appropriately to arithmetical rules or avoiding calculating appropriately to the 
rules and taking another arithmetical additional procedure. We have no means 
to perform the wrong calculation directly. 
This suggests that, according to the model in which we regard an action as 
rule-following analogously to keeping or contravening a specific rule, on one 
hand, we can keep a rule or intentionally avoid keeping it, and on the other 
hand, we can contra\'ene a rule or avoid contravening it. For example, we can 
preserve others' lives intentionally or avoid preserving others' lives intentionally, 
while we understand a specified means to preserve others' lives; we can take 
others' lives intentionally or avoid taking others' lives while we understand a 
means to take others' lives. We have to distinguish two types of actions 
according to what an agent regards as a norm of the action. 
According to a model, we can accept that an intentional wTongdoer is better 
than an unintentional uiongdoer in tlie sense that an agent who avoids an action 
CA"), called 'an intentional wTongdoer', is better at following a rule ('a,', 'a,', 'a^) 
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called 'doing right', than a person who fails in the action 'A', called 'an 
unintentional wongdoer'. The person who fails in the action ('A') unintention-
ally does the same thing ('a,', 'a,', 'a^', 'a/) as an agent intentionally does ('-A'). 
Also, we can accept that 'an intentional mongdoer" is worse than 'ah unintentional 
wrongdoer'm respect of intention to do right ('A'). But we cannot confuse the 
person who fails in doing an action ('A') in unintentionally doing a certain thing 
with the person who intentionally does the same thing ('~A'). We use the same 
name of an action for what happens to an intentional agent and what happens 
to an unintentional agent. Therefore, even i f formulating a false proposition 
derives from formulating the true proposition, it does not follow that doing 
wrong in a specified action derives from doing right. Therefore, we cannot 
justify what Socrates induces Hippias to accept (369b8-376c6). 
I V . Neither Socrates nor Hippias questions Socrates' right to ask about a 
science or skill i f he is not an expert in it. Why does Socrates conjecture what 
an expert in arithmetic can do if he is not an expert (366c5-367a5)? As also in 
the case of geometry- (367d6) and astronomy (367e8-368al), Socrates asks 
whether Hippias is an expert in the area in question, but does not explain why 
he has to ask (366c5-6). Socrates does not profess whether or not he is an expert 
in some specific area, but he must have some ideas of what is true of a specific 
expertise not in respect of its content or rules but in respect of some formal 
things common to expertise in general and knowable to laymen. If Hippias is not 
an expert in some specific area Socrates refers to, could Socrates not expect 
Hippias to answer the same questions not about Hippias but about an expert in 
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some specific area in general? Even if both of them knew little about arithmetical 
rules, could Socrates not ask Hippias whether Hippias, i f he became an 
arithmetician, would be able to speak truly of a given arithmetical proposition? 
Socrates' right would be supported by the conditions on which a layman can 
both suppose a formal truth about a specific expertise and discourse about it. 
Even if both were laymen, they would plausibly talk about formal truth about a 
skill or science. Laymen, for example, can refer to what is available for them, 
such as a product of a skill or science; however, they could not specify the 
process of the production. Accordingly, i f laymen obtain a formal idea about 
production of a skill or science, it would come from an ordinary idea of a means 
and its end. Further, la^ nmen hold the idea of truth and falsehood in advance of 
expertise. Therefore, whether or not Hippias is an expert in a specific area is 
indifferent to Hippias' commitment to a possible argument leading to the 
conclusion that all and only false men about calculations are true about them. 
Hippias' commitment: an expert in arithmetic 'verifies' whenever he wishes 
to (366c5-cl) 
Socrates' new series of questions (366c5-367a5) does not refer generally to a 
false man, a man able to falsify, a man who falsifies whenever he wishes to, or 
a man clever at falsif}'ing, in relation to the preceding conversation about a false 
man in general; he refers to Hippias (366c5). Socrates' first question is 
personal. Hippias could not understand Socrates' intention. Apparently Socrates 
appears to Hippias to confirm by a conducive question Hippias' experience in 
arithmetic (366c5-7). Socrates asks thus probably because of his personal 
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knowledge of Hippias (368b2-5) or Hippias' commitment to poh'mathy''". 
Whether or not Socrates intentionally commits Hippias to the existence of a man 
experienced in arithmetic by a personal question, Hippias' commitment is not 
logically necessary for"*'"* but still crucial to eliciting his commitment to the 
proposition that in any area, all and only experts speak truly whenever they wish 
to. By taking 'Hippias' as subject of a proposition about someone experienced 
in an area, Socrates can pin the responsibility for commitment to the proposition 
on Hippias. Looking ahead to the conclusion (367c7-d2), Socrates refers to 
Hippias as a representative expert in an area both (a) to commit Hippias to the 
propositions in his questions and (b) to ask about an expert in an area in general 
(367d6-9; 367e8-368a2). 
Socrates refers to Hippias not as a professional but as someone experienced. 
However, Hippias showed that he has professionally cultivated principle 
implicitly in contrast to a lower end changeable in a situation (364d3-6; 364a7-
9, 363c7-d4)'''"'^  Hence, Hippias would distinguish (1) a man who has acquired 
a disposition to obey a professional ethic from (2) an expert in an area, but 
Socrates may refer to expertise of (3) a clever man, occupied about a subject, 
who is able to use his skill properly and improperly (see p. 125-126). 
Hippias emphasizes his superlative experience in arithmetic boastftilly and 
unsolicitedly as before (cf 365d8)''" (366c6-7). Then, Socrates does not ask 
whether cm arithneticicni, asked what is the product of multiplying 700 by 3, 
gives the right answer quickest and best of all i f he wishes to. But Hippias 
possibly takes Socrates to ask a proposition generalised from the proposition in 
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his personal question, by taking Hippias as a representative expert in arithmetic 
and multiplication of 700 by 3 as a representative arithmetical performance 
(366c7-9) in a less probable conditional sentence'*'^ . Socrates puts this second 
personal question not only to elicit Hippias' commitment to the proposition that 
an expert in arithmetic utters tme propositions whenever he wishes to. As Hippias 
implicitly accepted a logic of a representative instance (366c2-3; 366c4), he 
would allow Socrates commonsensically to generalise from an exemplary 
instance"*'^ . 
No one who knows that Hippias is an arithmetician would ask arithmetical 
questions to test him. Readers can explain partly why Socrates uses the less 
probable conditional sentence (366c7-dl). Certainly, he is in a position to elicit 
a more assertiA'e commitment to the proposition about an expert in arithmetic in 
general. Then, why does Socrates dare to distance Hippias from his possible 
assertion of a general proposition by a personal question? Socrates may antici-
pate (cf 366el-367a5) that he will have difficulty in eliciting a commitment to 
a proposition that Hippias falsifies i f he wishes to and that not in the sense that 
Hippias utters a false proposition, irrespective of a commissive context, but in 
the sense that Hippias tells a lie or deceives. I f so, this could explain why 
Socrates encourages (366el-3) Hippias to answer questions about speaking 
falsely (366e3-367a5). 
7/TTippias supposed that Socrates is trying to commit him to the proposition 
that an expert in anthmetic tells a lie or deceives about arithmetic, (a) by 
recourse to the ambiguity between 'falsify' and 'speak falsely' which appears first 
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at 366e5, and (b) by taking advantage of the case that uttering what one believes 
true in commissive context is not significant for reliability in expertise in the 
sense that honesty in a usual dispositional sense is irrelevant to arithmetic, thert, 
Hippias could suspect that by the expression, 'one would speak truly i f one 
should wish to' (366c8-dl), Socrates wil l distort Hippias' commitment about 
arithmetic into his commitment about his honesty in arithmetic not in a usual 
dispositional sense but in an unusual achievement one. However, Hippias, 
attending to the contrast of 'uttering a true proposition, irrespective of a 
commissive context' to 'uttering a false one in that context', does not recogmse 
the ambiguity between "speak falsely' and 'falsify'. Neither does Hippias attend 
to the difference between honesty in dispositional and achievement senses; for 
Hippias would not, and only Socrates could, canalise that difiference into the 
exchange unusually^"^ and irrelevantly to expertise, in reference to Hippias' 
commitment to the idea of deceit in an achievement sense. Socrates is now 
asking Hippias about his arithmetic, not about deceit or about honesty. 
'Speaking truly' can be used neutrally to an agent's intention and is less 
morally loaded than 'telling the truth'. However, if Hippias cannot show that he 
distinguishes the case (a) that someone is taken by another to utter a true 
proposition, whether he believes it or not, from the case (b) that someone is 
taken by another to mtroduce a true proposition into his speech in commissive 
context, Socrates later might take Hippias to have committed himself to meanmg 
by 'speak truly' 'intentionally introducing a true proposition into commissive 
speech', as 'telling the truth' or 'being honest'. 
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To reply to Socrates' assumptive question (366dl), Hippias must assume that 
he is in a situation where he as an expert m arithmetic answers a questioner, 
whether pupil, teacher, or layman. Insofar as he admitted that he is most 
experienced in arithmetic, Hippias may assume that he is in a teaching context; 
he may also assume that he shows his ability in arithmetic in answering the 
question rightly. In this regard, Socrates' example of multiplication of 700 by 3 
is not so simple, like multiplication of 7 by 3, and not so difficult, like 
multiplication of 739 by 321, that Hippias can question whether Socrates 
seriously asks about his ability to calculate or suspect that Socrates asks about 
a true man indirectly in contrast to a false man in arithmetic. Hence, Socrates' 
example can provoke Hippias' assumptive demonsfration of his ability in 
arithmetic. 
Hippias could not recognise what question Socrates is going to ask 
consequent on his commitment to his ability to answer correctly a questioner 
about arithmetic, but Hippias would have to accept the proposition about his ability 
because of the personal function of the question. For this question psychologi-
cally presses Hippias to multiply 700 by 3 quickly and perfectly, assuming that 
Socrates knows the right answer; for, after his boasting, if he does not confirm 
the right product, he might publicly ridicule himself He would be tempted, by 
the personal function of this question, to disregard the supposed context of his 
speech to the supposed commissive questioner. Although hardly embarrassed 
by that calculation, he would be tempted to attend to the audience. Thus Hippias 
would not attend so much to the supposed commissive relation to the supposed 
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questioner as his own propositional act, i.e., what is the nght product of the 
calculation''*". 
Hippias might miss the possibility of moral connotation of Socrates' 
expression 'speaking tmly'; he might not care about separating infroducing a true 
proposition into his speech from the context of a commissive speech. For he 
would not have suspected that Socrates' questioning about his experience in 
arithmetic is concerned with his questioning Hippias' suggested view: the 
incompatibility of being false with being true in respect of achievement in the 
area concerned (365elO-366al; 366a5-6). 
As Hippias boasted that he is most experienced in arithmetic (366c6-7), 
Socrates uses successive superlatives in formulating the proposition (366d2). 
Socrates substantially elicits from Hippias his commitment to the proposition 
that a man is able and clever in arithmetic if and only i f he verifies about any 
arithmetical proposition i f he wishes to (366d2-3); for Hippias admitted that 
'knowing' implies 'clever (365e9-366al), that 'able' implies 'clever' (366b4-7), 
and that he is most experienced in arithmetic (366c6). However, it is open to 
question whether Socrates admits that 'expenenced' implies 'knowing'"**'. 
Socrates asks whether Hippias predicates of himself further 'best at anthme-
tic'. In asking whether Hippias is only cleverest and ablest or also best at things 
in which he is ablest and cleverest, namely, arithmetic (366d3-5), Socrates 
leaves unclear whether predication by 'good at arithmetic' is deduced from 
predication by 'clever and able in arithmetic'. Neither does he ask whether 
Hippias is good at arithmetic, if he is able and clever in arithmetic. 
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Socrates does not make clear whether Hippias is morally good in respect of 
being honest about arithmetic if he is clever at verifying and able to verify in the 
sense of being honest about arithmetic, whether in a usual dispositional sense 
or in an unusual achievement sense in relation to Hippias' idea of deceit in an 
achievement sense. Neither does Socrates ask whether i f Hippias is an expert in 
arithmetic, he is able and clever in arithmetic; nor does he analyse an arithme-
tician further, apart from answering a representative arithmetical question rightly. 
I f Socrates takes Hippias to admit that the predicate 'experienced in 
arithmetic' is equivalent to the predicate, 'good at arithmetic', it is dubious whether 
Socrates investigates the conditions of an expert in arithmetic. Rather, Socrates 
allows the possibility that he is trying to elicit from Hippias his commitment to 
the predication of'good at arithmetic' to elicit Hippias' further commitments by 
his following questions, whether or not Hippias recognises that 'good' is used 
equivocally in the meaning of knowing how to follow a norm or following a 
norm, and whether or not Socrates intends to lead Hippias to admit that he 
committed himself to predicating of a false man in arithmetic the predicate, 'the 
best', which Hippias used to differentiate Homer's Achilles from Homer's 
Odysseus and Nestor. 
Socrates also allows the possibility that he introduces 'good' as a word of 
approval m respect of cleverness and ability in arithmetic and somewhat 
irrelevantly, pace Sprague'**' and Fouillee''*"', if Hippias takes Socrates to relate 
anthmetic to some moral goodness irrespective of the syntax. However, Hippias 
could not recognise what Socrates intends to do in arranging questions. He 
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would not mind the predication 'good', if he understands by it 'good at arithmetic'. 
But inasmuch as he committed himself to the proposition that he is most 
experienced in arithmetic (366c6), he would have to accept definitely that he is 
best, as well as cleverest and ablest, in arithmetic (366d5-6). 
Socrates elicited from Hippias by his first two questions Hippias' commitment 
to the proposition that i f Hippias is experienced in arithmetic, he would 
infroduce a tme proposition in commissive speech about a particular arithmeti-
cal question i f he should wish to (366c5-6; 366c7-dl). Socrates is asking 
conducively, based on Hippias' commitment to his being himself 'good at 
arithmetic in general' (366d5-6), whether Hippias would speak tmly about 
arithmetic in general most ably (366d6-el). Apart from using successively the 
superiative form 'most ablV (366d6), Socrates leaves unclear whether he intends 
to elicit some new point from Hippias' commitment to the predication of 'good 
at arithmetic' to himself 
Socrates refers not to the context of performing a commissive speech in this 
question (366d6-el) but to Hippias' speaking tmly about arithmetic in general. 
Hence, Scicrates may focus on ability to utter a true proposition without refemng 
to a commissive context, i f we assume that Socrates anticipates Hippias' 
commitments to the propositions in his following questions about Hippias' 
ability to speak falsely about arithmetic. 
To sum up, Socrates refers to an anthmetician's goodness in respect of his 
clevemess and ability. However, Hippias takes Socrates to ask not whether an 
arithmetician is able to be tme in arithmetic in the sense that he is able to 
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achieve his commitments about arithmetic, i f any, but whether an expert in 
arithmetic is able to utter a true proposition in arithmetic in the sense that what 
he tells about arithmetic is true, irrespective of a commissive context. If Socrates 
asked about an honest man in arithmetic, Hippias' experience in arithmetic 
(366c5) would be irrelevant. However, Hippias probably does not attend to the 
point that an arithmetician take the commissive context for granted. 
Hippias may suspect Socrates' rhetoric in formulating and ordering his 
questions, but he is in no position to foresee Socrates' development of his following 
questions. Hippias accepts that i f he is good at arithmetic, he would most ably 
speak truly about arithmetic not in the sense that he would infroduce a true 
proposition into his commissive speech as an honest man about arithmetic in 
contrast to a deceitful man about arithmetic but in the sense that he is able to 
utter a true proposition, taking the commissive context for granted. He would 
accept the proposition on account of his acceptance of the proposition in 
Socrates' second question (366b7-dl) in this series, but if he must keep consistency 
in his commitments, he must distinguish the ability to utter a true proposition 
irrespective of a commissive context from the ability to tell the truth in 
introducing a true proposition into commissive speech. 
Hippias' commitment: an expert in arithmetic falsifies whenever he wishes 
to (366cl-367a5). 
Most experts take for granted speaking of arithmetic in a commissive context 
(see p. nSft".). Therefore, to be honest or deceitful about antlimetic sounds sfrange. 
However, telling a lie or the truth about arithmetic approximates uttenng a false 
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or tme proposition about arithmetic. Hence, EQppias may alternate between the 
two interpretations of'speak falsely' (366el-367d3). 
Socrates tells Hippias he is going to change the subject-matter of his 
questions to speaking falsely, and requests Hippias to answer nobly and 
magnificently just as he answered on speaking truly (366e 1-3). 
Socrates does not make clear whether he elicited from Hippias his personal 
commitment to the proposition embodied in his question or obtained Hippias' 
agreement to what Socrates can deduce from the proposition embodied in his 
question; neither whether he is concerned with Hippias' commitment to Hippias' 
personal characteristics nor whether he interprets only that Hippias personally 
is honest in infroducing a tme proposition in commissive speech about anthmetic, 
regardless of other experts nor whether Hippias is able to infroduce a tme 
proposition about arithmetic, regardless of a commissive context; nor whether 
he elicited from Hippias his commitment to the proposition that an arithmetician 
in general is honest in introducing a tme proposition into commissive speech or 
is able to introduce a tme proposition, regardless of a commissive context. 
While Socrates perhaps leaves unclear how he interprets the answers elicited 
from Hippias, he shows that he is going to ask questions about speaking falsely 
about antlimetic in general, whether in commissive speech or not (366el -2). He 
leaves unclear in what relation to the questions about speaking tmly he is going 
to ask about speaking falsely, but shows his satisfaction with the answers 
elicited from Hippias in suggesting that Hippias answered his questions nobly 
and magnificently. Hippias would take Socrates to have talked about speaking 
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tally in arithmetic in contrast to speaking falsely in arithmetic. He need not have 
noticed Socrates' reversion to the topic about the relation between being true and 
being false. 
Socrates asks, 'If someone should ask you what is the product of multiplying 
700 by 3, would you falsify most and always consistently speak falsely about the 
product, wishing to falsify and never to give a right answer (366e3-6), or [if 
someone should ask the same question,] would a foolish [or ignorant] man in 
arithmetic be abler to falsify than you are when you wish to (366e6-367a2); 
otherwise, on one hand, would a foolish [or ignorant] man, i f it so happened, 
often speak truly against his wish, while wishing to speak falsely, because he 
does not know about arithmetic, and on the other hand, you, clever [at 
arithmetic] as you are, would falsify always consistently if you should wish to 
falsify (367a2-5)?' 
As regards the alternatives here, Socrates does not clarify their relation. I f 
Socrates means that the second (366e6-367a2) is exclusive to the first (366e3-
e6), Socrates would have to ask in the second, formally, whether there is 
someone who would falsify more and speak falsely more consistently and 
infallibly, wishing to falsify and never to answer rightly, than Hippias. When 
Socrates introduced the superlative adverb in the question about speaking truly 
(366c7-dl), he did not refer to a non-expert or a foolish man in arithmetic. But, 
in the second alternative (366e6-367a2), Socrates infroduces the comparative 
form for the comparison between a foolish or ignorant man and an expert. 
Neither does Socrates there refer to consistency and infallibility in speaking 
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falsely. Socrates' introduction of the verb, 'be able to', can be associated with the 
first alternative, according to Hippias' commitment to the proposition that the 
man able to do something is the man who does it whenever he wishes to 
(366b7-c3). Therefore, the second alternative is associated with 'falsifying much' 
in the first. Hence, Hippias must supply the lacking counterpart to make the first 
and second alternatives exclusive in respect of the incompatibility of an expert 
with a foolish or ignorant man and in respect of consistency and infallibility in 
speaking falsely. As the second alternative lacks detail, Hippias must still judge 
the meaning of 'falsify'. 
As to the relation between the second alternative (366e6-367a2) and the third 
(367a2-5), Socrates linguistically marks their altemativeness; he introduces both 
'Hippias' as 'an expert or a clever man' and 'a foolish or ignorant man' in both 
altemafrves. But they are apparently not exclusive. The second part of the third 
altemative (367a4-5) suggests the exclusiveness in that that part formally refers 
to the same content of the first altemative. Hippias takes Socrates to refer to both 
a foolish man and a clever man, or both an expert and a non-expert and describe 
what each of them does in respect of the same thing, speaking falsely or 
falsifying, but Socrates keeps consistency neither in expressing ability at 366b2-
3, 366b5, 366b7-c3 nor in using 'speaking falsely' and 'falsifying'. Therefore, 
what proposition Socrates introduces into his question depends on Hippias' 
-demand of clarification or Hippias' interpretation. 
As to Socrates' arrangement of the verb, 'falsify', Hippias would have taken 
Socrates to substitute this for 'deceive', which Hippias had introduced at 365d8 
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and 366a 1 (366b2, b3, b5, b6). But as Socrates predicated the verbal phrase 
'speak truly' of Hippias (366dl), so he predicates 'falsify' of Hippias in the 
corresponding question (366e5) and yet coordinately with the verbal phrase, 
'speak falsely' (366e5); as he collocated the adverb, 'most' with a verbal phrase, 
'speak truly' (366dl), so he does with the verb, 'falsify' (366e4). Further, 
Socrates uses this verb, 'falsify, of Hippias (367a5) as a counterpart of the verbal 
phrase, 'speak truly', used of an ignorant or foolish man (367a3) and, in this 
third alternative (367a2-5), 'falsify' (367a4) is used as a rephrase of the verbal 
phrase, 'speak falsely' (367a2-3), because both are introduced in the correspond-
ing clauses about an agent's wish (367a2-3; 367a4). Further, the predicative part 
at 367a4-5 in the third altemative is meant as a paraphrase of the second verbal 
phrase of the first altemative, 'always consistently speak falsely' (366e5). Hence, 
Socrates would appear to Hippias to make no distinction between the use of 
'falsify' and that of'speak falsely'. Hippias has the right to ask Socrates to clarify 
his meaning to ask. However, in this context (366c5 fif.), Socrates allows the 
possibility' that he uses the verb, 'falsify' and the verbal phrase, 'speak falsely'm 
the meaning corresponding to that of the verbal phrase, 'speak truly' (366dl) in 
Socrates' question about Hippias' expertise in arithmetic. 
As to Socrates' expression of ability, he allows the possibility that the 
participle, 'wishing' (366e5-6, 367a2) corresponds to the conditional clause at 
366c8 and 367a4. 
On the content of Socrates' question in confrast with his locutions, Socrates 
does not introduce the same ty^pe of proposition about speaking falsely by 
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formally substituting 'speak falsely' for 'speak truly'. Socrates regarded Hippias 
as an expert in arithmetic (366c5-6) in his questions about speaking truly about 
multiplication of 700 by 3. He did not refer to a non-expert or a foolish man in 
arithmetic who would think he knows arithmetic. However, in asking about 
speaking falsely, apart from choosing different words and conforming to the 
form of the previous question about speaking truly, Socrates refers to three cases 
about speaking falsely of the multiplication of 700 by 3 as follows: 
(1) An expert in arithmetic or a clever man occupied about it speaks 
falsely consistently and infallibly i f he wishes to (366e3-6; 367a4). 
(2) An ignorant or foolish man in arithmetic often speaks tnily agamst 
his wish i f he chances to (367a2-5). 
(3) An ignorant or foolish man in arithmetic speaks falsely, i f he wishes 
to, worse than an expert in arithmetic or a clever man occupied about it 
does i f he wishes to (366e6-367a2). 
Case (1) means either (l)-(a) that an expert in arithmetic or a clever man 
introduces into commissive speech what he believes false if he wishes to or (1)-
(b) that the proposition which an expert in arithmetic or a clever man introduces 
into commissive speech i f he wishes to as what he believes false is false. The 
former (l)-(a) means that an expert in arithmetic or a clever man intentionally 
speaks falsely if he wishes to; the latter (l)-(b) means further that the proposi-
tion which an expert in anthmetic or a clever man intentionally introduces into 
his speech as false is false, too. Apart from the commissive context, Socrates 
allows the possibility that he means the latter (l)-(b), because Hippias takes 
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Socrates to contrast an expert to a non-expert or a clever man to a foolish man 
in respect of the truth-value of the proposition that they utter as what they 
believe false. 
Further, as to the context of commissive speech in answering a questioner, the 
first case (l)-(b) means either (l)-(b)-(i) that a clever man occupied about 
arithmetic tells a lie by uttering a false proposition i f he wishes to or (l)-(b)-(u) 
that an expert in arithmetic utters a false proposition if he wishes to, irrespective 
of commissive context. Simply speaking, (l)-(b) means either (l)-(b)-(i)' that 
a clever man occupied about arithmetic is deceitful in arithmetic if he wishes to 
be or (l)-{b)-(ii)' that an expert in arithmetic introduces a false proposition into 
his speech if he wishes to, irrespective of a commissive context. Further, this 
clause in (l)-(b)-(ii)' does not imply that Hippias interprets that an expert 
disregards commissi\'e context. If Hippias interprets so, he would admit that an 
expert is dishonest just because of disregarding commissive context. Hence, that 
clause implies that Hippias, from the viewpoint of an observer of an expert, 
disregards whether or not the expert is set in commissive context. In other 
words, i f Hippias takes case (l)-(l5)-(ii), he means that i f we disregard the 
commissive context of speech, we can take one who utters a false proposition i f 
he wishes to to be an expert. 
Hippias can also interpret the second case (2) and the third one (3), mutatis 
mutandis, in the same way according to the double standard of interpretation of 
the commissive context, apart from the detail of Socrates' formulation. 
Therefore, if Hippias simplifies Socrates' formulations, he could envisage uvo 
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schemes in Socrates' questions about speaking talsely. One scheme (A) following 
case (l)-(b)-(i) is that a clever man occupied about arithmetic is deceitful by uttering 
a felse proposition about arithmetic in commissive context if he wishes to be, while 
a foolish man in arithmetic [who would think that he knows arithmetic but does not] 
may fail in being deceitful by uttering a false proposition about arithmetic in 
commissive context, ifhe wishes to. The other scheme (B) following case (l)-{b)-(ii) 
is that i f we disregard a commissive context, an expert in arithmetic utters a false 
proposition ifhe wishes to, while a non-e>5)ert in arithmetic may fail against his wish 
in uttering a false proposition. 
Socrates does not make plain which scheme his question refers to. Hence, i f 
Hippias does not seek clarification about Socrates' whole scheme and if Hippias 
aflSrms the propositions embodied in his question, he leaves open the possibility 
that he commits himself to either scheme. 
This means (1) that i f Hippias took Socrates to mean 'utter a true proposition 
in commissive context' by 'speak truly' [scheme (A)], he naturally takes Socrates 
to mean 'utter a false proposition m commissive context' by both the verbal 
phrase, 'speak falsely, and the verb, 'falsify' and (2) that if Hippias took Socrates 
to mean 'utter a true proposition, irrespective of commissive context' by 'speak 
truly', he naturally takes Socrates to mean 'utter a false proposition irrespective 
of commissive context' by both 'speak falsely' and 'falsify' [scheme (B)]. 
Most experts, especially, arithmeticians, take for granted that they make 
statements about anthmetic. Hence, it is irrelevant for them to ask whether an 
arithmetician is honest about arithmetic, at least in a dispositional sense. 
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However, disregarding one's commissive context differs from taking it 
unquestioningly as established. Further, disregarding one's commissive context 
differs from leaving another's commissive context out of consideration. 
However, this time, Hippias does not distinguish between the following cases: 
(1) Hippias disregards his own commissive context and (2) Hippias reflectively 
leaves his supposed commissive context out of consideration. 
Hence, Hippias may take for granted the commissive context in arithmeti-
cians' speech, but when he is asked about his speaking truly at 366c7-dl, 
Socrates' question works personally for Hippias to follow scheme (B). Further, 
as only one answer of the arithmetic question is right, it would be irrelevant for 
Hippias to ask whether an expert uttering a true proposition is set in commissive 
context. Hence, as Smith suggests"*'', it is natural for Hippias to follow the line 
of thought in (B), unless he suspects Socrates' sophistry. Hence, he would have 
to make clear what he is committed to in his answer to Socrates' question, if he 
persists in consistency of commitment. 
Scheme (B) is experientially nearly intact because it avoids the problem of an 
expert's acquisition of a disposition to speak falsely. Further, if Hippias follows 
(B), he is, truly, consistent in interpreting the meaning of the controversial verbs, 
'speak truly', 'speak falsely' and 'falsify'. Nevertheless, Socrates would not try to 
commit Hippias to (B). I f Socrates reduces Hippias' opinion about false men to 
(B), insofar as Hippias commonsensically believes that knowledge is ability to 
make a true statement about a right or wrong answer of a given question, 
Socrates would too trivially reduce Hippias' idea of deceit to knowledge. This 
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could not explain Hippias' intense affumation of a false man in arithmetic in the 
next speech (367a8); still less would even Hippias miss such a sophistry. 
However, even if interpreters can admit that Socrates has tried to commit 
Hippias to accept scheme (A), why could Hippias understand (1) that Socrates, 
having asked about Hippias' speaking truly in (B), asks about Hippias' speaking 
falsely in (A) and (2) that Hippias may be taken to commit himself to all his 
aflBrmations in (A)? One reason is that he committed himself to the proposition 
that false men are clever at deceiving in respect of what they deceive about 
(365el0-366al). In other words, although it is dubious that honesty in an 
achievement sense is conceivable in contrast to deceit in an achievement sense, 
Hippias commits himself to (A) because he believes, without analysing the 
possibility of honesty in an achievement sense, that he is consistent in believing 
that deceit in an achievement sense needs expertise in many areas. Another 
reason is that when Hippias is asked the same assumptive question about the 
same multiplication (366e3-4), he disregards the commissive context probably 
because he habitually disregards it in displaying his self-professed ability to 
answer any question. Certainly, answering any question from anyone does not 
imply disregarding one's responsibility for one's statement; however, public 
display of polymathy involves the inclination to disregard it. No one can answer 
every question rightly. Hence, asked about the same multiplication in the 
supposed context, unlike the former situation (366c6-dl), Hippias is relieved of 
worry about his ability being publicly tested. He probably replaces his ability to 
make any number of true statements consistently and infallibly about what is a 
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wrong answer of the multiplication concerned by his ability to make false 
statements about the right answer consistently and infallibly. For these reasons, 
Hippias would take (A) at least here (366e3-367a5), not necessarily through 
Socrates' sophistic questions. 
Consequently, although Hippias may believe that Socrates instilled his 
opinion into his question (367a5), Hippias allows the possibility of his 
commitments to the proposition that a clever man is able to deceive and tell a lie 
consistently and infallibly bymearts of giving a wrong answer in uttering a false 
proposition, i f he wishes to, while a foolish man is not. Further, as regards 
uttering an objectively true proposition (366c5-el), retroactively Hippias allows, 
mutatis mutandis, the possibility that he committed himself to the proposition 
that a clever man occupied about arithmetic is honest and tells the truth consis-
tently and infallibly by means of uttering an objectively true proposition, ifhe 
wishes to, while a foolish man is not. Therefore, insofar as neither party makes 
clear what proposition they refer to, Hippias allows the possibility that he 
believes (i) the above propositions and, accordingly, (ii) the proposition that a 
clever man occupied about arithmetic is able both to be honest and tell the truth 
by means of uttering an objectively true proposition, i f he wishes to, and to . 
deceive and tell a lie, by means of uttering an objectively false proposition, ifhe 
wishes to, because he does so consistently and infallibly ifhe wishes (cf 366b7-
cl) . 
Hippias' commitment: false men falsify about subjects concerned (367a6-bl) 
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Socrates did not refer to a false man in general at 366c5-367a5', but does so 
at 367a6 probably correspondingly to 'a foolish man' (366e6-367al; 367a2) and 
'a clever man' (367a4). He asks whether there is no such thing as a false man in 
calculating (367a6-7). He allows the possibility that he has referred to a false 
man in arithmetic as an example of a false man in various areas as Hippias 
suggested (365el0-366al; cf 365d8). 
Socrates has introduced questions personal to Hippias, but after Hippias' 
affirmation to his question about falsifying and speaking falsely, he links 
Hippias' commitment to his preceding questions with one about a false man. 
When Socrates started his questions about Hippias by infroducing 'Hippias' as 
a subject, Socrates did not make clear his intention to ask about a true man in 
arithmetic by taking Hippias as a representative expert in arithmetic or that he 
intended to ask about a false man in transition to the subject of speaking falsely. 
Hippias might have enough reason for recognising that Socrates had been 
continuously asking about a true man and a false man, because Socrates 
introduced the words he had used in the previous questions about a false man 
(e i PouAoio (366c8; cf 366e5-6, 367a2, 367a4), S u v a t c b r a T o g i s s i 
Kai oocpwTaxoc; (366d2-, cf 366d3-4, 366d4-5), duvaTdoxata (366d5), 
t a l^;Et)6fi (366el-2), I | ; E I 3 6 O I O (366e5, cf 366e6, 367a 1, 367a4, 367a5), 
CiLLCt\)f\Q (367al, 367a2), oocpog (367a4)). However, Socrates has just made 
clear that he has taken Hippias as a representative expert in arithmetic and has 
just suggested that he avails himself of Hippias' affirmations given to questions 
about Hippias' personal expertise as Hippias' commitment to a general 
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proposition about a false man and a true man in arithmetic. Insofar as Hippias 
admitted publicly that he is most experienced in arithmetic and committed 
himself to the propositions about his expertise in respect of their general 
implications, Socrates could justify conjecturing a general proposition about a 
false man from Hippias' answers. 
Hippias, accepting the proposition in Socrates' question (367a8), might 
understand, following scheme (B), that there is a false man who utters a false 
proposition, irrespective of a commissive context, in each subject or, following 
(A), that as F^edlander'*^ Fowler'**, and Waterfield''" suggest about 367a6-7, 
a false man achieves deceit about subjects concerned. 
Socrates proposes that they should assume the thesis that someone is a false 
person about both number and calculation (367a8-bl). Pace Penner''*', Socrates 
is, as Robinson suggests"**', not saddled with Hippias' implications, but by 
appearing so, encourages Hippias to reach the conclusion, because Socrates never 
agreed to Hippias' opinion before. Socrates focuses again on what Hippias had 
presupposed, i.e., the existence of a false man, in an achievement sense, about 
number and calculation. Socrates shows that he will start another series of 
questions about a false man in arithmetic. 
On one hand, Hippias at 367b 1 has no reason to reject the existence of false 
men occupied in the field of arithmetic, because of his preceding affirmation 
(365d7-8, 365e8-9, 365elO-366al, 366a4, 366b3-4; cf 365a3, 365b2); on the 
other, Socrates allows the possibilit}' that he refers to a false man only in 
arithmetic, not to a clever man who achieves deceit about subjects concerned. 
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When Socrates refers to Hippias' previous commitments next (3 67b 1-5), he may 
refer to a liar in an achievement sense; Hippias may replace scheme (A) by (B) 
at 367b6-c7. Some critics'*™ see Socrates' usual craft-analogy, specifically, the 
transition from speaking falsely in a skill or science to telling a lie in the domam 
of morality. Socrates' following references to an area'''' may support his appeal 
to this transition. However, Hippias' commitments to the transition leaves the 
. interpretability that Hippias only indistinctly sees the transition from telling a 
technically specific lie to telling a technically non-specific lie. 
Hippias' commitment: an expert in arithmetic is able to speak truly and 
falsely (367b l-c4) 
Socrates asks with tagged reference to Hippias' commitment (366b4-7), 
whether, assuming the existence of a false person about number and calculation, 
i f a man is false about number and calculation, he is able to falsify (367bl-5). 
Socrates introduces into his question the proposition that- all men false in 
arithmetic are able to falsify in arithmetic, because no men unable to falsif}' 
become false. 
The formulations he introduces into his questions (367b2-5; 367b6-7, 367cl-
2), in the context different from questions about false men (365d6-366c4) and 
which Hippias commits himself to are: 
(1) a false man about number and calculation is able to falsify ifhe is 
false (367b2-6); 
(2) Hippias is the ablest to falsify about calculations (367b6-7); 
(3) Hippias is the ablest to .speak truly about calculations (367c 1-2). 
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At 367c2, Hippias does not dismiss his affirmation given to the formulation, 
'Hippias is the ablest to speak truly about calculations'; though he does not 
clarify whether he means by 'speak truly' 'tell the truth, to be honest in an 
unusual achievement sense' or 'utter an objectively true proposition, irrespective 
of a commissive context'. He admitted that he is most experienced in arithmetic 
(366c6) and, accordingly, accepted that he utters a true arithmetical proposition 
i f he wishes to, but not in an unusual achievement sense of honesty (366c5-d3). 
Hence, Hippias may be alert to how Socrates intends to use Hippias' previous 
commitments, but Hippias does not realise that his three answers to Socrates' 
questions about a false man in arithmetic imply that honesty and deceitfiilness 
are the same in a dispositional sense. 
If Hippias assumes (1), he can review (2) and (3). I f he interpreted the verbs 
in question consistently in accordance with scheme (A) of Socrates' question 
about falsity (366e3-367a5), the propositions which Hippias is committed to 
would be: 
A(l ) a false man about calculations is able to deceive or tell a lie about 
calculations; 
A(2) Hippias is the ablest to deceive or tell a lie about calculations; 
A(3) Hippias is the ablest to be honest or tell the truth about calculations. 
What Hippias has the right to deduce from the premises is, for example, the 
combination of A(2) and A(3). But if Socrates interprets that Hippias' accep-
tance implies that all and only those able to tell a lie and deceive about 
calculations are able to tell the truth and be honest about calculations, he leaps 
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some steps. 
However, i f Hippias admits that A( l ) is inferred from the proposition that a 
false man is able to falsify i f he wishes to, and i f he admits, correspondingly, 
that a true man about calculations is able to be honest or tell the truth about 
calculations, he would obtain, by the reciprocity of ability with actuality in truth 
and falsity, the proposition that he is both true and false about calculations. He 
may recognise that he is pressed by his commitments to face the conclusion 
whose acceptance would make public his inability to answer any question from 
anyone in that he cannot keep consistency in the whole of his answers. 
Hippias might be confident of consistency even i f pressed to accept the 
proposition that he is both true and false in arithmetic, because he is not 
committed to the proposition that all and only false men are true in arithmetic. 
If he sees that it is inescapable to accept that the same man is true and false in 
arithmetic in the sense that all and only false men are true in arithmetic, he 
might not give-affirmation to Socrates' question. 
If Hippias reviews his commitments by interpreting the verbs in question in 
accordance with scheme (B) of Socrates' question about falsity (366e3-367a5), 
and in the way similar to the above case, he could formulate that the same man 
is able both to utter an objectively true proposition, and to utter an objectively 
false proposition, irrespective of a commissive context, but need not interpret 
that irrespective of a commissive context, in anthmetic, all and only those able 
to utter an objectively true proposition are able to utter an objectively false 
proposition. Therefore Hippias need not conclude by substituting 'true' and 'false' 
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for the above predicates that in arithmetic, all and only false men are true. 
I f Hippias tacitly admitted the reciprocity of ability with actuality, he could 
perform a valid inference, but, according to (A), i fhe must have acquired the 
disposition of honesty and deceitfulness, he has to understand by the conclusion 
that he is both honest and deceitful in a dispositional sense. He could not accept 
this conclusion. Therefore, this argument is not sound for him. But i f he 
reconstructs the argument in accordance with (B), Hippias still must accept the 
premise about reciprocity to draw the conclusion. Unless he understood that 
falsity is not actuality but ability, he would not reach the conclusion. Neverthe-
less, ifhe systematically misunderstood by 'speak truly or falsely' 'formulate a 
true or false proposition', he could suppose that he soundly draws a conclusion, 
holding the premise about reciprocity. Therefore, ifhe believes that he justifies 
his commitments, he might replace the argument according to (A) by that 
according to (B) by systematically mistaking 'speaking truly or falsely' for 
'formulate a true or false proposition'. 
Socrates' speech (367c2-4) works at least as an indirect question for 
Hippias^'', because Socrates refers to implications of Hippias' commitments: 
'Therefore, the same man is the ablest to speak falsely and truly about calcula-
tions' and 'And this man is a man good at them, namely, an expert in anthmetic.' 
Socrates can combine the propositions which Hippias just confirmed, by using 
a pronoun, 'the same man' in the meaning in which the same man, Hippias, is 
the ablest to speak truly and falsely about calculations. 
Certainly, Hippias admitted his expenise in arithmetic (366c5-7; 366d3-6). 
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Hence Socrates justifiably adds that Hippias is good at calculations. However, 
unless Socrates needs to generalise Hippias' commitments, Socrates would not 
need to substitute 'the same man' for 'Hippias' or refer to Hippias simply as good 
at calculations, instead of as the best at them as before (366d5). 
Then, in what sense can Socrates show as entailed by Hippias' commitments 
that the same man is able to speak truly and falsely about calculations while 
adding that the man is expert in arithmetic? 
If Socrates simply assumes that Hippias is good, i.e., expert at arithmetic, he 
cannot properly infer that all and only those able to speak truly about calcula-
tions are able to speak falsely about calculations, from the following proposi-
tions about Hippias: (1) Hippias is good at calculations; (2) Hippias is able to 
speak truly about calculations; (3) Hippias is able to speak falsely about calcula-
tions. But Socrates has the right to combine the three propositions to conclude 
that there is at least one man, Hippias, good at calculations, and able both to 
speak falsely and to speak truly about calculations. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion suffices to make public that Hippias does not keep 
consistency in answering, because the proposition that there is at least one man 
who is both tme and false about calculations contradicts the proposition that no 
man true about calculations is false about calculations. If the audience 
understand this, then they could see that Hippias does not keep consistency 
because he commits self-contradiction about the opposition of a true man to a 
false man at least in one area. 
I f Socrates intends the ambiguous formulation about 'the same man' and 
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justifies deducing from Hippias' commitments, as 367c3-4 suggests, that all and 
only those able to speak falsely about calculations, i.e, experts in arithmetic, are 
able to speak truly about calculations, Socrates must take Hippias as a 
representative expert. Further, i f Socrates interprets the confroversial points 
according to scheme (A), and i f when a predicate applies to Hippias about 
calculations, it applies to any clever man good at calculations, i.e., any clever 
expert in calculations, then he could conclude that all clever men occupied about 
calculations are able both to deceive or tell a lie and to be honest or tell the truth 
about calculations. 
However, even if Socrates takes Hippias as a representative clever man who 
achieves deceit about calculations, he ought not to conclude that all and only men . 
who are able to deceive and lie about calculations are able to be honest or tell the 
truth about calculations. Without assuming that Hippias believes the reciprocity 
of ability with actuality, he could not justify Hippias' possible belief that all clever 
men occupied about calculations are both true and false about calculations; still 
less, his possible belief that all and only false men occupied about calculations 
are true about them. 
Whether Hippias, considering the superlative (367c3), interprets 'the same' 
as 'Hippias himself or 'an expert in arithmetic', and whether Hippias reinterprets 
that Socrates has asked about a clever man who achieves deceit about arithmetic 
in accordance with (A) or about an expert in arithmetic, Hippias cannot avoid 
giving affirmation to Socrates' formulation including his additional remark, 
without demolishing the conversation. However, he affirms relevantly to 
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Socrates' speech (367c4); hence, he might recognise retrospectively that his 
emerging inconsistency stems from this acceptance and also to Socrates' hiding 
his intention in questioning, but not that he is committed to accepting that all 
and only false men occupied about calculations are true about calculations. 
Hippias accepts the conclusion: all and only false men are true in arithme-
tic (367c4-d3) 
Socrates continuously asks about what Hippias' previous commitments entail 
to lead Hippias to the concluding proposition that all and only false men 
occupied about calculations are true about calculations (367c7-d2). 
Socrates says, 'Then, Hippias, who becomes false other than a man good [at 
calculations]? I ask this because the same man is also able [both to speak truly 
and to speak falsely or to speak truly]; because this man is also true.' The whole 
speech works as a question, the latter part as Socrates' summary of Hippias' 
admissions"^ 
Socrates supposes out of Hippias' anticipated affirmation that Hippias must 
accept that all and only false men occupied about calculations are true men 
about calculations. How does Socrates justify deducing Hippias' conclusion from 
the formulations he introduces into his question? 
C I . No one becomes false about calculation other than one good [at 
calculations]. 
[367c4-6] 
PI. The same man is also able [both to speak truly and to speak falsely 
or to speak truly or to speak falsely about calculations]. 
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[367c6] 
P2. or C2. This man is also true [about calculations]. 
[367c6] 
C2. or C3. the same man is both false and true about calculations. 
[367c7-8] 
I f Socrates means 'a man good at calculations' by 'the same man' and 
rephrases C l as that aU those false about calculations are good at calculations'* '^*, 
the possible arguments are as follows according to different grammatical 
supplementations. 
163 
I. 
PI. All men good at calcu-
lations are able both to 
speak tnily and to speak 
falsely about calculations. 
[367c6: the proposition 
about ability; cf. 367c2-4, 
367b6-7, 367bl-6, 366e3-
367a5, 366d6-el, 366c7-
dl,366b7-cl] 
C I . All men false about 
calculations are good at 
calculations. 
[367c4-6: the proposition 
about the transition from 
actuality to ability; cf 
367a8-bl, 367a6-8, 
366d3-6, 366a6-8] 
II. 
PI. All men good at calcu-
lations are able to speak 
truly about calculations. 
[367c6: the proposition 
about ability; cf 367cl-2, 
366d6-el, 366c7-dl, 
366b7-cl] 
C I . All men false about 
calculations are good at 
calculations, 
[seel, CI] 
III. 
PI. All men good at calcu-
lations are able to speak 
falsely about calculations. 
[367c6: tlie proposition 
about ability; cf 367c2-4, 
367b6-7,366b7-cl,366e3-
6] 
C I . All men false about 
calculations are good at 
calculations, 
[see I, CI ] 
P2. All men good at calcu-
lations are true about cal-
culations. 
[367c6: the proposition 
about the transition from 
ability to actuality, cf 
366c5-dl,366d6-el] 
C2. All and only men false 
about calculations are true 
about calculations. 
[367c7-8: the proposition 
about actuality] 
P2. All men good at calcu-
lations are true about 
calculations, 
[see I, P2] 
C2. All and only men false 
about calculations are true 
about calculations, 
[see I, C2] ' 
P2. All men good at calcu-
lations are tnie about cal-
culations, 
[see I, P2] 
C2. All and only men false 
about calculations are true 
about calculations, 
[see I, C2] 
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On the soundness of these arguments, it is questionable how Socrates justifies 
explaining CI by PI in any of them without implicitly assuming some other 
proposition. Even i f Socrates inexplicitly assumes that Hippias appeals to the 
reciprocity of ability with actuality, Socrates has no right to deduce the 
mediating proposition that all and only those good at calculations are false. In 
other words, Hippias might assume that all those able to falsify are false and 
that all those able to verify are true, but Socrates cannot justify the proposition 
that all and only false men about calculations are good at calculations. Further, 
in any argument, Socrates has the right to posit that the same man, i.e., a man 
good at calculation, is true and false about calculations, meaning that all those 
good at calculations are both true and false about calculations, but not to infer 
that all and only those false about calculations are true about calculations. 
Furthermore, if Socrates means by the first summarising remark (PI), 'the same 
man is also able', the proposition that all and only those good at calculations are 
able both to speak truly and to speak falsely about calculations, Socrates has the 
right to propose explaining C1 by this proposition. However, he has no right to 
infer that all and only those false about calculations are true about calculations. 
Then, how does Socrates justify inferring Hippias' conclusion, in spite of the 
propositions in his questions being ineffectual to enforce Hippias' deduction of 
the conclusion? In general, the following form of inference, reading 'E' as 'expert', 
'F' as 'false' and 'T' as 'true', is invalid. 
P1. For any x, if x is E, x is F. 
P2. For any x, if x is E, x is T. 
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C1. For any x, x is F i f and only i f x is T. 
I f the premises are both bi-conditional, as Weiss indicates'*'^  the conclusion 
follows according to the rule of transitivity. However, Socrates has not dealt 
directly with such bi-conditional premises. Therefore, i f we need reason for 
assuming that Socrates justifies supposing that Hippias reaches the conclusion 
through Hippias' commitments, we have to fmd another valid inference or 
plausible premises inexplicitly suggested. Considering specific exchange 
between the interlocutors, one promising candidate for a sound argument which 
we may legitimately conceive that Socrates would appeal to lies in the 
exclusiveness between expert and non-expert or between a clever man and a 
foolish man, and between ability as infallibility and inability as fallibility. The 
possible specific arguments which Socrates would conceive are as follows, 
according to the interpretation (A) of the controversial words. 
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Scheme of a ju.stifiable argument 
which Socrates would conceive 
PI . A l l clever men occupied about calculations are honest or tell the 
truth about calculations whenever they wish to. 
[366c7-dl, 366d2-3; cf 365el0-366al, 367a2o, 367a6-8] 
P2. A l l foolish men occupied about calculations are not always honest 
and do not always tell the truth about calculations i f they wish to, but 
sometimes tell a lie or deceive against their wish. 
[No texlxial evidence; analogy to P5; cf 367a2-3] 
C I . A l l and only clever men occupied about calculations are honest or 
tell the truth whenever they wish to. 
psfo textual evidence; combination of PI and the contraposition of P2; 
inference by combination (366a2-4, 365d6-366al, 366b6-7, 366b4-5); 
inference by contraposition (366b6-7, 366b4-5)] 
P3. A l l and only those able to tell the truth about calculations if they 
wish to are those who tell the truth whenever they wish to. 
[366d6-el, 366c7-dl, 366b7-cl, 366a8-b4, 367cl-2; cf 366e3-367a2] 
C2. All and only clever men occupied about calculations are able to tell 
the truth whenever they wish to. 
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[CI , P3 and transitivity (365e5-8, 365e8-366al)] 
P4. A l l clever men occupied about calculations tell a lie or deceive 
whenever they wish to. 
[366e3-6] 
P5. Al l foolish men occupied about calculations do not always tell a lie 
or deceive about calculations if they wish to, but sometimes are honest 
or tell the truth about calculations against their wish. 
[367a2-3] 
C3. A l l and only clever men occupied about calculations tell a lie or 
deceive about calculations whenever they wish to. 
[No textual e\'idence; combination of P4 and the contraposition of P5] 
P6. Al l and only those who are able to tell a lie or deceive about 
calculations i f they wish to, tell a lie or deceive about calculations 
whenever they wish to. 
[366e3-6, 366e6-367a2, 366b7-cl, 366a8-b4] 
C4. All and only clever men occupied about calculations are able to tell 
a lie or deceive about calculations whenever they wish to. 
[C3, P6 and transitivity; 367b6-7, 367b 1-5] 
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C5. A l l and only those who are able to tell a lie about calculations are 
able to tell the truth about calculations. 
[C2, C4, transitivity] 
P7. Al l true men occupied about calculations tell the truth about calcula-
tions [whenever they wish to]. 
[No textual evidence; analogy to P8; transition from achievement to 
infallibility] 
C6. A l l true men occupied about calculations are able to tell the truth 
[whenever they wish to]. 
[P3, P7, and transitivity; analogy to C7; no textual evidence] 
P8. All false men occupied about calculations tell a lie or deceive about 
calculations [whenever they wish to]. 
[367a6-8, 367a8-bl, 366e3-6, 367a4-5; transition from achievement to 
infallibilit}'] 
C7. Al l false men occupied about calculations are able to tell a lie or 
deceive about calculations [whenever they wish to]. 
[P6, PS, and transitivity; 367b 1-6] 
P9. All men who are able to tell the truth about calculations [whenever 
they wish to] are true men occupied about calculations. 
169 
[367c6; transition from ability to actuality] 
PIO. Al l men who are able to tell a lie or deceive about calculations 
[whenever they wish to] are false men occupied about calculations. 
[Transition front ability to actuality; no textual evidence; analogy to P9; 
cf 365d7-8] 
C8. Al l and only true men occupied about calculations are able to tell 
the truth about calculations [whenever they wish to]. 
[C6, P9; no textual evidence] 
C9. Al l and only false men occupied about calculations are able to tell 
a lie or deceive about calculations [whenever they wish to]. 
[C7, PIO; no textual evidence] 
CIO. Al l and only false men occupied about calculations are true men 
occupied about calculations. 
[C5, C8, C9, and transitivity; 367c7-8] 
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If Socrates anticipates that Hippias will have to see the conclusion because 
of previous commitments, and i f Socrates justifies the necessity in Hippias' 
seeing the conclusion, Socrates must trail some argument like those shown in 
this table. It is certain that the interlocutors do not mention the reciprocity of ability 
with actuality, especially, the acquisition of disposition of deceit or honesty in 
the process of learning to be false or true (P9 and PIO), or consistency in respect 
of truth (PI). 
I f Socrates leads Hippias to see the conclusion which Hippias must draw 
according to his commitments and the inferential rules Hippias committed 
himself to, Socrates must ask at the last step to the conclusion whether Hippias 
accepts the inferential transition from ability to falsity and truth. Socrates refers 
to this point in summarising Hippias' previous admissions (367c6). He says, ' [ I 
ask this because] this man [i.e., a man good at calculations] is also true?' 
Moreover, Socrates leaves the possibility that he is asking the question in accor-
dance with scheme (B). 
The above candidate for Socrates' possible justification in leading Hippias to 
see the conclusion has some defects in reference to the text; it is dubious 
whether Socrates is ready to justify the entailment of Hippias' commitments not 
by Hippias' giving affirmations to the formulations in his questions but by 
Socrates' formulating the scheme of inference. However this candidate would be 
qualified. Some critics see Socrates' palming off upon Hippias the wrong 
transition from ability to disposition'*'*; however, Socrates would have recourse 
to some sound argument i f he has the right to lead Hippias by Hippias' reasons 
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to see the conclusion and publicise Hippias' self-contradiction. 
Hippias answers with reservation for the first time in the conversation about 
a false man (367c7). Hippias gives affirmation to Socrates' formulation, 
whatever propositions or argument he interprets that Socrates introduced. Hippias 
would afifiim that only a good man, meaning an expert in calculations, is false 
about calculations (367c4-6), because he would accept that a false man about 
calculations is a man able to speak falsely about calculations whenever he 
wishes to. Further, Hippias would accept, in Socrates' summary of his 
commitments, 'an expert in calculations is able to speak falsely (367c6),' 
because an expert in calculations is able to utter a false proposition infallibly 
and consistently, while a non-expert is not. However, Hippias could not accept 
that an expert in arithmetic is true about arithmetic (367c6) i f he does not accept 
that i f a man is able to speak truly he is true. I f asked whether a man able to 
speak falsely and falsify is false, he would consider, before accepting the 
proposition, the acquisition of disposition of deceit in the process of leaming 
arithmetic or leaming to falsify about anthmetic. However, since a learner of 
arithmetic acquires the disposition to formulate a proposition in accordance with 
anthmetical rules by exchanging commissive speeches with a teacher, Hippias 
would accept the reciprocity of ability with actuality easily in a professional 
arithmetician; less easily in an expert in arithmetic; least in a clever man who 
has abandoned the disposition and practised falsifying about arithmetic. In spite 
of his crucial commitment, it is dubious that Hippias is sure of his commitment 
to some inference leading to the conclusion that all and only false men are true 
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about calculations (cf 369b3-7); he is, though, ready to give affirmations to 
Socrates' respective formulations and sees the concluding formulation that the 
same man is true and false about calculations. 
Hippias would have recognised (a) that anyone is exclusively an expert or a 
non-expert in arithmetic and (b) that all and only experts utter a false proposition 
when they wish to. In analogy to uttering a false proposition, Hippias possibly 
recognised that the similar propositions are true of the case about uttering a true 
proposition, mutatis mutandis (PI-7 and CI-7 at the preceding table (see p. 
166). However, it is arguable whether he recognises that it follows from these 
propositions that all and only false men in an achievement sense, occupied about 
calculations are true men in an achievement sense, occupied about calculations 
(CIO). If he does not recognise the necessity of the conclusion by reciprocity of 
ability with actuality (P9-10, C9-10), and if he still finds some reason to affirm 
the conclusion, he might appeal to the truism that all and only experts in 
arithmetic are able to judge whether a given arithmetic proposition is true or 
false, according to one and the same criterion. 
From our point of view, Socrates has to recognise and appeal to the truism 
that a man who knows a criterion of the truth-value of a proposition is able to 
judge whether it is true or not, i.e., whether it is false or not, if he anticipates 
that Hippias' affirmation to his formulations leads to the apparently paradoxical 
conclusion that a true man and a false man are the same in anthmetic. However, 
if Hippias finds some necessity to give affirmation to the concluding formulation, 
Hippias has to recognise that truism. Therefore, dramaturgically speaking, if the 
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author, Plato, governs the interplay between interlocutors, and wants to have the 
audience understand the plausibility that the interlocutors reach the paradoxical 
conclusion, he has to use the truism inexplicitly, whether he is committed to it 
or not. However, it is arguable whether the proposition (a), crucial in Hippias' 
commitments, that all and only men able to utter a false proposition are able to 
utter a true proposition follows from the proposition (b) that all and only men 
able to judge whether or not a given proposition is true are men able to judge 
whether or not the proposition is false. 
Conseqently on Hippias' reserved affirmation at 367c7, Socrates asks about 
the conclusion from Hippias' previous commitments (367c7-d2)''". 
Socrates leaves unclear whether he means by the formulation, 'the same man 
is both false and true about calculations,' the proposition that all and only false 
men about calculations are true about calculations. Socrates does not use the 
formulations, 'a false man about calculations is the same as a true man about 
calculations,' or the formulation, 'a man good at calculations is both true and 
false about calculations.' However, when he uses the pronoun, 'the same', with 
subject and modifier omitted, and refers to the opposite relation between a true 
man and a false man, in his explanatory remark (367dl), he refers to the 
formulation that a tme man about calculations is the same as a false man about 
calculations. 
Socrates appears to Hippias to refer to what Socrates believes objectively true 
m usmg the phrase, 'see that ...'"'^ ^ and 'not.... as you thought', but Socrates could 
only oppose what Hippias should properly believe to what Hippias believes. 
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Socrates leaves unclear whether he commits himself to what he believes Hippias 
has to infer from his previous commitments according to the inferential rules 
Hippias followed. 
Socrates' reference to Hippias' opinion about a false man in the preceding 
stage (366a5-6) does not necessarily indicate that Socrates intentionally 
distorted Hippias' opinion about a false man. For Hippias has not fully analysed 
its consistency, although Socrates did not take the initiative of distinguishing 
ability from achievement, ability from disposition, or a clever man occupied 
about calculations from an expert in calculations. At that stage, Hippias appeared 
to Socrates to mean by a false man a successful cheat exemplified in Homer's 
Odysseus in opposition to a consistently honest man Like Achilles (364e7-365b6), 
but Socrates would not necessarily have been sure whether Hippias used 'a false 
man' in an achievement sense or in an attempt sense. Therefore, Socrates 
consistently seeks Hippias' opinion about false men. Admittedly, Hippias later 
could take Socrates to have arranged his questions sophistically and to have 
referred to his previous commitments in different senses in subsequent questions. 
However, Hippias loses consistency in making commitments about a false man, 
even if he believes that he keeps consistency in understanding a false man. 
Hippias gives a reserved aflSrmation limited to the area of arithmetic (367d3). 
Although he suggested that false men are occupied with falsifying about many 
subjects (365d8; 365el0-366al), he might suspect that he wrongly somewhere 
mistook a person whom he would observe uttering a false proposition about 
arithmetic consistently for a clever man who is occupied with lying or deceiving 
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about arithmetic. However, he could perhaps not find where and why he 
committed himself to the identity of falsity with truth in arithmetic in respect of 
actuahty. 
Hippias does not refer to the formulation, 'the same man is both false and true 
about calculations'. Hence, he might accept the proposition that an expert in 
arithmetic is able both to speak truly and to speak falsely in arithmetic, even in 
the sense that the expert is able both to be honest and to deceive. Certainly, 
Hippias would accept that a false man in arithmetic is no cleverer at arithmetic 
than a true man in arithmetic in the sense that both consistent and infallible 
deceit and honesty are due to knowledge of arithmetic, and, therefore, that a true 
man and a false man are the same in arithmetic in respect of knowledge. 
However, he would not accept that a deceiver in a dispositional sense is better 
than or the same as an honest man in that sense in respect of the evaluation of 
sincerity. Hippias would not miss the distinction between 'good in respect of 
sincerity' and 'good at calculations' while answering Socrates' questions. If he 
were asked about the distinction by an exact formulation, he would be 
committed to the proposition that an honest man in a dispositional sense is 
better than a deceiver in that sense in respect of wish to be honest and would 
suspect the proposition that i f anyone deceives in arithmetic, the deceiver in 
arithmetic is the same as an honest man in arithmetic, in respect of sincerity, 
because he would commonsensically take a deceiver in a dispositional sense if 
he compares the deceiver with an honest man. The problem lies in his potential 
idea, of an honest man who is occupied with calculations and achieving his 
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commitments about calculations. 
Hippias concedes 'consideration' of a false man in another subject (367d4-5). 
Whether Socrates supposes that the reason for Hippias' reservation in his 
affirmation is Hippias' suspicion of Socrates' questions about arithmetic or, 
Hterally, Hippias' limitation of his affirmation to the field of arithmetic, Socrates 
appears to Hippias to take him at his word. Socrates proposes to Hippias to 
continue consideration with him. 
Since Hippias had allowed the possibility that he inexplicitly referred to areas 
m which false men falsify (365d8, 365el0-366al; cf 366a4, 366b 1-2, 366b3), 
Socrates had reason to refer to the field of arithmetic subsequently (366c5-
367d2). Now (367d4), Socrates might suppose that Hippias understands that his 
commitments about arithmetic are so exemplary as to be generalised to any 
other area or he might suppose that Hippias might believe that false men are 
differently occupied about other subjects. Further, Socrates might believe that 
Hippias can generalise his conclusion, if he applies his previous commitments 
to any area of sciences and crafts, into the general proposition that all and only 
false men are true about any subject; i f so, Socrates might intend to make 
Hippias see further that his belief involved in his idea of falsity in an achieve-
ment sense implies that all and only consistent and infallible deceivers occupied 
about any subject concerned are consistent and infallible honest men in respect 
of achievement of their purpose as well as knowledge. Hence, although Socrates 
suggests that they have been considering something, Socrates might heuristi-
cally consider not so much some inter-agreed belief as how Hippias' beliefs are 
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evolving. 
Hippias shows that Socrates' proposal depends on Socrates' wish, not his 
(367d5). Hippias neither refuses to continue their consideration nor shows 
willingness to continue. 
Hippias applies his previous commitments to the case of geometry (367(16-
367e7) 
Following the preceding series of questions about arithmetic (366c5 ff.), 
Socrates attempts to confirm Hippias' experience in geometry, still ambiguously 
in acquired disposition as at 366c5-6, before asking whether Hippias applies his 
commitments about arithmetic to geometry. 
Hippias seems to realise why Socrates asked the question about his expertise 
and in what conte\-t. Hippias would realise that he must commit himself to 
accepting formulations similar to those which Socrates introduced about 
arithmetic as his expertise, mutatis mutandis, i f he wishes to keep consistency 
of commitment. Yet he cannot find any reason for denying his expertise in 
geometry as in the case of arithmetic (see p. 134). 
On Hippias' commitment to his expertise in geometry, Socrates can anticipate, 
at the beginning of his speech (367d7), Hippias' acceptance of propositions 
analogous to those elicited about arithmetic. Hence, in his conducive question 
(367d7), Socrates suggests that Hippias must see the same conclusion as about 
arithmetic (366c7-d2). However, Socrates does not specify what scheme of 
inference Hippias followed about arithmetic. 
Hippias can compare Socrates' question about geometry at 367d7-9 to those 
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about arithmetic at 367c2-4, but i f he recalls his commitments, Hippias, first, 
must recall his acceptance that Hippias, a representative expert in arithmetic, utters 
a true proposition on a given arithmetical question, i f he wishes to, (366c5-dl) 
and a false proposition on a given arithmetical question i f he wishes (366e3-
367a5) and, then, has to transform his acceptance into the propositions about 
ability respectively (365d6-7; 367c 1-2), probably because of his previous 
commitment to the meaning of ability (366b7-c4). 
This suggests that Socrates allows the possibility that he held the following, 
though unspecified, assumptions in the conversation about Hippias' expertise in 
arithmetic (366c5-367d2): (a) that Hippias followed the inferential rule of 
combining Hippias' commitments (367b5-c4); (b) that Hippias took himself as 
a representative expert in arithmetic (367a6-8); (c) that Hippias followed the 
rule of substitution of 'Hippias' for 'an expert in arithmetic'(367c2-4). It is 
arguable whether Hippias recognised the inferential rules which Socrates can 
take Hippias to have inexplicitly followed in accepting what Hippias regarded 
as the propositions embodied in Socrates' questions. However, when Socrates 
proceeds to introduce the propositions in the frame similar to the preceding 
conversation about arithmetic, Hippias can suspect that Socrates takes him to 
have committed himself to accepting on arithmetic both formulations and 
inferential rules similar to what he commits himself to about geometry. 
Socrates did not use the formulation substituting 'calculations' for 'geometrical 
figures' and 'arithmetician' for 'geometrician', apart from a similar formulation 
at 367c2-4. As to Socrates' usage of 'the same', it is controversial as before 
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whether Socrates here intends to lead to the proposition that all and only false 
men about some specific area are true about the area or the proposition that an 
expert in some specific area is both true and false about the area. Further, 
Socrates uses the combination of 'falsify' with 'speak truly' for the first time 
(367d8). Hence, as to the usage of the three verbs, 'falsify', 'speak falsely', and 
'speak truly', Socrates does not keep consistency or make any distinction 
between 'falsify' and 'speak falsely' (366e5; 366e6, 367a2-a3; 367a4-5; 367b6-7; 
367c2-3). Neither does Socrates make clear what he meant by the verbs, except 
for his suggestion in reintroducing the words, 'true' and 'false', which Socrates 
can take Hippias to understand in the sense which he had introduced (365b4-5). 
Hippias would have to decide whether he means by 'falsify' 'utter a false 
proposition in commissive context' or 'utter a false proposition, irrespective of 
commissive context', i f he denies or accepts what he regards as a proposition 
embodied in Socrates' question. 
Hippias accepts the proposition in Socrates' question (367d9), whatever he 
understands Socrates to mean by the verbs. Therefore, Hippias leaves the 
possibility that he follows his commitment about an expert's ability to speak 
truly and speak falsely (366c5-dl; 366e3-367a5; 367b6-c4), including the rules 
of inference involved in accepting the contiguous formulations, and follows the 
systematic substitution of geometric for arithmetical matter. Hence he must face 
the conclusion that the same man is both true and false about geometrical figures, 
in whichever sense he understands it (cf 369b3-7). 
At 367d9-el, Socrates attempts to confirm that Hippias means 'a man good 
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at geometry' by 'an expert in geometrv'', in analogy to substitution of 'a man good 
at arithmetic' for 'an expert in arithmetic' (367c4). The proposition Socrates 
introduces can be that a man good at geometry is an expert in it and not the 
converse. However, Socrates can suppose that Hippias would admit that the 
predicates, 'an expert in some area', 'clever at some area', 'able in some area' and 
'good at some area' are interchangeable (365e9-366al; 366a8-b7; 366dl-6; 
367c3-4) and that a predicate by the name of an expert in an area is used 
indistinguishably from those predicates (367c3-4; 367d7-9). 
In his question at 367el-3, Socrates refers ambiguously to a professional who 
obeys his ethic or to a man who works at geometry, but adds nothing substantial 
to Hippias' previous commitment (367d7-9). Rather, i f Hippias understands that 
sj^ Socrates use^ '^good' and 'clever' in the subject not redundantly in the sense that 
he is good and clever at geometry but substantially in the sense that he is good 
• and clever in respect of sincerity or consistent and infallible sincerity, Hippias 
must ask for exposition about the predicates, 'good' and 'clever', to prevent 
Socrates from trading on Hippias' commitment. 
Further, Socrates asks whether only the man good at geometry is false about 
geometncal figures (367e3-4) and summarises Hippias' admissions (367e4-6). 
Socrates asks a concluding question about a false man in geometry, but does not 
refer to the conclusion similar to that about arithmetic (367c7-d2). As Socrates' 
question suggests, Socrates would be following the form of his remark about 
arithmetic at 367c4-6. 
Socrates' first summary of Hippias' preceding admissions at 367c6 corre-
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spends to his first summary here, but the second one at 367c6 does not. Socrates 
is referring here, on geometry, to what he believes to have resulted firom Hippias' 
commitments about arithmetic, in saying that the man good at geometry, i.e., the 
expert in geometry was"^ able to speak falsely and that the man bad at 
geometry, i.e., the non-expert in geometry was unable to falsify. Socrates did not 
refer to the propositions in any speech. Nevertheless, Socrates supposes (1), as 
Sprague indicates'* '^, that the propositions follow firom Hippias' commitments 
about arithmetic and (2) that giving affirmation to the formulation in his present 
summary suffices to lead to the conclusion similar to that about arithmetic by 
virtue of what Socrates supposes to be Hippias' affirmation of the propositions 
in his preceding questions, even i f he does not specify the conclusion. Therefore, 
Socrates did not make clear how Hippias had to reach the conclusion about 
arithmetic fi-om his commitments, but retrospectively he suggests here that the 
necessity lies in the bi-conditional proposition that all and only experts in 
geometry are able to falsify or vertjy about it. 
Socrates introduced into the last part of his speech (367e5-6) the proposition 
Hippias afBimed before (366b6-7; 367b3-5). Although Socrates introduced the 
proposition that a false man is able to speak falsely, paraphrasing by the form 
of contraposition is not trivial for the interlocutors. However, i f Socrates 
supposes that the affirmation of these propositions suffices fpr Hippias to reach 
the similar conclusion, he believes Hippias to accept a premise about the 
reciprocity of ability with actuality; specifically, the proposition that abilit}- to 
falsify is falsity, whether or not Hippias confirms this point in his affirmation 
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(367e6-7). 
Hippias admits that the case Socrates referred to stands without any 
subjective reservatioa Consequently, although Socrates did not make clear how 
the conclusion about arithmetic had to follow from Hippias' commitments, 
Hippias allows the possibihty that he accepts the transition from ability to falsity 
as well as truth and that he accepts retroactively how the conclusion follows 
from his commitments in geometry as in arithmetic. 
Hippias reluctantly applies his previous commitments to astronomy, 
looking ahead to the conclusion (367c8-368a7). 
Socrates shows that he knows Hippias' expertise in astronomy (367e8). 
Whether or not Socrates appeals to Hippias' greater expertise in astronomy than 
the former subjects to elicit the conclusion from Hippias' commitment, he 
proposes that they should examine an astronomer in general. 
Asking personal questions about Hippias' expertise, still ambiguously in 
acquired disposition (367e8-368al), Socrates allows the possibility that he has 
thought that i f Hippias accepts the propositions about Hippias' expertise, 
Hippias commits himself to the proposition about the relevant expert. Whether 
Socrates believes (a) that what he is examining is an inter-agreed sound belief 
uncovered by an exchange by questions and answers or (b) that what he is 
examining is what Hippias should properly believe, Socrates allows the 
possibility' that they have been examining the truth in Hippias' admission. 
However, Hippias would not necessarily take at face value Socrates' procedure 
I by taking the injtiative in asking questions. 
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Following Hippias' agreement to his expertise in asfronomy (368a 1), Socrates 
asks whether the 'same' thing is.tme of astronomy also(368a2). Neither Socrates 
nor Hippias has specified what is the same truth common to the areas mentioned 
or what is the same process leading to the conclusion in the areas. On geometry, 
Socrates referred to a process he had not referred to in the conversation about 
arithmetic but did not specify the conclusion similar to that about arithmetic. 
Accordingly, it is dubious whether both have the same idea of what is the same 
in these areas, but Socrates suggests that he supposes that the same conclusion 
that a true man and a false man are the same in a specific area follows from the 
same process. 
While Hippias shows reluctance to accept the .same conclusion as in 
arithmetic (368a3), Socrates resumes in his question and additional summary 
what he regards as the same propositions and inferential rules as those in the 
conversations on arithmetic and geometry, asking''*' whether only the good 
astronomer, i.e., the man able to falsify, will be false (368a3-5) and explaining, 
' I ask this because the man unable [to do that] is at least not false; he is foolish 
(368a5-6).' 
Socrates' whole speech summarising Hippias' commitments resembles 
speeches at 367c4-6 and 367e3-5. As the proposition in Socrates' summary 
(368a5-6) suggests, Socrates supposes Hippias can infer the proposition in his 
question at 368a3-5 from the bi-conditional that all and only experts in 
astronomy are able to verify or falsify i f they wish to; specifically, from the 
proposition that a non-expert in astronomy is not able to falsify (368a5-6) and 
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the proposition that a man unable to falsify is not false (368a5). Socrates does 
not repeat the same form of the proposition as before. 
Hippias reluctantly affirms (368a6). As Socrates did not use the same 
proposition or locution, it is dubious whether Hippias recognises the similarity 
in the propositions in Socrates' questions. However, i f he realises that he must 
accept the propositions about astronomy by analogy, he must accept the transition 
firom ability to falsify infallibly to actual performance of falsity. 
Socrates asks''^, 'Therefore, wi l l the same man be both true and false in 
astronomy also(368a6-7)?' Socrates did not refer to the proposition that a man 
expert in astronomy is able to speak truly about astronomy or specify the 
proposition that a man expert in astronomy is able both to speak truly and to 
speak falsely about astronomy, but he seems to suppose that the formulation that 
only a man good at astronomy, i.e., able to speak falsely about astronomy is 
false is crucial for Hippias to draw the similar conclusion. It sounds paradoxical 
that only a man good at astronomy is false, but i f Hippias understands by 'speak 
falsely' 'utter a false proposition, irrespective of commissive speech', it would be 
plausible insofar as it approximates the proposition that a false man about 
astronomy is able to formulate a false proposition. However, unless Hippias 
understands 'false' in an achievement sense, he would not dissolve the oddness 
in the collocation, 'false in astronomy' in parallel with 'true in astronomy'. In other 
words, it would make more sense that a false man in an achievement sense, i.e., 
a man who achieves deceit about astronomy, is expert in astronomy. Inasmuch 
as Socrates leaves unclear the process or the inferential rules of the argument to 
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the conclusion, it is not necessarily clear whether the interlocutors recognised 
the crux in the whole. However, i f Socrates envisages the necessity of Hippias' 
conclusion, he would assume that Hippias accepts the fransition from ability to 
falsify to actual falsifying in drawing the conclusion about actuality. 
Hippias affirms the similar conclusion reluctantly''^'' according to some 
necessity of a certain specifiable argument leading to the conclusion (368a7). 
Hippias would have been confident of keeping consistency in committing 
himself to the proposition (a) that the same person is not both truthful and 
deceitful in a dispositional sense and to the truism (b) that because the criterion 
of the truth-value of a proposition is one and the same, the same person is both 
able to judge whether a given proposition is true or not and to judge whether it 
is false or not. Therefore, Hippias might assume without inconsistency that a 
consistently and infallibly truthful man about a specific area, i f any, is expert in 
that area and that a consistently and infallibly deceitful man in the area, i f any, 
is also expert in the area. However, Hippias does not have the right to infer by 
combination of the two propositions that all experts in a specific area are 
consistently and infallibly both truthful and deceitful, because normal experts 
learned a disposition of proper use of the skill concerned and because only some 
experts, having acquired the ability with the disposition of proper use, abandon 
the disposition. 
Commonsensically, it is not necessarily true that all the experts in some area 
are consistently and infallibly truthfiil in it; neither is it true that all the experts 
in some area are consistently and infallibly deceitful in it. I f Hippias follows our 
186 
common sense, Hippias would not affirm the formulation that an expert m a 
specific area is both true and false in the meaning of the proposition that all 
experts in the area are consistently and infallibly both truthful and deceitful, 
whether in an achievement or in a dispositional sense. 
However, i f he assumed that an expert in an area has acquired the disposition 
to deceive in the process of acquiring the ability to deceive, he would have 
mistaken that ability for potentiality indifferent to disposition. I f his affirmation 
is to be justified, he must admit that there is an expert who, having abandoned 
the disposition to do properly in the expertise, has acquired the disposition to do 
properly or improperly for a purpose different firom that appointed to the 
expertise. Indeed, i f Hippias has any reason in the conclusion at all, he has to 
admit that all and only clever men who have practised both a proper and an 
improper use of a skill or science achieve honesty or deceit about a subject 
concerned whenever they wish to. 
Socrates' clincher and Hippia.s' welshing (368a8-369b7) 
Hippias has shovv'ed reluctance in affirming the propositions in Socrates 
questions about astronomy (368a3; 368a6; 368a7), except for that about his 
greater expertise (368a 1). Socrates did not keep consistency in locution while 
showing the similarity in the steps to the conclusion in the areas mentioned. 
However, Socrates pushes Hippias to apply the consideration about areas 
mentioned to all the areas of expertise in his self-proclaimed polymathy. 
Socrates leaves inexplicit whether he is committed to the result of Hippias' 
consideration, but i f there is some reason for pushing Hippias to apply the 
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preceding consideration to all expertises, he would have recognised some 
necessity in Hippias' reaching the conclusion from his commitments, specifi-
cally, an argument which Hippias has to follow by Hippias' reasons. Although 
he encouraged Hippias to regard the latter two conversations as abridged 
versions of the first conversation, he crucially repeatedly introduced the similar 
type of question with summary of Hippias' admissions, embodying the proposi-
tional type that only a man good at X is false about X (367c4-6; 367e3-4; 
368a3-5). Considering a justifiable argument which leads Hippias to the similar 
conclusion in a specific area, the proposition conceming the reciprocity of ability 
with actuality, especially, the proposition conceming the transition from ability 
to falsify or verify to falsity or truth, is crucial for Hippias, from our point of 
view. However, Socrates referred to this transition only once, at 367c6, and that 
passingly. Why did Socrates suggest to Hippias that Hippias' affirmafion of this 
propositional type (cf 367c6) but not the one about the transition is so crucial 
for Hippias to reach the conclusion? 
Socrates might have been trading both on an apparent similarity by similar 
locution and on Hippias' boast of ability to answer any question, once he 
obtained Hippias' commitment to the transition from ability to actuality 
passingly. Hence, he might have been distracting Hippias from the crux of 
Hippias' commitments. 
However, if Socrates has some reason in the interplay, we must consider what 
Socrates might have sophistically distanced Hippias from or what propositions 
Socrates assumes that Hippias tacitly accepts other than that type. We could 
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offer some answer by considering why Socrates used a rhetorical question such 
as 'Is anyone but an expert false about some specific area?' 
Socrates, certainly, appears to Hippias to induce him to evaluate falsity in 
some respect against an established morally negative sense of falsity which 
Hippias acknowledges (364e7-365b6). Socrates might shift the meaning of'an 
expert in an area' from 'a man clever at a specific subject' to 'a clever man 
occupied about the subject'. He might systematically shift the meaning of the 
verbs concerned from a non-commissive to a commissive sense. But Socrates 
would assume that an expert's expertise is a mediating term between truth and 
falsity and that i f 'speak falsely' means 'tell a lie' or 'deceive' in a usual 
dispositional sense, it is less plausible that an expert is able to speak falsely if 
he wishes to. Therefore, Socrates introduces a type of question which challenges 
this implicit implausibility (367c4-6; 367e3-4; 368a3-5). 
Socrates might assume that i f Hippias is convinced of the general truth in all 
expertises, he must repeat the consideration about his own expertises or generalise 
his previous commitments in any other expertise irrespective of his own expertises; 
anyway, Socrates reminds Hippias that Hippias is in a position to consider 
whether the same conclusion holds true in any other expertise (368a8-bl). On 
this reminder, Socrates repeats Hippias' boast of his expertises, probably to 
encourage Hippias to carry out his consideration, and to publicise Hippias' 
cleverness'* '^'. 
In enumerating Hippias' expertises (368b5-el), Socrates asks him to consider 
(368a9-bl) (1) whether an expert is able to speak falsely on a given question 
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consistently and infallibly i f he wishes to, (2) whether a non-expert is unable to 
do that, (3) whether an expert is able to speak truly on a given question 
consistently and infallibly i f he wishes to, and (4) whether a non-expert is 
unable to speak truly. Socrates assumes, in whatever meaning he takes and 
thinks that Hippias takes 'expert' and the verbs, 'falsify', 'speak truly', and 'speak 
falsely', that if Hippias gives affirmation to the four propositions, Hippias must 
see the conclusion that all and only false men are true in any area. 
Socrates asks Hippias to appeal to what both have agreed in considering 
Hippias' and others' expertises, but Socrates does not specify what proposition 
types Hippias should examine in each expertise and under what inferential rules 
(368e3-4). Accordingly, Socrates would assume that Hippias understands how 
he deduced the similar conclusion from his commitments. Apart from the points 
in the process leading to the similar conclusion, and unlike his introductory 
remark in the'same speech (368bl), Socrates points out that he is asking 
Hippias to judge on his previous agreements whether or not all and only false 
men are true in any area. 
Socrates does not introduce the proposition that falsity and truth are the same 
characteristic but the proposition that in any area, if any man has either, he 
necessarily has the other (368e4-5). If Hippias assumes that it is possible that 
being true and being false are both attributed to the same man at the same time 
as characteristics conceming speaking truly and falsely on the same subject, he 
must assume that they are not actual characteristics but potential. 
Socrates, suggesting that it does not matter whether Hippias regards a false 
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man as clever or unscrupulous or of any other characteristic according to 
Hippias' previous commitment, concludingly asks whether or not Hippias fmds, 
according to their previous result, any science or craft in which it does not hold 
that all and only false men are true. While indicating that there is no area in 
which it does not obtain, whether Hippias takes Socrates to regard it as truth or 
as a necessary deduction firom Hippias' commitments, Socrates asks Hippias to 
•fmd some area"*^ .^ 
Although Socrates did not show that he agreed to the propositions in his 
previous questions, he asks Hippias to appeal to what has been agreed by 
Hippias and Socrates''^ .^ Socrates apparently is ready to share the responsibility 
for Hippias' previous commitments leading to Hippias' miscarriage; Socrates 
gives the impression that he believed the proposition he introduced into his 
question which Hippias affirmed; however, Socrates did not commit himself to 
any affirmations of Hippias'. 
Hippias provisionally surrenders to the generality (369a3). But, Socrates 
denies its pro^'^sionality as Hippias indicates that Hippias cannot find any 
counterexample (369a4-5). Socrates observes that Hippias will find none. Also 
Socrates appears to Hippias to recall''^ ^ what comes out'*^ ^ firom their 
conversation''^ .^ To what degree Socrates assumes that Hippias' affirmations to 
the propositions in his questions are acceptable beyond the limits of Hippias' 
previous commitments is controversial, but at least, Socrates reminds Hippias 
that Hippias must accept the conclusion (a) i f he accepts the propositions and 
the inferential mles in Socrates' questions about arithmetic and (b) i f he accepts 
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that the same form of steps to the conclusion holds valid in other areas. 
Socrates did not necessarily formalise the steps to the conclusion. Hence, in 
the conversation, Hippias is responsible for the formal necessity of the argument 
in Hippias' affirmations only or the content of the form as well. 
Hippias indicates that he cannot find in the preceding conversation what 
Socrates means by 'what comes out for both Hippias and Socrates from their 
exchanges' (369a6). When Hippias gave affirmation to the formulation in 
Socrates' question, he might have thought that Socrates was setting a series of 
loaded questions in a certain order without telling Hippias his intentions. 
Therefore, he might think there is no entailment for which he should take 
responsibility. 
However, as Hippias recognised that he is liable to be publicly taken by the 
audience to commit self-contradiction at least partially, he might be passing the 
responsibility to Socrates. Socrates appears to him responsible for his apparent 
self-contradiction, if not his affirmations, in public, but he cannot make public 
Socrates' specific cheat in the conversation; that would befray the emptiness of 
his boasted ability to answer any question. 
While snidely remarking on Hippias' forgetfulness in reference to his 
mnemonic, Socrates reminds Hippias of what Socrates regards as the conse-
quence of their exchange (369a7-bl). Socrates, first, asks Hippias to confirm 
that Hippias said that Achilles is true while Odysseus is false and polytropos 
(365b3-6). But he does not say in what sense he believes Hippias used these 
words. At least, Hippias used them in a di.spositional sense at 364e7-b6 (cf 365e3, 
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365e7, 365e8-9, 366b3). Hence, he leaves open the possibility that he is tr>'ing 
to show that the formulations which Hippias committed himself to include a 
contradiction formally. 
Following Hippias' confirmation (369b2), Socrates, first, invites Hippias to 
recognise'"" that it has been shown that all and only false men are true (369b3-
4). Referring to the conclusion in the preceding conversation, Socrates presup-
poses that Hippias' affirmations have entailed that all and only false men are 
true in any area. Socrates appears to Hippias to refer to the objective truth of the 
conclusion by some valid proof, but he might mean by 'what has been shown'*''' 
'that which Hippias should properly accept from his affirmations'. Therefore, it 
does not necessarily follow that Socrates believes the propositions affirmed. 
Taking the general proposition as a premise, Socrates asks Hippias whether 
it has been concluded that i f Odysseus was false, he becomes true and that i f 
Achilles was true, he becomes false too and that they are not different or 
opposite but similar (369b4-7). Socrates has indicated that he meant by the 
previous concluding formulations with 'the same' at 367c7-8, 368a6-7, 368e4-5 
the general proposition that all and only false men are true. 
Formally, whatever Hippias means by 'true' and 'false', (1) //Hippias 
introduces into his statement the formulation (FPl), 'Odysseus is false,' and the 
formulation (FP2), 'Achilles is true,' and (2) //"Hippias gives affirmation, on one 
hand, to the formulation in Socrates' question (FP3), 'for any man, if he is true, 
he is not false,' and on the other hand, to the formulation (FP4), 'the same man 
is both true and false,' meaning the formulation (FP5), 'a man is true i f and only 
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if he is false,' and (3) //he accepts the rule of instantiation and applies it to FP3 
and FP5, then, Socrates has the right to conjecture that Hippias may work out 
from FPl and FP3 both (FCl), 'Odysseus is false and not false' and (FC2), 
'Achilles is true and not tme.' Formally, i f Hippias affirms the formulations FP3 
and FP5, Socrates rightly invites Hippias to confirm his formal self-contradiction. 
However, i f Hippias reahsed that Socrates asks Hippias to mean the words, 'true' 
and 'false', differently between (FP3) and (FP4), he could accuse Socrates of 
palming off the shift of meaning. Nevertheless, i f Hippias did not realise his 
commitment to the shift, he might be supposing the premise which admits the 
shift, i.e., the reciprocity of ability with actuality. 
As to Socrates' initiative in proceeding with their conversation by questions, 
could Hippias take Socrates to have taken wrong procedures? First, Hippias 
may take Socrates to be wrong in applying Hippias' affirmation to the formula-
tion about a specific expertise to the formulafion without any limitations of a 
specific expertise. Hippias might accuse Socrates of analogising the truth in the 
area of expertise to morality. However, although neither interlocutor had 
expository exchanges about 'true', 'false', 'falsify', 'speak truly' and 'speak falsely' 
effectively in spite of Hippias' apparent affirmations of Socrates' formulations, 
it was Hippias who suggested that false men are clever at deceiving about subjects 
concerned (365el0-366al) and who allows the possibihty that 'speak falsely' is 
used commissively in an area of a skill or science. 
Although Socrates began asking Hippias about his expertise in order to elicit 
Hippias' commitment about the expertise in question, Socrates did not make 
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explicit that he was asking about expertise in order to ask about the relation 
between truth and falsity. In his questions about expertise, Socrates neither 
referred to 'deceit' which Hippias explicitly had used before nor distinctively 
used 'speak falsely', 'speak truly' and 'falsify'. Hippias later certainly could take 
Socrates sophistically to have started questioning about Hippias' uttering a true 
proposition indistinguishably fi-om his telling the truth. However, it was Hippias 
who had unanalysed opinion about falsity, whether in an achievement or in a 
dispositional sense, complementarity to that about truth. 
Further, in his concluding remark (369a8-bl; 369b3-7), Socrates certainly 
does not refer to the area of expertise as the domain of discourse in formulating 
the conclusion. What Socrates has the right to introduce as Hippias' conclusion 
is that all and only false men are true not in a dispositional but in an achieve-
ment sense. It is.Hippias who is required to understand his conclusion according 
to an achievement sense of the predicates. To interpret the conclusion thus, 
Hippias must admit that there is an expert who has become ambivalently able 
to do properly or improperly by abandoning the disposition to do properly. 
Actually, Hippias might still be confident of keeping consistency because 
Socrates introduces a paradoxical conclusion and because Hippias believes that 
he gave each affirmation to what he believed true. Certainly, i f Socrates 
formulates in his question, instead of using 'true' and 'false', the conclusion that 
a deceitful man and a truthful man are the same, he would give the audience 
some impression of his cheat in taking the initiative in asking questions and 
pushing Hippias to the conclusion. 
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However, when Hippias finds some exemplariness in both heroes in respect 
of sincerity in a commissive context, his quoted passage allowed the interpretation 
of'true' and 'false' in an achievement sense. In other words, Hippias first assumed 
normally but inconsistently that Homer's Odysseus achieved deceit while 
Achilles is dispositionally honest. Hence, when Socrates asked whether false 
men are l ike those able to do something (365d6-7), Hippias is not wrong in 
working out a kind of ability from his belief in successful deceitfulness and 
specifiability of the means of already achieved deceit. Hippias might deduce the 
proposition about potentiality from the proposition about actuality. 
I f Hippias understands ability in a normal sense, and, so, admits (a) that 
ability does not imply actuality and (b) that the inference from actuality to ability 
is valid, then, according to Homer's passage which suggests that both falsity and 
truth are actuality, Hippias would not have been wrong in affirming that false 
men are able to do something (365d7-8) or in inexplicitly admitting that false 
men actually falsify (365e3, e7, e8-9, 366b3). However, i f he commits himself 
to the proposition that abilit}' to do something is doing it whenever one wishes 
to (366b7-c4), and i f he commits himself to the transition from this ability to 
actuality (367c6), he wrongly modifies either the meaning of falsity and truth or 
that of abilit}'. I f he reduced falsity and truth to ability in a normal sense, he 
would be inconsistent in deducing actuality from that ability (365e3, e7, e8-9, 
366b3), even i f he rescued the transition from ability to verify to truth (367c6); 
i f he modified ability in a normal sense to the ability with reciprocit)' to 
actuality, he would rescue the above issues but would have to solve the identity 
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of tmth with falsity; specifically, Hippias would have to require 'abilit}'' to mean 
'ability to do properly or improperly in an expertise with reciprocity'. In this case, 
apart fi-om the interlocutors' mutual justification, Hippias would logically have 
to see the ability with consistent reciprocity to actuality in both Homer's Achilles 
and his Odysseus and have to require truth to mean ambivalent ability in 
contrast to experts' usual unambivalent truth. 
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6. Roll-in and Roll-back (369b8-373c5) 
General analysis of 369b8-373c5 
Neither party makes clear whether he intends to end their conversation 
'(369b3-c8). Socrates might, but Hippias' response (3.69b8-c8) invites Socrates' 
and thus re-involves Hippias (373c6 flf). 
Socrates' question at 369b3-7 clinches their conversation concerning Hippias' 
opinion about Homer's characterisation (363al-365d5), and specifically about 
false men (365d6 flf.) because, as Weiss indicates'*'^, Socrates refers, first, to the 
general conclusion about false men and, then, to the inference firom it to Homer's 
Achilles and Odysseus. This conclusion implies that Hippias' initial opinion 
(364c3-7, 364e7-365b6) is insolvent. However, Hippias does not end their 
conversation by accepting or rejecting the conclusion or by objecting to Socrates' 
previous particular speech (369b8). He objects to Socrates' conversational method, 
despite his professional boast (364d3-6), and proposes the contest for interpret-
ing Homer (369b8-c8). He is still confident of proving that Homer's Achilles is 
truthful and Odysseus deceitful (369c2-5). So, allowed to respond, Socrates makes 
a long meta-elenctic speech (369dl-370e4), counter-arguing for his method 
(369dl-e2) and, relatedly, a retrospective speech defending his practice (369e2-
370e4). He interlaces this wi th his proof of Homer's Achilles' falsifying which 
is obviously open to Hippias' counter-interpretation (cf. 369c2-5). He leaves 
moot Hippias' acceptance of the general conclusion (369b3-4) that all and only 
false men are true. Hippias predictably counter-argues for Achilles' unwished 
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deceit (370e5-9). Socrates reargues for Achilles' wish to deceive Odysseus by 
referring to lines Hippias forgot in the Iliad (370elO ff . ) . Socrates drags Hippias 
around to a consequence of Hippias' previous affirmations (365d6-369b7), the 
preferability of those who falsify as they wish to to those who falsify as they do 
not wish to (37Ie7-8). Taking the thesis as an explicitly moral proposition, 
Hippias asks rhetorically whether it is not against a commonsensical penal 
presupposition (371e9-372a5). Leaving the thesis uninterpreted, Socrates shifts 
to his apparently suspended meta-elenctic speech (372a6-c8) and professes that 
his wavering over that moral thesis, caused by ignorance, is swung to it by 
Hippias' previous affirmations. To resolve this wavering, Socrates demands 
Hippias' response to questions (372e6-373a5). Hippias concedes this by force 
of his boast of polymathy, evading his dilemma between allowing for Socrates' 
unwished misbehaviour and admitting Socrates' conversational superiority 
(373b4-9; 371e9-372a5; 364d3-6), and foUowmg Eudicus' demand (373cl-3). 
Hippias fails in retrie\ing the initiative by displaying on Homer and reverts to 
a respondent's role. 
Hippias' objection: Homer's Achilles is innocent; his Odysseus is a liar 
(369b8-c8) 
I f Hippias recognised which previous admission entails the unintended 
conclusion, would he readily withdraw the wrong admission''^'*? Some cntics 
interpret that Hippias does not know where Socrates' fallacy or his own wrong 
admission lay'''^ Certainly, Hippias has not exactly located his unwary 
admission, but would not question his or Socrates' previous particular speech 
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because he thinks the audience believe Socrates has arrived sophistically at a 
paradoxical conclusion. Hippias would understand that he appears to fail in 
surviving Socrates' questions in committing self-contradiction; however, to retrieve 
the initiative, he would not publicly analyse a specific 'blunder' but appeal to 
Socrates' sophistical impression on the audience. Since Socrates did not clanfy 
actuality of falsity and truth (369b3-7)''^^ pace Weiss'"^, Hippias would be 
objecting to only a part of the conclusion indirectly (369c2-5). The conclusion 
certainly appears paradoxical, but pace Blundell'*'^, Hippias would not be ready 
to disentangle his confiision through Socrates' pedagogic elenchus. 
Hippias does not answer Socrates but criticises Socrates' plot in intertwining 
his speeches (369b8); specifically, Socrates' distinguishing whatever point 
makes difficulty, and touching on it in detail while ignoring the subject-matter 
o f the whole conversation"*'^ (369b9-c2). He suggests that by sticking to 
whatever point he finds hardest to manage, Socrates has not discussed the main 
question on the superiority of Homer's Achilles to Odysseus, as he believes they 
should (369cl-5). 
Hippias proposes that they should each make a speech on the superiont}' of 
one hero, and that, within these limits, i f Socrates wishes, he should in turn 
compare the argument, and that the audience should judge their speeches 
(369c2-8). 
However, Hippias does not compare his present statement with his preceding 
afTirmations, or clarify on what criterion he judged Homer's Achilles superior. 
As Schleiermacher says'''', Hippias requested short questions (365d5); consciously 
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or not, he avoids disclosing his dialectical inability. Setting apart his preceding 
afiSrmations about ability and still supporting Achilles' superority, he indirectly 
rejects at least part of Socrates' conclusion in the sense of actuality. 
Socrates's provocative 'defensive' speech involving a reminder: Homer's 
Achilles demotes speaking truly from his principle (369dl-370e4) 
Socrates' defensive speech, pace Vlastos^°°, does not so clearly defend his 
conclusion at 369b3-7, especially as one drawn from the defmition at 366b4-5, 
nor offer, as Weiss argues'"', a topical fransition from ability to actuality. 
Socrates evades Hippias' proposal (a) by implying that Hippias proposed a 
contest in 'cleverness' and (b) by conceding Hippias' superiority in 'cleverness' 
without clarifying his criterion of cleverness (369dl-2). 
In defence, Socrates explains that he habitually questions only a speaker he 
judges clever to 'learn' something (369dl-7). He indicates that i f he persists 
concerning what a speaker said and asks a question to profit from learning 
something, then he thinks the speaker clever (369d7-e2). I f Hippias thought 
Socrates' description applied to this conversation, Socrates would appear to him 
to suggest that as he asked him persistendy, Socrates thought him clever, Socrates, 
though, did not explain what he learned from a speaker. 
Socrates does not specify how he has applied his habitual way with a man he 
thinks clever to his conversation with Hippias. But he obviously asked about 
Hippias' opinions and referred to his cleverness (364a2, 364b2). Hence, Hippias 
may naively take Socrates to explain his habit with a clever man by his 
preceding behaviour; Socrates might psychologically contrast his listed habitual 
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procedures to his preceding behaviour through his disbelief in Hippias' 
cleverness (369e2)^°^. He suggests this (1) by saying what he believed againsl 
Hippias on Homer's characterisation when Hippias quoted Achilles' speech at 
364e7-365b6 (369e2-370a2) and (2) by additionally making his case against 
Hippias' view by interpreting Homer (370a2-370d6). 
While Socrates proposed to drop Homer (365c8-dl) before asking about a 
false man in general (365d6-369b7), and declined a contest (369dl-2), he 
smuggles Homer's interpretation into his retrospective remark. 
Socrates says he thought that Hippias showed by quoting Achilles' speech 
(364e7-365b6) that Achilles regarded Odysseus as a deceiver in an achievement 
sense (aA,aC6va) . He indicates he thought that Hippias' interpretation that 
Achilles is true and simple while Odysseus is false and polytropos (364e7-
365b6) was inconsistent with Homer's portrayals^"''. Hippias might take Socrates 
to have thought that Hippias meant by 'false' normally 'deceitful' in a dispositional 
sense or 'a man expert at achieving deceit in subjects concerned', although, as 
Grote suggests''", Socrates does not make explicit the moral connotation of'falsify' 
here. Further, Socrates might have previously recognised his subsequent part-
p r o o f ° ' of Achilles' falsity by a single but not infallible falsifying'"* when 
Hippias quoted Homer (365al-b2). Anyway, Socrates does here argue agamst 
Hippias' interpretation of Homer. 
Readers should not read arbitrarily into the preceding conversation what 
Socrates tells Hippias that he thought. Readers may consider Socrates' 
retrospective suggestion, but it is risky to read one's ex post facto remark into 
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preceding deeds. When Socrates remarks what he tacitly supposed earlier, he 
may be motivated for some reason in the present, for example, for counter-
arguing against Hippias' f i rm belief in the way that Hippias suggested they 
should follow. One speaking retrospectively necessarily stands at his present 
perspective. Therefore, Socrates here attends to the result of the precedmg 
conversation at 363al-369c8. 
A t 369e2-370d6 Socrates does not make clear, but Hippias can reasonably 
assume, his continuing commitment to his interpretation of Achilles' beha\'iour. 
//"Socrates here assumes that Hippias accepts (1) that Homer's Achilles is 
typically honest in an achievement sense, (2) accepts that Odysseus typically 
deceives in an achievement sense, (3) means 'able to verify' by 'true' and 'able 
to falsify ' by 'false', and (4) according to his commitments, has to accept that 
both Odysseus and Achilles in Homer are able both to falsify' and to verify in the 
sense that they actualise their ability whenever they wish to, then, Socrates is 
counter-arguing against Hippias' (1) and (2). 
Socrates indicates retrospectively that he thought that i f Hippias interprets 
Odysseus as polytropos in the sense that he typically achieves deceit, Hippias 
must justify Homer's portrayal that Odysseus does not attempt to deceive relevandy 
to Achilles' snide remark and that Achilles deceives once (369e2-370a3). 
Further,.in terms of a proposition of potentiality, Socrates allows the 
possibility that he presupposed that Hippias thought that Achilles is actually, not 
only potentially, honest and that Odysseus is actually, not only potentially, 
deceitful. Hence, whether or not, while asking a question, Socrates palmed off 
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the inference from a proposition of potentiality to one of actuality on Hippias, i f 
Hippias recognised, according to a normal sense of ability, that Socrates' 
impropriety was trading on that inference, he could nail Socrates' past and 
present impropriety by seizing on Socrates' remark immediately. However, Hippias 
did not and does not criticise Socrates. Hippias might have attended to both non-
reciprocal and reciprocal uses of ability when they talked about false men's 
ability, but he might not have been able to distinguish the reciprocity in a clever 
man occupied about subjects concerned from that in a reliable expert in 
formulating a true proposition of a subject. 
Socrates interprets Achilles' wish, by considering Achilles' inaction 
incongruous to his commitment (cf //. 11. 598-600, 607-614). On textual 
evidence, he concludes that while declaring that he w i l l leave, Achilles 
obviously made no preparations but belittles speaking truly in lordly fashion 
(370d2-6). Whether Socrates evaluates Achilles' wish as moral'°^ or ironically 
non-moral'°^, he allows the possibility (a) that he interprets that Achilles tells 
a lie in his declaration of leaving and (b) that he thought that Achilles, but not 
Odysseus, tells a lie in the passage concerned. 
As Socrates interprets. Homer's Achilles commits self-contradiction in his 
commissive speeches to Odysseus and others, about sailing off the following day 
(//. 9.356-363, 417-418, 614-615, 646-651); Achilles does not sail off but 
overiooks the battle (//. 11. 598-600, 607-614); hence, Achilles here demotes 
speaking truly from his professed pnnciple (//. 9.312-313). Homer represents 
characters doing something, but does not necessarily ascribe the described 
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action to their wish. Hence, Socrates can interpret what Homer's characters wish 
under Homer's description, but Socrates' interpretation as well as Hippias' is 
only one possibility. Achilles may or may not falsify as he wished. I t does not 
fo l low that Achilles tells a lie consistently whenever he wishes to. Homer 
indicates that Achilles lies at least once. However, neither Achilles' audience nor 
even Achilles may believe that he tells the truth about leaving. Neither 
Diomedes .(//. 9. 697-698) nor Odysseus (ibid. 673-683) need, as Socrates 
apparently does, believe that Achilles commits himself to the proposition that 
he w i l l leave'° ' . 
Possibly Hippias takes Socrates to exercise his memory of Homer to 
extemporise or to have ready a rival interpretation of this passage. However, i f 
Hippias, as a professional contender for Homeric interpretation, considers 
Socrates' display of his ability to formulate the proof by scanning Homer's Iliad 
and / / Hippias supposes some sound criterion of interpreting Homer's 
characters' wish in their behaviour, then, he may suppose that Socrates is ready 
now to prove Achilles' insincerity, irrespective of preceding conversation. 
Contrariwise, i f Hippias rejects any sound criterion, except a popular one, 
Hippias could suspect Socrates (1) of showing off his ability to expound Homer 
in any way from various passages to mock Hippias and (2) of being constantly 
ready to invent a counter-argument against Hippias' type of interpretation. 
Anyway, Hippias could suspect that Socrates was able to argue that Homer's 
Achilles deceives at least once, while Odysseus does not deceive relevantly. 
Further, i f Hippias considers Socrates' introduction of the word, aXaCtov 
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(369e4), and admits that it can imply some expertise, Hippias could eventually 
recall Socrates' sophistical arrangement of questions; specifically, he could take 
Socrates to have thought, when Hippias explained that Odysseus is false (364e7-
365b6), that Odysseus' falsity implies his expertise^'". Hence, Hippias could 
suspect that Socrates might have believed, tacitly interpreting Hippias' quoted 
passage, that Hippias' descriptive condition of the predicate 'false', when Hippias 
introduced it (365a4-b6), was, as he suggested subsequently (365b7-8, 365elO-
366al), cleverness at achieving deceit about subjects concerned. I f Hippias 
suspected so, he could conclude that, while believing so, Socrates might have 
(i) given priority to estabhshing the general contradiction of falsity to truth on 
this condition (365c3-7), and, then, (ii) dismissing Homer's responsibility 
(365c8-d4), restarted asking about Hippias' descriptive conditions of Talse' 
(365d6 f f . ) . 
Earlier Socrates superficially suggested, using diagnostically tagged questions 
(363b7 and elsewhere), that he mostly concerned himself wi th Hippias' opinion 
of Homer's charactensation. Further, he did not mention the soundness of Hippias' 
opinion, only saying he thought he understood what Hippias said (364d7-el, 
365b7-8). Even in the conversation about false men, although Hippias naturally 
said what he believed true (366b7, 367a5), Socrates mostly seemed concerned 
wi th Hippias' opinion, pmning on Hippias the responsibility for the proposiuon 
embodied in his tagged quesfions^", or making 'Hippias' a subject of such 
propositions'''. Socrates m his concluding speeches would have appeared to 
Hippias to concern himself with the truth-value of Hippias' proposit ions 'but 
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not what Hippias should consistently believe from his previous commitments. 
Accordingly, despite Socrates' apparent concem with Hippias' b e l i e f s ' H i p p i a s 
might take Socrates to have believed what Hippias affirmed. Hence, i f Hippias 
took Socrates to have assumed he could elicit true opinions from Hippias, whom 
Socrates thinks 'clever', he could question how Socrates can justify his behefs, 
by eliciting Hippias' affirmations or denials of propositions embodied in 
questions. 
I f Hippias relied on Socrates' refrospective remark and exerted his mnemonic 
art, he could suspect that (a) Socrates, not mentioning the soundness of Hippias' 
opinions on Homer, concerned himself with it tacitly, (b) specifically, when 
indirectly asking, 'You mean 'a false man' by 'a polyfropos man', at least as it 
seems (365b7)?' Socrates suspected that Hippias' exposition conflicted with 
Socrates' own textual interpretation of Achilles' behaviour, and (c) supposing 
that Odysseus obviously does not lie relevantly, Socrates was not opposed to 
Hippias' extrapolation that Homer created Odysseus as false in many passages 
in the Iliad (365c 1-2). However, in exerting his mnemonics so well, Hippias 
would remember that Socrates did not refer to or justify Socrates' opinion about 
Homer's Achilles and Odysseus. Therefore, Socrates' refrospective remark would 
be unreliable, even for Hippias; it might even intensify Hippias' suspicion of 
Socrates' weaving of speeches; Socrates might invent his previous opinion since 
Hippias resuggested Homer's Odysseus' achievement of deceit at 369c5. 
Hippias here can take Socrates to tell him truly or falsely his earlier thoughts; 
Socrates here links his proof of Achilles' falsity with what he had thought in his 
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initial question (370d6-e4), saying, 'So then, Hippias, even from the beginning, 
I asked you because I did?i't know which of those two men is created by the poet 
to be the better ...' [Italics mine.] 
Since Socrates refers to the temporal order of his views on Achilles' falsity, 
Hippias could suspect Socrates of asking Hippias' opinion about Achilles' 
superiority without making explicit his belief that one hero's superiority can 
hardly be justified in respect of'falsity and truth and the rest of goodness'. 
Socrates does not tell what particular proposition he meant to introduce into 
his question or which he believed true. Socrates tells Hippias, on the initial 
question which hero is the better in what respect (364b3-5; c f 363b6-cl, 364cl-
2), that he was not committed to any proposition as he did not know the answer; 
rather, he suggests that he had reason to think he could not give any nght 
answer on any comparative criterion such as 'falsity and truth and the rest of 
goodness (370d7-e4)'. 
Socrates speaks after (a) he required Hippias to see the conclusion implying 
Hippias' self-contradiction (369a8-b7) and (b) Hippias, rejecting at least the 
consequence about Homer's characterisation (369c2-5), showed readiness still 
to counter-argue for Achilles's superiority in honesty (369c2-5). In this ex post 
facto contex-t, Socrates declares his interpretation against Hippias that Achilles 
falsifies at least once. Hence Socrates suggests (370el-2, e3-4) that one hero's 
supenonty is hardly discernible. Neither party specifies his criterion of falsity 
(ij; e u 6 0 g); nor does Socrates make clear whether falsity is included by the rest 
of goodness (370e2-3)"'. 
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To keep consistency, Hippias must exclude from goodness disposition to speak 
falsely and cleverness at achieving deceit and could not reduce heroes to 
specialists. 
Socrates makes his second retrospective remark (370d6-e4) just after arguing 
that Achilles falsifies at least (370a3-d6). I f he argues against Hippias' 
evaluation of Achilles' wish (369c2-5), he must have Hippias realise that 
Socrates means 'tell a lie' and/or 'deceive' by 'falsify'. I f Hippias connects 
Socrates' remark to his preceding argument on Achilles' character, Hippias could 
suspect, in proportion as he supposes that Socrates' previous argument is not 
conditioned by the present refrospective context, that Socrates is committmg 
himself to his general views. 
Hippias could then suspect that Socrates in his initial question was not merely 
undecided but also sceptical about justifying one hero's superiority; therefore, he 
could suspect not that that question was incompatible with what he says he 
supposed, but that while not ready to support one hero's superiority, he asked 
Hippias' opinion, widiout explaining his intention to leam the truth from him. 
I f Hippias disbelieves Socrates' first retrospective remark (369e2-370d6), he 
probably disbelieves Socrates' second. However, Hippias could not deny that 
Socrates' remarks, i f decontextualised, shake Hippias' firm ground again. 
Hippias' objection: Homer's Achilles docs not wish to tell a lie while his 
Odysseus does (370c5-9) 
Socrates does not make explicit his continuing commitment to earlier 
considerations. Hippias can suspect Socrates' extemporisation of these beliefs. 
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Nevertheless, Hippias argues on the assumption that Socrates (a) is committed 
to what he said he had believed (370e5) and (b) is indifferent to one hero's 
superiority in respect of wish to deceive because both heroes sometimes deceive 
(370e5). 
Hippias intends to maintain Achilles' superiority in respect of wish to deceive, 
by proving that Achilles has no such wish, being forced to remain against his 
wish (370e5-8) while Odysseus deceives in consequence of wish to deceive 
without the victim noticing (sxoov xe x a i sTt iPouA.f j ( ;"*) (370e8-9). 
Therefore, Hippias admits Socrates has some right to interpret that Achilles 
made an unfulfi l led commissive speech but Hippias thinks Achilles does not 
deceive deliberately (370e5-8). But he thinks Odysseus deceives in consequence 
of his wish. 
Agents' wish is ordinarily significantly mentioned in explanation, justification 
or penalisation of an action; so, introduction of words related to wish is often 
associated with morally negative connotation; unlike Socrates Hippias would 
commit himself to that connotation. 
Socrates' responsive objection: Homer's Achilles wishes to deceive (370el0-
371e3) 
Socrates reproaches Hippias for deceiving him, wishing to deceive him 
misinterpreting that Homer's Achilles does not deceive because he wishes. Hence, 
Socrates argues for Achilles being no better than Odysseus in respect of wish to 
deceive because deceiving is Achilles' wished deed (370el0-l 1). 
Whether or not he recognises the possibility of Socrates' interpretation. 
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Hippias denies his intention of foisting of f misinterpretation and suggests, by 
asking what Socrates means and in reference to what (371al), that he intends 
to argue from Homer's text about Achilles' wish to deceive. 
Socrates argues agamst Hippias as to the sound interpretation of Homer, 
whether or not deceit is ascribed to Achilles' wish (371a2). Hence, apparently, 
Socrates is not concerned only with Hippias' opinion but with the difference 
between their opinions; he suggests that this difference is resolved on the 
interpretation of Homer's passage which Hippias is clever at (363c7-d4; c f 
369dl-2). On the proposition that Achilles falsifies as a deceit, both probably 
agree to a condition for falsifying that Achilles both makes a commissive speech 
saying he w i l l leave atid does nothing conforming to it; however, they differ in 
respect of the actual object of Achilles' wish, although Homer portrays Achilles' 
inaction but not necessarily his wish in his inaction (cf //. 598-600, 607-614)"^. 
Achilles might intentionally commit inaction but not wish to. Whether or not 
Socrates is ready to argue about Hippias' opinion seriously, Socrates would 
admit that i f Achilles falsifies in deceit and Odysseus does not falsify relevantly, 
then Hippias is wrong according to his comparative criterion. 
Anyhow Socrates shows that Achilles' actions suffice to ascribe wish to 
deceive to him. By morally negative words such as 'cheat', 'a treacherous man', 
and 'imposition ( c c l a C o v e i a ) ' in opposition to Hippias' opinion (371a3), 
Socrates does not distinctively categorise Achilles as a man who does injustice 
but as a deceitful man, particularly in falsifying about subjects concerned in 
successful deceits. 
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Socrates indicates, by showing that Achilles easily deceives Odysseus without 
Odysseus' noticing, that in general Achilles deceives in consequence of his wish 
without the victim noticing (371a4-bl). He takes advantage of (1) Achilles' not 
telling Odysseus the reason for doing nothing conforming to his commitment and 
(2) Odysseus' saying nothing to Achilles to indicate that he noticed Achilles 
deceiving (371a7-bl). 
Socrates deduces (1) that Achilles is deceitfiil in an achievement sense and 
(2) that Achilles designedly deceives Odysseus from both (3) that Achilles dares 
to tell Odysseus two contradictory things, without telling Odysseus his 
contradiction and (4) that Odysseus says nothing to Achilles to indicate that he 
noticed. Yet one doubts that Socrates or Hippias can justify Homer's characters' 
wish in their inactions, since i f Homer does not describe their wishes. Hence one 
doubts that Socrates can justify his assertion that Odysseus did not notice 
Achilles deceiving just because Homer does not describe Odysseus' behaviour 
implying his noticing. 
Both Odysseus' recognition of Achilles' self-contradiction and Achilles' 
superiority in cleverness at achieving deceit are indifferent to proving Achilles' 
wish to deceive Odysseus but not his achieving deceit. But Socrates inserts 
cleverness at achieving deceit as the condition of deceitfulness. Accordingly, i f 
Hippias believes that Socrates has some reason in inserting cleverness, Socrates 
allows, whether or not he believes in the specifiability of conditions of achieving 
deceit, the possibility that he proves Achilles deceitful in an achievement sense 
as Hippias suggested. Hence Socrates proposes Achilles' achievement of deceit 
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and his superiority to Odysseus in this respect in addition to Achilles' wish to 
deceive. 
Interrogatively Hippias suggests that Socrates' interpretation is inadmissible 
(371b2)^'^. Whether or not Socrates generally infers from the premise that A 
deceives B without B's noticing that A is clever at achieving deceit, Socrates, 
allowing the possibility that he is scorning Hippias' cleverness at interpreting 
Homer in introducing a conducive question, appeals to Achilles' speech to Ajax 
in Odysseus' presence about remaining at dawn after his speech about leaving 
(371b3-5). 
Hippias asks Socrates to cite Homer's passage which Hippias has not noticed 
(371b6). 
On Achilles' speech to Ajax (//. 9.650-655) (370b8-c5)^", Socrates asks 
whether it implies that Achilles (a) wishes both to disregard sincerity and 
contradict himself in his commissive speech, (b) regards Odysseus as old, and 
(c) assumes that he wi l l outdo Odysseus in both plotting and deceiving (371c6-d7). 
Socrates does not conclude explicitly that Achilles is the better at achieving 
deceit or that Achilles is the worse in respect of wish to deceive. 
However, Hippias does not refer to Socrates' description of Homer's portrayal 
but criticises Socrates' argument from it. Socrates makes explicit Hippias' 
approved view that it is not in consequence of his wish against Odysseus 
without his noticing that Achilles falsifies (371a2-3) and asks Hippias to 
confirm that both Achilles' scorn of deceitftil men (aXccCovccQ) and his self-
contradiction undermine Hippias' opinion. Socrates not only argues that falsifying 
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is Achilles' wished action but indicates that Achilles falsifies successfully. 
Hippias' objection: Homer's Achilles says different things from his good 
will (371d8-e3) 
Hippias admits Homer allows the interpretation that Achilles tells Ajax what 
contradicts what he tells Odysseus; however, he denies Socrates' interpretation 
that Achilles contradicts himself designedly(e ^ ETI: i P o u Xf j but interprets that 
it is because Achilles is convinced by his goodwill. 
Although Hippias neither refers to nor argues from a particular passage, he 
interprets, 'it is always by design that Odysseus speaks tnily and falsifies 
(371e2-3)'. 
Since Hippias told Socrates that Homer characterises Odysseus as false in 
many passages (3 65c 1-2), it is controversial whether Hippias interprets by using 
'speak truly' that'Odysseus sometimes tells the truth. Hippias probably gives iE, 
tTZx^ovXf\c, morally negative connotation (372a3). Hence it is further arguable 
whether Hippias justifiably asserts that it is always by evil desigti that Odysseus 
tells the tnith. 
However, Hippias' present point is that deceit is not Achilles' wished action 
but Odysseus'. Hence he is consistent in arguing that Achilles is better than 
Odysseus in respect of wish to be honest. 
Consistently he intentionally or unintentionally avoids associating morally 
negative connotation with Achilles' behaviour in contrast to Odysseus'; his 
phrase 'say different things (371el)' on Achilles' behaviour is less morally loaded 
than 'falsify' which could earlier mean 'deceive' or 'tell a lie' for Socrates. As 
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some suggest^'", Hippias allows the possibility that Odysseus speaks truly or 
falsely as he wished to but not that Odysseus tells truth for its own sake. Hippias 
would avoid ascribing to Odysseus wish to tell the truth for its own sake, 
because, otherwise, Hippias is committed to the proposition that Achilles is not 
necessarily better than Odysseus in respect of wish to be honest for the sake of 
honesty. Therefore, he would mean by 'speak truly' 'utter a true proposition' or 
'say that one w i l l do what one w i l l do' and not 'tell the truth'. Therefore, by 
'falsify' he would mean 'utter a false proposition' or 'say that one w i l l do what 
one w i l l not do' and not 'deceive' or 'tell a lie'. Hence, i f Hippias keeps 
consistent, he would use iE, iTi\^ovXf\c, with morally negative connotation 
like 'plot'; otherwise, though not consistent in locution, he might assert that 
Odysseus utters a true proposition and deceives by pldt^^\ 
Socrates' question: 'Is Homer's Odysseus better than his Achilles because 
of Hippias' previous admission?' (371e4-8) 
Socrates at least indirectly asks about what Hippias' previous commitment 
entails (37le4-5)"-. 
Changing direction, he appears to Hippias to try to trip him on his words on 
Odysseus"^ i f Hippias does not remember suggesting that a deceitful man is 
clever at achieving deceit. 
Admittedly, i f Hippias followed Socrates' patchwork interpretation, he could 
interpret that Odysseus is better in some part of Homer than Achilles in respect 
of both wish to deceive and actual deceit. Further, i f he admitted what Socrates 
interprets as Achilles' supposition in his behaviour (371a3-6; 371d5-7), he could 
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interpret that Achilles is better at achieving deceit than Odysseus. 
I f Socrates conjectured that in an achievement sense of deceit, Hippias 
compares Achilles wi th Odysseus in respect of cleverness at deceit involved in 
wish to deceive, he could conjecture that Hippias' previous commitment (370e5-
9; 371e2-3) entails Odysseus' superiority. 
However, Hippias plausibly would have compared consistently only by the 
criterion of wish to deceive, not cleverness at achieving deceit, although, not 
always specifying the criterion, he allows the possibility that he means 'achieve 
deceit' by 'falsify'. 
Socrates proved that AchiUes falsifies, to prove that Achilles is not better than 
Odysseus in respect of sincerity (370a2-d6), but did not make clear here or at 
370d5-6 whether the criterion is disposition or, unusually, achievement. 
However, in formulating the difference between his opinion and Hippias' 
(37 la2-3), although he might have dared to show that he suspected that Hippias 
deceived him by maintaining that falsifying is not Achilles' wished action 
(370elO-l l ) , he pointed out that Hippias' crucial point is that it is not in 
consequence of wish formed without the victim noticing that Achilles falsifies. 
Hence Socrates allowed the possibility that he recognised that Hippias (1) judged 
Achilles superior in wish to deceive and (2) had not been concerned with the 
judgement of Odysseus' superiority by cleverness at achieving deceit (370e5-
371e3). 
Therefore, insofar as Hippias does not remember invoking deceit as 
achievement, Socrates appears to Hippias abmptly and irrelevantly to change the 
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criterion from wish to deceive to cleverness at achieving deceit. Hippias 
consistently denies the proposition by interpreting the criterion of the compari-
son as an agent's wish to deceive, believing that Homer's Achilles is honest 
dispositionally (371e6). 
Hippias would accept that Achilles falsifies but not designedly; he would accept 
that Odysseus falsifies and always designedly. Therefore, still confronting the 
issue whether Achilles designedly falsifies, Socrates appeals to what he deems 
Hippias' previous commitment (366c5-368bl; 368e2-369a2): he who falsifies 
always consistently, i f he wishes to is more experienced in a subject about which 
he falsifies or cleverer at falsifying in it than he who does so not consistently, i f 
he wishes to (371e7-8). 
Socrates, giving the appearance of getting an unexpected denial from Hippias, 
asks, without diverting the conversation, 'Didn't it turn out just now^"'' that those 
who falsify e x o v t e g are better than those who falsify axov tec ;? (371e7-8)' 
I f we inspect the whole conversation as readers, this speech links the 
preceding with the subsequent conversation. Socrates might be only conducting 
Hippias to giving affirmation to the formulation in his question, but Socrates 
allows the possibility that he believes what Hippias regards as the proposition 
embodied; for Socrates conducively asks, without referring to any responsibility, 
whether the proposition did not turn out"^ 
Leaving aside Socrates' possible manoeuvre, Hippias' preceding comparison 
presupposes that (1) Achilles falsifies on particular occasions in the Iliad 
(370e5-6, 371d8-e2); (2) Achilles falsifies not in consequence of wish formed 
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against someone else without his noticing (370e5-8; 371d8-e2); (3) Odysseus 
falsifies always in consequence of such wish (370e8-9, 371e3); (4) Odysseus 
speaks truly always in consequence of such wish (371e3). Hippias admits that 
each hero falsifies sometimes; therefore, Socrates has no prospect of obtaining 
aflSrmation that Odysseus is better than Achilles in respect of falsifying. Then, 
as to wish to falsify, Socrates and Hippias are divided; therefore, Socrates has 
no prospect of obtaining Hippias' affirmation that Odysseus is better than 
Achilles in respect of wish to falsify. What Socrates can use among Hippias' 
commitments is (2) and (3). Since Hippias allows the possibility that he would 
accept that Achilles always does not falsify in consequence of wish formed 
against someone else without his noticing, he would possibly afiSrm that Odysseus 
is better than Achilles in respect of infallibly falsifying in consequence of such 
a wish in an achievement sense of falsifying. 
Although Socrates appeals to the proposition from the preceding conversation, 
nothing in the interlocutors' speeches tallies wi th the present formulation about 
actuality. Socrates, here must have Hippias see that the proposition Hippias 
denies without specifying the criterion contradicts what resulted before. Hence, 
whatever Socrates usually means by S K O J v and aKCOv, he has to introduce the 
words in Hippias' usage and Hippias would understand the words according to 
his criterion since they have not made expository exchanges about them. 
Although Socrates first introduced CCKOOV, he introduced it but not EKCO v, not 
in the present context about Achilles' falsifying but in the conversation about 
false men (367a3). Socrates only tacitly suggested that the function of the 
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participle, 'wishing', (367a2), is condifional (cf 366c8, 367a4). Although E K C O V 
and Poulouevog (366e5-6, 367a2, 367a2, 367a4) are often interchangeable, 
i f Socrates means 'wishing to do the action concemed' by E K O V , he cannot 
jusf ify Hippias' inferenfial transition from 'ability to do something' to 'doing it, 
wishing to do it'. For the proposition that one falsifies, wishing to do so, 
meaning a proposition about actuality, does not follow from the proposition about 
abil i ty that one falsifies i f one wishes to; that actuality proposition would not 
fo l low without the premise of reciprocity of ability wi th actuality or without 
distinguishing wish to do within one's ability from wish to do beyond one's ability. 
Socrates introduced aKcov as an adverb modifying 'speak truly' in confrast 
to 'speak falsely' subordinated to 'wish to'. Socrates' usage of K K C O V at 367a3 is 
traced in the proposition type that i f an agent wishes to do X, he does not always 
consistently do X but does Y (cf 366b7-cl; 366e3-367a6). Socrates uses aKcov 
to distinguish different thmgs the grammatically same token 'Y' stands for: what 
an agent ascribes to his wish and what he does not. Since Socrates referred 
already to an agent's not knowing about what he wishes to do (367a3) as the 
cause of failure, he would have meant by CCKCO v, 'as the agent does not wish to', 
or 'against the agent's wish', i f he means a proposition about actuality by 'one 
does Y aKOJv'. Hence, although Socrates did not use S K C O V in the formulation 
about a false man who speaks falsely always consistently whenever he wishes 
to, he would not necessarily need to use zxchv insofar as he uses the equivalent . 
verb. Hence, in this context, i f Socrates were to use E K C O V , it would mean 'as an 
agent wishes to'^'*. 
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ButHippias introduces eKcbv and aKwv (370e7-8) into the conversation in 
relation to tE, s7ixPouA .f i<; (370e6, 370e9, 371e3, 372al; c f 371a2). 
Therefore, i f Socrates is asking Hippias to confirm the proposition in his 
question, according to Hippias' understanding of the words, he must recognise 
that Hippias understands what Socrates means by the words. 
Concerned with Socrates' interpretation on Achilles' unfulfilled commitment, 
Hippias indicated that lying is not Achilles' wished action. He would then mean 
by EKCov 'as one wishes to' or 'not as one is forced to' and by aKco v 'as one does 
not wish to'. 
Therefore, as to what Socrates' question indicates resulted (371e7), Hippias 
too would understand that those who falsify as they, wish to, or wishingly, are 
better than those who falsify as they do not wish to, or tmwishingly ( I use these 
shorthands below for convenience)"^. I f so, Socrates does not directly quote or 
paraphrase but asks Hippias to infer the proposition from his preceding commit-
ment (cf 375d5; 375e3, 376cl), insofar as they had not argued this point already 
in the present conversation (369b8 ff .) . 
Socrates might suppose that he himself referred to those who falsify 
iinwishingly about calculations (367a3-5), just as about geometry he asked 
Hippias to confirm what he supposed resulted (367e4-5). However, he did not 
refer to those who actually falsify wishingly or wnvishingly, hence, he has no nght 
to refer directly to them. Neither did Socrates refer to comparison between them 
( c f 366e3-6; 367a2-5). Socrates only indirectly suggested the comparison of 
those who falsify whenever they wish to with those who do not always falsify 
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when they wish to. 
//"Socrates considers, following Hippias' commitments, that Hippias would 
be ready to accept that (1) an expert is better at the expertise than a non-expert, 
(2) all and only experts wishingly falsify or verify always consistently whenever 
they wish to, meaning a proposition about ability, theii, Socrates may fairly 
conjecture that Hippias w i l l accept that those who wishingly falsify always 
consistently i f they wish to are better at verifying than those who unwishingly 
falsify. 
However, Socrates cannot refer directly to Hippias' commitment to the 
proposition that those who actually falsify wishingly are better at verifying or 
falsifying about subjects concemed than those who actually falsify umvishingly. 
Certainly, Socrates can take Hippias to have admitted (367c6) inexplicitly the 
reciprocity of actuality with ability, but it is dubious that Hippias would commit 
himself to that reciprocity. Hence i f Socrates has reason to introduce what Hippias' 
previous commitment entails, he still has to appeal to Hippias' commitment to 
the inference from abilit}' to actuality. 
However, the proposition in Socrates' question here is probably conjectured 
on Hippias' previous admissions"^, if, pace Kraus"' , Hippias reinterprets his 
previoas admissions on falsifying about a skill or science in a moral context^^°. 
For those who falsify wishingly are mostly experts or men clever at falsifying 
because sometimes non-experts can falsify wishingly accidentally; those who 
falsify iimvishingly are non-experts or men foolish in falsifying; therefore, mostly 
the former are better at the subject in which they falsify than the latter. Experts 
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or men clever at falsifying cannot by definition falsify iimvishingly. Therefore, 
those who consistently falsify wishingly are better at the subject in which they 
fals i fy or at falsifying about the subject concerned than those who falsify 
Iinwishingly. 
Socrates asks Hippias to confirm the proposition not as accepted but as what 
his preceding commitment entails"' and, also, that Hippias admitted the 
proposition as fait accompli. Specifically, by appealing to the general proposi-
tion, Socrates asks Hippias to aff irm that Odysseus is better at things in which 
he falsifies or at falsifying about the subject concerned than Achilles. Insofar as 
Hippias' preceding admissions imply that consistently falsifying wishingly 
belongs only to an expert and falsifying unwishingly belongs only-to a non-
expert, Hippias must accept the proposifion according to his commitments, i f 
Socrates specifies the comparative criterion. 
Hippias' objection: 'How could those who do injustice wishingly be better 
than those who do injustice unwishinglyV (371e9-372a5) 
I f Hippias distinguishes attempted from achieved deceit and i f he assumes 
that wish to do something, whether within or beyond one's ability, implies no 
actuality, he possibly takes Socrates to divert their argument in respect of the 
comparative criterion (371e4-5). Specifically, he would take Socrates to switch 
the criterion from wish to ability. Hippias could by clarifying the criterion accuse 
Socrates of his improper shift, but he does not (371e6). Socrates justifies his 
shift from what Hippias' previous commitments imply (371e7-8), but Hippias 
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leaves inexplicit the difference beUveen attempted and achieved deceit. 
Hippias does not confirm whether his previous commitments entail the 
proposition in Socrates^ question, whether or not he believes he affirmed the 
propositions about morality; but he denies what he regards as the proposition 
Socrates introduced. Specifically, Hippias possibly takes Socrates to have 
intended to infroduce into his question the proposition that those who falsify 
wishingly are better than those who falsify unwishingly in respect not of wish to 
falsify but of abihty to falsify, whether as expertise in a subject or as cleverness 
at falsifying mdverif'ing about a subject concemed. Yet Hippias, intentionally 
or not, indicates that Socrates introduced the self-contradictory formulation 
presupposing that those falsifying wishingly wish to verijy. 
Unlike Hippias, Socrates has not made explicit that falsifying or speaking 
falsely is doing injustice or wrong; although Hippias would plausibly have 
associated Socrates' expressions with wrongdoing. However, Hippias indicates 
that Socrates introduced a proposition about doing injustice. Tacitly denying the 
proposition, he suggests by conducive question that his denial is justified by the 
presupposition of penal assessment^ "*'. By regarding agents' wish as the criterion, 
Hippias supports the commonsensical moral opinion that those who do injustice 
wishingly and who formed a wish without the victim noticing and do a bad thing 
wishingly cannot be better than those who do so unwishingly. 
Without questioning the existence of people who do bad things wishingly, he 
indicates that according to the criterion of wish to obey a norm, a man 
acknowledging the norm judges that those who contravene it wishingly are worse 
223 
than those who contravene it unwishingly. 
I f Hippias recognises that Socrates omits the criterion in quesfions at 371e4-5 
and 371e7-8, he would take Socrates to use the omission to elicit Hippias' 
commitment to the proposition Hippias rejects. However, i f Hippias imagined 
somehow that what he had suggested as achievement of deceit presupposes the 
possibility of comparison according to an agent's clevemess at deceit, he could 
not object to Socrates' infroduction of that comparison into his questions, 
especially, i f wish to deceive is wish to achieve deceit within one's ability as 
Hippias suggested (366b7-c4). Hippias leaves open his attitude towards this 
comparison, allowing the possibility that he prefers an agent's wish to ability in 
evaluating a wrongdoer. 
Does Socrates learn from Hippias how to heal his wavering over the 
preferability of those who go wrong wishingly? (372a6-372e6) 
Socrates neither answers Hippias' question nor immediately argues against 
the preferability of those who do injustice unwishingly, he neither requests 
clarification about the preferential criterion nor concludes whether or not 
Homer's Achilles wishes to falsify; nor does he ask whether Hippias believes 
that lying is bad as a means to another unmoral end as he suggests concerning 
Odysseus (371e2-3) or that lying is bad in itself as concerning Achilles (365a4-
bl)"^. Leaving these questions moot, Socrates resumes a meta-elenctic speech, 
abandoning the heroes (372a6-bl). 
Socrates here would appear to Hippias to try to reinvolve him in another 
sophistry by reminding him of both their conversational context of Socrates' 
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learning from clever men and Socrates' ignorance causing their opposition 
(372a6-d3). He defends his persistent questionings of 'clever' men, by denigrat-
ing his other qualities about knowledge (372b2-4). He suggests that he differs 
f rom Hippias on the preceding issue, but justifies his question by his general 
way of resolving the difference from 'clever' men which indicates his foolish-
ness, whether or not he eventually leams something from Hippias. He still does 
not specify how and in what they differ over the preferability of those doing 
injustice wishingly. He emphasises only their difference. Socrates' difference 
from any opinion of 'clever' men's is as empty as Hippias' polymathy. 
Hippias can suspect that Socrates frames his general attitude in front of the 
audience, as i f he had been learning what he wants to learn from Hippias as a 
teacher by asking questions. Previously he left unclear his opposition to Hippias' 
affirmation of the proposition in his question, although he did not always 
confirm what Hippias affirmed. Only after Socrates pointed out that what 
Hippias' commitments entailed was self-contradiction (368el-369b7) and 
Hippias criticised Socrates' conversational way (369b8-c8), did Socrates tell 
Hippias that during their previous conversation he had held views different from 
Hippias': specifically, not the view that Homer's Achilles does not falsify 
(369e2-370d6) or that Achilles is better than Odysseus in respect of some 
goodness (370d6-e4). When Hippias came close to the conclusion or offered a 
part of a general conclusion, Socrates vaguely indicated readiness to share 
responsibility for Hippias' previous commitments which he expected would lead 
to Hippias' miscarriage (367d4, 367e6, 367e8, 368e3-4, 369a5); when he 
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thought Hippias' self-contradiction was made public (369b3-7), he abandoned 
his passingly shared responsibility by retrospectively showing that he had 
differed from Hippias (369e2-370e4). I f Hippias exerted his mnemonic, 
Socrates' statement would be unreliable. 
Again, on the preferability of those who falsify wishingly to those falsifying 
unwishingly, Socrates has not confirmed in what sense Hippias understood the 
issue, but makes clear, suspending his reason for their difference (cf 372e3-6), 
his concem with their different opinions (372c8-d2); he ascribes their difference 
ambivalently to what he is, to speak no better or no worse of himself"'* (372d2-
3). 
Socrates explicitly proposes his belief (372c8-d4; 372e2). Hippias can prima 
facie take Socrates to oppose what Hippias says at 371e9-372a5 by formulating 
(F): the preferability of those who damage people"^ do injustice, falsify"*, 
deceive"^, or go wTong ( a u a g t d v p v i s g ) , wishingly (37264-1). He 
introduces 'go wTong'(auocQTavo); c f e^auaQTdvo) (372e2)), which can 
mean moral wrongdoing or error or non-moral error"^, to use it as a representative 
item (372e2; 373c8). However, apart from his intention of reducing moral 
injustice to non-moral mistakes by analogy to error"', Socrates does not refer to 
the criterion of (F). 
On one hand, Hippias would believe it self-confradictory that those who do 
injustice wishingly wish to do justice. Hence, he would reject (F) in respect of 
wish to do justice. Further, Hippias would believe that Socrates has recognised 
this self-contradiction because Socrates apparently argued for Achilles' wish to 
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deceive (371a2-d7; cf 370a2-d6). Hence, Socrates would not appear to Hippias 
to oppose him over (F) (372d7-8). I f Hippias has plausibly conjectured on Socrates' 
preceding remarks (371a4-bl; 371d4-7; 371e4-5; 371e7-8), that Socrates here 
takes cleverness at doing injustice as the criterion of (F), it would not matter that 
Socrates does not ask whether wish to do justice is a criterion prior to cleverness 
at doing injustice. 
On the other hand, i f Socrates believed that i f he specified the criterion by 
adding t a O x a aTteo ooqjcbxEQotat 372d7 (cf 366d3-6), Hippias would 
admit the proposition based on Hippias' previous admissions at 365d6-369b7, 
he would not need to leave the criterion unspecified. As Hippias still clings to 
Achilles' superiority to Odysseus in respect of not wishing to tell a lie (371e9-
372a5), Socrates would see Hippias' furn ground irrespective of Hippias' 
blunders in the conversation about a false man (365d5-369b7). Hence, Socrates, 
at least, reflectively, appears to Hippias to avoid clarifying his opinion for some 
hidden purpose. 
Further, Hippias can take Socrates prima facie to profess that he wavers over 
(F) through ignorance (372d7-el). When Socrates diagnoses his wavering as a 
periodical fit (372el-2), Hippias might find that Socrates reads (F) as the 
preferability in respect not of wish to do a good thing but of cleverness at doing 
a bad thing. However, when Socrates ascribes his present provisional commit-
ment to (F) to the preceding conversation, he would appear to Hippias to be 
engineering another sophistry i f he remembers that Socrates did not commit 
himself to any of Hippias' affirmations. Hippias might remember believing that 
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Socrates instilled his opinion into some questions (cf. 367a5), but he could not 
believe that Socrates believed all that Hippias affirmed. Hence Socrates' 
emphasis on their difference and his abrupt commitment to Hippias' preceding 
affirmations would be unreliable for Hippias. That commitment might be a 
stratagem; for Hippias has not answered (cf 371e7-8) whether or not he accepts 
(F) in respect of cleverness at doing a bad thing. However, i f Hippias soon 
associates Socrates' wavering both with his request of healing it by Hippias' 
answering his question (372e6-373a2) and his inhibition of Hippias' long speech 
(373a2-5), Hippias could see Socrates' plot in his long speech here. 
I f Hippias rehed on Socrates' remark (372a6-c8), he could suppose that 
Socrates believes' him clever, suggesting that Socrates means by clevemess 
expertise or polymathy exemplified in Hippias (372a6-cl). Hippias could believe 
that Socrates is generally opposed to a so-called 'clever' man's view although he 
claims that he wants to learn the truth from such a man by questioning. Hence, 
Hippias could assume that Socrates generally wavers about (F), even in the 
preceding convei-sation (363al-369b7), while, because of that conversation's 
result, he now opposes Hippias' opinion on (F), and therefore, Hippias could 
suspect that before conversing with Hippias, Socrates is acquainted already with 
(F). Therefore Hippias could suspect that Socrates had (F) in view. However, 
Socrates' apparent profession purposely set in an ex post facto context appears 
to Hippias to work to induce him into Socratic conversational way. 
Socrates here might, as some say '^*°, mean to say what he is saying. I f 
Socrates indeed holds his usual doctrine, Tsfo one does WTong wishing/y', he 
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might face the problem concemmg (F), whether a good man able to do badly 
wil l do so. Penner sees Socrates' irony here, abandoning ambivalent ability in 
morahty while maintaining general resemblance between morality and crafts^*", 
in contrast to Kraut, Vlastos, and Blundell, who see Socrates' honest profession 
of aporia. However, pace Kraut '^*', Socrates did not argue for his opinion or 
commit himself to craft-analogy; he asks Hippias to appeal to it. Whether or not 
Socrates believes Hippias' preceding affirmations unsound"'', he would appear 
to Hippias to request him, as Kahn suggests"'*, ironically to heal his periodical 
fit by answering Socrates' question. 
Hippias resumes the role of respondent (372e6-373c5) 
Socrates requests Hippias to cure his soul (372e6-373a2), not by a long 
speech but by answering questions (373a2-4). Socrates endorses that answering 
will not damage Hippias (373a5), but leaves the possibility that he is reallocat-
ing Hippias a respondent's role. 
Eiidicus not only indicates that he supports their continuation of argument but 
also indirectly demands Hippias' answering on the basis of his previous 
commitment (363c7-d4). This Eudicus conducively asks Hippias to confirm. 
Shackled by his boast, Hippias, nevertheless, appeals to Eudicus against their 
request on the ground that Socrates always raises disturbance"^ Although he 
may fairly suspect Socrates of improper questioning, he does not specify what 
Socrates did where. 
Socrates argues against Hippias' appeal that he makes trouble not wishingly, 
but umvishingly (373b6-7). I f he behaved il l wishingly, he would be clever and 
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shrewd according to Hippias' argument (373b7). Leaving unspecified a criterion 
of the preferability of those who do injustice wishingly (371e9-372a5), Hippias 
suggested that those who do wrong wishingly are bad in respect of wish to do 
wrong. I f Socrates recognised Hippias' suggestion, what Socrates refers to as 
Hippias' argument here is not Hippias' suggestion there but what Socrates has 
believed to be the entailment from Hippias' previous commitment (365d6-
369b7), i.e., the entailment that a man contravening a norm wishingly knows how 
to obey the rule as an expert. Whether or not Hippias admits to what Socrates 
calls Hippias' argument, Socrates indicates here that i f Hippias follows the 
entailment from his commitments (365d6-369b7) and i f Hippias regards raising 
disturbances as Socrates' wished action, he must admit that Socrates is clever 
and shrewd at things in which he raises disturbances. Whether or not Socrates 
accepts the conclusion, this suggests that Hippias would have to admit that 
Socrates might equal or surpass him at doing right in conversation. If Hippias 
refuses the admission, he must reject his previous admissions. To do that, he 
must specify what Socrates was doing when Hippias affirmed a particular 
proposition Socrates introduced. 
But, if Hippias admits that Socrates behaved i l l unwishingly, Hippias would 
have to make allowances for Socrates' unwished i l l behaviour as Socrates 
concludes (373b7-9), because Hippias took wish to do wrong as the criterion of 
the preferability of those who do wrong unwishingly (371e9-372a5). 
Socrates argues that he behaves ill imwishingly, but also suggests that 
Hippias must admit that Socrates is good at conversation or make allowances 
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for Socrates' unwished i l l behaviour. But i f Hippias accepts what Socrates calls 
Hippias' argument and what he said about penalisation, Hippias has to admit 
both (1) that those who do wrong wishingly are better at doing right than those 
who do wrong umvishingly, in respect of knowledge of doing right and (2) that 
firom the viewpoint of a rule-follower, those who do wrong wishi?igly are not 
better than those who do wrong iinwishingly, ia respect of their wish to do wrong. 
Therefore, since Socrates behaves ill either wishingly or iinwishingly and not 
both, Hippias must either admit that Socrates is clever at conversation or make 
allowances for him. 
Eudicus requests Etippias to answer partly for the sake of Hippias' earlier 
statement (373c 1-3). Whether or not Hippias admits what Socrates calls his 
argument, Hippias follows Eudicus' request for Eudicus' sake. This escapes the 
dilemma at 373b6-9. However, Hippias, requesting Socrates to ask what 
question he wishes, has little specific idea how Socrates misbehaves in his 
questions.-
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7. Pull-about and Scuttle (373c6-376c6) 
General analysis of 373c6-375d7 
Socrates restrained Hippias from a long speech (373a2-3) but by his own long 
speech (372a6-373a8) returns Hippias to a respondent's role. He restarts 
questioning about the preferability of wishing to unwishing wrong-goer^"*. 
Socrates repeats the subject-matter in different interrogative types in the 
middle part of the exchange (373c9-375d4)"^. Further, he supports the sequence 
by repeating a linking phrase between cases, 'What then? ( t \ 6 e)"^'. I f Hippias 
gradually takes Socrates to anticipate his answer leading to the same conclusion 
in each case, he could take Socrates to invoke a kind of induction by not co-
ordinate but analogical cases towards the conclusion which he must deny to remain 
consistent with his previous commitment (371e9-372a5). 
Hippias rejects at 375dl-2 the anticipated conclusion. Socrates does not make 
clear whether he uses e^auao tdve iv and K a K O U o y e i v with moral 
cormotation, but Hippias takes him to ask about the preferability of wishing to 
imwishing wTong-doers (cf 365e8-9) and repeats the preferability of iinwishing-
ly to wishingly unjust men as at 371e9-372a5. 
Socrates' objective in his self-proclaimed examination (373c6-9) 
Socrates declares his desire to examine the preferability of wishing to 
iinwishing wrong-goers as his provisional opinion based on Hippias' previous 
commitments about false men. However, in the restarted bout, Socrates asks 
Hippias' opinions by tagged questions (374c2-3) or by pinning the responsibility 
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for the proposition introduced on Hippias^"". Socrates does not propose his own 
opinion, despite taking the initiative in forming propositions. Pace Blundell^^°, 
the exchange here is still Socrates' question about Hippias' opinion, not Socrates' 
argument; Hippias can, though, literally take Socrates to argue for his own belief 
in spite of his ironical confession at 372c8-e3. 
I f Socrates ascribes to Hippias' affirmations about false men the provisional 
validity of the preferability of wishing wcong-goers (371e7-8;. 372e3-6), 
Socrates allows the possibility that he finds some applicability of Hippias' 
preceding affirmations to the following cases of wrong-goers. However, i f he 
understands Hippias' afGimations as concerned with ability in a usual sense but 
not actuality, Socrates, as argued before (see p. 219 f f ) cannot deduce but can 
conjecture some conclusion about actuality. 
However, i f Socrates believes that Hippias' affirmations apply not only to 
falsifying in uttering a false proposition in a science or craft but also to going 
\wong in that domain, Socrates must already have considered (a) that all and only 
experts are able both to follow a rule and to contravene it in a science or craft, 
(b) that no experts contravene it imwishingly, (c) that only experts consistently 
contravene it wishingly. 
According to the propositions in Socrates' questions about calculation (366e3-
367a5), falsifying in a science and craft consists of three steps: (i) following a 
rule, (ii) contravening it by deviating from following it, and then, (iii) showing 
the resulting proposition to others; Socrates did not mention how an expert takes 
steps (i) and (ii), but only (iii), uttering a false proposition or demonstrating 
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some mis-handling. Socrates can infer that only experts consistently falsify 
wishingly, but it is questionable (1) whether actually going wong wishingly is 
performable and profitable in some science or craft and (2) whether, as shown 
before (see pp. 129-133), the derivativeness about calculation can be generalised 
to going wrong. 
Even if, as Socrates suggested at 372e3-6, Hippias' affirmations about false 
men give any solution, Socrates eventually does not ask Hippias to confirm the 
cmcial premise in accordance with his question about an expert in calculations 
(366e3-367a5; esp. 366e4-6; 367a4-5); specifically, neither (a) whether a man 
bad at running runs slowly not consistently, i f he wishes to, i.e., is unable to run 
slowly nor (b) whether a man bad at running, i f he wishes to run slowly, often 
runs quickly, if it so happened, against his wish, because he does not know how 
to run. 
Preferabilit}' of a wishingly slow rurmer or racer (373c9-d7) 
Socrates asks three main quesUons about Sgousug.a runner or a racer: (A) 
'Do you admit the descnptions 'a good Soousuc' and 'a bad SDOUEUC;'?^^'' 
(373c9-dl); (B) 'In running or racing, a man who runs quickly is a good runner 
or racer and a man who runs slowly is a bad runner or racer?' (373d4-5); (C) 
'Which is a better runner or racer, a man who runs slowly wishingly or a man 
who runs slowly unwishinglyT (373d5-7) 
As to the exemplariness of this first case, to support the conclusion of the 
preferability of wishing to unwishing wrong-goers in any given area, Socrates 
first has to aminge the conditions on which he has the right to introduce into his 
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concluding question a proposition similar to that general conclusion and 
qualified by a particular area. Since Hippias must change the criterion of 
evaluation from an agent's wish to an agent's ability i f he accepts the conclusion 
in each case, Socrates must beforehand arrange to ask Hippias to confmm any 
particular description of the criterion by which Hippias evaluates an action in 
running or racing (373dl-5). Further, to elicit from Hippias affirmation of any 
particular description of a rule or norm, Socrates must obtain beforehand Hippias' 
acceptance of the possibility of evaluation in the area concerned (373c9-dl). But 
Socrates does not ask beforehand about the justifiability of evaluation but only 
the evaluation (373c9). 
Concerning Socrates' tactics in examining each example, i f he intends to elicit 
Hippias' affirmation of a concluding formulation similar to that at 373c7-8, 
Hippias possibly thinks it fair if Socrates makes clear the steps to the conclusion 
in the opening case of a runner or racer. But i f Socrates later, as at 367e4-5, tries 
to commit Hippias to what Socrates believes resulted, and i f Hippias, then, 
admits the proposition concemed and supposes that the examination of each 
example has the same structure as the first, Socrates will be able to use Hippias' 
commitments here reciprocally with later ones. Within these limits, Socrates has 
the right to use different language with an organ or a soul as subject of an 
action, to invert the order of or to omit questions corresponding to those in the 
first example. 
Hippias can take Socrates first (373c6-8) to summarise the theme mentioned 
at 371e7-372a5 and 372d4-372e6, and to rephrase the problem as that concerning 
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'going mong'. Socrates professes that his following way is most relevant to the 
whole problem (60^ ox ax' 373c8). But why does he need examples like 
running or racing? 
Truly Socrates and Hippias referred to people who, so to speak, violate a 
criminal law (371e9-372a5; 372d4-7), in addition to people who tell a lie in a 
craft or science. Hippias took up 'doing injustice' and 'doing or performing bad 
things' in listing crimes (371e9-372a5); Socrates took up similar immoral 
descriptions. However, when Socrates added 'go wrong' (372d4-7), and, further, 
in reformulating, used only 'go wrong', whether as a subsuming or representing 
term or not, he allowed the possibility that he suggested error in immoral actions. 
Then, if Hippias takes justice dispositionally, and not in an achievement sense, 
he can suspect that Socrates evades his objecUon at 371e9-372a5. 
To jusfify his way of reexamining the issue Hippias denied (371e9-372a5), 
Socrates admittedly must refer to the same field by the same words as Hippias 
used. To make Hippias admit he is wrong, Socrates ought either (1) to 
investigate the validity of his opponent's beliefs by using the same words in the 
same meaning as his opponent or (2) to argue from what his opponent regards 
as a more comprehensive standpoint than his. Moreover, the opponent must 
accept the argument from the more comprehensive standpoint. However, 
Hippias may not realise that Socrates' propositions about going wrong in the 
area of expertise would include his belief as to doing injusfice, if he, judging 
expertise irrelevant to dispositional justice and injustice, does not imagine that 
his idea of falsity as achievement implies that he should understand justice and 
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injustice in an achievement sense. However, i f Socrates tries to test Hippias' 
belief according to his unanalysed opinion of falsity as achievement, he could 
have some reason to talk about going wrong in a subject concemed in relation 
to injustice in an achievement sense; although he does not refer to Hippias' skill 
or science explicitly recounted (368b2-el; 366c5-368a7). 
I f Socrates directly tries to resolve the issue comprehensively, Hippias could 
easily find the similarity to the case of injustice in a domain where an action of 
following or not following a rule is evident, such as playing a game. However, 
considering Socrates' infroduction of'go wrong', i f Hippias does not potentially, 
as in the case of a false man (365elO-366al; 365d7-8), take an unjust man to 
achieve injustice about subjects concemed, he would take Socrates naturally to 
distance his attention from the domain with an evident mle-foUowing action and 
to trade on a domain where there is not a norm but a degree which makes an 
agent's physically quantitative ability distinctive. 
Lexically, in which meaning the word Sgoueuc here is used, a racer or a 
runner' depends on the context and is open to question"^. Few cntics or 
translators discuss whether Socrates means or Hippias understands by 
6 o 0 ue u c 'a mnner' or 'a racer' or whether they leave it ambiguous"^ Only 
Jantzen analyses this section on the assumption that Socrates means by it an 
ordinary action which, unlike skills and justice, admits ambivalent abilit\', but 
he misses Hippias' understanding of this word"'*. 
In contrast with 6 O O U I K 6 ( ; " \ Socrates sfill refers to a mnner or racer 
ambiguously in acquired disposition (see pp. 125-126). If Socrates referred to 
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a professional racer, Hippias might doubt whether a professional racer who has 
acquired a disposition to obey a norm disregards it. Further, to circumvent 
Hippias' objection, Socrates might intentionally leave the ambiguity, (1) because 
the domain of a developmentally acquired habit would seem to Hippias to be 
less normative, (2) because, i f Socrates meant explicitly by6ooLi8u<;a racer, 
Socrates could so easily remind Hippias both of the established norm in the 
domain such as running as quickly as possible and outrunning other competitors 
and of the ability such as speed in running that Hippias would come closer to the 
comparison in respect of wish to obey a norm, and (3) because Socrates tries to 
commit Hippias to what Hippias understands by the formulation with 
Sgoiieuc;, in order to lead him to the concluding formulation about the 
preferability of wishing to unwishing wrong-goers. 
I f one in a race runs more slowly/ro?/? his wish than other competitors and 
actually achieves his end of running relatively slowly to lose, when any other 
competitor wishes to run faster than the others but may actually run relatively 
slowly and lose, then he is still able to run faster than others. Although one 
acknowledging the rules of racing would describe him as contravening them, he 
IS good at racing. Only someone good at racing runs more slowly wishingly than 
other competitors because it is a premise that any other racer wishes to run faster 
than he. Socrates would be ready to apply his question to the case of racing if he 
used the case after that of wrestling. Socrates leaves Hippias to take a runner as 
a racer in order to commit Hippias to the conclusion. Hippias might see with 
Ovink"^ that Socrates is trying to replace absolute goodness by relative 
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goodness such as speed in mnning. But Hippias would easily fmd an analogy 
to his firm belief, if Socrates clearly referred to the case of racing first. Therefore 
Socrates must use the ambiguity of 6 g o ue u g to circumvent Hippias' objection. 
Hippias unreservedly admits the description of 'a good mnner or racer' and, 
then, 'a bad mnner or racer' (373dl), because of the usual complementary-
relation of bad to good. Certainly, it is not self-evident what is the criterion of 
goodness in an ordinary elementary motion such as bending one's index. It is 
difficult to find who is a good walker, because we need not specify a mle or 
norm by which we evaluate our ordinary elementary motion. Socrates' choice of 
mnning brings controversy whether or not he chooses a case representative of 
our ordinary elementary motions. Socrates might take advantage of the 
difference between mnning and walking or standing for the reason that the 
relative degree in speed is admissible as a criterion for the evaluation of mnning. 
Admittedly, in the domain of ordinary elementary motions, there is no distmct 
norm. Experientially, we recognise such elementary motion as an action in a 
theoretical analysis or medical rehabilitation of malfunctional limbs. However, 
the analogy to a mle-foUowing action would not be far wrong, considering our 
learning process of such an action and some relative anatomical and physiological 
isomorphism in our ordinary' motion; the cmx in describing a hierarchy of an 
action including elementary motions is that doing justice or injustice is not at the 
apex of an agent's spatio-temporally describable action but his evaluation of the 
action. 
Because speed is admissible as criterion, Socrates might choose mnning as 
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an ordinary action to circumvent an exemplary case of a rule-following action. 
However, it would be easier for Hippias to take Sooueuc; as a racer, i f he 
commits himself to some criterion of evaluation. Whichever criterion Hippias 
takes, insofar as he admits the use of the predicate, 'good' and the predicate, 
6 o 0 ue u he could not avoid admitting their collocation, and complementarily 
that of 'bad' with 6 o o u £ u c;. 
Whether or not Hip^ias recognises what his commitments imply for Socrates' 
examination, he must affirm the reference to a bad runner, since he admits 
commonsensically, as he did (367e4-5, 367e6-7) the complementarity between 
goodness and badness (373dl) and his boast of polymathy still works'^' (cf 
373c4-5). 
Socrates asks Hippias whether he relates his criterion for evaluation of a 
runner or racer to some mode of running (373dl-2). 
In this stage, the present participle .Socrates introduces can be interpreted 
generally or particularly. 'A man running well' can be 'a man who runs well 
generally' or 'one who is running well on a particular occasion'. Since a good 
runner mentioned in the first stage (373c9) is not running on a panicular 
occasion, Hippias would take Socrates, pace Jantzen"^, to refer by the participle 
of the verb 'run' in this stage (373dl-3) to generality or ability. 
While affirming unreservedly (373d2), Hippias might not, as he did not 
before (366c5-el), recognise why Socrates refers to a runner in examining 
preferabilit]>' of wishing wrong-goers. However, if he has no reason to object to 
relating the criterion of evaluation to some characteristic of a runner or racer's 
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action, Hippias could fmd no reason to give denial because the proposition with 
two positive evaluative predicates appears tautological. 
In asking. Then, does a man who mns slowly mn badly, and a man who mns 
quickly run well?', Socrates does not ask Hippias to agree to Socrates' criterion 
of evaluating mnning or racing; but, generally, Socrates asks whether Hippias 
affirms speed as Hippias' descriptive condition of evaluating mnning or racing 
(373d3). 
Generally speaking, speed in mnning is a relative graded characteristic of 
mnning and not necessarily a self-evident discrete standard for evaluating an 
action of mnning, i f we do not compare a mnner with another. Tmly, compared 
with actions approximate to running, such as walking or standing, we can easily 
take speed as the standard to distinguish mnning from other linearly moving 
actions as well as grade people discretely, if they run a race. However, Hippias 
might fairly take either graceful postures or sure-footedness in mnning or ability 
to choose speed as a standard. Hence he has to answer on his view. 
Hippias unreser\'edly affirms speed as the criterion of evaluating mnning or 
racing (373d3). As to the relativity' of speed, i f Hippias compares mnners m 
respect of quickness or slowness, he must mean by the speed of a mnner not the 
speed wliich the runner feels only but that which is measured objectively too, as 
tmth in speaking tmly and falsehood in speaking falsely. Therefore, whether or 
not Hippias recognises what he implies, he must admit that a mnner who mns 
slowly only wishingly is able to mn quickly, because he mns more slowly than 
on some other occasion. 
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Hippias would be motivated to affirm that criterion in running or racing, i f he 
thinks ability is honourable, as Socrates heard Hippias boast of publicly (368b3-
el). However, if Hippias took speed as a norm in running or racing, he would, 
as Ovink suggests"', risk admitting relatively gradable goodness. 
Socrates paraphrases his preceding question using an abstract particular term 
(373d4-5). Socrates does not explain his intention. Hippias, however, i f he 
remembers, could later take Socrates to (a) have prepared for introducing the 
•phrase x a x a egy aCeo ^  a i-which Hippias had used (372a 1, 372a3, 372a4-5) 
and replacing the phrase 'run slowly' by 'perform a bad thing at running' (373e3-
4), and (b) have come near to the concluding formulation about doing a bad 
thing in running, which is both analogisable to the following cases and approxi-
mate to the formulation about doing wTong and, further, about doing injustice, 
although the distance from one to the other formulation proves too blatant. 
Saying, 'Yes, but what else would you expect?', Hippias may be alert for 
impropriet}' while accepting Socrates' paraphrase (373d5)^*°. Hippias may 
recognise that having accepted both the criterion of evaluating running and 
Socrates' paraphrase, he cannot avoid accepting the preferability of a man who 
performs a bad thing at running •n'/5/?/;7g/v in respect of the ability both to run 
quickly and slowly. However, he probably does not imagine that Socrates is 
referring to a man who goes wrong about running or racing as analogous with 
a man who achieves injustice about subjects concerned (cf 372e2-3). Hippias 
could imagine a man achieving deceit about subjects concemed (365elO-366al ; 
365d7-8) but could not easily imagine a man achieving injustice about subjects 
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concerned; he should from his commitments (cf 371e9-372a5; 373b7; 365elO-
366al) but does not recognise that injustice is an achievement about subjects 
concemed like falsity. 
In asking about the preferability of a wishingly slow mnner, Socrates asks 
about that of a wishing wrong-goer in running or racing (373d5-6).. Since Hippias 
affirms the reference to a good mnner or racer and the criterion of evaluating 
miming or racing, Socrates can logically ask a question about the comparison 
between a man who wishingly contravenes a mle in mnning or racing and a man 
who does so unwishingly in respect of ability to follow the mle. If Hippias 
supposes that contravening a mle is relevant to a race but not to an ordinary run, 
he would take Socrates to refer to a racer. 
If Socrates assumes, in accordance with Hippias' commitments about a false 
man in arithmetic, that all and only experts in mnning, i.e., those who are able 
to run quickly, mn objectively slowly whenever they wish to, that only slow 
runners mn slowly unwishingly, and that only quick mnners consistently mn 
objectively slowly wishingly, Socrates could analogously infer that a man who 
mns slowly wishingly is better than a man who mns slowly unwishingly, in 
respect not of wish to mn quickly or the actual slow run but of the ability to mn 
quickly'*'. Further, if he supposes that Hippias can dravy the same conclusion, 
he can suppose that i f Hippias is ready to assent to the question with the 
criterion of companson unspecified, Hippias would affirm the proposition that 
a man who mns slowly wishingly is better at mnning quickly than a man who 
runs slowly umvishingly. He can suppose further that Hippias would affinm that 
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a man who does something bad in running wishingly is better at doing 
something bad in running than a man who does so lamishingly. 
Since Hippias accepts the preferabihty of a wishingly slow runner or racer, 
unquaHfiedly and without specifying the criterion of preferabiUty (373d7), he 
allows the possibility that he affirms (A) that a man who runs or races slowly 
wishingly is an expert in running or racing or (B) that a man who wishingly does 
a bad thing in running or racing is clever at doing a bad thing in running or 
racing. Jantzen sees here the confiasion of the coordinately ambivalent ability in 
an ordinary elementary motion with the only apparently coordinately ambivalent 
but actually non-ambivalent ability in skills or sciences^*'. But neither Hippias 
nor Socrates makes explicit or commits himself to the confusion (see pp. 125-
126; 129-133). Certainly, we have no standard for penalising our ordinary 
elementary motions, and, as Pohlenz points out^", slowness in running is 
morally indifferent; however, demolishing a race is possibly a moral problem 
and slowness possibly an aesthetic one. Therefore, Hippias does not yet see any 
analog}' to a morally unjust action, but allows the possibilit}' that he believes the 
preferability of a wishingly slow runner or racer in the sense of the preferability 
of a wishingly bad man in running.or racing. 
Prefcrabilih' of a wishingly bad and .shameful and/or ugly runner or racer 
(373d8-374al) 
Hippias might not understand the main point of Socrates' examination about 
a runner or racer (373c9-374al), apart from the formal sequence of questions, 
because of the ambiguits' of Sooueug , but Socrates uses Hippias' affirmations 
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in the section about S g o u e u g (373c9-374al). 
As regards the similarity to the following cases, Hippias would later see that 
racers are similar to wrestlers (3 74a 1-6) as Socrates wi l l introduce the proposition 
subsuming these two cases under using the body (374a7-b3). In contrast to 
Socrates' later examples, i f Hippias translates into normal language the animistic 
language in which Socrates assumes bodily organs as subjects of actions, 
Socrates leaves Hippias to suppose that the structure of examination about 
Sgoueu^ corresponds to that about taking a beautiful posture such as dancing. 
(374b5-9), that about singing in tune (374c2-4), that about steering a ship 
(374e4-5), that about riding a horse (375a 1-3), that about shooting an arrow 
(375a7-b2), that about healing patients (375b4-7) and even that about walking 
properly (374c6-d2), or that about viewing properly (374d2-6). 
Specifically, i f the similar questions are omitted in some cases, Socrates 
implicitly leaves Hippias to supply the conditions on which Hippias has the nght 
to aff irm or deny the concluding proposition in each case. Yet the companson 
between wishing and imwishing doers of a bad thing in each case is formulated 
diflFerently. Sometimes Socrates leaves out the condition, 'when agents do a bad 
thing' (373e4-5, 375b7-c3) and sometimes expresses the question not in 
comparative form (374d8-e2). However, in general, Hippias must refer to the 
exemplariness of the first case i f he affirms each conclusion. Socrates does not 
specify the criterion in each case except at 374a8-bl, 375b5, 375b7-9, but 
Hippias must supply the ability both to do a positive thing and to do a negative 
thing in a particular area, whether or not he or Socrates confuses this abilit}' in 
245 
a particular expertise wi th the ability to achieve wrongdoing about any subject 
concerned. 
By asking, conducively, the trivial 'Isn't to run to do something?' (373d8), 
Socrates is preparing to replace the phrase, 'run slowly' by the phrase 'perform 
abad and shameful and/or ugly (aioxoov) thing at a running' next (373el-2). 
While gi\'ing an assertive affirmation, Hippias could not recognise Socrates' 
intention in arranging the question here. However, according to his previous 
commitment (365d6-7, 366b8, 365e7, 372a3) and the general usage of 'do', he 
can hardly deny a rather tautological question (373d8). 
In asking conducively, 'Then, i f it is to do something, isn't it performing 
something, too?' Socrates asks another triviality to get Hippias to admit 
paraphrasing 'do' by 'perform' (373d8-el). Hippias admits the tautological para-
phrase, as his usage indicates (372al, 372a5; cf 372a3). 
Pace Ovink^*^, Hoerber^^^, and Jantzen^**, neither Socrates nor Hippias 
commits himself to some real hierarchy of existents between 'do' and 'perform', 
and, correspondingly, between skill and morality, in reference to Chmi. 162a, 
163e. As Jantzen indicates^*^, i f we read this periphrastic usage as a kind of 
ex-pression about the original ordinary expression and the secondary expression 
as showing or explaining the action's structure, we must consider the quality of 
the substantialised particulars which stand for an action. Truly, certain verbs 
such as 'have' or 'do' occur with two different types of particulars as logical 
subjects. For example, the sentence type, 'x is F' can be ordinarily paraphrased 
as 'x has F-ness' or 'x runs' as 'x does a run'. But i f we regard this paraphrase as 
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some significant procedure, we would have no right to stop taking the same 
procedure for the first paraphrased sentences. Consequently, we obtain another 
sentence type, 'x has having-ness of F-ness' or 'x does a doing of a run'. This 
would continue ad infinitum. Therefore, although the relationship between a 
subject of an- action and its ability is a key to consideration of Socrates' 
introduction of animistic language, it would commit us to an unnecessary 
burden that, as Jantzen interpretsSocrates commits a fallacy in introducing 
the verb, 'produce a work' into the area of bodily abilities. Rather, I think 
Socrates introduces the words which Hippias uses in his opposition to 'Socrates' 
view'of the preferability of w.s/7/>7g//i7r5 (371e9-372a4), to make Hippias think 
about the issue in his own words. Socrates introduces periphrases such as 'do a 
bad deed at running' or 'perform a bad and ugly act at running' in order to 
approximate the language about running or other actions to the evaluative 
language in which the descriptive conditions of evaluation are concealed such 
as 'doing a bad thing' or 'performing injustice'. Indeed, Socrates introduces 
'doing' or 'performing a bad thing in some actions' to make Hippias finally judge 
about performing a bad thing in general. 
In asking, 'So, does the man who runs badly perform at running a bad and 
aioxQo V (ugly and/or shameful) thing?', Socrates introduces a possibly moral 
evaluation of running (373el-2). Hippias possibly takes Socrates to deviate, as 
Calogero suggests^^', the topic to morality gradually. 
I f Hippias sees no difference between negatively evaluated predicates, 'run 
badly' and 'perform a bad and ugly and/or shameful thing', Hippias would take 
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the question as trivial. However, by adding a io -^gov , Socrates leaves open the 
possibilit}' that he is ti}'ing to elicit Hippias' commitment to the proposition that 
a slow run is an ugly and/or shameful thing. 
Socrates, combining two predicates, introduces into his question (373el-2) 
two propositions one of which Hippias would f ind trivial. Therefore, i f Hippias 
distinguishes 'bad' from 'ugly and/or shameful' significantly, he can suspect 
Socrates of taking advantage of Hippias' admission of the other non-trivial 
proposition, as earlier (365el-2; 365e2-4; 365e5-6). 
Socrates leaves open the possibilit}' that he means by 'perform a n a i o x o o v 
tiling' (1) 'perform a thing which causes an agent to feel shame', (2) 'perform a 
thing which causes an observer to feel ashamed of it, whether the agent feels 
ashamed or not', or (3) 'ugly' of an agent's outward appearance^^°. 
Socrates has no reason to decide which Hippias takes him to mean by 
a i o x o o V or what implications beUveen 'ugly and/or shameful' and 'injustice' 
Hippias assumes.- Consequently, what Socrates can do at best is to suggest the 
possibilitN' of an analogy- between slowTiess and injustice"'. 
As to the effect of introducing a i o x Q o v (373el, e5, 374a3, a5), it refers to 
outward characteristics for an obser\'er rather than an agent's feeling. A n 
unscrupulous contravener of a norm does not feel ashamed. Socrates cannot 
necessarily assume that Hippias is ready to infer from an agent's choice of 
shameful and/or ugly things to his choice of injustice. Hippias, however, may 
(1) easily take an out\\'ard ugliness and/or the spectator's shame as the criterion 
of evaluating using the body, (2) as about falsifying (366c5-367al), miss the 
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agent's wish to contravene the norm because the agent does not necessanly feel 
shameful, (3) evaluate wishing wrong-goers in respect of ability, as Socrates' 
question suggests, (4) replace ability to judge right from wrong by abihty to 
demonstrate diversified wrong performances and (5) be restrained from 
assuming that an agent evaluates his wished action as shameful and/or ugly or 
unjust. 
Affirming assertively (373e2), Hippias allows the possibility that he ordinarily 
affirms the proposition embodied in Socrates' question by using a part of its 
predicate in Socrates' question; however, Hippias may disclose his inclination 
to take only the predicate, 'perform a bad thing', relevant to the context. But i f 
he is not explicit which of the combined'^propositions he affirms, Hippias allows 
the possibility that he affirms both. 
I f Hippias is to justify aflBrming the proposition with the predicate a i o x o o v 
by distinguishing 'bad' from a i o x Q 6 v significantly, then, regarding dooaevQ 
as a runner, he may take Socrates to refer to an ugly appearance of a slow 
runner"' or to an agent's feeling of shame, given respect for physical strength in 
a male dominant society. I f Hippias interprets Sgoueugasa racer, he could easily 
associate a racer who runs slowly in a race and loses, not only with ugly 
appearance in being outrun but also with the racers' and some spectator's shame. 
At 373e3 Socrates repeats the question at 373d3. He does not conducively ask 
but can anticipate Hippias' repeated affirmation. Therefore, his question 
rhetorically works to distract Hippias from Socrates' introduction of a i o x o 6 v 
as in the case of the clause ' i f one wishes to' (366a8-c4), apart from the trivial 
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inference of transitivity (373el-2; 373e3)"\ 
Socrates' question at 373e4-5 indicates that Hippias' preceding affirmations 
imply that a rurmer or racer good at running wishingly performs a bad and 
shameful and/or ugly thing in running slowly; a runner or racer bad at running 
imwishingly performs that bad and ugly and/or shamefial thing (cf 367e4-5). 
Socrates can assume because of Hippias' previous affirmations (373e2, 373e3; 
373e5) that Hippias would replace 'run slowly' by 'performs a bad and shamefiil 
and/or ugly thing'. 
I f Socrates assumes that Hippias interprets S g o j j s i j g a s 'runner' rather than 
'racer', he carmot assume that Hippias w i l l accept (1) that a runner who is able 
to run quickly, and, so, able to run slowly, does not wish to run slowly or (2) 
that he does not run slowly wishi?ig/y; likewise, he cannot assume Hippias' 
acceptance that a runner who always runs objectively slowly runs slowly 
iinwishingly; Hippias, though, could be constrained fi-om accepting that doing 
a bad thing is a quick runner's wished action, after accepting that a slow run is 
bad"^ 
I f Socrates assumes that Hippias interprets Sgousu^ as 'racer', he can assume 
more easily Hippias' acceptance that all and only experts good at racing are able 
to run quickly; that all experts in racing do not run slowly unwishingly; that only 
experts in racing consistently run slowly wishingly. 
I f Socrates justifies Hippias' conclusion in his quesfion on the basis of 
Hippias' affirmation, then, as he turns out to introduce the detailed formulation 
in his first generalised question (374a7-b3), Socrates has to interpret that the 
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proposition means that i f a man is good at racing, then i f he is performing a bad 
and shameful and/or ugly thing in running slowly, he is doing it wishingly, 
because he is able to do both: running quickly and slowly; while i f a man is bad 
at racing, then i f he is performing a bad and shameful and/or ugly thing in 
running slowly, he is doing it iimvislmigly, because he is not able to run quickly. 
Hippias reluctantly accepts the proposition he thinks embodied here. To 
justify this, he would have to re-interpret the present formulation as that which 
he gives affirmation to (373d5-6) or supply the above-mentioned missing 
conditions. 
Socrates concludingly asks about the preferability of a man who performs 
bad things wishingly at running (373e6-374al). He conjectures that Hippias' 
afOrmation to the just preceding proposition implies that preferability, but neither, 
without supplying the missing conditions, has the right to infer that preferability 
from Hippias' preceding affirmation, apart from appealing to Hippias' affirma-
tion of the preferabilits' of a wishingly slow runner or racer (373d5-6). 
But by using the expression, 'perform bad things', which Hippias used 
(372a4-5; cf 372al) in listing criminal descriptions, Socrates has come close to 
Hippias' firm ground in that wishing wrong-goers in running are closely 
analogous to wishing wTong-doers about subjects concemed. 
Hippias affirmed reservedly (374a 1), as he answered Socrates' concluding 
question about arithmetic (367d3). In limiting the validity of his affirmations to 
the area of running, he suggests that he is unconvinced of their application to 
doing injustice, in spite of giving affirmations to the formulation with words 
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resembling those he used about doing injustice (371e9-372a5). As Jantzen 
suggests"^ Hippias would limit the validity to running not as an ordinary' 
motion but as a skill. He thinks that the validity holds in the case of skills but 
not of justice. As Sprague and Ovink"* see, ordinary experts who have acquired 
and preser\'ed the disposition to try to win a race as well as the ability to race 
cannot lose wishingly, but as Ovink admits"^, wishingly losing a race can be 
morally good or bad and, whether or not penalised, is bad according to a norm 
to be obeyed by racers. 
Preferability of a wishingly bad and shameful and/or ugly wrestler (374al-6) 
Inside the section about using the body (374al-374b4), Socrates arranges the 
question about running as an exemplary case, followed by the question about 
wrestling"^, and subsumes both cases under 'using the body'- The choice of 
ruiming is not necessary, and the criterion of comparison there is not more 
understandable than in the case of wrestling, because of the ambiguity of 
5goueiJ(; . Rather, Hippias could clearly understand what aspects of these 
actions Socrates focuses on just in his intermediate concluding question (374a6-
b3), after Hippias committed himself to the conclusion in the particular cases. 
On one hand, Socrates still refers toTcaAaiofqc; ambiguously in contrast with 
TtaXaio t ixog . On the other hand, i f Socrates believes that Hippias takes him 
to try to induce him to reach the conclusion about injustice, Socrates presumably 
understands that the first section about simple strong bodily actions is necessary 
to lead Hippias to the comprehensive conclusion of the preferability of wishing 
to unwishing wrong-doers in any given area. Therefore, Socrates would be 
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suggesting that Hippias should properly admit not only that wishing wTong-
goers in a particular area are experts but also that vaong-doers who achieve 
wrong are expert in doing wrong in any area concemed. 
Socrates does not introduce a gradable property such as speed in running into 
the case of wrestling. On wrestling, Socrates does not mention the mode of an 
action but two aspects of the same event in the wrestling match, falling and 
throwing. The main point here is not the mode of action but an evaluative 
standard. Therefore, the second stage of Socrates' examination about wrestling 
is to commit Hippias to a prescribed norm in a certain area. Here Socrates can 
ask about the comparison between two types of wrong-goer^; Hippias more 
reluctandy continues to agree (373e5, 374a 1, 374a3, 374a6, 374b3-4). As Jantzen 
indicates^^', the gradable mode of an ordinary elementary motion would canalise 
Hippias more easily to die concept of the ambivalent ability, but it is not clear 
whether Hippias commits himself to applying gradability to mode of an action 
in other cases. 
Asking immediately about the preferability of a wishingly falling wrestler 
(374a 1-2), Socrates leaves Hippias to supply the condition of reference to a good 
or bad westler and the criterion of evaluating a wrestler. By leaving Hippias to 
appeal to running or racing as exemplary, Socrates introduces the similar 
concluding proposition (cf 373d5-6), but he is ready to arrange the question 
about the criterion of evaluating wrestlers after this question (374a3-4, 374a5-6). 
I f Socrates supposes, according to the rule for a wrestler, that Hippias w i l l 
admit that a wrestler ought to try (1) to outdo his opponent in power by throwing 
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and (2) to win the bout wi th the opponent falling, Socrates can anticipate his 
affirmation following Hippias' corresponding affirmations (373e6-7, 373e4-5, 
373d5-6; c f 373c7-8) and can suppose Hippias ready to compare the wrestler 
who falls not in respect of following the rule of wrestling but of the ability to 
fol low the rule by overpowering his opponent. 
The meaning of'fall ' Socrates introduces here is marginal in the classification 
of motions into intentional actions or unintentional motions; for, when Socrates 
apphes the verb to a man falling wishingly, he can mean that the man causes his 
body to fall in intentionally reducing his power in a wrestle, with or without one's 
opponent noticing; when applying it to a man who falls unwishingly, Socrates 
can mean that the man attempts to overpower his opponent but unintentionally 
falls by the opponent's throw. 
Hippias reluctantly admits, or possibly indirectly questions, the preferability 
of a wishingly falling wTestler (374a3). This requires him not only to apply his 
preceding corresponding affirmafions (373d5-7; 373e6-374al) to the present 
proposition but to confirm that falling is doing a bad thing in wrestling. I f he 
recalls the established mle, he could not reasonably reject falling as complemen-
tary to throwing as the criterion of doing badly i n wrestling. 
Whether Hippias could infer the proposition in Socrates' question depends on 
Hippias' admissions of these proposifions: (1) i f a wrestler causes his body to 
fal l on purpose by using less power than his opponent who acknowledges the 
rule of wrestling in attempting to overpower, then, although he loses the westle, 
he is still good at wrestling because he is able to outdo his opponent in power; 
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(2) i f a man acknowledging the rule of wrestling attempts to outdo his opponent 
by exerting his power but is thrown, he is bad at wrestling because he has not 
the power to outdo his opponent; (3) therefore, only non-experts fall 
unwishingly; only experts consistently fall wishingly. 
Hippias would have less difficulty in inferring the proposition than in the case 
of running; therefore, his . reserved answer suggests that he recognises the 
conversation's direction rather than the proposition's truth-value. 
Socrates leaves Hippias' reservation. Infroducfrig the predicates, 'worse' and 
'more shameful and/or uglier' (374a3-4), Socrates asks Hippias which he 
chooses as the criterion of evaluating a wrestle negatively, falling or throwing. 
Understanding that he infroduced into the preceding question the proposition 
similar to Hippias' previous affirmation, he can anticipate Hippias' choice of 
falling. 
Hippias chooses falling unreservedly, in contrast to his preceding answer, 
because of his commitment (374a 1-3) and the normal view about wrestling. 
Further, by analogy with the racer, he would rationally affirm, as he might have 
inexplicit ly supposed that losing a race or running slowly is doing a bad and 
ugly and/or shameful thing. 
Consequently on Hippias'affirmation (373el-3) Socrates might have intended 
to ask Hippias to reconfirm that in wrestling also, falling is not only doing a bad 
thing but also a shameful and/or ugly thing. However, whether or not Socrates 
believes this view, even i f Hippias affirms it now, Socrates cannot assume that 
Hippias' affirmation of the proposition concerning an agent's choice of a 
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shameful or ugly thing in an area commits Hippias to the proposition concerning 
an agent's choice of injustice, unless Socrates believes that Hippias believes (a) 
that all and only shameful and/or ugly things are unjust, (b) that all and only 
inabilities are unjust. However, because Hippias committed himself to the 
preferability of wishing to unwishing wrong-goers in wrestling, Hippias allows 
the possibility (1) that an agent who wishes to do bad and shameful and/or ugly 
things in an area possibly wishes to do injustice and (2) that because throwing 
or falling in westling is not an end in itself for a man who goes wrong wishingly 
i n a wrestle, he is clever at achieving w o n g correspondingly to Hippias' 
unanalysed idea of achieving deceit. 
Asking^^ concludingly about the preferability of those who perform bad and 
shameful and/or ugly things wishingly in wrestling, Socrates indicates that he 
asked the frrst question about wrestling to introduce this concluding formulation 
and ask Hippias to confirm that the same stands here. Hippias can take Socrates 
not to have thought it trivial to ask whether falling is worse and more shameful 
and/or uglier. 
When aflSrming reluctantly again (374a6), Hippias has no reason to reject that 
preferability i f he prefers an agent's ability rather than wish as a criterion of 
evaluating a 'wrestler'; however, Hippias would be reluctant to agree because he 
would see that Socrates induces him to confirm some general proposition about 
doing a shameful and/or ugly thing based on his affirmations about running and 
wrestling. 
Preferabilit)' of a wishingly shameful and/or ugly athlete (374a7-b4) 
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Socrates asks next about the generalisation: (1) a man good at using the body 
is able to do (374a7-8): (l)-(a) both strong things and weak things (374a8-bl) 
and ( l ) - (b) both shameful and/or ugly and honourable and/or beautiful things 
(374b 1); (2) therefore, whenever a man performs bad diings in respect of the 
body, the man better in body performs wishingly, and the man worse 
unwishingly (374b 1-3). 
As to the evaluative predicate a i o x Q a , Socrates first introduced it 
coordinately wi th 'bad', but as subsumed by 'bad' (373el-2), and continued to 
arrange it coordinately with 'bad' (373e4-5; c f 374a3; 374a5). Hippias allowed 
the possibility that he accepts that 'bad' subsumes it (373e4-5). However, 
Hippias has not committed himself to a proposition with xk xaA-d (374b 1), 
'honourable and/or beautiful', and Socrates has not introduced a i o x Q d , 
'shameful and/or ugly', separately from 'bad'. Certainly, Hippias can assume, 
analogously to 'bad', that 'good' subsumes t d xaA.d . Hence, Hippias can 
assume that 'bad' implies 'shameful and/or ugly'; and 'good', 'honourable and/or 
beautiful'. However, when Socrates introduces the combination of these 
predicates (374b 1) without referring to 'good' or 'bad', Hippias can suspect that 
Socrates has been inducing him to give affirmation to the proposition with these 
predicates. 
Socrates has not yet introduced the proposition underlying Hippias' inference 
of the preferability of a man who wishingly does a specific bad thing in an area, 
but he apparently conjectures in detail how Hippias possibly infers that type of 
conclusion, whether or not Socrates believes the proposition. However, i f 
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Socrates has assumed, as he told Hippias, that he can justify the conclusion 
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provisionally by Hippias' affirmations about a false man, then, although he still 
does not specify the comparative criterion (374a7, 374b2, b3), he allows the 
possibility that he believed that an expert in using the body is able to do 
something either strongly or weakly. 
However, it is not necessarily plausible that Socrates can justify this last 
conclusion by Hippias' affirmations about a false man. Truth-values are not 
gradable like physical strength; rather, like 'honourable and/or beautiful' and 
'shameful and/or ugly', they are normally discrete. I f Hippias chooses a degree 
of speed in running as the criterion of evaluating a runner by applying 'good' and 
l^ad', Hippias can regard the evaluation of a runner as a matter of degree on that 
basis. I f Hippias bases the application of'shameful and/or ugly' and 'honourable 
and/or beautiful' or evaluation by the relative criterion such as speed in running, 
he has no reason to reject the use of the predicates in comparafive form (374a3-
4); however, Hippias would commit a fallacy in analogising something 
normative or rule-following to something relative and gradable^^'. As Guthrie 
says^^', this analogy would hold within the limits of relatively gradable things 
but not between two discretely incompatible things. For example, concerning 
running, Hippias can grade a variety of particulars by speed. I f Hippias 
maintains the relatively gradable degree in affirming the proposition about 
acfions, he presupposes that agents are capable of doing an action but are 
differentiated by some relative criterion found in that action. 
Answering reluctantly and with qualification by an area, Hippias affirms the 
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proposition but would not necessarily admit the case about injustice (374b3-4). 
Since Hippias affirms the proposition generalising the preceding cases about 
wrestling and running, Socrates can retroactively take Hippias to have admitted 
the corresponding conclusion for the reason Socrates proposed in his question. 
Whether or not Socrates intended to infroduce animistic language with organ 
or soul as subject of an action, Hippias commits himself to the instrumentality 
of the body as an unanalysed idea in ordinary language, though, pace Jantzen^ '^', 
not beyond it. Hence Hippias' commitments to the separation between the 
subject as user and the body as used pave the way for Socrates' introduction of 
that language. 
Hippias here does not necessarily, as Smith interprets^^"*, admit only 'sfrong 
and weak' but not 'beautiful and/or honourable and ugly and/or shameful'; as 
Calogero indicates^^, Hippias could not reject the latter predicates after previous 
admissions (373e2, 373e5, 374a6); rather, without clearly understanding 
Socrates' intention, he would dimly look ahead to the preferability of wishingly 
unjust men. 
Preferabilih' of a wishingly uglily dancing body (374b5-c2) 
Socrates has not yet used language making the whole body, organs or souls-
into subjects or instruments of actions. Whether we commit ourselves or not to 
the implication of such animistic language, we can observe such language in 
ancient Greek and modem tongues. 
However, in the contexi: of ascription to an agent, such language, i f it has die 
same qualification as the language with a human being as subject, would be 
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pointless in our experience. For example, the spatio-temporal limit of ascribable 
responsibility is not the same as the limit of our body. Considering the almost 
complete lack of examples of excov and a x c o v with non-human subjects^ ^^ 
and of examples of organs as subjects of actions, Socrates' phrases of e x 6 v and 
a x GOV with non-human subjects sound odd even i f the interlocutors implicitly 
paraphrase the sentence with a human being as subject. 
Therefore, Socrates' justification for introducing animistic language depends 
on his purpose. We must consider his strategy and the necessity of the order of 
topics and questions. For, i f we omit consideration of animistic language or 
assume that Socrates thinks that such language can be paraphrased in ordinary 
language, it would not be necessary for him to arrange his questions and topics 
in the present order, for the topics and questions in animistic language could be 
arranged coordinately with others in normal language. Accordingly, when 
Socrates apparently distances Hippias from normal language and a normative 
idea associated with a shameful action as an agent's wished object, his rhetoric 
suggests that he intends to drive Hippias round to the conclusion by distracting . 
Hippias' attention from normal language^^ .^ 
While using 'shameful and/or ugly', Socrates asks whether Piippias thinks, in 
the case of bodily grace, that i f the body takes the ugly and bad postures in 
dancing wishingly, it is better; and if so imwishingly, it is worse (374b5-7). 
Socrates asks Hippias' opinion without asserting his own. Introducing the 
proposition analogous to but linguistically different from the latter part of the 
proposition in his preceding question (374b 1-3), without detailing the criterion 
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of evaluation of dancing postures, Socrates asks whether the same conclusion 
holds in the case of the body dancing. 
Allowed to make clear his opinion, Hippias affirms unreservedly the 
proposition in Socrates' question in contrast with his preceding reluctance 
(374b8). Hence, Hippias supplies the conditions for that proposition and draws 
the conclusion. 
Socrates asks^^ whether gracelessness (aoxri!iOOTJvr |)asa body wishes 
it is derivable from the body's goodness and gracelessness as a body does not 
wish it is derivable from the body's badness (374b8-cl). This introduces an 
explanatory proposition on Hippias' affirmation. 
A dancer taking an ugly posture may be one whose outward appearance does 
not please spectators or one who contravenes a norm of dancing. A bad thing a 
good dancer does wishingly may be either unaesthetic or illicit. Hippias and 
Socrates, therefore, may or may not put the same interpretation on the proposi-
tions Socrates embodies in his questions and Hippias accepts. Hippias could 
589 give reserx'ed affirmations to either version 
Preferabilit)' of a wishingly mis-tuning voice (374c2-5) 
Socrates asks about Hippias' presupposition on having acquired good things 
(374c5-6) before the question on limping feet (374c6-d2). This arrangement is 
explicable, to some degree, if Socrates introduces the proposition with the feet 
separate from the human subject to elicit below Hippias' affirmation about a soul 
governing the body. 
Why does Socrates arrange the cases about dancing and singing before the 
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question on having acquired good things and the case of limping feet? The case 
of a mis-posturing dancing body does not subsume the case of a mis-tuning 
singing voice or that of limping feet. These three cases are coordinate. Classified, 
they would fall under the category of going wrong of things we possess (374d6-
7), but not under that of mis-perceiving (374d2-374e2). Further, the class 
including the mis-perceiving senses would be, as Socrates' reference to 
possession at 374el-2 suggests, what we possess '^". 
For one thing, miscarrying bodily action in examples such as running and 
wrestling implies the measure of physical strength. However, the case of 
posturing deals with making one's body outwardly beautiful. 
For another, the characteristic of going wrong differs between these two 
sections. Simple physical strength normally enables agents to achieve the 
performance demanding less power, although they may miscarry against their 
wi l l . Miscarriage in singing or dancing is not based on physical strength 
(374a8-9) but rather on deviation from trained outward uniformity. But in such 
a case performers often use animistic language in swearing at their own failure 
and, literally or not, they often superficially ascribe their failure to the body out 
of control. Therefore, Socrates has some right to differentiate the two sections 
in reference to the difference of the use of the body and of the kind of deviation 
from appropriateness concemed. 
Socrates seeks Hippias' opinion of the preferability of wishing to unwishing 
wrong-goers in the case of a tuning voice (374c2-3). He can anticipate Hippias' 
afiSimation to the proposition following Hippias' commitments to corresponding 
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conclusions in corresponding questions (373d5-7; 373e6-374al; 374al-3; 
374a5-6) and Hippias' admission of animistic language. 
Choosing unreservedly a voice which mistunes wishingly, Hippias would find 
no reason in preceding affirmations to reject the proposition in this altema-
tive(374c4). 
To justify affirmation to the proposition with the equivocal term, 'mis-tune', 
Hippias must understand the singer's wish to mis-tune. He must understand that 
a man who conceives what is the right tune for a song and sings a particular wrong 
melody by deliberately deviating is better at singing in tune than a man who 
simply fails in singing in tune. However, Hippias might disregard the singer's 
wish to contravene a norm by attending only to the outward ugliness of the sound. 
Socrates asks (374c4) about the inverted comparison with 'inferior', as he 
asked at 373e6-374al. Hippias cannot avoid affirmation because of his 
preceding affirmations at 374c2-4 (374c5). Hence, Hippias allows the possibility 
that he admits that a wishingly WTong-goer in mistuning is clever at going 
wrong in singing. 
Having acquired good things (374c5-6) 
Hjppias' commitment to preference for having acquired good things shackles 
him to evaluating non-human subjects according not to wish to follow a rule but 
to knowledge or abilit}' to follow it. 
Asking, TTien, which would you accept, having acquired good things or bad 
things^"?' Socrates makes clear that it is Hippias' choice, and introduces in his 
first alternative a tautological proposition''' implying that Hippias approves pos-
263 
session of things he approves. Hence Socrates evidently anticipates that he can refer 
to things acquirable analogically. 
In contrast with Socrates' strategy in introducing a proposition with "Hippias' as 
subject of doing a bad thing (cf e.g. 366c5-367a5), Socrates' animistic language 
would distract Hippias' attention from a specific ordinary-language proposition. 
Hippias has no reascai to reject the first alternative insofar as he admits evaluative 
propositions and leaves open the criterion of good things (374c6). He clearly cannot 
anticipate Socrates' later using the formulation "have acquired' in odd animistic 
language. 
E[aving acquired wishingfy limping feet (374c6-d2) 
The verb, X(ji A,a iv co, means 'limp'; it often refers to innate irretrievably disabling 
deformity or acquired irretrievable mal-flinction, e.g., by mutilation^''. Therefore, we 
can cause our feet to limp by injuring ourselves, but it is medically often practicable for 
one who wishingly became lame to retne\'e the ability to walk properly. Socrates could 
refer not to one pretending to go lame but to one who comes to limp by injuring 
himself and recovers. Socrates might not envisage a case where one who limps 
wishingly does not actualise his ability on account of something irrelevant to the time-
span for recovery (cf 366c 1-3)''^ . Hippias would, as Aristotle remarks '^^  take limp 
wishingh^ as 'mimic limping' like fall wishingh/ in a wrestle. He would believe that, 
unless one who limps wishingly pretends to limp, he is not able to walk whene\'er he 
wishes to. 
What Socrates intends to ask at 374c6-7 is inferred as follows. 
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PI . I f Hippias affirms that he would accept having acquired anything, 
he affirms that it is good. 
[374c5-6] 
P2. (a) Hippias aflErms that he would accept having acquired feet which 
limp wishingly or (b) he affirms that he would accept having acquired 
feet which limp unwishingly. 
[Presupposition of question at 374c6-7] 
CI . (A) Hippias affirms that feet which limp wishingly are good or (B) 
he affirms that feet which limp unwishingly are good. 
[(A): instantiation of PI and P2 (a), modus ponens; (B): instantiation of 
PI and P2 (b), modus ponens] 
Therefore, while introducing animistic language, Socrates formally asks Hippias' 
opinion about a proposition similar to those in his preceding concluding 
questions (373d5-6; 373e6-7; 374a5-6; 374c2-3; cf , 373c7-8; 374al-2). 
Accordingly, Hippias allows the possibility that he, supposing that limping is 
ugly, accepts (1) that personified feet, acknowledging the beauty of walking 
properly, which contravene beautiful postures, are good at walking properly 
because they are able both to walk and limp or (2) that a man who limps 
wishingly is better than one who limps unwishingly, in respect not of wish to 
walk properly but of ability to walk and limp. 
Hippias unreservedly accepts having acquired feet which limp wishingly 
(374dl). Having accepted similar propositions and admissions of animistic 
language, he affirms the preferability of wishingly limping feet in respect of 
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capability of walking properly and, in ordinary language, the preferability of a 
wishi?igly limping man. He might imagine in odd language the preferability of 
wishingly limping personified feet out of their proper subject's confrol or in 
ordinary language the preferability of those wishingly mimicking limping. 
Disregarding the morals of mimicking lameness, Hippias could reasonably 
accept the preferability of a wishingly limping man because mimicking limping 
implies ability to walk. However, he allows the possibility that one who wishingly 
walks improperly is clever at going wTong in walking because he abandoned a 
developmentally acquired habit of walking properly '^*. 
Asking whether limp of the feet is not inferiority and gracelessness (374dl), 
Socrates refers to Hippias' presupposition in his preceding affirmation in 
quesfions in the reverse order to those concerning wTestling at 374a3-4. 
Referring by 'gracelessness' (374d2; cf 374b8) to visually negative evaluation 
associated with organs' malfiinction, Socrates may still see some analogy of 
choosing gracelessness to contravening a norm in Hippias' admission at 374d2, 
but Hippias would not see a normative association in this word; he accepts limp 
as gracelessness because of his and the popular association. 
Socrates could legitimately ask flirther about propositions concerning another 
organ in odd language. Apart from the formal similarity to the preferability of 
wishingly unjust men, Socrates' questions work to distance Hippias from the 
conclusion about injustice and so to distract Hippias' attention from an analogy 
of wish to walk improperly with wish to do injustice towards evaluation of 
bodily ugliness. 
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Having acquired wishingfy dimly viewing eyes (374d2-6) 
Socrates conducively asks whether dim sight is not the condition for a 
conclusion about the eyes like that about feet (374d2-3). Hippias unreservedly 
affrrms so (374d3). In respect of dim sight, Hippias cannot affirm that he would 
accept having acquired such eyes. 
Socrates asks about the preferability of having acquired and living with the 
eyes with which one views dimly and experiences illusion wishingly (374d3-5). 
It is questionable from our viewpoint how one can mimic viewing dimly or how 
one can retrieve an optical function which one caused to halt. However, Socrates 
can anticipate Hippias' affirmation because Hippias (1) accepted dimness as 
badness of the eyes and (2) affirmed the similar proposition about feet. Although 
Socrates did not refer to a human subject, i f Hippias affirms the proposition with 
a human subject, he retroactively allows the possibility that he accepts the 
proposition with a human subject about the feet too and that he will accept such 
propositions again. 
Further, Socrates did not first refer to experiencing illusion as inferiority of the 
eyes (374d2-3), but he adds experiencing illusion (374d5). If Hippias affirms, 
he allows retroactively the possibility that he accepts that expenencfrig illusion 
IS inferiority (cf 373el-2 and 374b 1). Therefore, Socrates can look ahead to 
(a) '^^  the analogy of living with organs (374d4) to keeping in partnership with 
tools (374e3), (b) the analogy of illusion of the eyes with that of other senses and 
with errors of subjects and (c) the analogy of a possible wish to experience 
illusion with wish to do injustice in respect of error. 
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Choosing unreservedly the eyes with which a man views improperly wishingly, 
Hippias committed himself to the preferability of a wishingly improper viewer 
(374d5-6). Therefore, Hip j^ias allows the possibilities that (1) he takes ability to view 
properly as the criterion, (2) retroactively, he admits the preferability of a wishingly 
limping man in respect of ability to walk properly, and (3) he admits that a man who 
wishingly goes wrong in viewing badlyis clever at going wrong about viewing. 
Socrates would now haw come to look ahead more clearly to analogies (a) and (b) 
above in reference to Htppias' aflBrmed propositions tiseing aoxTHiOOUVT] (374b8; ^ 
374d2) and (XTtaSouaav (374c3). 
Having acquired organs which do bad things wishingly (374d6-e2) 
Socrates ammges the case of having acquired one's own organs before that of 
keeping in partnership with an instrument Does Hippias find any necessary 
relationship between these cases? Is there any reason why Socrates necessarily set 
the question about sense organs before that about instruments? 
Concerning the relationship between the question about instruments (374e3-
375a 1) and that about an animal's soul (375a 1 -7), Hippias later might find some 
positive reason for Socrates' ordering of questions, in that each treats a human 
being's possession of independent objects and controlling them as instruments. 
Therefore, considenng Socrates' further fransition from the question about 
having acquired an animal's soul to that about having acquired a person's soul 
(375a7-c3), Hippias later could find Socrates' plot in the order of the three 
subjects. However, what could Hippias later understand that Socrates mtends 
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by arrangmg the question about sense organs before that about instruments in 
general? 
Is the preferability wishingly erring sense organs sufficient or necessary for 
that of wishingly erring instruments? First, 'the sense organs which do a bad 
thing wishingly' is animistic language but 'those having acquired or keeping 
partnership with instruments and wrongly manipulating the instruments 
wishingly' is normal language. Secondly, having acquired sense organs is not 
keeping partnership with instruments. Certainly, ordinary ideas of sense organs 
involve instrumentalitj'. But the preferability of sense organs is not sufficient for 
the preferability of instruments. 
Then, is the former necessary for the latter? Organs are analogous to 
instruments. Some miscarriage of organs would be necessary for wrongly 
manipulating instruments. However, i f we apply having acquired the instru-
ments to the case of having acquired organs, we enlarge the usage of'having 
acquired' in that we cannot separate our sense organs from ourselves. Even if we 
conceptually separate off"our sense organs, it is dubious whether the organ itself 
is a subject of an action. Moreover, it is questionable whether we can manipu-
late our sense organs since perception does not stand without something external 
given. As Smith suggestsSocrates would appear to Hippias later to have tried 
to shackle him to the conclusion by his preceding admissions of analogous 
propositions, especially, by re-approximating to a sentence with a soul (which 
governs the body) as subject. 
Neither is Socrates' question on sense organs coordinate with his question on 
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instruments; nor are these questions subsumed by his question on having 
acquired an animal's soul; for the meaning of 'having acquired' in the case of 
instruments is closer to that in the case of having acquired an animal's soul 
because of the contiguity of the matter referred to. The possibility is, rather, that 
the case of having acquired sense organs is subsumed by the case of having 
acquired a human being's soul. 
I f the question of sense organs is not coordinate with the question of 
instruments, the analogy would stand between two kinds of having acquired 
good things: having acquired any sense organ which goes wrong wishingly and 
having acquired any instrument with which a worker does a bad thing 
wishingly, i f Hippias understands a sense organ as a kind of instrument as in 
circulating animistic language. Socrates does not regard normal instruments as 
agents of actions; rather, in this regard, the analogy would stand between the 
cases of having acquired a sense organ and having acquired an animal's or a 
human being's soul. 
As to the arrangement of the examples, after Hippias commits himself to 
accepting having acquired good things, Socrates takes up, as the preferable 
object to have acquired, i.e., to live with, wishingly limping feet, wishingly 
improperly viewing eyes and wishingly mis-perceiving sense organs. These are 
coordinate, but the degree of receptiveness of perception is problematic. We can 
imagine the dimness of senses but we have difficulty in finding what we counts 
as an error of the perception concemed. The cases Socrates enumerates are not 
necessarily acceptable. If Hippias commits himself to the possibility of causing 
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oneself to mis-step, mis-look, mis-hearken, mis-smell, or mis-taste, he would 
pass gradually from the observer's standpoint for evaluating the outward 
appearance of an agent to an agent's standpoint for evaluating the capability of 
a confroUed object. 
Socrates asks about Hippias' supposifion about his own organs in his 
preceding affirmations at 374c5-d6 without specifying the criterion of preferabil-
ity (374d6-7); however, he refers to the proposition presupposed in Hippias' 
preceding affirmations. Hence he can take Hippias to take a subject's ability but 
not wish as the criterion; further, he may anticipate Hippias' affirmation. 
Hippias affirms but with similar qualification, avoiding any generalisation, 
on the area in which the proposition holds (374d7), as at 367d3 and 374a 1. Unable 
to answer, "No,' following his preceding acceptance, he might foresee Socrates' 
sophistical way, his unreasonable generalisation, or some analogy he dislikes. 
Socrates introduces a general proposition into his question^'' at 374d8-e2. He 
explains the reasons for the preferability of organs which do bad things (374d3) 
•vishingly but does not specify the criterion of goodness (cf 374b8-cl; 374a7-b3), 
whether a subject's wish or ability. He can anticipate Hippias' affirmation 
because he generalises Hippias' preceding affirmation. Hippias' affirmation at 
374e2 by an explicit performative enables Socrates to assume, although it is 
open to question how an agent controls his sense, that Hippias admits 
generalising his preceding affirmations. 
Partnership with tools by which a man wishingly does a bad thing in 
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respect of their appointed purpose (374e3-375al) 
Socrates refers to general preference for having partnership with tools (374e3-
4) and having acquired an animal's soul (375a 1-2) instead of referring to 
Hippias' preference for having acquired something (cf 374d5-6)*°°. How does 
Socrates arrange his questions for Hippias to commit himself to the proposition 
that in any given area, // Z5 better to have acquired an animal's soul which goes 
wrong and with which we perform wrongly wishingly (375a 1-7), paraphrased 
into the propositional type: 'in any given area, it is better to have acquired the 
soul of X which goes wrong and with which we wishingly perform wrongly, i.e., 
a good soul of x'? 
What he wants Hippias to accept prior to the case of an animal's soul seems 
to be the proposition that for every instrument, in any given area, it is better to 
keep partnership with an instrument with which we wishingly do wrongly the 
thing appropriate to the instrument or manipulate the thing subordinated by the 
instrument, paraphrased into the propositional type: 'in any given area, it is 
better to have acquired x with which we do wishingly wrongly the thing 
appropriate to x or manipulate the thing subordinated by x, i.e., a good x'. 
Hence, on the relationship between the generalised conclusions which Socrates 
asks Hippias to confirm in those two stages, Hippias would find, despite the 
different logical structure, an analogy of steering a ship with^a'nding a horse in 
respect of controlling something. Therefore, Hippias possibly takes Socrates to 
suppose that what stands concerning instruments in general also stands concerning 
the animal's soul as an instrument. If Hippias admits the analogy of tools to an 
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animal's soul in instrumentality, Hippias could accept Socrates' transition. 
After the general concluding question (374e3-4), Socrates enumerates 
examples. He will reenumerate those of shooting an arrow and playing the flute 
in the section on having acquired a human being's soul. This reenumeration 
indicates that Socrates does not implement a simple induction by enumerating 
co-ordinate samples inrespective of his animistic language. Rather, in analogical 
fransition between topics, he would be seeking progressive stages to the fmal 
conclusion probably by dissolving gradually the difference between a subject 
and its instrument, once posited in animistic language*"'. 
Socrates asks (374e3-5) a question similar to his question about having 
acquired an organ. Assuming Hippias believes it is good to keep in partnership 
with a good thing, Socrates asks about the preferability of the partnership with 
an instrument with which a man wishingly does a bad thing in respect of what 
it is for Hippias probably takes as the criterion the tools' capability of having a 
user able to manipulate them rightly. Hence, when Socrates takes a rudder as 
example (374e4-5), Hippias chooses one in respect not of the user's abilit}' but 
of the rudder's ov\'n capability (374e5). Hence Hippias allows the possibility (1) 
that he generalises his affirmation from this exemplary case, (2) that he 
evaluates a user of an instrument in respect of a use appropriate to some purpose 
which the instrument is for, and (3) he assumes, on the basis of past commit-
ments, that a man who uses an instrument badly wishingly conceives the 
appropriate way and deviates from it. 
Without describing a user's specific abuse of an instrument, Socrates asks 
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Hippias to reconfirm the generalised proposition about partnership with an 
instrument (374e5-6). Affinning unreservedly (375al), Hippias endorses the 
above possibility. 
But, saying, 'You are right' (375a 1), Hippias ascribes responsibility for the 
proposition to Socrates. Since Socrates introduced a conducive interrogation, 
Hippias has some right to assume colloquially that Socrates indirectly asserted 
in interrogative form (cf 364bl; 364d7; 376b7). It is risky to generahse Hippias' 
supposition, but it is too trivial to arrest attention that whenever Hippias answers 
Socrates' question, he always refers to what he regards as the proposition which 
Socrates introduces into his question, whether he rejects or accepts the 
proposition or neither (cf 374a3). Whether or not Socrates believes the 
proposition he introduces, Socrates does not give in his questions any distinctive 
mark by which he lets Hippias know what proposition Socrates believes. 
However, Hippias might perhaps assume that Socrates induces him to agree to 
what Socrates believes, not only after Socrates apparently professed (372c8-e6) 
that he believed the preferability of wishing wrong-goers but also i f Hippias looks 
ahead to Socrates' push to the general conclusion. 
Having acquired a soul of an animal with which a man wishingfy does a bad 
thing in respect of its appointed purpose (375al-375a7) 
How does Socrates arrange his questions for Hippias to reach the intended 
conclusion tliat in any given area of sciences or arts, it is better to have acquired 
a soul which does a bad thing wishingly, i.e., a good soul (375a7-9)? The 
preceding case of having acquired some animal's soul has a grammar close to 
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the next case of having acquired a person's soul. However, compared with the latter, 
the former concerning controlling animals does not include the whole area of 
sciences or arts. Moreover, these two neighbouring stages refer to "having acquired 
a soul' in different senses. It means confroUing a soul something separate in the 
former; it means ambiguously, in the latter, hiring or becoming a man occupied 
about a skill or science. Thus the transition between the stages is not logically 
necessary but is a kind of analogy. Theretbre, Hippias could not find how Socrates 
arranges the two cases except for shared introduction of a soul, but Hippias later 
possibly takes Socrates to have tried to ehcit his commitment to the proposition in 
the former to push him to the proposition in the latter. 
Socrates asks a question analogous to those about having acquired an organ 
at 374c6-7; 374d8-e2; especially 374d3-5 and that about keeping partnership 
with an instrument at 374e3-4 (375a 1-2). He asks about the preferability of 
having acquired the soul of a horse with which a man will ride badly wishijigly. 
Hippias affirms that it is better to have acquired such a soul of a horse (375a2-
3). 
In infroducing a soul of a horse, Socrates does not specify the cntenon of a 
bad thing in nding a horse or explain his view of the relation between the soul 
and that which has it; neither will he ask further about the conditions for a 
particular relation. Unlike the case of an organ or an instrument, Socrates 
formulates his question by introducing the division of the confrolled thing into 
two subjects, a horse and its soul. 
Socrates may now (375a3) anticipate Hippias' commitment to the preferability 
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of a soul of a horse with which a man will ride badly wishingly in respect of the 
soul's capability of what Hippias regards as having the man riding well. Hence, 
he might utter this speech like a statement, but in what Socrates regards as 
examination, he has shown Hippias that he is asking about Hippias' opinion. 
Therefore, at least, pace Burnet, Socrates asks Hippias to confirm that his 
preceding commitment imphes the proposition*"^, and Hippias aflfinns (375a3). 
Socrates asks Hippias to confirm that the similar type of conclusion holds true 
by using a similar interrogative form in animistic language (STSaS-S)*"^ ; another 
point would be whether Hippias admits the relation between what he regards as 
a man's doing a bad thing and the work of the soul. As Jantzen shows*"'*, only 
a good soul of a horse enables a rider to do badly wishingly. 
To justify his intense affirmation (375a6), Hippias has to interpret that the 
formulation in Socrates' question means that if a man has acquired a good soul, 
then, i f he does the soul's work badly, he does it wishingly and i f a bad soul, i f 
he does it badly, he does so unwishingly. Hippias allows the possibility that he 
believes (1) that in an area of having acquired a soul of an animal, he would 
accept a good soul of an animal and (2) that if a man has acquired a good soul 
of an animal, he does the work of the soul of an animal well and (3) that if a 
man has acquired a good soul of an animal, if he does the work of the soul of an 
animal badly, he does so wishingly. Therefore, irrespective of the descriptive 
condition of the predicate, 'bad', Socrates has some prospect of Hippias' 
affirmation about a man's soul. 
Socrates asks whether Hippias generalises the preceding affirmation to the 
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case of a soul of an animal in general (375a6-7). Hippias accepts (375a7). 
Hence, Socrates can generalise Hippias' implication at 375a6. 
Having acquired a human being's soul as one's instrument which, occupied 
with a skill or science, goes wrong wishirtgly (375a7-375c3) 
In 375a7 ff., Socrates directly uses the proposition type that in a certain area 
it is better to have acquired the soul which wishingly does a bad thing in the 
area. Further he deals with the case of having acquired the slave's soul which 
performs in any given area. 
As Jantzen suggests^^ unlike the preceding meaning of 'having acquired', 
there is no technically inner relationship between the owner and the owned soul 
occupied with a skill or science like that between a rider and a horse. Ovink*'* 
and Hunziker^ interpret Socrates' 'ha\ang acquired' as 'hiring', but the meaning 
depends on Hippias' interpretation. Socrates' point here is an idea of a soul as an 
mstrument . 
Socrates arranges the example of having acquired slaves' souls (375c3-6) m 
contrast with having acquired a soul occupied in each art or science, which 
invites Hippias' reserved answer at 375c3. Socrates shows in the case of a soul 
in general in sciences or arts that in any given area, it is good to have acquired 
a good soul in the area and that in any given area, a good soul is one which goes 
wrong in the area wishingly. But Socrates intends to show in the case of slaves' 
souls that in any given area, if we have acquired a slave's soul as our instrument, 
we would accept having acquired the soul which goes wrong wishingly. 
Socrates intends thus to corroborate the next stage's conclusion by appealing to 
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the case of ha\'ing acquired our own soul. 
Socrates asks about the preferability of having acquired a bowman's soul 
which misses the mark wishingly (375a7-bl). He may also be asking, 
specifically, whether it is better to miss wishingly than to miss iinwishingly. 
Hippias must answer consistently with preceding admissions which soul is 
better at archery, one which does a bad thing wishingly or one which does it 
Iinwishingly. 
In introducing the action of missing, Socrates can assume that i f Hippias 
aflfirms the case of a bowman's soul, Hippias is ready to analogise the model of 
missing as going wrong ( a u a Q T a v e i v ) t o another case. 
Therefore, if Hippias does not quer>' the analogy by indicating its limits in his 
preceding affirmations in respect of the relation between a man and what he has 
acquired, he leaves open the possibility that he believes that a man who goes 
wrong wishingly is good at things he goes wrong about. Socrates might believe 
that Hippias has understood by a man who goes wrong wishingly in an area not 
an expert in the area but a man who does a bad thing wishingly because of his 
cleverness at doing a bad thing about subjects concerned, if he believes that 
Hippias commits himself to an agent's wish to go wrong in each area in the 
preceding analogies (373c6-375a7). 
In affirming unreservedly (375bl), Hippias keeps consistency probably by 
accepting the preferability of a man who misses the mark wishingly as about 
runners and wrestlers. 
However, he does not query the limits of the analogy presupposed by these 
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affirmations. Hence, Hippias allows the possibility that he believes what the 
analogy and the model of missing the mark imply. 
In the second question in a series as at 375a3 (375b2), Socrates asks about 
the preferability, in archery, of a soul missing the mark wishingly. 
Socrates has left Hippias to imagine what is badness in an area of having 
acquired an organ or a soul of an animal or keeping in partnership with an 
instrument and what is the criterion of evaluating something which does that 
bad thing wishingly, however, Socrates specifies that criterion in the case of a 
bowman's soul, apart from, his question about using the body in general (374a7-
b3; especially, 374a7-bl; 374a5-6). 
Hippias keeps consistency in his unreserved affirmation (375b2), understand-
ing that a bowman who misses the mark wishingly is better at archery than one 
who does so umvishingly. However, when he affirms Socrates' formulation, he 
allows the possibility'' that he analogises his criterion of comparison of a 
bowman who misses the mark to his tacit criteria elsewhere. Further, whether 
or not Hippias would aSirm that a bowman's wish to miss is analogous to an 
agent's wish to go wrong in contravening a norm, he affirms the proposition 
approximate />? locution to the conclusion that a soul which goes \vTong 
( a u a o T a v E i v ) wishingly is better than one which does so unwishingly. 
Socrates at 375b3-4 introduces the formulation which Hippias can interpret 
as the proposition (a) that a soul of a bowman which misses the mark 
unwishingly is worse than one which does it wishingly in respect of archerv' or 
as the proposition (b) that a soul which goes wrong unwishingly is worse m its 
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wish to obey a norm than one which goes wrong wishifigly^^. Socrates would 
appear to Hippias to be palming off what Hippias regards as a wrong view (b) 
on him. 
Hippias makes clear that he commits himself to proposition (a) but not to (b) 
(375b4) and suggests that he inhibits Socrates from generalising his affirmation. 
However, since Hippias affirms (a), Socrates can assume, specifying explicitly 
the criterion of the comparison, that Hippias is ready to affirm that a soul which 
wishingly does a bad thing in doing something specific in an area is better in 
respect of knowledge and/or ability in the area than a soul which does it 
unwishingly. If Socrates supposes that Hippias assumes that a wrongdoer is not 
only about archery but about any other subject, as he suggested about a false 
man, Hippias offers the possibility that he admits that a wishingly bad man 
occupied about a subject is better in respect of cleverness at doing a bad thing 
about the area than an U7iwishing bad man. 
Without referring to a soul of a man reliable in medicine, Socrates asks 
Hippias to confirm on his preceding affirmations that a soul which does 
wishingly what Hippias supposes as a bad thing concerning medicine is good 
in respect of ability and/or knowledge in medicine. Socrates does not introduce 
the word, 'go wrong' here but introduces the phrase, 'perform bad things', which 
Hippias introduced in listing criminal descriptions (372al). This phrase as. well 
as 'go wrong' echoed as 'do wrong' to Hippias as it did in Socrates' preceding 
questions (373e6-374al; 374el; 374e4). Socrates does not disclose what he 
intended by the formulation in his preceding question, but while making 
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unmistakable the criterion of the comparison which Socrates believes Hippias 
has presupposed in his preceding affirmations, he asks about what Hippias' 
affirmation implies in medicine (375b4-5). 
Hippias unreservedly affirms that in medicine, a soul which does a bad thing 
to bodies wishingly has more knowledge and/or ability in healing bodies than 
a soul which does so unwishingly, whether or not he refers to the soul which 
disregards a norm in healing patients (375b6). Socrates can now introduce into 
his question the phrase, 'perform bad things', associable with 'do injustice'. 
Without referring to the soul as a physician's soul, Socrates invertedly asks*'° 
whether Hippias substitutes the word, Ixtter' for the phrase, 'skilled in medicine' 
(375b6-7). In iatroducing the word, 'skill', of medicine, Socrates can expect 
Hippias' generalisation of the case of archery and medicine to the case of skills 
and knowledges in general because it is a permissible induction and because 
Hippias allowed generalisation (374a7-b4, 374d6-7, 374d8-e2, 374e3-375al, 
375a6-8). 
Hippias confirms the implication of his preceding affirmation (375b7). Hence 
he leaves the possibility that he assumes (1) that his criterion of comparison 
about a soul which does a bad thing wishingly in the area of a skill is an ability 
and/or knowledge in the skill which does not imply acquisition of a disposition 
to obey the norm prescribed in the profession or (2) that his critenon is 
clevemess at going wrong about a skill concerned because the soul abandoned 
the disposition to obey the norm and practised doing improperly. 
Socrates at 375b7-c3 asks a concluding question like the preceding ones 
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(373e4-5; 374a7-b4; 374b5-7), about having acquired a soul occupied with a 
skill or science. He leaves open the possibility that he is asking in normal 
language, without referring to a professional, whether or not an expert in a 
subject goes wrong wishingly while a non-expert in it goes wrong unwishingly. 
Therefore, in his conducive question, Socrates may fairly expect that ffippias 
applies his affirmation given to those preceding similar questions to the present 
case, insofar as he assumes that Hippias has referred not to the preferability of 
an expert professional soul to a non-expert non-professional soul but the 
preferability of wishing to unwishing vixong-goers occupied about a subject 
concerned. While specifying both the domain of discourse as skills and 
knowledges and the criterion of comparison as ability and/or knowledge in a 
specific area, Socrates introduces not only the predicates, 'perform bad things' 
which echoes as 'do wrong' to Hippias and 'performs ugly and/or shamefiil 
things', but also the predicate, 'go wrong' (e^ a ua g xd v e i) meaning either 'do 
wrong' or 'err'. Hippias allows the possibility that he admits Socrates' introduction 
of the predicates, 'perform bad things' and 'perform shameful and/or ugly things'; 
for Hippias, although resistingly, committed himself to substituting 'perform bad 
and shameful and/or ugly things' for 'do something badly' in the case of a runner 
(373el-2) and admitted Socrates' introduction of'perform bad things' in that of 
medicine (375b4-6; cf 374d7, 374el). 
However, Socrates has not introduced 'go wrong (e^auaQxdvev)', 
explicitly anywhere since he introduced it into his reformulation of his view 
opposed to Hippias' (372e2) and the synonymous verb at the begirming of his 
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examination (373c8). Socrates is motivated to introduce this word in order to 
induce Hippias to reach the conclusion that those who go wrong wishingly are 
better than those who go wrong unwishingly. 
However, it is a subtle question whether Socrates has enough reason for 
expecting Hippias to admit e^auagTdveiv. On one hand, since s ^ a u a o t a -
v e i v and a u a o T a v s i v are almost indistinguishable in general, Socrates 
might have supposed Hippias ready to affirm that doing a bad thing in any other 
preceding case as well as an exemplary case of dancing or tuning is a kind of 
going wrong, as he indicated at 373c8 and, so, that doing a bad thing is going 
wrong in any area. However, Socrates has not asked Hippias to generalise what 
Hippias regarded as doing a bad thing to going wrong since the examination 
began. On the other hand, Hippias affirmed Socrates' introduction of a ua o r d -
V e tv in the meaning of a bowman's missing the mark, in the present speeches 
about a skill and a knowledge. Socrates may conjecture that Hippias would admit 
e ^ a u a g r a v s i v in the sense analogisable to a bowman's missing. However, 
Hippias suggested that his affirmation about a bowman should not be 
generalised (375b4). 
If Hippias has some reason for his unassertive affirmation (375c3)*" anyhow, 
he must supply the condition, 'if the soul performs bad and shameful and/or ugly 
things and goes wTong'. He cannot object to the missing condition because he 
gave affirmation to the same proposition type before (373e4-5; 374b5-8). 
If Hippias assumes that Socrates has been talking about the case (a) that what 
an agent does in a specific area is consistently wrong, whether or not the agent 
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believes it to be wrong, but not the case (b) that a wrongdoer occupied about a 
subject concerned wishifigly goes wrong in that area and if he understands that 
Socrates, introducing e^auag-cdvsiv refers to what Socrates formulated as 
the object of Socrates' present examination (373c6-8; 372e2-3), he could object 
to Socrates' deviating from consistency in locution bit by bit. However, because 
of his previous affirmation of the same proposition type, he may be not only 
admitting the introduction of s^a^aDTdve^v and d u a g i d v e i v but also 
aflBrming the proposition approximate to the object of Socrates' examination as 
follows: in any area of knowledge and skill, a soul which goes wrong wishingly 
is better at things which it goes wrong about than one which does so unwishingly. 
Having acquired slaves' souls as one's instrument which both go wrong and 
do wrong wishingly (375c3-6) 
Socrates appears to Hippias to be trying to induce hkn to affirm the preferabil-
ity of wishing to unwishing wrong-doers by changing the subject-matter from 
the soul of a man occupied about a science or skill through the slave's soul 
occupied about it to our own soul. 
Socrates indirectly asks Hippias to withdraw his unassertiveness in his 
affirmation at 375c3. He refers to a case which he supposes that Hippias' 
preceding affirmation indicates holds true certainly, but weakens the assertive-
ness of his supposition. Hence, Socrates' speech works as an indirect question^''. 
On Hippias' presupposition that it is good to have acquired a soul expert in 
a skill or science (375a7-c3), Socrates asks him to confirm the conclusion in the 
area of having acquired a slave's soul in the meaning of using a slave as an 
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instrument*'^ in spite of Hippias' weakening assertiveness in his conclusion 
about having acquired a wishingly wrong-going soul in any area of a craft or 
science. Socrates, using the first person plural, refers to the proposition that we 
would accept having acquired the slaves' souls who wishifigly go wrong and do 
a bad thing (x a x o u o y o i3 a a in a science or skill because they are more 
skilled. 
Hippias unreservedly affirms the preceding conclusion in the case of having 
acquired slaves' souls (375c6), but when he admits Socrates' introduction of 
'morally or non-morally go wrong' and 'do a morally or non-morally bad thing' 
(xocxovQyzlv;ci 365e8-9,373b5)*''', Socrates can come close to what he has 
intended to introduce into his question. 
Having acquired one's o>vn soul which both does a bad thing and goes 
wrong wishingly (375c6-d2) 
Socrates omits the phrase indicating the area in which the proposition stands 
both in the opening formulation (373c7-8) and the fmal formulation at the end 
of the series of examples (375dl-2), as in the opening and conclusion of the 
examination about a false man (365c3-4, 369b3-4; see also 366a5-6, but 367c7-
d2). 
This might be strong evidence that Socrates commits the fallacy of de dicto 
secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter^^^ or that he wrongly applies the case 
which stands in sciences and crafts to morality. However, Socrates might use the 
question v-Hth implicit qualification of the area. Hence, Socrates' apparent fallacy 
depends on Hippias' interpretation of Socrates' question. The fallacy of the 
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wrong transition from crafts to morality, or the wrong substitution of goodness 
as an end in itself for goodness as a means depends on Hippias; for Socrates (1) 
does not make clear whether 'go wrong' or 'do a bad thing' is used in a moral or 
criminal sense, (2) may refer to doing a bad thing in the preceding cases in 
relation to an achievement sense of injustice, whether criminal or not, (3) in 
reference to false men's or Homer's Achilles' falsifying, refers to no distinction 
between 'bad as a means' and 'bad as an end' or 'good as a means or an end in 
a situation' and 'good as an end in itself and (4) allows the possibility that 
'goodness' (370e3,374cl) fimctionally belongs to a group of'falsity (370e2), 'tmth' 
(370e3), and 'badness' (374cl). 
In asking conducively about the preferability of possessing our own soul as 
good as possible (375c6-7), Socrates appeals to the same commonsense as is 
presupposed in Hippias' affirmation that he would accept having acquired good 
things (374c5-6). He does not specify the descriptive condition of the evaluative 
word, 'good', here, as he did m the case of a soul in the area of a skill and a 
knowledge (375b2, 375b4-5, 375b7-c3). Socrates does not necessarily commit 
himself to the proposition that we would accept having acquired slaves' souls 
which are good at a skill or science; however, since Hippias committed himself 
to this proposition (375c6), Socrates might appeal either to a fortiori argument 
tliat if we would prefer to possess technically good slaves' souls, we would even 
more prefer to possess good souls of our own or to Hippias' commitment to 
approval of having acquired our own organs which do bad things wishingly 
(374d5-6/'*. 
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Hippias unreservedly affirms (375dl), but might not understand whether 
Socrates applies 'good' by the criterion of a soul's knowledge of following a 
norm or by that of a soul's wish to follow it. Whichever way Hippias interprets, 
what he regards as the proposition in Socrates' question v/ould be obvious to 
him insofar as he affirms the common sense, as at 374c5-6, that we would 
accept having acquired a good thing. Apart fi-om Socrates' criterion of 'good', 
Hippias is forced by his commitment to (a) instrumental interpretation of what 
he possesses, (b) ambivalence of ability*'^, and (c) respect for abilities. 
In askiag about the preferability of a wishingly bad and wrong-going soul m 
the case of our own soul (375dl-2), Socrates does not make clear whether he 
refers to a criminally bad thing or specify the preferential criterion. If Hippias 
later knows what Socrates reargues for (375d7ff), he might take Socrates to have 
asked here, as at 371e4-5 and 371e7-8 (see pp. 214-216, 221-223), about the 
preferability of a man who both morally does wrong and morally goes wong 
wishingly in respect of expertise in things about which he does so. Further, i f 
Hippias later relied on Socrates' remark at 375d5, he might take Socrates to have 
taken here his inductive step pnor to asking again about the preferabiliry of 
wishingly to unwishingly unjust men; he could take Socrates to have, as before, 
regarded as the criterion not wish to obey justice but clevemess at achieving 
justice and injustice about the subjects concerned. 
Hippias denies the proposition he thinks Socrates introduced into his question 
or looked as if he was gomg to introduce next; he explains that the proposition's 
implications would be absurd (375d3-4)*'*. Hippias understands that Socrates 
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infroduced or was about to introduce and was inducing him to affirm the 
preferability ofwishi?jg to umvishi?ig wrong-doers in the case of our souls. Then, 
Hippias would anticipate again that i f he affirms, Socrates would understand 
him to imply the preferability of wishingly to unwishingly unjust men in respect 
of wish to do right. Therefore, Hippias would deny what he regards as Socrates' 
proposition. However, Hippias repeatedly does not specify whether he accepts 
the preferability of a wishingly unjust man in respect of expertise in a subject in 
Which he does injustice or cleverness at achieving injustice about subjects 
concerned or whether he prefers an agent's wish to an agent's ability as the 
criterion of preferability on injustice. Hippias still leaves his attitude open, but 
to keep consistency, he must distinguish (1) a clever man who, occupied about 
subjects concerned, does wrong by disregarding a norm concemed from (2) an 
expert who consistently goes WTong irrespective of his moral intention. 
Socrates expounds neither what proposition he would have introduced i f 
Hippias had accepted the proposition introduced into his preceding question at 
375dl-2 nor in what respect he introduced the preferability of wishingly bad and 
wrong-goifig souls (375d5). Socrates does not confirm Hippias' reason for 
denying the preferabilit}' o[wishingly unjust men. How can Socrates reasonably 
suggest that Hippias should properly accept the preferability of wishingly unjust 
men according to his previous commitment? 
As it may seem to Hippias, Socrates might have been inducing Hippias only 
to affirm publicly, despite his consistent denials, but not to see reasonably, the 
preferability of wishingly unjust men in respect of their wish to do justice, i f 
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Socrates admits that this preferability is self-contradictory. 
However, since Hippias referred to a man who achieves the wrong he wishes 
to do (371e9-372a5), he allowed the possibilities (a) that criminally described 
actions can be the object of an agent's wish and so, (b) that one can be clever at 
achieving justice or injustice. Consequently, Socrates may fairly take Hippias 
to be ready to admit that wishingly unjust men are preferable in respect of that 
clevemess. Therefore, Socrates could have been trying to induce Hippias to take 
that clevemess as the criterion of the preferability. 
Indeed, Socrates has left Hippias to understand what proposition Socrates 
means by his formulations about the preferability of wishing to unwishing 
wrong-goers in each area (373c6-375c6); especially, as to the critenon, Socrates 
has not resolved the priority of an agent's expertise to an agent's wish to do 
properly. Further, Hippias has allowed the possibility that he prefers the criterion 
of an agent's expertise or clevemess, only in the case of non-criminally described 
actions; Socrates clearly refers to an agent's ability and expertise as the criterion 
at 374a8, 375b2, 375b7-8, and 375c6. 
However, although Hippias has affirmed preferabilities without specific 
criterion, Socrates suggested (373b7; 372e3-6; 371e7-8), and Hippias perhaps 
still does not believe, that Hippias should properly take clevemess at achieving 
injustice as the criterion of the preferability of wishingly unjust men. Thus 
Socrates can perform a reasonable induction, but Hippias could again take 
Socrates sophistically to be trying to supply Hippias' criterion. 
Hippias denies Socrates' suggestion that Hippias should properly accept the 
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preferabiHty of wishingly unjust men following his previous commitment (375d6). 
Hippias might believe that whatever different formulations Socrates introduced 
into questions, he himself is consistent in denying the preferability of wishingly 
to timvishingly unjust men in respect of wish to do justice and in accepting the 
preferabUity of wishing to unwishing wrong-goers in respect of expertise in areas 
where they consistently go wrong, whether or not they wish to go wrong. 
Despite Hippias' repeated denial (375d3-4; 375d6), Socrates still shows that 
he has expected Hippias to accept the conclusion from his previous 
commitments^". I f Socrates believes that Hippias and he would not take the 
preferability of a wishingly unjust man in respect of wish to do justice because 
it is self-contradictory, then how could Socrates believe, without having referred 
to any criminally described actions at 373c6-375c6, that Hippias should take that 
preferability in respect of expertise injustice or cleverness at doing both justice 
and injustice? Socrates, certainly, has referred to a wishingly bad and wrong-
going man occupied about a skill or science or developmentally acquired habit 
but not to a wishing criminal. Then, how could Socrates believe that Hippias 
should analogise the cases of wrong-goers about non-criminally described cases 
to the case of wTong-doers closely connected to criminals for Hippias (371e9-
372a5)? Socrates might, as some interpret"", assume his usual analogy of crafts 
to morality, whether it is his elenctic stratagem or his belief Certainly, we have 
some reason to inteipret that Socrates would believe the analogy because he may 
appeal to it in his concluding questions about a false man (368el-369b7); 
although Hippias at 371e7-8 might take Socrates to have referred to moral cases 
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consistentlv. 
However, Socrates does not explicitly mention the distinction beUveen 
morality and sciences or crafts. Admittedly, he refers under others' responsibility 
to goodness in general (370e3) or Homeric heroes' goodness (363b3-4, 364b4-5, 
364d7), but he does not propose the distinction of moral from technical 
goodness. Socrates commits himself only to the goodness of speech (364b 1, 
364d7) and the goodness of his conversational habit (372b2, 372c3, cf 373al, 
373a5). Rather, Socrates, demanding the examination of all skills and 
sciences*" (368a8-bl; 375b8-cl), appears to Hippias not to care about the 
conceptual division (368e5-369al). Hence, Socrates does not necessarily 
presuppose it; neither does he propose, on this presupposition, that what holds 
in all crafts and sciences holds in morality. 
Further, Socrates does not explicitly commit himself to the craft-analogv'. He 
takes the initiative of introducing the topics about a science or skill, but 
introduces them m examining Hippias' opinion (366c5-369b7; 373c6-375c5). 
Hippias' preceding commitments pave the way for Socrates' introduction 
(365el0-366al; 372e3-6) andHippias admits them. 
I f Socrates implicitly introduced his usual doctrine, that would render 
problematic the consistency of Socratic ethics in relation to the interpretation of 
Socrates' final remark on 'No one does wrong voluntanly' (376b5-6)*-°. 
Specifically, i f Socrates believed that some or all of the propositions holding 
about all or some crafts also hold concerrung morality and i f he believed that a 
craftsman's ambivalent ability to do properly or improperly in his craft holds in 
291 
morality, Socrates would face the conclusion that a just man has the ability to 
do justice or injustice. If the meaning of 'ability' does not imply 'having acquired 
the disposition to do properly', the argument is intact, but raises the question in 
what sense both a craftsman and a morally good man is able to do improperly 
in each area. Further, if Socrates supposed the existence of wishing wrong-goers 
in crafts, he would face the existence of wishingly unjust men. Therefore, i f he 
accepted the preferabUity of wishing WTong-goers in the case of crafts, he would 
confront the preferability of wishingly unjust men in respect of justice as a 
knowledge. Accordingly, he would confront its presupposition that a wishingly 
unjust man is 'just', i.e., expert in justice and an iinwishingly unjust man is 
'unjust', i.e., non-expert injustice. If Socrates rejected this consequence of the 
craft-analogy, he would have to reject the whole analogy or exclude the 
ambivalent ability from the shared characteristics, as Penner does* \^ 
In my opinion, it is not Socrates but Hippias who is forced by his commit-
ments to accept both the division of the two areas and their analogy; Socrates, 
so far as this conversation goes, may or may not believe them. Hippias does not 
make explicit what morality is, but Hippias commits himself to his and Homer's 
Achilles' practical principle. Socrates does not commit himself to the proposition 
that justice is a knowledge, but he has a right to assume, on Hippias' boast of 
polymathy (see p. 296), that Hippias believes it. Further, Hippias suggests that 
falsity is an achievement about subjects concerned (365d7-8; 365el0-366al) 
and lists falsifying coordinately with doing injustice (371e9-372a5). Therefore, 
neither Socrates nor Hippias commits himself to the craft-analogy, but Socrates 
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may fairly ask Hippias to appeal to it as the potential implication of Hippias' 
commitments; Hippias, though, appears to Socrates to reject the analogy 
indirectly (369b3-7; 371e9-372a5; 375d3-4; 375d6). 
I f Socrates does not ask Hippias to appeal to the analogy of craft to justice, 
Socrates might ask Hippias to appeal to a logical implication between the 
preceding cases in a craft or science and a case injustice. Socrates has referred 
to no judicially penalised crime at 373c6-375c5, but might suppose that Hippias 
has committed himself to the proposition about an agent's wish to do injustice 
in going wrong about each subject. He might have listed 'doing injustice' 
coordinately with 'going wrong' (372d3-7) in proportion as Hippias arranged 
'doing bad things' coordinately with 'doing injustice' (371e9-372a5); hence, after 
referring to the cases which he categorises as wrong-going (372e2-3; 373c7-8), 
he might have referred to the cases co-ordinate with judicially penalised crimes 
including lying. Certainly, Socrates has not explicitly referred to cleverness at 
doing wrong about subjects concerned but often to expertise, i.e., knowledge of 
how to do properly in craft or science (374a8, 375b2, 375b6; 375b7-8; 
375c6)* '^'; further, it is doubtful whether Hippias believes he has affirmed the 
proposition about an agent who wishes to do morally or criminally wrong about 
a craft or science (373c6-375d5). The problem is that Hippias believes that he 
commits himself to the proposition that an agent wishes to go wrong in a skill 
or science but does not believe he commits himself to the proposition that the 
agent wishes to do injustice. Interpreters have to decide whether all experts are 
skilled in doing improperly. I f interpreters admitted so, they would suppose 
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Hippias rightly to admit the ambivalence of ability in a skill or craft and to 
suggest in his repeated denial that the ambivalence does not hold in jtistice. 
However, in my opinion, as Sprague*"^ Ovink*^*, and Jantzen"^ suggest, an 
expert is not necessarily able to do improperly (see pp. 129-133), and an expert 
must abandon the disposition to do properly and practice doing improperly to be 
able to do both properly and improperly consistently and successftjlly. Hence, 
I think (1) that Hippias believes that he is so clever that he can easily acquire the 
ambivalent ability and (2) that Hippias would demote an agent's wish to go 
wrong in each area (373c6-375d5). Hippias need not accept against Socrates' 
possible overinterpretation (a) that Hippias has committed himself to the 
proposition that each wishing wrong-goer in a craft or science does a legally 
penalised action and (b) that each wishing wrong-goer in a craft or science 
disregards justice. He might even object that a wishing wrong-goer occupied 
about a skill or science disobeys the norm concerned for a higher approvable 
norm"^. However, whether or not Socrates objects that not all legally unpe-
nalised actions are morally insignificant, i f he asks Hippias to appeal to some 
direct reason for acceptance despite his repeated denial, Socrates might see, 
besides the craft-analogy, Hippias' preceding admissions of both an agent's wish 
to go wrong in a skill and science and a clever man's achievement of a specific 
improper action. Further, Socrates might see that Hippias, admitting the existence 
of a wishingly unjust man, should admit the presupposition that in the situation 
of conflicting norms a wishingly unjust man is clever at obeying and disobeying 
them. 
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General analysis of 375d7-376b7 
The first discrepancy between Socrates and Hippias in understanding the 
result of the examination leads Socrates to restart questioning about justice but 
not injustice (375d7-376b8). Socrates finds the discrepancy in understanding the 
relation of justice to cases concerning skills and sciences; therefore, Socrates 
must try to clarify the relation if he thinks Hippias should accept the preferability 
of wishingly unjust men in respect of expertise in justice. This time, while 
asking Hippias to appeal to previous affirmations (373c6-375d7; 365d6-369b7), 
Socrates would appear to Hippias to try to induce him to bring every hom of a 
trilemma to the preferability of wishingly unjust men in respect not of wish to 
do justice but of cleverness at achieving justice. However, when Socrates 
(376b4-6) concludingly refers to Hippias' conclusion fi-om his preceding 
affirmations, he indicates his wavering over the criterion of preferability, 'good', 
because Socrates not only introduces a confusing locution for 'do unjust things 
(a 6 I X a Tt 0 id)v) ' but also reduces to a hypothetical condition (376b4-6) the 
existence of referents of the term 'a man who goes wrong and does both 
shameful and unjust things wishingly'. 
Hippias consistently denies what he regards as Socrates' proposition. Without 
confirming what proposition Hippias understood Socrates introduced into his 
statement, Socrates scuttles the argument by agreeing to Hippias' denial. Hippias 
IS unconvinced of the conclusion, as ever, in spite of giving affirmations to the 
preceding formulations in Socrates' questions. Socrates indicates that the validity 
of the conclusion is limited to the validity of Hippias' affirmations and that 
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Hippias fails in answering Socrates' questions in failing to resolve the issue over 
which Socrates 'wavers'. 
Hippias commits himself to the assumption of a trilemma: justice is a 
bvvaiiic, (ability or property) and/or knowledge (375d7-el) 
In ordering Hippias to answer questions again, Socrates attempts to have 
Hippias confirm that he should accept the preferability of wishingly unjust men 
in respect of expertise injustice according to his previous commitment. Socrates 
asks Hippias conducively, 'Is justice some Suva j i i i ; or knowledge or both; or 
isn't it necessary that justice is at least some one of them (375d7-el)?' 
6i3 va^iig is polysemous"'. It can mean 'ability' or 'property of a soul'"". 
Socrates has not explicitly referred to ability since 374a8, and before that at 
368a5. In 373c6-375c6, as his explanation at 374a8 indicates, Socrates would 
have supposed that Hippias affirmed the preferability of a wishing wrong-goer 
in each section in respect of an ambivalent ability, but Hippias does not 
necessarily at 365d7-8 associate falsity as ability to do something with justice. 
Neither is it clear, pace Fouillee^'', whether or not Socrates introduces his usual 
opinion that virtue is knowledge of goodness in itself Hence, the direction and 
meaning of the argument depend on Hippias' interpretation. 
It also depends on Hippias whether justice is necessarily Suvauig or 
knowledge or both (375d9-el), but if Hippias affirms it and takes one alterna-
tive, Socrates may fairly refer to the applicability of the case true of abilit}' and/or 
knowledge to the case of justice. Socrates might be trying to commit Hippias 
finally to.what Hippias denied firmly (371e9-372a5; 375d3-4, 375d6), i.e., the 
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preferability of wishingly unjust men, and yet not in respect of wish to do justice 
but in respect of cleverness at achieving justice and injustice. I f Socrates has 
supposed that Hippias accepted the preferability of wishing wrong-goers in any 
science or craft in respect of an ambivalent ability, and i f he believes Hippias to 
accept that justice, like falsity, is achievement in a science or craft, he could ask 
Hippias to substitute 'do injustice' for 'go wrong' both in an achievement sense. 
It is not logically necessary that justice is Suvautg and/or knowledge. If 
Socrates does not appeal to logical necessity, Socrates must appeal tor the 
propositional neccesity to what he regards as Hippias' previous commitments. 
Socrates need not found the necessity on his understanding of justice as knowledge 
and/or ability. Anyway, neither interiocutor has referred to justice before. Hippias has 
not necessarily given his own reason for believing the necessity. Hippias has (1) 
boasted of polymathy^"", and suggested that (2) talsity is an achievement (364e7-
365b6), (3) falsity is an ability (365d7-8) and cleverness (365el0-366al) and (4) 
falsity is coordinate with or included by injustice (371e9-372a5). Hippias probably 
assumed that injustice is coordinate with doing a bad thing and going wrong but not 
with mis-calculating or mis-steering. Accordingly, if Hippias aflGrms that justice is 
6uvaui(; and/or knowledge, he must face questions difterent from those where 
Socrates tried to induce him to see the preferability of wishing wrona-goers. 
Howe\CT, Socrates left unclear whether he believed that Hippias committed himself 
not to the proposition that a specific action in an expertise such as running or steering 
is doing injustice but to the proposition that contravening a rule by improper action 
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in an area like running slowly is doing injustice. 
Socrates' usage of abstract particular terms (375d8-el) is not based on fijrther 
analysis of the right to use these terms (cf 373d4-5, 374b8-cl), but the crucial 
point is that i f Hippias affirms the proposition with abstract particulars, he 
allows the possibility (a) that he accepts that justice is a particular member of 
a group of knowledges and/or abilities, i.e., that justice is knowledge of how to 
do something and/or ability to do something and, further, formally, (b) that he 
accepts that the related words are co-ordinate with the words used in a particular 
knowledge and/or abihty^^ He possibly accepts, for example, that as 'justice' is 
coordinate with 'arithmetic', the predicate, 'doing justice' is co-ordinate with 
'calculate'; likewise, just' of a person with 'expert in arithmetic'; 'do injustice' 
with 'mis-calculate'; 'unjust' with 'non-expert in arithmetic'; on the other hand, 
formally, the predicate, 'do a bad thing' or 'go wrong' subordinates 'do 
injustice'*"^ '*. However, Socrates does not in the final stage mention the qualification 
on a subject about which a man achieves justice or injustice. 
Hippias affirms unreservedly (375el), but it is not clear here how Hippias 
justifies affirming that the proposition is necessary. Because of the polysemy of 
613 V a u X (;, Hippias might, as Guthrie suggests*", not refer the necessity back 
to his previous commitments. Hippias' acceptance suggests his conftision about 
the ordering of concepts such as the coordination of goodness as means with 
goodness as an end in itself*''*;" however, his confusion is due to his unanalvsed 
idea of justice as an achievement, as his idea of falsity and truth suggests 
(364e7-365b6). His beliefs imply hat one is able to achieve justice and injustice 
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as specifiable actions. 
Hippias' commitment: if justice is a loiowledge and/or ability, justice 
admits the ambivalent ability to do honourable and/or beautiful or 
shameful and/or ugly things (375el-376al) 
In Socrates' first question on his trilemma (375el-3)^", if Hippias fransforms 
(a) the proposition in which Socrates refers to a soul as earlier into (b) the 
proposition with a person as a subject as Hippias tacitly transformed it just now 
(375d3-4), he can interpret that Socrates introduces the proposition (1) that i f all 
just men are able, all abler men are juster and, in support, the proposition (2) 
that all abler men are better. 
As to (1), it would be invalid i f justice is actuality because the antecedent 
implies the transition from actuality to ability while the consequent implies the 
transition from ability to actuality. Hence, unless Hippias assumes the 
reciprocity of ability with actuality, he commits fallacy; Hippias, though, 
committed himself to the assumption (cf 367c6). Moreover, (1) is apparently 
invalid because it seems to commit a fallacia consequentis as Pohlenz points 
out"^, i f it can read formally: 
'(Vx(Just(x)-Able(x)))-(Vx(Abler(x)-Juster(x))).' 
Insofar as Hippias does not assume that the degree of ability is in proportion to 
the degree of justice^^', Hippias cannot justify this. However, neither Socrates 
nor Hippias has suggested that assumption. Accordingly, if Socrates assumes 
that Hippias should accept the proposition, Socrates would ascribe the validity 
of the inference to his next proposition. 
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Then, i f Socrates assumes that Hippias can understand that Socrates means 
by 'that kind of soul' a man who is abler, does Socrates have the right to 
conjecture that it appeared to them*"*" (3) that all those abler are better, and, 
further, to conjecture proposition (1)? 
As to Socrates' reference to that transformable proposition (3), whether or not 
he assumes that Hippias understands that Socrates' criterion of comparison in 
reference to 'better' is an agent's knowledge of what he is able to do, he has not 
introduced the formulation, 'all those abler to do something are better at doing 
it; however, in both the conversation about a false man (365c6-369b7) and the 
conversation about the preferability of wishing wrong-goers (373c6-375c6), 
Hippias accepted that in a science or craft, all those able to do something are 
good at things about which they do it in the sense that they are clever or expert 
in them (cf 366d3-6). Insofar as Hippias admits Socrates' use of comparatives, 
pace Pohlenz^', Socrates can refer to the proposition that all those more able to 
do something are better at things about which they do it. 
In Socrates' speech, (l)-(C) that all abler men are juster, does not follow fi-om 
( l ) - (A) that all just men are able, but if Socrates adds a premise that all men 
abler to do something are better at things about which they do it, he may fairly 
conjecture the proposition that all abler men are juster, because he may fairly 
assume that 'doing justice' is formally a name of action as a substitute for 'do 
something' subordinated to 'able to' and that the related predicate, just', is a 
substitute for 'good at doing justice'. In other words, what Socrates conjectures 
in his speech is as follows: 
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PI . Al l just men are able to do justice. 
P2. Al l and only just men are good at doing justice. 
[reciprocity of ability with actuality] 
P3. For any action, all men able to do it are good at doing it. 
C I . Al l men able to do justice are good at doing justice. 
[Instantiation of P3 by substituting 'do justice'] 
C2. Al l men able to do justice are just. 
[P2, C I , Substitution of'just' for 'good at doing justice'] 
C3. Al l men abler to do justice are juster. 
[C2, Transformation by a comparative form] 
I f we assume that Socrates transforms the proposition with abstract particular 
terms into the proposition with specific subjects and predicates, the formulation 
in his question would be redundant in respect of the identity of ability with the 
criterion of applying the predicate, 'good'. However, apart from the possible 
redundancy, if Socrates assumes that he can justify the above inference, his point 
in the first horn of the hypothetical trilemma lies in the assumption that words 
concerning injustice work like words concerning a domain of a science or a 
craft, insofar as Hippias understands that justice is not only disposition but also 
achievement. 
Hippias admits his previous commitments (375e3). Socrates can trace 
Hippias' inference in his preceding affirmations, although Socrates does not 
specify in which part Hippias admitted that an abler soul is better. To that 
extent, despite his affirmation, it is questionable how Hippias understands what 
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his commitment to the proposition that justice is Su vauig and/or knowledge 
entails. 
Socrates asks about the consequence of the second horn that justice is a 
knowledge (375e4-5). In conducively asking, 'Isn't the cleverer soul juster and 
the more foolish soul more unjust?', Socrates avails himself of transformation 
from 'knowing' to 'clever', and introduces the proposition about a foolish soul 
although he did not mtroduce into the first horn the proposition about a soul 
unable to do something. 
I f Socrates supposes Hippias ready to fransform the proposition about a soul 
into that about a man in this case too, the proposition he introduces into his 
question implies (1) that i f all just men know something, then all cleverer men 
are juster, and (2) that if all just men know something, then all men more foolish 
are more unjust. If Socrates further assumes Hippias is ready to admit, as before 
(365e9-366al; 366d2-3; 366e3-367a5) that 'know something' is replaceable by 
clever at something', while the predicate, 'not know something' is replaceable 
by 'be foolish in something', what Socrates conjectures as the consequence from 
the second assumption in analogy to the preceding inference is as follows: 
PI . All just men know how to do justice. 
P2. Al l men knowing how to do justice are clever at doing justice. 
P3. Al l and only just men are good at doing justice. 
P4. For any action, all men clever at doing it are good at doing it. 
C1. Al l men clever at doing justice are good at doing justice. 
[Instantiation of P4 by substituting 'do justice'] 
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C2. A l l men clever at doing justice are just. 
[P2, C1, Substitution of just' for 'good at doing justice'] 
C3. A l l men cleverer at doing justice are juster. 
[C2, Transformation by a comparative form] 
Then, how does Socrates conjecture the proposition that all men more foolish 
in doing justice are more unjust? If it is not by committing the fallacy of denying 
both logical predicates of C2 that Socrates conjectures the proposition with a 
positive form that all men foolish in doing justice are unjust, he might take the 
contrapositions of PI and P2, as he did (366b6-7; 367b3-5; 367e5-6; 368a5) and 
apply to them the rule of transitivity as he suggested (366a8-b5; cf 369a8-b7), 
as follows: 
P5. All who are not clever at doing justice do not know how to do justice. 
[Contraposition to P2] 
P6. Al l who do not know how to do justice are not just. 
[Contraposition to PI] 
C4. Al l who are not clever at doing justice are not just. 
[P5, P6, the rule of tiansitivity] 
If Socrates substitutes opposite predicates for the negatives, he may reasonably 
conjecture the following conclusion: 
C5. Al l men foolish in doing justice are unjust. 
Socrates might conjecture this either from the second assumption that justice 
is knowledge or by appealing to the exclusiveness of a clever man against a 
foolish man in respect of ability (367a2-5), the identity of a man clever at things 
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with a man good at them (cf 366d4-5, 367c3-4), and the identity of a man 
foolish in things with a man bad at them (cf 367e4-5; 368a5-6), as Hippias 
affirmed in the conversation about a false man, because Hippias had admitted 
Socrates' indistinguishable usage of 'expert', 'clever', 'able to', and 'good at'. 
According to this interpretation, what Socrates conjectures as the inference is as 
follows: 
*P5. If all men clever at anything are good at it, then all men foolish in 
it are bad at it. 
*C4. I f all men clever at doing justice are good at justice, then all men 
foolish in doing it are bad at doing it. 
[P5, Instantiation of P5] 
*C5. Al l men foolish in doing justice are bad at doing it. 
[C1, C4, and modus ponens] 
*C6. A l l men foolish in doing justice are unjust. 
[Substitution of'unjust' for 'bad at doing justice'] 
Accordingly, as to die missing formulation of the question on the first 
assumption, i.e., 'All men unable to do justice are more unjust', i f Socrates can 
conjecture the conclusion that all men more foolish in doing justice are more 
unjust, and if Hippias affirms it, Hippias allows the possibility that he admits 
that all men more unable to do justice are more unjust. 
Whether or not Hippias bases his unreserved affirmation on preceding 
affirmations, if he admits the indistinguishable usage of'ability' from 'knowl-
edge', as before, Hippias has to affirm (375e6). 
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Socrates induces Hippias to accept the consequent from the assumption on the 
basis of Hippias' affirrnations to the question on the first and second assump-
tions (375e6-8), although Socrates did not refer to a more unable soul. Socrates 
introduces an abstract particular term and a verb, 'have', for the preceding syntax 
with subject and predicate. Further, he is inconsistent in using a comparative 
form. However, he may conjecture Hippias' agreement to the necessity of the 
proposition in the sense that Hippias has already affirmed the consequences 
from the first and second assumptions. 
Accordingly, i f Socrates assumes that Hippias is ready to transform the 
proposition about a soul to one about a man, as before (375d3-4), Hippias 
allows the possibility that he affirms that all men both abler to do justice and 
cleverer at doing justice are juster while all men both more unable to do justice 
and more foolish in doing it are more unjust. 
While saying unassertively, 'It appears so (375e8),' Hippias has no superficial 
reason to weaken his affirmation, insofar as he has already affirmed the 
consequences from the first two assumptions, but Hippias may begin to suspect 
that Socrates is trying to snare him into self-contradiction by using the 
hypothetical trilemma when Socrates has led to the similar conclusion with not 
necessarily consistent locutions about comparative forms. 
Assuming that Hippias is ready to admit the transformation by using a 
positive form of comparative words, Socrates is asking Hippias to confirm that 
Hippias' preceding affirmations imply that all able to do something and clever 
at doing it are good at doing it and able both to do honourable and/or beautifiil 
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things and shamefiil and/or ugly things, in every occupation (375e9-376al). 
Socrates does not refer to honourable and/or beautifial things and shamefijl 
and/or ugly things in the conversation about false men or to ability to do both 
things in the conversation about the preferability of wishi7ig wrong-goers, except 
at 374a7-b3*''^ . However, Socrates, linked the proposition (A) tiiat in any area, 
an expert is able both to falsify and to veri^ while a non-expert is unable to do 
either (cf 366c5-367a6)*''^ , with the proposition (B) that those who falsify 
wishingly are better at things about which they falsify than those falsifying 
iimvishingly (371e7-8), for the reason (C) that consistently falsifying wishingly 
is a characteristic proper to an expert while falsifying iinwishingly to a non-
expert. Therefore, whether or not Socrates assumes that Hippias justifies him in 
linking his affirmation of the propositions about false men with his affirmations 
to the propositions about wishi?ig wrong-goers, Socrates can ask Hippias to 
confirm what his affirmations imply. 
Hippias affirms that his preceding affirmations imply the proposition in 
Socrates' question (376a 1), although Hippias consistently denied the application 
of his affirmations to the case of justice. Pace Kraus*^ "*, Hippias must have recourse 
to his idea of injustice as achievement, whether or not it is contradictory to a 
Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge of goodness in itself Jantzen sees 
Socrates' distortion of justice because Socrates usually believes that justice has 
no specific product*^ ,^ but Hippias commits himself to the proposition embodied 
in Socrates' question. 
Neither Socrates nor Hippias concedes the conclusion from Hippias' 
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commitments: the man who goes wrong about justice wishingly is the good 
man (376a2-376b8) 
Socrates introduces the type of interrogation*^* he used in the conversation 
about a man who goes wrong wishingly (374a7-b3; 374b5-7; cf 373e4-5; 
375b7-c3). He asks Hippias herewith (1) to confirm that i f a man is able to do 
something and/or clever at doing it, then, i f he is performing shameful and/or 
ugly things, he is doing so wishi?igly and (2) to confirm that the case about justice 
is the same because justice is ability and/or expertise*''^ . 
With reluctant acceptance (376a4), Hippias has not completely anticipated 
what Socrates is going to propose in his question i f Hippias gives affirmation, 
but he might recognise that i f he assumes that justice is ability and/or knowl-
edge, he is going to face the question whether those who are able to do justice 
and/or clever at doing it do wishingly injustice as an action of performing a 
shameful and/or ugly thing in the domain of that ability and/or knowledge, 
whenever they do injustice. I f Hippias understands justice in an achievement 
sense, he.must accept the ambivalence of justice; if in a dispositional sense, he 
must reject it; for injustice would not be an agent's wished object. 
Socrates asks*^ Hippias successively to confirm that in the domain of justice 
as an ability and/or knowledge, 'do injustice' is a substitute for the general 
predicate, 'do bad things m a domain of ability and/or expertise', and 'not doing 
injustice' for 'do good things in a domain of ability and/or expertise', although 
he introduces.'beautiful and/or honourable' for 'good' at 376a5*''' (376a4-5). 
While Hippias affirms unreservedly (376a5), Socrates leaves open the 
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possibility that he introduces a tautological judgement about evaluative 
predicates. Hippias might not recognise that his affirmation is a crucial step to 
the conclusion in a series of questions based on a hypothetical trilemma. 
However, he cannot avoid giving affuroation, i f he follows the trilemma 
assumption and his preceding affirmations; for he could not deny that to do 
injustice is to do bad things (cf 371e9-372a5). 
Socrates is not necessarily consistent or distinct in using terms and predicates 
in his propositions, especially in using 'good' and 'bad'. Neither does he 
transform the propositions about a soul into those about a man. He might use the 
proposition with a soul as subject to make it difficult for Hippias to anticipate 
his concluding formulation in his question. Socrates introduces an inference by 
instantiation, on the basis of (a) Hippias' preceding affirmation at 376a4 in 
reference to 376a2-3, (b) Hippias' reconfirmation of the proposition that justice 
is an ability and/or an expertise at 376a4 in reference to 376a3-4, and (c) 
Hippias' preceding affirmation about the rule of instantiation as to the predicate 
(376a4-5). Socrates asks (1) whether in the domain of justice as an abilit}' and/or 
expertise, if a soul is able to do justice and good at doing justice, then just when 
he does injustice ( o r a v T i e g ) , he does so wishingly, and (2) whether if a man 
is unable to do justice and bad at doing justice, then, if he does injustice, he does 
so umvishifigly (376a6-7). Whether or not Socrates tries to suggest by Ttso 
(376a6)^^° that justice is a disposition, if Hippias understands that his assump-
tion that jastice is a knowledge and/or ability implies (a) that 'a just man' means 
'a man able both to achieve justice and to achieve injustice' and (b) that justice' 
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I S a name of a knowledge about a means but not an end in itself, he has to 
disregard the dispositional sense of justice. 
With reluctant acceptance (376a7), Hippias would see some defect of his 
beliefs about justice. Hippias might regard injustice as an achievement but not 
justice. If Hippias supposes that justice is some specifically describable action-
type as an object of knowledge, he must admit the ambivalent ability in the Geld 
of 'justice', and by his admission about ability (366b7-c4), he must admit that 
a just' man does injustice whenever he wishes to because 'injustice' can be an 
agent's wished action. Further, i f he admits the existence of an expert who is 
able to do improperly in a skill or science, he must admit the existence of a man 
who IS clever at doing justice or injustice for another higher purpose. 
In his question (376b 1 -2), Socrates does not necessarily appear to Hippias to 
focus on the transformation rule of the proposition about a soul into the 
proposition about a man; rather, in reference to justice he leaves here open the 
possibility that he refers to a proposition not about goodness as expertise but 
about goodness as moral disposition. 
Affirming unreser\^edly (376b2), since Hippias may reasonably take the 
transformation rule as established in ordinary language (375dl-4)^''^, he would 
understand that Socrates asks about a trivial proposition about a soul which 
wishes to obey or contravene a norm. He allows the possibility that he switches 
from the area of'justice' as expertise to the area of dispositional justice. 
Socrates introduces into the question (376b2-4)*''' a proposition similar to his 
preceding ones (374b5-7; 374b8-cl), but leaves open the possibility that he is 
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asking not (\) whether consistently doing injustice wishingly is the nature of a 
man good at justice as a knowledge and/or an ability while doing injustice 
iinwishingly is the nature of a man bad at justice as a knowledge and/or an 
ability, if indeed, the man good at justice has a soul which is good at justice as 
a knowledge and/or an ability but (2) whether consistently doing injustice 
wishifigly is the nature of a man who wishes to obey justice while doing 
injustice imwishingly is the nature of a man who wishes to disobey justice, i f 
indeed the man has a soul which wishes to obey justice. 
hi saying, 'But, surely, he does have a good soul (376b4),' Hippias, pressed 
to give affirmation to the formulation in the sense of (1), but recognising the 
proposition in the sense of (2), is inclined to deny the formulation; therefore, 
showing tacitly that he admits what Socrates presses him to admit, he 
emphasises that a man who wishes to obey justice has a soul which wishes to 
obey it. 
Expecting Hippias' agreement, Socrates concludingly states, 'Therefore, the 
man who goes wrong and does shameful and/or ugly and unjust things 
wishingly, Hippias, if indeed there is such, would be none other than the good 
man. 
Socrates formulates not (a) that the man who does injustice wishingly is none 
other than the man good at doing justice or (b) that in the domain of justice as 
an ability and/or a knowledge, if a man goes wrong in doing injustice wishingly, 
he IS good at doing justice, but (c) that the man who goes wrong and does 
shameful and/or ugly and unjust things wishingly is the good man (376b4-6). 
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Socrates arranges the predicates, 'go wrong' and 'do unjust things', coordinately, 
and the predicates, 'do shameful and/or ugly things' and 'do unjust things', 
coordinately. He does not use the predicate, 'do injustice', which he may fairly 
assume that Hippias afSrmed as the predicate for doing wrong in the domain of 
justice as an ability and/or a knowledge. He allows the possibility that he has 
meant that these couples of predicates are coordinate and that he has confusingly 
distinguished the domain of knowledge and/or ability from the domain of justice 
in spite of the hypothesis that justice is an ability and/or a knowledge. 
Apart from Socrates' confusing choice of words, i f he formulates his questions 
on the basis of Hippias' affirmation of the hypothesis that justice is an ability 
and/or a knowledge and i f he assumes that Hippias regards 'good' as 'good at 
something' in his affirmations, he has the right to draw the following conclusion 
following Hippias' preceding affirmations. 
PI . Justice [in an achievement sense] is an ability and/or a knowledge 
of a soul. 
[375d8-el; cf 375el-2; 375a7-c3; 375c6-d4] 
P2. In the domain of an ability and/or a knowledge, all souls able to do 
something and/or clever at doing it are good at doing it[; all souls unable 
to do it and/or foolish in doing it are bad at doing it]. 
[375e9-10 and 376al; 375e3-4; 366d3-6, 367c3-7; 367el-7; 368a3-6] 
CI . In the domain of justice, all souls able to do justice and/or-clever at 
doing justice are good at doing justice, i.e., just; all souls unable to do 
justice and/or foolish in doing it are bad at doing justice, i.e., unjust. 
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[PI , P2, Instantiation. 375el-8] 
P3. In the domain of an ability and/or a knowledge, all souls able to do 
something and/or clever at doing it are able to do honourable and/or 
beautiful [good] and shameful and/or ugly [bad] things. 
[375el0-376al; 374a7-b4; cf 366c7-el and 366e3-367a5; 367c2-4; 
367el-7;368a6-7] 
C2. In the domain of justice, all souls able to do justice and/or clever at 
doing justice are able both to do good things and to do bad things in that 
domain. 
[PI , P3, Instantiation. No explicit textual evidence; cf 376a3-4] 
P4. In the domain of an ability and/or a knowledge, i f a soul is able to 
do something and/or clever at doing it, then, i f a soul performs shameful 
and/or ugly things [or does a bad thing and goes wrong], it performs them 
wishingly [; i f a soul is unable to do it and/or foolish in doing it, then i f 
a soul performs shameful and/or ugly things, it performs them 
unwishingly]. 
[376a2-4; 375e4-6; 375e6-8; 376a7; cf 374a7-b4; 374b5-8; 375b7-c3] 
P5. In the domain of justice, to do injustice is to do bad [or do shameful 
and/or ugly things or go wrong] and not to do injustice [or to do justice] 
is to do good [or do honourable and/or beautiful things]. 
[376a4o] 
C3. In the domain of justice, if a soul is able to do justice and/or clever 
at doing justice, then if it does injustice, it does it wishingly; i f a soul is 
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bad [at doing justice: unable to do justice and/or foolish in doing 
justice], then i f it does injustice, it does so imwishingly. 
[PI, P4, P5, histantiation. 376a6-7] 
P6. I f a soul has a characteristic, i f a man has the soul, he has the 
characteristic. 
[375a7-c3; cf 376bl-2; 375c6-d7] 
C4. In the domain of an ability and/or a knowledge, i f a soul is good at 
doing something, then i f a man has the soul, he is good at doing it; i f a 
soul is bad at doing it, then if a man has the soul, he is bad at doing it. 
[P6, instantiation. 376b 1-2] 
C5. In the domain of justice, i f a man is able to do justice and/or clever 
at doing justice, then if he does injustice, he does injustice wishingly; i f 
a man is unable to do justice and/or foolish in doing justice, then if he 
does injustice, he does injustice unwishingly. 
[C3, P6, AppHcation of P6 as a transformation to C3. No explicit textual 
evidence.] 
C6. In the domain of justice, if a man does injustice wishingly, he is 
good at doing justice; if a man does injustice unwishingly, he is bad at 
doing justice. 
[C5, C I , modus ponens. 376b2-4]'" 
C7. In the domain of justice, if a man wishingly goes wrong and does 
shameful and/or ugly things in doing injustice, he is good at doing 
justice [; if a man unwishingly goes wrong and does shameful and/or 
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Ugly things in doing injustice, he is bad at doing justice]. 
[376b4-6; paraphrase of C6] 
The last step to C6 would not be clear to Hippias, especially i f he understands 
that the criterion of applying the predicate, 'good', was not expertise injustice 
according to the hypothesis but obeying justice or wish to obey justice. However, 
Socrates' possible scheme would be justified by Hippias' preceding affirmations 
of his formulations in which expertise, abihty, wisdom, and goodness as expertise 
or skill are interchangeable. 
However, Hippias rejects what he regards as the proposition in Socrates' 
statement (376b7). Socrates also scuttles the argument as i f he had asked as 
Hippias understands (376b8). 
In contrast with pre\'ious denials (371e6, 371e9-372a5, 375d3-4, 375d6; cf 
373b7), Hippias here again confronts the following irreconcilable presuppo-
sitions of Socrates' ambivalently interpretable statement: 
(A) the man who wishingly goes wrong in doing injustice is the just 
man, i.e., the man who is able to do justice and/or knows it; 
(B) the man who wishingly goes wrong in doing injustice is the just 
man, i.e., the man who wishes to do justice. 
Hippias, presupposing the existence of wishing unjust men, denied (B) before 
(371e9-372a5, 375d3-4, 375d6), but it is not clear whether he denied (A) (cf 
373b7). Hence Socrates' questions (375d7 ff.) are not irrelevant for Hippias; for 
if Hippias had believed it false that justice is an ability and/or a knowledge, he 
would have rejected the preferability of a wishingly unjust man for that reason. 
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Therefore Hippias at the beginning of a trilemma argument would not have 
looked ahead to (A) as an implication from his commitment to the trilemma. 
However, he would probably have come to view (A); he did not foresee (A) at 
once at 376a 1, but dimly at 376a7 and clearly at 376b4. I f Hippias had kept 
consistency with the trilemma assumption by suspending his preconceptions 
about justice in a dispositional sense, he could have legitimately concluded that 
a man who goes wrong about justice wishingly is good at justice, whether he 
regards this man as a normal expert or a clever man. Even i f justice as a 
disposition seems to him, as Jantzen points out* "^, to have no specific product 
like other expertises, i f he could appeal to his potential belief that justice like 
falsity is an achievement of some describable end, he would not have to reject 
the conclusion. However, Socrates does not concludingly state that the man who 
wishingly goes wrong in doing injustice is good at justice. 
Hence a possible explanation for Hippias' denial is this: Socrates' locution does 
not work as any warning against (A) except for his introduction of aS ixa 
IT: o id) V at 376b5 (see below). Hippias finds reason to accept (A) because he 
accepted the tnlemma assumption and the ambivalence of ability and/or 
knowledge. However, either (i)-(a) he suspects that Socrates has tried to pakn 
off (B) again and/or (i)-(b) he feels reluctance to accept (A) publicly because his 
acceptance gives the impression of immorality and/or because his acceptance 
contradicts his objection at 371e9-372a5 or (ii) he has just recognised the 
monstrosity of (A), to whatever extent he may notice Socrates' questioning of the 
existence of wishingly unjust men (376b5-6). 
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Then, when Socrates adds in his statement (376b4-6), 'if there is such 
(eiTceg xiq OUT:O<; ioxw)', does Socrates by implication affirm or deny the 
proposition that there is a man who goes wrong and does ugly and/or shamefiil 
and unjust things wishingly or does he merely hypothesise it? How can 
interpreters determine Socrates' suggestion in this clause, although formally it 
does not affect Hippias' commitments? 
Plato might have, as Wilamowitz says*^ ,^ instilled Socrates' doctrine, 'No one 
does wrong voluntarily ( a f i a g t a v e i sxcov)' and suggested to ancient 
Socratic readers that Socrates here denies the proposition in the clause. Whether 
or not ancient non-Socratic readers, as Wilamowitz says, saw Socrates' immoral 
view in the main sentence without recognising his doctrine in the condition, one 
may ask, as Jantzen rightly suggests"*, whether we are justified in interpreting 
with some critics*" that Socrates appeals to his usual belief without actually 
referring to it. 
Then, can we assume, with Shorey"* and Hoerber*", that the conditional 
clause with e'nzeo suggests Socrates' rejection of the proposition in the clause? 
Plato's usage of this word 71: e g may sometimes suggest the speaker's rejection 
of the proposition in the clause. However, Shorey and Hoerber's argument by 
reference to Euthphr. 8e6 and Grg. 480e5-6 begs the question. We have to know 
Socrates' usual belief beforehand to decide whether or not he instills it. The mark 
s iTC e g does not necessarily suggest the speaker's rejection of the proposition in 
the clause**". Socrates may only be making explicit Hippias' presupposition, 
whether or not Hippias is encouraged to question it. 
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Socrates can use 'e iTt s Q P, Q ' when he does not believe 'P' and also when he 
does. If K S Q modifies the conjunction, one can literally or ironically emphasise 
the propositional relation, e.g., like'... i f and only if... or 'even i f ...'^^ I f TI s o 
modifies P' but propositionally adds nothing to 'P' like 'really', one can suggest 
'not P' when his opponent believes 'Q'*^^ and ' Q ' when they have agreed on 'P'^. 
Then, at 376b4-6, Hippias does not believe the preferability of wishingly unjust 
men in respect of their wish [ Q ] ; he admitted their existence and he thinks 
Socrates has admitted it [P]. Hence, Socrates might literally or ironically 
emphasise their existence causing their goodness; othenvise, he might appear 
to Hippias to suggest their non-existence or their preferability. 
Then, how can we support Socrates' rejection inside the present conversation? 
Socrates uses TT eg three times hereabouts (376a6; 376b3; 376b5). It is doubtful 
that as Jantzen interprets^*', Socrates rejects the instrumental understanding of 
our soul at 376b3. At 376a6, Hippias would have dimly viewed (A) by the 
proposition in the clause of o t a v u e o but pace Blundell, the word does not 
grammatically work as a warning. As the trilemma argument goes on (375d8 
f f ) , Socrates faithfully, although in locution inconsistently, traces, except for 
a S i x a Tioicov at 376b5, what Hippias' assumption that justice is an ability 
and/or a knowledge entails. Socrates has used propositions with a human 
being's soul as subject without confusion; he introduced 'ugly and/or shameful' 
and 'beautiful and/or honourable' (375elO-l 1) at least in accordance with the 
locution Hippias had admitted (373el-2, 371e4-5, 374a3-4, 374a5-6, 374bl, 
374b5-7, 375b7-c3). However, Socrates would probably have come to look 
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ahead to (A) in his concluding formulation. If he believed what Hippias has 
affirmed and also Hippias' assumption in the trilemma argument, Socrates 
would have no reason to avoid drawing the conclusion presupposing (A) or to 
weaken it by questioning the precedingly presupposed existence of wishingly 
unjust men. I f Socrates at 376b8, assuming that Hippias rejected (B) at 376b7, 
agreed to Hippias' denial of the conclusion presupposing (B), he would not need 
to question the existence of wishingly unjust men. 
Socrates might have been trying to pahn off (B) without questioning the 
validity of (A). Socrates' self-proclaimed wavering would appear to Hippias to 
be rhetoric to give the impression of their shared downfall. If Socrates publicly 
rejected (A) without questioning the existence of wishingly unjust men, he might 
clearly see that his escape is, by modus tollens, rejecting either that justice is a 
knowledge and/or ability or that the ambivalence does not hold in justice or 
both. However, his device by questioning the existence might suggest that he 
sees some different defect in (A), as some critics focusing on motivation in 
Socratic ethics suggest***. 
I f Socrates identified the defect as substitution of knowledge of practical 
means for knowledge of an end in itself, this would explain Socrates' rejection 
of the existence of one who, knowing an end in itself, sets himself a different end 
for another higher end. Then, Socrates does not explain how (A) is unsound, but 
interpreters can explain Socrates' final denial by introducing the hierarchy of 
means and end and can rescue, by abandoning the ambivalence in justice, the 
Socratic unmentioned doctrine that no one does wrong voluntarily, i.e., that 
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virtue is a knowledge of goodness in itself 
However, i f this assumption interpreters introduce needs further theoretical 
justification, the question arises whether it holds in our experience. Neither 
interlocutor explains an agent's motivation in general, but it is open to question, 
(i) whether there exists something good in itself or an end in itself; (ii) whether 
everyone believes both things; (iii) whether everyone presupposes these 
conceptual hierarchies in his discourse about action; (iv) whether every agent 
always ratiocinates in advance his end and means, whether or not by evaluatmg 
all possible consequences of each electable means; (v) whether i f anyone 
assumes these conceptual hierarchies and ratiocinates his end and means in 
advance of his action, he necessarily chooses the action resulting from his 
ratiocination. In a scheme, an agent's contradiction to his preceding ratiociaation 
is due to a kind of ignorance. Hence, it is possible to interpret the value of 
Socrates' wavering in relation to Socratic ethics constructed from other passages 
in Plato's dialogues. However, Socrates does not mention the view that wrongdoing 
is harmful for an agent and that a wishingly unjust man is ignorant of the damage 
of wrongdoing to himself Hence, his wavering is open to speculation. However, 
Hippias has no good reason to take Socrates at his word because of Socrates' 
behaviour which he deerns sophistical. 
Since Hippias admitted the existence of the subject at 371e9-372a5, he does 
not reject the conclusion for the reason that no one does injustice wishingly, but 
for the reason that a just man does not wish to do injustice. Therefore, Hippias 
also does not keep consistency with his commitment to the assumption that 
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justice is an ability and/or knowledge. However, he is still inconsistent in 
committing himself to the propositions that there is a practical principle (363c7-d4; 
364d3-6; cf 365a4-bl), that the principle is an object of knowledge (364a7-9), 
and that those who disobey it wishingly know it (371 e9-372a5). 
Socrates has not questioned the existence of those who do injustice wishingly 
in his questions about a false man (365d6-369b7) or his statements about 
Homer's Achilles (369b8-372a5); rather, Socrates took responsibility for 
positively admitting their existence in opposition to Hippias' view (372d3-e6). 
Hippias would have taken Socrates to have presupposed the existence of a 
wishingly unjust man. Hence, i f Socrates has found in the end, some reason to 
question the existence of those who do injustice wishingly, he also questions his 
and Hippias' preceding presupposition. 
Then, i f Socrates here admits the non-existence of those who do injustice 
wishingly, he would have to regard his and Hippias' speeches presupposing the 
existence of such people as meaningless. Hov/ever, Socrates would have referred 
to some experience in talking about Homer's Achilles' demotion of speaking 
truly from his principle (370d5-6), his wished deceit (371a2-bl; 371c6-d7), and 
those who do bad things wishingly (372d3-e6; 373c6-375c6). Hence, whether 
or not he abruptly instills his usual opinion in the conditional clause at 376b5-6, 
he would not reject the meaningfulness of the preceding speeches (365d6-
375c6). He would rather suggest (a) that if doing a bad thing is specifically 
described like lying or a crime, even if it is cruel or maliciously designed, there 
exists a man who is clever at doing this bad thing for another good or bad purpose 
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without the disposition to avoid it and (b) that i f an agent believes some 
specifiable action to be unjust in itself, it cannot be his wished action. 
Socrates' final remark on his wavering over the conclusion (376b8-c6) 
Socrates suggests that he has reached the conclusion on the basis of Hippias' 
afiBimations and of his own choice of words (376b8-cl). But Socrates limits the 
validity of the conclusion to Hippias' preceding affirmations to his questions on 
the basis of the hypothesis that justice is an ability and/or a knowledge^^. I f 
Socrates refiites Hippias by professing their shared wavering, his target is 
Hippias' confused beliefs. Hippias refers to his own or Achilles' practical 
principle, but admitting the penal presupposition, he has to admit that under 
conflicting norms, the evaluation of a man as a wishingly unjust man alternates 
with the evaluation of the same man as a wishingly just man according to which 
norm an evaluator acknowledges. I f Hippias applies his commitment to an 
achievement sense of falsity to injustice and further to justice, he must admit that 
a man who achieves injustice is clever at doing justice and injustice about subjects 
concemed. However, he himself v/ould publicly reject that a man who achieves 
justice has acquired the disposition to do injustice as he rejects that all and only 
false men are true. Hippias' commitment to injustice as achievement results from 
the disposition embodied in his polymathy. His personal emphasis on learning 
and teaching makes him think of moral qualities, in a kind of 'successful' 
relativism, as cleverness at achieving for one's purpose what altemates between 
justice and injustice. 
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I I I . Conclusion 
1. I have attempted to establish reflectively a method of reading Plato's 
dialogues, and applied it to the analysis of the Hippias Minor. My method is not 
an apriori construct in advance of a literary form of dialogue in general but a 
working hypothesis to be refined and/or remoulded by reciprocation with 
practice of reading Plato's dialogues. I must critically review the effect of the 
preceding analysis. 
According to the arrangement of my work, one may rightly ask whether I have 
practised my method effectively; specifically, first of all, whether I have analysed 
the interplay of the interlocutors against the background of their personally 
divergent understandings of exchanged speeches. 
I have attempted to reconsider Socrates' intention in his speeches on the basis 
of Bumet's punctuations** .^ In question-and-answer bouts (365d6-369b7; 373c6-
376c6), Socrates sets his speeches in series of questions but often, without any 
grammatically explicit interrogative marks, makes a confirmatory or interroga-
tive speech with aga**' or aga, cbg eoixev*™. Hippias might understand 
Socrates to confirm Socrates' opinion, but Socrates would be referring to what 
he conceives as Hippias' opinion or inference in the context of seeking Hippias' 
opinion. Socrates' speech works as an indirect question, even if Hippias takes 
it as also expressing Socrates' present belief Hence, Hippias allows the possibil-
ity that he appears to state his present opinion to Socrates in his response. 
This means that insofar as Socrates does not expound his question, what 
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Socrates' direct or indirect question means is mainly explained not by what 
Socrates means by it but by what Hippias understands by it. Therefore, in a 
question-and-answer bout, apart from analysing Socrates' ordering of questions, 
my analysis has focused on what Hippias understands by Socrates' questions 
and what implication Hippias leaves in his response. This analysis is designed 
to explain how Socrates can approach Hippias' beliefs in his next question and 
why Hippias admits or denies what he understands as the proposition embodied 
in Socrates' question. The analysis did not delve into what Socrates means by the 
proposition in his question, because Socrates leaves Hippias to understand 
precisely what proposition he introduces. 
Socrates makes a meta-elenctic speech (369dl-e2; 372a6-d3) and a 
retrospective speech on their preceding question-and-answer bout (369e2-370a 1; 
370d6-e4), but m an ex post facto context and not just before and after asking 
the question concemed. Hence, I did not read these subsequent speeches and 
Hippias' response to them into the preceding conversations. 
These speeches of Socrates' are statements in contrast with his questions. 
Hippias might understand Socrates to state his belief, but the ex post facto 
context makes his speech appear ironical. 
But despite apparently offering opinions at 372c8-e3, Socrates is not 
necessarily arguing for his opinion as well as refuting Hippias, although 
Socrates' mode of expression separate from Hippias' point of view might indicate 
his arguing for his opinion. Tlie conversation at 372d3-376c6 is formally an 
example of Socrates' arguing for his opinion. However, Socrates still uses 
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diagnostically tagged questions and bases his initial belief on the preceding 
conversation, i.e., substantially Hippias' afiSnnations leading to self-contradiction. 
I have attempted to avoid speculating about the interlocutors' background 
beyond the conversational proceeding and their speeches. I have attempted to 
explain Hippias' responses here and there by his initial unsolicited boast of 
polymathy, but not solved to what extent I should read into my analysis ancient 
Homeric studies and Hippias' reputation for Plato's ancient readers. The 
interlocutors' personal divergence is open to further analysis. The interplay with 
personal divergency is complex in contrast with soliloquy. No propositional act 
can be separated from the interlocutors' interplay, but it is still worth analysing 
this complex construction. 
2. According to my reading method and practice, I contradict myself if I refer 
to the historical Socrates' or Plato's ultimate intention in this conversation*''. 
Admittedly, question-and-answer dialogue provokes readers into examining the 
proposition which one dramatic interlocutor introduces into his speech to another, 
becaiise questions can often notify some audience that the propositions 
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embodied in the questions are open to general consideration . However, I have 
not explored how to dig out what Plato was philosophising when writmg a 
particular passage*". 
Now let me dare to go halfway to consider what follows from the assumption 
that Plato argues for Socratic doctrines in a series of dialogues. It is controversial 
to enumerate and interpret Socratic doctrines*^ "*, but provisionally, let us suppose 
that Socrates in the Hippias Minor believes (A) the craft-analogy: some or all 
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characteristics common to some or all crafts and sciences are common to 
knowledge of goodness in itself and (B) "No one does wrong voluntarily': no one 
who knows goodness in itself chooses to do wrong. I suggested the problem 
arising from introducing Socrates' usual doctrines (see pp. 290-291). Socrates 
asks Hippias to appeal to the craft-analogy at 368a8-b3, 368el-369b7; 375b7-
d2; he suggests doctrine (B), as most critics mark, at 376b5-6. He questions the 
view that there is someone who goes wrong wishingly ( E X 6 V ) (376b5-6). 
Socrates in the Hippias Minor does not argue against it in reference to (a) a 
science of measuring pleasure and pain, (b) the popular view of conversion 
between justice and honourableness and/or beauty and between injustice and 
shamefulness and/or ugliness, (c) the view of the damage of wrongdoing to an 
agent, (d) the contrast of an agent's choice with all the consequences considered 
to an agent's choice in an unenlightened state, or (e) the view of 'good for 
oneself as a universal object of an agent's wish. Hence, it is open to question, 
except for the ambivalence of ability, how a student of Socratic ethics should 
deal with Socrates in the Hippias Mifior. 
According to a typical interpretation, Socrates develops the argument from the 
area of a craft or science to morality, from the area of knowledge of goodness as 
a means to the area of knowledge of goodness as an end in itself Apart from the 
soundness of these interpretative concepts projected into the text, in the 
conversation about false men (365d6-369b7), Socrates examines a man who 
tells a lie about a science or craft, and then, draws the conclusion that all and 
only deceitful men are truthful (369b3-7). Following this conclusion (371e7-8; 
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372d3-e7; 373c6-8), Socrates considers those who go wrong about a craft or 
science, and then concludes that those who do injustice wishingly are morally 
good men who are able to do justice whenever they wish to. Most critics see that 
Socrates draws an unacceptable conclusion by recourse to the craft-analogy. 
Specifically, a tj'pical objection is that an expert in a skill or science is able to 
do improperly and so performs for another purpose while an expert in knowl-
edge of goodness in itself is able to do improperly but never so perfoirns for 
another purpose. The ambivalent ability which holds in the case of knowledge 
of means or practical judgement of an end in a situation, does not hold in the case 
of knowledge of goodness in itself*^^ However, whether or not Socrates rejects 
the craft-analogy in the broadest sense is open to question"*. Since it is self-
contradictory that one who knows goodness in itself as an end in itself, chooses 
an end different from the end in itself, the typical argument in the Hippias Minor 
indirectly still leaves a problem on an agent's choice of an end in a practical 
situation*". As suggested before (see p. 318), a theoretically justifiable starting-
point on considering motivation is not self-evident, although we have already 
talked about it ordinarily. However, if Socrates, holding his usual doctnnes, is 
to reconcile, besides his suggestion on Hippias' standpoint, his acceptance of the 
existence of wishingly unjust men in the context about criminal law (372d4-7) 
with his suggested rejection of their existence at 376b5-6, he has to have 
different explanations about wishingly unjust men. My proposal is based on 
Leges IX (857b9 fif.)*'^. On one hand, i f wrongdoing is no longer relative to a 
subjective norm, an authority of an absolute norm, governing penalisation, 
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ascribes wrongdoing to an agent's wish; on the other hand, the agent is 
involuntary in the sense of being ignorant that wrongdoing is against his 
interest; in other words, in the sense of being ignorant that his actual object is 
against his interest. 
3. There is no unilinear argument in the conversational interplay. From the 
interlocutors' viewpoint, Socrates tries to induce Hippias to produce some view 
consequent on his commitments, whether or not Hippias recognises Socrates' 
rhetorical stratagem at the time of a question. Socrates does not necessarily show 
by what procedure Hippias should work out the consequence from his particular 
commitments, common sense and some inferential rules which Hippias previously 
admitted. Hippias does not examine how he should work out the consequence, 
as Socrates suggests (367c4-367d3; 367el-7; 368a3-6; 369a4-b7; 371e4-372a5; 
375c6-d7). Neither Socrates nor Hippias might be ready to or able to justify how 
Hippias should work it out. I f there is a sound procedure to work it out from 
Hippias' point of view, that is left to discover. 
4. According to my method in practice, what interplay is going on? Hippias 
carmot object to Socrates' questions about Hippias' opinion about Homer's 
characterisation (364b3-c2) because Hippias boasted that he can answer any 
question about any subject (363c7-d4; 364a7-9; cf. 364d3-6). Whether or not 
Hippias clearly distinguishes achievement from disposition (365a l-b2), Hippias 
cannot object to Socrates' questions about a man who achieves deceit about 
subjects concerned (366e3-369b7), because Hippias suggested the idea (365d7-
8; 365el0-366al). Although Socrates let Homer go (365c8-365d5) and reftises 
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Hippias' offer to compete in interpreting Homer (369dl-2), Hippias cannot 
object to Socrates' reintroduction of interpreting Achilles' wish in Homer 
(370a2-d6) because Hippias offers to display his cleverness at interpreting 
Homer (369c2-8; 370e5). Hippias thinks Socrates is trying to induce him 
rhetorically to accept the preferability of wishingly to unwishingly unjust men 
when Socrates does not specify the criterion (371e7-8; 375dl-2; 376b4-6); but 
Hippias cannot object to Socrates' question because he boasted that he could 
answer any question (373c4-5; 365d5) and because he confiises cleverness at 
achieving injustice about a subject concerned with cleverness at the expertise in 
which unjust men do injustice. At the end of the dialogue, i f Hippias clearly 
distinguished his commitment to legal evaluation of an agent's wish to do 
injustice from his commitment to cleverness at achieving injustice about 
subjects concerned, and i f he exerted his mnemonic art for Socrates' artful 
interlacing of his questions, Hippias could take Socrates to have committed 
Hippias sophistically to (1) the proposition about a true man in relation to a talse 
man by asking about Hippias' expertise; (2) the transition from ability to actuality by 
asking, only passingly, whether a man good at anthmetic is true; (3) conftision 
between wis/mig wTong-goers as experts in a subject and wishing \vcom-doers 
occupied about any subject concerned. When Socrates questions the existence of a 
man who achieves injustice wishingly (376b5-6), he leaves open the possibilir.- that 
he questions not only the existence of wishing wrong-goers in specific subjects but 
also his own previous proposition that Achilles demotes telling the truth and 
successfiilly deceives Odysseus, and Flippias' aflSnmation that an expert falsifies 
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i f he wishes to. Therefore, while Socrates ascribes the provisional and reserved 
vaHdity of the preferability of wishifig wrong-goers to Hippias' previous affirm-
ation (376b8-cl), he allows the possibility that he questions the meaningfiikiess 
of Hippias' idea of achievement of falsity and injustice about subjects concerned. 
5. Is there any interpretation which explains inter-relatedly and consistently all 
the intertwined and paradoxical questions that Plato's Hippias Minor provokes 
in readers which I enumerated at the outset of the analysis (see pp. 27-29)? 
Since Hippias' response involves the inconsistency of his unanalysed beliefs, it 
would be irrelevant to give Hippias uniformity in his beliefs. However, my 
proposal in this work is this. Although Hippias would show publicly that he 
does not believe that doing injustice is doing justice, he allows the possibihty 
that justice alternates with injustice in the situation of conflicting norms. When 
Hippias allows the possibility that he admits the possibility' of achieving deceit 
about subjects concerned (367a8, cf •365a3, 365b2, 369c5, 372e3) and the 
ability to do so (365d7-8, 365el0-366al), and when Hippias allows the 
possibility that he admits the existence of a wishing wrongdoer (366e5-6, 
371e9-372a5), Socrates can develop his questioning about Hippias' unanalysed 
opinion about falsity and injustice as achievement. But i f Hippias has any reason 
for not objecting that reliable and consistent justice altemates with reliable and 
consistent injustice, it is probably because Hippias is ready to admit the idea that 
what people approve as virtue and what people reprove as vice, if interpreted as 
achievement of any describable end, are indistinguishable in respect of 
knowledge and ability. 
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